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Technical Textiles Market in the EU – Poland Emerges as the Fastest-growing Exporter

technical textiles textile

Technical Textiles Market in the EU – Poland Emerges as the Fastest-growing Exporter

IndexBox has just published a new report: ‘EU – Textile Products And Articles For Technical Uses – Market Analysis, Forecast, Size, Trends and Insights’. Here is a summary of the report’s key findings.

The revenue of the technical textiles market in the European Union amounted to $1.6B in 2018, stabilizing at the previous year. This figure reflects the total revenues of producers and importers (excluding logistics costs, retail marketing costs, and retailers’ margins, which will be included in the final consumer price).

Overall, technical textiles consumption continues to indicate a slight descent. The pace of growth was the most pronounced in 2016 when the market value increased by 6.6% year-to-year. Over the period under review, the technical textiles market attained its maximum level at $1.9B in 2007; however, from 2008 to 2018, consumption stood at a somewhat lower figure.

Consumption By Country in the EU

The countries with the highest volumes of technical textiles consumption in 2018 were the UK (19K tonnes), Germany (12K tonnes) and France (12K tonnes), together accounting for 36% of total consumption. These countries were followed by Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, the Czech Republic, Romania, Poland, Sweden, Belgium and Portugal, which together accounted for a further 47%.

From 2007 to 2018, the most notable rate of growth in terms of technical textiles consumption, amongst the main consuming countries, was attained by the Netherlands, while the other leaders experienced more modest paces of growth.

In value terms, the largest technical textiles markets in the European Union were Germany ($311M), France ($248M) and the UK ($170M), with a combined 47% share of the total market. Sweden, Italy, the Czech Republic, Romania, the Netherlands, Belgium, Poland, Spain and Portugal lagged somewhat behind, together comprising a further 27%.

The countries with the highest levels of technical textiles per capita consumption in 2018 were the Netherlands (582 kg per 1000 persons), the Czech Republic (536 kg per 1000 persons) and Sweden (415 kg per 1000 persons).

From 2007 to 2018, the most notable rate of growth in terms of technical textiles per capita consumption, amongst the main consuming countries, was attained by the Netherlands, while the other leaders experienced more modest paces of growth.

Market Forecast 2019-2025 in the EU

Driven by increasing demand for technical textiles in the European Union, the market is expected to continue an upward consumption trend over the next seven years. Market performance is forecast to decelerate, expanding with an anticipated CAGR of +0.2% for the seven-year period from 2018 to 2025, which is projected to bring the market volume to 121K tonnes by the end of 2025.

Production in the EU

In 2018, technical textiles production in the European Union stood at 140K tonnes, reducing by -3.2% against the previous year. The total output volume increased at an average annual rate of +1.9% over the period from 2007 to 2018; however, the trend pattern indicated some noticeable fluctuations being recorded in certain years. The growth pace was the most rapid in 2009 with an increase of 15% against the previous year. The volume of technical textiles production peaked at 161K tonnes in 2011; however, from 2012 to 2018, production remained at a lower figure.

In value terms, technical textiles production totaled $1.9B in 2018 estimated in export prices. Overall, technical textiles production, however, continues to indicate a mild deduction. The most prominent rate of growth was recorded in 2016 with an increase of 3.8% y-o-y. The level of technical textiles production peaked at $2.3B in 2007; however, from 2008 to 2018, production failed to regain its momentum.

Production By Country in the EU

The countries with the highest volumes of technical textiles production in 2018 were Germany (32K tonnes), Italy (18K tonnes) and the UK (15K tonnes), with a combined 47% share of total production. These countries were followed by the Netherlands, Spain, Belgium, France, the Czech Republic, Sweden, Poland, Hungary and Romania, which together accounted for a further 43%.

From 2007 to 2018, the most notable rate of growth in terms of technical textiles production, amongst the main producing countries, was attained by Romania, while the other leaders experienced more modest paces of growth.

Exports in the EU

In 2018, the amount of textile products and articles for technical uses exported in the European Union stood at 138K tonnes, declining by -5.6% against the previous year. The total export volume increased at an average annual rate of +1.5% over the period from 2007 to 2018; however, the trend pattern indicated some noticeable fluctuations being recorded in certain years. The pace of growth was the most pronounced in 2010 when exports increased by 30% year-to-year. The volume of exports peaked at 152K tonnes in 2011; however, from 2012 to 2018, exports remained at a lower figure.

In value terms, technical textiles exports amounted to $2.8B (IndexBox estimates) in 2018. In general, technical textiles exports, however, continue to indicate a relatively flat trend pattern. The pace of growth was the most pronounced in 2011 with an increase of 14% year-to-year. Over the period under review, technical textiles exports reached their peak figure at $2.9B in 2008; however, from 2009 to 2018, exports remained at a lower figure.

Exports by Country

Germany represented the major exporting country with an export of about 41K tonnes, which amounted to 30% of total exports. It was distantly followed by Italy (18K tonnes), the Netherlands (9.6K tonnes), Belgium (9.6K tonnes), Poland (8.4K tonnes), the Czech Republic (7K tonnes), Spain (6.9K tonnes) and France (6.5K tonnes), together mixing up a 48% share of total exports. The following exporters – the UK (5.8K tonnes), Sweden (4.2K tonnes), Austria (3.8K tonnes) and Slovakia (3K tonnes) – together made up 12% of total exports.

Exports from Germany increased at an average annual rate of +2.4% from 2007 to 2018. At the same time, Poland (+11.3%), the Czech Republic (+7.9%), Slovakia (+6.6%), the Netherlands (+5.5%) and Italy (+2.5%) displayed positive paces of growth. Moreover, Poland emerged as the fastest-growing exporter in the European Union, with a CAGR of +11.3% from 2007-2018. Sweden, France and Austria experienced a relatively flat trend pattern. By contrast, Belgium (-1.8%), Spain (-4.7%) and the UK (-5.7%) illustrated a downward trend over the same period. From 2007 to 2018, the share of Germany, Poland, Italy, the Netherlands and the Czech Republic increased by +6.7%, +4.2%, +3.1%, +3.1% and +2.9% percentage points, while Belgium (-1.6 p.p.), Spain (-3.5 p.p.) and the UK (-3.9 p.p.) saw their share reduced. The shares of the other countries remained relatively stable throughout the analyzed period.

In value terms, Germany ($1B) remains the largest technical textiles supplier in the European Union, comprising 37% of total technical textiles exports. The second position in the ranking was occupied by Italy ($297M), with a 10% share of total exports. It was followed by France, with a 5.9% share.

In Germany, technical textiles exports expanded at an average annual rate of +1.2% over the period from 2007-2018. The remaining exporting countries recorded the following average annual rates of exports growth: Italy (+1.1% per year) and France (-1.6% per year).

Export Prices by Country

The technical textiles export price in the European Union stood at $21 per kg in 2018, jumping by 12% against the previous year. Overall, the technical textiles export price, however, continues to indicate a slight downturn. The growth pace was the most rapid in 2018 when the export price increased by 12% year-to-year. Over the period under review, the export prices for textile products and articles for technical uses attained their peak figure at $23 per kg in 2008; however, from 2009 to 2018, export prices failed to regain their momentum.

There were significant differences in the average prices amongst the major exporting countries. In 2018, the country with the highest price was Austria ($36 per kg), while Spain ($13 per kg) was amongst the lowest.

From 2007 to 2018, the most notable rate of growth in terms of prices was attained by the Czech Republic, while the other leaders experienced more modest paces of growth.

Imports in the EU

In 2018, technical textiles imports in the European Union amounted to 116K tonnes, dropping by -2.9% against the previous year. The total import volume increased at an average annual rate of +1.0% from 2007 to 2018; the trend pattern remained relatively stable, with only minor fluctuations being observed in certain years. The growth pace was the most rapid in 2010 when imports increased by 19% y-o-y. The volume of imports peaked at 120K tonnes in 2016; however, from 2017 to 2018, imports stood at a somewhat lower figure.

In value terms, technical textiles imports totaled $2.1B (IndexBox estimates) in 2018. The total import value increased at an average annual rate of +1.2% over the period from 2007 to 2018; the trend pattern remained consistent, with somewhat noticeable fluctuations in certain years. The pace of growth was the most pronounced in 2011 with an increase of 16% y-o-y. Over the period under review, technical textiles imports reached their maximum in 2018 and are expected to retain its growth in the near future.

Imports by Country

In 2018, Germany (21K tonnes), distantly followed by Italy (12K tonnes), France (11K tonnes), the Netherlands (10K tonnes), the UK (9.1K tonnes), Poland (7.5K tonnes), the Czech Republic (5.7K tonnes) and Spain (5.4K tonnes) represented the major importers of textile products and articles for technical uses, together creating 70% of total imports. The following importers – Belgium (4.5K tonnes), Romania (3.9K tonnes), Austria (3.1K tonnes) and Sweden (3K tonnes) – together made up 12% of total imports.

From 2007 to 2018, the most notable rate of growth in terms of imports, amongst the main importing countries, was attained by the Netherlands, while the other leaders experienced more modest paces of growth.

In value terms, Germany ($497M) constitutes the largest market for imported textile products and articles for technical uses in the European Union, comprising 24% of total technical textiles imports. The second position in the ranking was occupied by France ($223M), with a 11% share of total imports. It was followed by the Netherlands, with a 8.9% share.

In Germany, technical textiles imports increased at an average annual rate of +1.3% over the period from 2007-2018. In the other countries, the average annual rates were as follows: France (+1.5% per year) and the Netherlands (+7.6% per year).

Import Prices by Country

The technical textiles import price in the European Union stood at $18 per kg in 2018, jumping by 9.9% against the previous year. Overall, the technical textiles import price continues to indicate a relatively flat trend pattern. The most prominent rate of growth was recorded in 2011 an increase of 15% year-to-year. The level of import price peaked in 2018 and is expected to retain its growth in the near future.

Prices varied noticeably by the country of destination; the country with the highest price was Germany ($24 per kg), while Romania ($11 per kg) was amongst the lowest.

From 2007 to 2018, the most notable rate of growth in terms of prices was attained by Romania, while the other leaders experienced more modest paces of growth.

Source: IndexBox AI Platform

grape

Global Dried Grapes Market 2019 – the UK is the Leading Import Market

IndexBox has just published a new report: ‘World – Dried Grapes – Market Analysis, Forecast, Size, Trends And Insights’. Here is a summary of the report’s key findings.

The global dried grapes market revenue amounted to $6B in 2018, going down by -3.5% against the previous year. This figure reflects the total revenues of producers and importers (excluding logistics costs, retail marketing costs, and retailers’ margins, which will be included in the final consumer price). The market value increased at an average annual rate of +3.3% from 2007 to 2018; the trend pattern indicated some noticeable fluctuations being recorded throughout the analyzed period. The growth pace was the most rapid in 2010 when the market value increased by 15% y-o-y. The global dried grapes consumption peaked at $6.7B in 2014; however, from 2015 to 2018, consumption stood at a somewhat lower figure.

Consumption By Country

China (512K tonnes) constituted the country with the largest volume of dried grapes consumption, comprising approx. 18% of total consumption. Moreover, dried grapes consumption in China exceeded the figures recorded by the world’s second-largest consumer, India (208K tonnes), twofold. The U.S. (160K tonnes) ranked third in terms of total consumption with a 5.6% share.

From 2007 to 2018, the average annual rate of growth in terms of volume in China stood at +6.6%. The remaining consuming countries recorded the following average annual rates of consumption growth: India (+8.1% per year) and the U.S. (-5.4% per year).

In value terms, China ($896M), the U.S. ($454M) and India ($444M) were the countries with the highest levels of market value in 2018, with a combined 30% share of the global market.

The countries with the highest levels of dried grapes per capita consumption in 2018 were the UK (1,470 kg per 1000 persons), Germany (831 kg per 1000 persons) and Japan (825 kg per 1000 persons).

From 2007 to 2018, the most notable rate of growth in terms of dried grapes per capita consumption, amongst the main consuming countries, was attained by India, while the other global leaders experienced more modest paces of growth.

Market Forecast 2019-2025

Driven by increasing demand for dried grapes worldwide, the market is expected to continue an upward consumption trend over the next seven-year period. Market performance is forecast to retain its current trend pattern, expanding with an anticipated CAGR of +0.1% for the seven-year period from 2018 to 2025, which is projected to bring the market volume to 3M tonnes by the end of 2025.

Production 2007-2018

In 2018, approx. 2.9M tonnes of dried grapes were produced worldwide; lowering by -5.8% against the previous year. Over the period under review, dried grapes production, however, continues to indicate a relatively flat trend pattern. The growth pace was the most rapid in 2013 when production volume increased by 8.7% y-o-y. The global dried grapes production peaked at 3.2M tonnes in 2016; however, from 2017 to 2018, production remained at a lower figure.

In value terms, dried grapes production stood at $7.1B in 2018 estimated in export prices. The total output value increased at an average annual rate of +3.5% over the period from 2007 to 2018; the trend pattern indicated some noticeable fluctuations being recorded over the period under review. The most prominent rate of growth was recorded in 2013 when production volume increased by 12% against the previous year. The global dried grapes production peaked at $7.3B in 2016; however, from 2017 to 2018, production stood at a somewhat lower figure.

Production By Country

The countries with the highest volumes of dried grapes production in 2018 were China (516K tonnes), Turkey (285K tonnes) and India (230K tonnes), with a combined 36% share of global production.

From 2007 to 2018, the most notable rate of growth in terms of dried grapes production, amongst the main producing countries, was attained by India, while the other global leaders experienced more modest paces of growth.

Exports 2007-2018

In 2018, the amount of dried grapes exported worldwide amounted to 773K tonnes, falling by -4.7% against the previous year. Over the period under review, dried grapes exports continue to indicate a relatively flat trend pattern. The growth pace was the most rapid in 2010 when exports increased by 3.5% y-o-y. Over the period under review, global dried grapes exports attained their maximum at 848K tonnes in 2007; however, from 2008 to 2018, exports failed to regain their momentum.

In value terms, dried grapes exports amounted to $1.7B (IndexBox estimates) in 2018. The total export value increased at an average annual rate of +3.6% from 2007 to 2018; the trend pattern indicated some noticeable fluctuations being recorded over the period under review. The pace of growth appeared the most rapid in 2010 with an increase of 30% year-to-year. Over the period under review, global dried grapes exports reached their peak figure at $2B in 2011; however, from 2012 to 2018, exports stood at a somewhat lower figure.

Exports by Country

Turkey represented the key exporter of dried grapes in the world, with the volume of exports reaching 279K tonnes, which was near 36% of total exports in 2018. The U.S. (85K tonnes) occupied the second position in the ranking, followed by Chile (63K tonnes), South Africa (61K tonnes), Uzbekistan (43K tonnes), Iran (42K tonnes) and Argentina (41K tonnes). All these countries together took approx. 43% share of total exports. Afghanistan (26K tonnes), India (23K tonnes), Greece (17K tonnes), China (17K tonnes) and the Netherlands (13K tonnes) followed a long way behind the leaders.

Exports from Turkey increased at an average annual rate of +1.4% from 2007 to 2018. At the same time, Afghanistan (+4.7%), South Africa (+3.7%), India (+3.6%), Argentina (+3.3%) and Uzbekistan (+3.1%) displayed positive paces of growth. Moreover, Afghanistan emerged as the fastest-growing exporter in the world, with a CAGR of +4.7% from 2007-2018. The Netherlands and Chile experienced a relatively flat trend pattern. By contrast, Greece (-2.8%), the U.S. (-3.2%), China (-3.6%) and Iran (-11.4%) illustrated a downward trend over the same period. From 2007 to 2018, the share of Turkey, South Africa, Argentina and Uzbekistan increased by +5%, +2.6%, +1.6% and +1.6% percentage points, while the U.S. (-4.7 p.p.) and Iran (-15.2 p.p.) saw their share reduced. The shares of the other countries remained relatively stable throughout the analyzed period.

In value terms, Turkey ($490M), the U.S. ($284M) and Chile ($156M) were the countries with the highest levels of exports in 2018, with a combined 56% share of global exports. These countries were followed by South Africa, Afghanistan, Argentina, Iran, Uzbekistan, Greece, India, the Netherlands and China, which together accounted for a further 36%.

Afghanistan recorded the highest rates of growth with regard to exports, among the main exporting countries over the last eleven years, while the other global leaders experienced more modest paces of growth.

Export Prices by Country

In 2018, the average dried grapes export price amounted to $2,145 per tonne, increasing by 17% against the previous year. In general, the export price indicated a resilient increase from 2007 to 2018: its price increased at an average annual rate of +4.5% over the last eleven-year period. The trend pattern, however, indicated some noticeable fluctuations being recorded throughout the analyzed period. The growth pace was the most rapid in 2008 an increase of 26% year-to-year. Over the period under review, the average export prices for dried grapes attained their maximum at $2,351 per tonne in 2011; however, from 2012 to 2018, export prices failed to regain their momentum.

Prices varied noticeably by the country of origin; the country with the highest price was Afghanistan ($3,794 per tonne), while Uzbekistan ($1,236 per tonne) was amongst the lowest.

From 2007 to 2018, the most notable rate of growth in terms of prices was attained by Afghanistan, while the other global leaders experienced more modest paces of growth.

Imports 2007-2018

Global imports stood at 744K tonnes in 2018, declining by -5.9% against the previous year. Overall, dried grapes imports, however, continue to indicate a relatively flat trend pattern. The growth pace was the most rapid in 2010 with an increase of 8.2% against the previous year. The global imports peaked at 851K tonnes in 2016; however, from 2017 to 2018, imports remained at a lower figure.

In value terms, dried grapes imports stood at $1.6B (IndexBox estimates) in 2018. The total import value increased at an average annual rate of +3.2% over the period from 2007 to 2018; the trend pattern indicated some noticeable fluctuations being recorded throughout the analyzed period. The most prominent rate of growth was recorded in 2010 with an increase of 27% y-o-y. The global imports peaked at $1.8B in 2013; however, from 2014 to 2018, imports stood at a somewhat lower figure.

Imports by Country

The UK (99K tonnes), Germany (77K tonnes) and the Netherlands (55K tonnes) represented roughly 31% of total imports of dried grapes in 2018. It was distantly followed by Japan (35K tonnes), mixing up a 4.8% share of total imports. Kazakhstan (29K tonnes), France (26K tonnes), Brazil (26K tonnes), Russia (24K tonnes), Canada (24K tonnes), Belgium (22K tonnes), Italy (21K tonnes) and Australia (18K tonnes) followed a long way behind the leaders.

From 2007 to 2018, the most notable rate of growth in terms of imports, amongst the main importing countries, was attained by Kazakhstan, while the other global leaders experienced more modest paces of growth.

In value terms, the largest dried grapes importing markets worldwide were the UK ($199M), Germany ($163M) and Japan ($116M), together accounting for 31% of global imports. The Netherlands, Canada, France, Brazil, Italy, Russia, Australia, Belgium and Kazakhstan lagged somewhat behind, together comprising a further 29%.

In terms of the main importing countries, Kazakhstan recorded the highest growth rate of imports, over the last eleven-year period, while the other global leaders experienced more modest paces of growth.

Import Prices by Country

The average dried grapes import price stood at $2,094 per tonne in 2018, growing by 15% against the previous year. Over the last eleven-year period, it increased at an average annual rate of +3.1%. The pace of growth was the most pronounced in 2008 when the average import price increased by 23% y-o-y. The global import price peaked at $2,390 per tonne in 2012; however, from 2013 to 2018, import prices stood at a somewhat lower figure.

Prices varied noticeably by the country of destination; the country with the highest price was Japan ($3,274 per tonne), while Kazakhstan ($592 per tonne) was amongst the lowest.

From 2007 to 2018, the most notable rate of growth in terms of prices was attained by Japan, while the other global leaders experienced more modest paces of growth.

Source: IndexBox AI Platform

meat

Global Duck And Goose Meat Market to Keep Growing, Driven by Strong Demand in Asia

IndexBox has just published a new report: ‘World – Duck And Goose Meat – Market Analysis, Forecast, Size, Trends and Insights’. Here is a summary of the report’s key findings.

The global duck and goose meat market revenue amounted to $19B in 2018. This figure reflects the total revenues of producers and importers (excluding logistics costs, retail marketing costs, and retailers’ margins, which will be included in the final consumer price).

The market value increased at an average annual rate of +2.1% over the period from 2007 to 2018; the trend pattern indicated some noticeable fluctuations being recorded throughout the analyzed period.

The most prominent rate of growth was recorded in 2011 when the market value increased by 13% y-o-y. The global duck and goose meat consumption peaked at $21.9B in 2014; however, from 2015 to 2018, consumption stood at a somewhat lower figure.

Consumption By Country

China (5.5M tonnes) remains the largest duck and goose meat consuming country worldwide, accounting for 76% of total consumption. Moreover, duck and goose meat consumption in China exceeded the figures recorded by the world’s second-largest consumer, France (203K tonnes), more than tenfold. The third position in this ranking was occupied by Myanmar (174K tonnes), with a 2.4% share.

In China, duck and goose meat consumption increased at an average annual rate of +2.2% over the period from 2007-2018. The remaining consuming countries recorded the following average annual rates of consumption growth: France (-2.4% per year) and Myanmar (+7.4% per year).

In value terms, China ($10.5B) led the market, alone. The second position in the ranking was occupied by France ($1.3B). It was followed by Myanmar.

The countries with the highest levels of duck and goose meat per capita consumption in 2018 were Taiwan, Chinese (6,116 kg per 1000 persons), China (3,771 kg per 1000 persons) and Myanmar (3,231 kg per 1000 persons).

From 2007 to 2018, the most notable rate of growth in terms of duck and goose meat per capita consumption, amongst the main consuming countries, was attained by Myanmar, while the other global leaders experienced more modest paces of growth.

Market Forecast 2019-2025

Driven by increasing demand for duck and goose meat worldwide, the market is expected to continue an upward consumption trend over the next seven years. Market performance is forecast to retain its current trend pattern, expanding with an anticipated CAGR of +1.6% for the seven-year period from 2018 to 2025, which is projected to bring the market volume to 8M tonnes by the end of 2025.

Production 2007-2018

In 2018, the global duck and goose meat production amounted to 7.2M tonnes, surging by 3.3% against the previous year. The total output volume increased at an average annual rate of +1.8% over the period from 2007 to 2018; the trend pattern remained relatively stable, with somewhat noticeable fluctuations throughout the analyzed period. The most prominent rate of growth was recorded in 2012 with an increase of 4.1% y-o-y.

Over the period under review, global duck and goose meat production attained its maximum volume in 2018 and is expected to retain its growth in the immediate term. The general positive trend in terms of duck and goose meat output was largely conditioned by a slight increase of the number of producing animals and a relatively flat trend pattern in yield figures.

Production By Country

The country with the largest volume of duck and goose meat production was China (5.5M tonnes), accounting for 76% of total production. Moreover, duck and goose meat production in China exceeded the figures recorded by the world’s second-largest producer, France (233K tonnes), more than tenfold. Myanmar (174K tonnes) ranked third in terms of total production with a 2.4% share.

From 2007 to 2018, the average annual growth rate of volume in China stood at +2.2%. The remaining producing countries recorded the following average annual rates of production growth: France (-2.1% per year) and Myanmar (+7.4% per year).

Producing Animals 2007-2018

In 2018, approx. 3.8M heads of ducks and gooses were slaughtered worldwide; jumping by 2.3% against the previous year. This number increased at an average annual rate of +2.0% from 2007 to 2018; the trend pattern remained consistent, with only minor fluctuations being recorded throughout the analyzed period. The growth pace was the most rapid in 2008 when the number of producing animals increased by 5% year-to-year.

Yield 2007-2018

In 2018, the global average yield of duck and goose meat production amounted to 1.9 tonne per head, therefore, remained relatively stable against the previous year. Over the period under review, the yield, however, continues to indicate a relatively flat trend pattern. The growth pace was the most rapid in 2013 with an increase of 2.3% y-o-y. In that year, the average duck and goose meat yield attained its peak level of 2 tonne per head. From 2014 to 2018, the growth of the average yield remained at a somewhat lower figure.

Exports 2007-2018

In 2018, the amount of duck and goose meat exported worldwide stood at 306K tonnes. The total export volume increased at an average annual rate of +2.0% over the period from 2007 to 2018; the trend pattern remained consistent, with only minor fluctuations throughout the analyzed period. The most prominent rate of growth was recorded in 2018 with an increase of 18% year-to-year. In that year, global duck and goose meat exports reached their peak and are likely to continue its growth in the immediate term.

In value terms, duck and goose meat exports totaled $1.3B (IndexBox estimates) in 2018. The total export value increased at an average annual rate of +1.3% over the period from 2007 to 2018; the trend pattern remained relatively stable, with somewhat noticeable fluctuations being recorded over the period under review. The pace of growth appeared the most rapid in 2011 with an increase of 21% y-o-y. In that year, global duck and goose meat exports reached their peak of $1.3B. From 2012 to 2018, the growth of global duck and goose meat exports remained at a somewhat lower figure.

Exports by Country

In 2018, Hungary (60K tonnes), China, Hong Kong SAR (55K tonnes), France (48K tonnes), Poland (40K tonnes) and China (35K tonnes) represented the key exporters of duck and goose meat in the world, generating 78% of total export. Bulgaria (13K tonnes), the Netherlands (10K tonnes), Germany (8.5K tonnes), the UK (5.8K tonnes) and Thailand (5.1K tonnes) followed a long way behind the leaders.

From 2007 to 2018, the most notable rate of growth in terms of exports, amongst the main exporting countries, was attained by China, Hong Kong SAR, while the other global leaders experienced more modest paces of growth.

In value terms, the largest duck and goose meat markets worldwide were Hungary ($309M), France ($307M) and Poland ($161M), together accounting for 61% of global exports. China, Hong Kong SAR, Bulgaria, China, the Netherlands, Germany, Thailand and the UK lagged somewhat behind, together comprising a further 30%.

China, Hong Kong SAR recorded the highest rates of growth with regard to exports, in terms of the main exporting countries over the last eleven-year period, while the other global leaders experienced more modest paces of growth.

Export Prices by Country

In 2018, the average duck and goose meat export price amounted to $4,173 per tonne, waning by -4.1% against the previous year. Over the period under review, the duck and goose meat export price continues to indicate a relatively flat trend pattern. The most prominent rate of growth was recorded in 2011 when the average export price increased by 19% against the previous year. In that year, the average export prices for duck and goose meat attained their peak level of $4,972 per tonne. From 2012 to 2018, the growth in terms of the average export prices for duck and goose meat remained at a lower figure.

Prices varied noticeably by the country of origin; the country with the highest price was Bulgaria ($8,089 per tonne), while China ($1,886 per tonne) was amongst the lowest.

From 2007 to 2018, the most notable rate of growth in terms of prices was attained by Thailand, while the other global leaders experienced more modest paces of growth.

Imports 2007-2018

In 2018, approx. 269K tonnes of duck and goose meat were imported worldwide. In general, duck and goose meat imports, however, continue to indicate a relatively flat trend pattern. The most prominent rate of growth was recorded in 2013 with an increase of 12% y-o-y. Over the period under review, global duck and goose meat imports reached their peak figure at 295K tonnes in 2017, and then declined slightly in the following year.

In value terms, duck and goose meat imports totaled $1.1B (IndexBox estimates) in 2018. In general, duck and goose meat imports, however, continue to indicate a relatively flat trend pattern. The pace of growth was the most pronounced in 2011 with an increase of 21% year-to-year. In that year, global duck and goose meat imports attained their peak of $1.4B. From 2012 to 2018, the growth of global duck and goose meat imports failed to regain its momentum.

Imports by Country

Germany (64K tonnes) and Taiwan, Chinese (53K tonnes) represented roughly 43% of total imports of duck and goose meat in 2018. France (19K tonnes) occupied the next position in the ranking, followed by the UK (14K tonnes). All these countries together held approx. 12% share of total imports. The following importers – Spain (9.6K tonnes), China, Hong Kong SAR (9.4K tonnes), Denmark (7.1K tonnes), the Netherlands (7.1K tonnes), Belgium (7.1K tonnes), Japan (5.8K tonnes), Viet Nam (5.3K tonnes) and the Czech Republic (4.7K tonnes) – together made up 21% of total imports.

From 2007 to 2018, the most notable rate of growth in terms of imports, amongst the main importing countries, was attained by Taiwan, Chinese (+84.5% per year), while the other global leaders experienced more modest paces of growth.

In value terms, Germany ($302M) constitutes the largest market for imported duck and goose meat worldwide, comprising 27% of global imports. The second position in the ranking was occupied by France ($127M), with a 11% share of global imports. It was followed by Taiwan, Chinese, with a 8.6% share.

In Germany, duck and goose meat imports plunged by an average annual rate of -1.1% over the period from 2007-2018. The remaining importing countries recorded the following average annual rates of imports growth: France (-0.1% per year) and Taiwan, Chinese (+66.1% per year).

Import Prices by Country

In 2018, the average duck and goose meat import price amounted to $4,185 per tonne, increasing by 2.1% against the previous year. Over the period under review, the duck and goose meat import price, however, continues to indicate a relatively flat trend pattern. The pace of growth was the most pronounced in 2011 an increase of 14% against the previous year. In that year, the average import prices for duck and goose meat reached their peak level of $4,803 per tonne. From 2012 to 2018, the growth in terms of the average import prices for duck and goose meat remained at a lower figure.

There were significant differences in the average prices amongst the major importing countries. In 2018, the country with the highest price was Belgium ($8,398 per tonne), while Taiwan, Chinese ($1,839 per tonne) was amongst the lowest.

From 2007 to 2018, the most notable rate of growth in terms of prices was attained by China, Hong Kong SAR, while the other global leaders experienced more modest paces of growth.

Source: IndexBox AI Platform

USMCA

How a Footnote in the USMCA Undermines Economic Liberty

House Democrats are holding up ratification of the U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) until U.S. Trade Representative Robert Lighthizer agrees to make some changes. While a number of the big concerns about the new NAFTA, such as enforcement, biologic drugs, and the implementation of Mexico’s labor laws have received a lot of attention, there is another issue that has flown under the radar, perhaps in part because it’s buried in a footnote.

Chapter 7 of the USMCA, “Customs Administration and Trade Facilitation,” includes a section on “Express Shipments.” These are goods of low or negligible value that are shipped by courier or express mail services in large volume. Think about that pair of shoes you just ordered from France. That’s an express shipment.

Because there are so many of these packages coming through customs facilities, and it’s such a burden to process them, most countries have what is called a de minimis threshold, that is a set value below which imported goods are both sales tax and duty free. The United States has the highest de minimis threshold in the world, allowing individuals and businesses to make purchases from abroad up to $800 with no duty or tax collected by customs.

As Gary Hufbauer, Euijin Jung, and Lucy Lu explain, high de minimis thresholds are not only good for consumers, who do not have to deal with the complexity and time delays in processing customs duties and sales tax on the things they buy, but also for small businesses, because of the importance of intermediate inputs, as well as cross-border sales for their profits.

As part of the USMCA, Canada and Mexico both raised their de minimis thresholds, which not only helps small businesses in the United States but also consumers in both countries as well. Canada raised its de minimis threshold to $150 CAD from its original $20 CAD limit, and sales tax cannot be collected until the value of the product reaches at least $40 CAD. Mexico increased its de minimis from $50 USD to $100 USD, with tax free de minimis on $50 USD.

While the U.S. did not alter its de minimis threshold in USMCA, there is a curious footnote in Chapter 7 that should be cause for concern. It reads:

Notwithstanding the amounts set out under this subparagraph, a Party may impose a reciprocal amount that is lower for shipments from another Party if the amount provided for under that other Party’s law is lower than that of the Party.

Now we are all well aware of this administration’s distorted concept of reciprocity, and they seem to be applying it here as well. What this footnote suggests is that the U.S. could potentially lower its de minimis threshold to match what Canada or Mexico have agreed to. To put this in perspective, in 2016, the United States increased its de minimis level to $800 from $200. This footnote would allow the de minimis to drop even below the 2016 limit. This is not only an attack on economic liberty for American citizens, but it would be an enormous step backward on a policy where the United States has been a leader for liberalization.

Back in June, Robert Lighthizer was directly asked about this footnote by multiple members of the House Ways and Means Committee during a hearing on the 2019 trade policy agenda. While a number of excellent questions were raised, I highlight two below. First, Rep. David Schweikert (R-AZ), noting bipartisan support for the current de minimis threshold, stated:

In 2016, Congress raised the U.S. de minimis threshold to $800 in the bipartisan Trade Facilitation and Trade Enforcement Act. This change enjoys wide bipartisan support in Congress and throughout the e-commerce landscape. The current threshold benefits millions of American small businesses, across all sectors, including manufacturers, who rely on low-value inputs for the production of U.S. exports. As a result, American small businesses now enjoy more rapid border clearance, reduced complexities and red tape, and lower logistics costs, while American consumers benefit through faster, less expensive access to a wider range of goods.

Given the benefits of the current de minimis threshold to American small businesses and the U.S. economy as a whole, and that Congress legislated on the U.S. de minimis level only a few years ago, I remain extremely concerned over the Draft Statement of Administrative Action (SAA) on the U.S.- Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) transmitted to Congress on May 30. This draft SAA includes language suggesting that you may seek changes to the U.S. de minimisthreshold through the USMCA implementing bill. As you know, last December, Rep. Kind and I led a bipartisan letter urging you not to seek to lower the U.S. de minimis threshold. My position has not changed.

I strongly oppose including any language in the USMCA implementing bill that would lower the U.S. de minimis level or that would delegate this authority to the Executive Branch. As you work with Congress to finalize the USMCA implementing legislation, will you commit to not seeking authority to lower the U.S. de minimis threshold?

Rep. Daniel Kildee (D-MI) also emphasized how this change would undermine Congress’s authority to regulate commerce:

In 2016, Congress raised the U.S. de minimis threshold to $800 in the bipartisan Trade Facilitation and Trade Enforcement Act. The current threshold benefits millions of American small businesses, across all sectors, including manufacturers, who rely on low-value inputs for the production of U.S. exports. As a result, American small businesses now enjoy more rapid border clearance, reduced complexities and red tape, and lower logistics costs, while American consumers benefit through faster, less expensive access to a wider range of goods.

Given the benefits of the current de minimis threshold to American small businesses and the U.S. economy as a whole, I was curious to see the Draft Statement of Administrative Action on the U.S. Mexico Canada (USMCA) includes language that you may seek authority for the Executive Branch to set U.S. de minimis thresholds. Congress must maintain its Constitutional authority to set tariffs – including de minimis thresholds.

As you work with Congress to finalize the USMCA implementing legislation, can you commit not to seek the derogation or authority to derogate from the current U.S. de minimis threshold?

Amb. Lighthizer’s comments to all questions on the de minimis threshold remained the same:

As noted in the Administration’s submission to Congress on changes to existing law and the draft Statement of Administrative Action, we identified this as an issue for consultation with the Committee on Ways and Means of the House and the Committee on Finance of the Senate. These consultations are underway. I look forward to continuing those conversations with you and other Members on this important issue.

Congress should continue to press the administration for the removal of this footnote from the USMCA. It may seem like a small part of the broader USMCA debate, but Congress should not be fooled. This is representative of the broader attempts by the executive branch under this administration to expand its power into areas where the Constitution gives Congress express authority. Congress should not give up its authority to regulate foreign commerce, and should actively push to rein in the abuses of the executive in trade policy. By pushing for this on de minimis, we can get one step closer to ensuring that the Trump administration’s trade policy remains as its own small footnote in the history of U.S. trade policy.

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Inu Manak is a visiting scholar at the Cato Institute’s Herbert A. Stiefel Center for Trade Policy Studies.

Understanding Saudi Arabia’s New Import Certification Scheme

Global businesses exporting to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia will soon have some relief from the burdensome export documentation required by the country’s customs agency, and will soon be able to lean more on their import partners to acquire and complete mandatory certificates. 

Saudi Arabia is in the process of implementing changes to the decades-old process for certifying consumer goods imported into the country.

The Saudi Standards, Metrology and Quality Organization (SASO) oversees the system for the development of standards applicable within Saudi Arabia. All imported consumer goods must be accompanied by a Certificate of Conformity establishing compliance with SASO standards and specifications, or the consignment is subjected to laboratory testing to verify conformity with SASO standards before clearing customs at import.

This means that businesses intending to export goods to Saudi Arabia must obtain a Certificate of Conformity for each shipment bound for Saudi Arabia. The certificates are usually issued by bodies accredited by SASO or an accredited laboratory. Accreditation bodies certified by members of the International Accreditation Forum (IAF) are also eligible to issue conformity certificates.

Most exporters to Saudi Arabia as well as traders in Saudi Arabia have long lived with the pain of the time-consuming process of obtaining a certificate of conformity for each shipment bound for Saudi Arabia. Once goods were ready for export, and invoices raised, exporters had to engage the services of an approved body to obtain a certificate of conformity before the shipment could leave for Saudi Arabia. This requirement, when combined with the requirements of attestation and legalisation of invoices and certificates of origin, led to a situation where considerable levels of inventory were being held immobile within the supply chain even after goods were ready for shipping with resulting undesirable increases to business in working capital requirements. Businesses have not shied away from referring to these process bottle necks as non-tariff barriers to trade.

The system is now bound for changes, albeit of an incremental nature.

SALEEM, the new certification scheme is expected to replace the Saudi Conformity Assessment program. It will operate through SASO’s newly implemented electronic, online service called SABER which has been created to streamline certification for imports into Saudi Arabia.

The scheme provides two types of certification. The first type is a certificate of conformity called the Product Certificate of Conformity (Product CoC). This certificate will be issued by registered certification bodies upon successful completion of tests and verifications of a product and will be valid for three years. The certificate confirms that a product complies with the technical standards and specifications issued by SASO.

The second type of certificate of conformity is called the Shipment Certificate of Conformity (Shipment CoC). This will be issued for each shipment, is valid only for that shipment, and is very much like the current certification scheme. This certificate confirms that all products within a shipment hold a valid Product Certificate of Conformity. Both the Product CoC and the Shipment CoC are mandatory before a shipment can be cleared for import into Saudi Arabia.

The main difference between the certification systems is that the certification required prior to import can be obtained online by the importer based inside the country. Importers will be connected through the SABER system to conformity assessment bodies and will be able to request and obtain Product CoCs through the system. 

Once shipments are ready for export, importers can use the system to request and obtain Shipment CoCs online from certifying bodies. It is expected that Shipment CoCs will be issued within a very short time for products that hold a Product CoC. Online availability of Product and Shipment CoCs is therefore expected to shorten the time lines required for import clearance.

Although it was announced that conformity certification through the SABER system would be mandatory for the import of all consumer products after its introduction in January 2019, news reports suggest implementation has only been partially successful. Use of the system for obtaining conformity certificates is currently voluntary for most products, and conformity certificates under the old regime continue to be issued and used for import into Saudi Arabia. 

Only a few product groups such as gas appliances and accessories, toys, low-voltage electrical equipment, and lubricating oils currently require mandatory certification through SABER. 

Authorities are encouraging the use of the system by prioritizing the clearance of those imports holding conformity certificates issued through the SABER system. There have also been reports of linking the SABER system to FASAH, an Electronic Data Interchange (EDI) System that will be used to exchange data electronically between Saudi Customs, ports, airports and private and public operators. Such a linkage can further enhance the efficiency of processing of imports into Saudi Arabia.

Businesses are hopeful that although it has been a slow start for the SALEEM certification scheme and the SABER system, a full implementation will eventually reduce the timelines required to import goods into Saudi Arabia, and consequently, the working capital requirements for businesses trading with, and within Saudi Arabia.  

 

JC Pachakkil is a senior consultant in Global Trade Management at customs broker and trade services firm Livingston International.

paper

BLOCKCHAIN COULD REPLACE MOUNDS OF PAPER AT THE BORDER

This is the third in a three-part series by Christine McDaniel for TradeVistas on how blockchain technologies will play an increasing role in international trade.

What’s Even Better Than No Tariffs?

Smoother and faster customs procedures could boost global trade volumes and economic output even more than if governments were to eliminate the remaining tariffs throughout the world – up to six times according to an estimate by the World Bank.

Blockchain is a promising technology that, if widely adopted by shippers and customs agencies, could reduce the current mounds of paperwork and costs associated with import and export licenses, cargo and shipping documents, and customs declarations.

Below the Snazzy Surface of Trade Policy

Trade agreements work when the people who want to buy and sell across borders can use them. Engaging in international trade transactions requires diving into the rules and regulations of international customs processes. Businesses either have someone in-house to handle this or they hire companies whose business it is to manage these processes.

Moving goods through the customs process means preparing the relevant paperwork for import or export at each step in the process. The paperwork at each step must be confirmed and verified, sometimes separately by different people. These procedures — in rich and poor countries alike — can be complex, opaque and laden with inefficiencies that raise costs and cause delays at best. At worst, less automated processes can leave the door open to corruption and security breaches.

paperwork in shipping

Trade policymakers have increasingly focused on simplifying and modernizing customs procedures — a policy approach commonly known as “trade facilitation.” Nearly all modern free trade agreements have a trade facilitation chapter and the World Trade Organization has an entire Trade Facilitation Agreement devoted to eliminating red tape at national borders to streamline the global movement of goods.

Too Much Paperwork

The international shipping industry carries 90 percent of the world’s trade in goods but is surprisingly dependent on paper documentation. In a New York Times article, Danish shipping company Maersk commented that tracking containers is straightforward. It’s the “mountains of paperwork that go with each container” that slow down the process.

A shipping container can spend significant time just waiting for someone to cross the t’s and dot the i’s on the paperwork. Delays pose real costs to traders and represent a deadweight loss of resources that could have been spent elsewhere in a more productive manner. The cost of handling documentation is so high that it can be even more expensive than the cost of transporting the actual shipping containers.

Beginning in 2014, Maersk began tracking specific goods such as avocados and cut flowers to determine the true weight of compliance costs and intermediation. The company discovered that a single container moving from Africa to Europe required nearly 200 communications and the verification and approval of more than 30 organizations involved in customs, tax and health-related matters. Maersk’s office in Kenya has storage rooms filled from floor to ceiling with paper records dating back to 2014.

single container paperwork v2

Lost Opportunities

Inefficiencies in customs processes create chain reactions, extending the costs and inefficiencies throughout the transportation industry and all the way to the consumer. In just one example, as many as 1,500 trucks might be lined up on a given day on both sides of the critical border crossing between Bangladesh and India. Many trucks wait up to five days before crossing. Examples like this are not hard to find in developing countries.

Delays for perishable items are painfully costly for traders, but also for consumers. Economist Lan Liu and economist and horticultural scientist Chengyan Yue examinedlettuce and apple imports in 183 countries. They determined that reducing delays from two days to one would increase lettuce imports in those countries by around 35 percent, or an additional 504,714 tons of lettuce, increasing in world consumer welfare by $2.1 billion. The same improvement would increase apple imports by 15 percent, enabling shipment of an additional 731,937 tons and increasing consumer welfare by around $1.1 billion.

Complexity Makes Corruption Easier

Fraud constitutes a major threat to the customs process. Fraudulent behavior can involve the forgery of bills of lading and other export documentation such as certifications of origin. A fraudulent shipper could claim “lost” goods, underreport the cargo, and steal the difference. Or a shipper could misrepresent the amount or quality of shipped goods and pay less than the required amount for their imports.

Fraud can be perpetrated by a shipper, by the receiver of goods, a customs official, or an interloping third party. The greater the complexity of customs procedures and the more discretion granted to customs officials, the more likely corruption will be present at the border, creating both risk and costs for companies working to avoid corruption.

Indeed, corruption acts as a “hidden tariff” for companies and reduces legitimate customs revenue for governments. The World Customs Organization estimates the loss of revenue caused by customs-related corruption to be at least $2 billion.

Blockchain Makes Corruption Harder

Blockchain is a digital distributed ledger that is secure by design. Each transaction in the shipping process is uploaded to the chain if (and only if) it is agreed upon by the other users. It is nearly impossible to make a fraudulent claim or edit past transactions without the approval of the other users in the network.

Blockchain could discourage corruption by simplifying procedures and reducing the number of government offices and officials involved in each transaction. Each transaction can also be audited in real time, allowing users to see exactly when and where disputes arise and exactly what the discrepancies are.

This level of transparency enables participants in the network to hold each other accountable for mistakes or purposeful deception. Though blockchain does not prevent false information from being entered into the system, it does reduce opportunities for the original information to be corrupted by intermediaries involved in the shipping process. Rather than parties relying on the good faith of shippers and customs agents, blockchain greater assurance of the integrity of each transactional record.

Blockchain technology in customs and border-crossing procedures could also be used to prevent circumvention and transshipment—that is, when shippers send goods to a neighboring country before the destination country in an attempt to avoid tariffs on goods from the real country of origin. The importer ends up liable for duties and penalties. (For example, some exporters from China are now sending finished products through Vietnam to avoid new U.S. tariffs on goods from China.)

All In on Blockchain?

The use of blockchain in customs processing is still nascent. An advisory group for U.S. Customs and Border Protection is broadly exploring the role of emerging technologies like blockchain.

IBM and Maersk have partnered to demonstrate how blockchain can simplify shipping. Their plan would allow all parties involved in a container’s shipment to observe and track the container from inception to endpoint. For example, after a customs agent verifies the contents of a container, they can immediately upload information to the blockchain with a unique digital fingerprint that visible to all other users. The ease of access to information throughout the blockchain system reduces time-consuming correspondence among the parties.

For all this to work, customs agencies, shippers and suppliers will have to cooperate to integrate blockchain technology along the supply chain and across borders. By reducing time and cost, blockchain could be a boon to the majority of honest global shippers. By providing greater accuracy and transparency, blockchain would be a bust for dishonest brokers who manipulate the current inefficiencies in customs procedures to commit fraud or gain from corruption.

ChristineMcDaniel

Christine McDaniel a former senior economist with the White House Council of Economic Advisers and deputy assistant Treasury secretary for economic policy, is a senior research fellow with the Mercatus Center at George Mason University.

 

This article originally appeared on TradeVistas.org. Republished with permission.

Amid the US-China Trade War, Vietnam Emerging as a Rising Star

As the US-China trade war continues to escalate with no relief in sight, American businesses are scrambling to find solutions to avoid the hard swallowing 25% tariffs on imported Chinese goods. One silver lining from the protracted conflict is China’s neighbor to the south and, at one time, one of America’s staunchest enemies, Vietnam. War-torn and poverty stricken merely 4 decades ago, this Southeast Asian star is rising quickly and experiencing record performing 7% GDP growth. However, despite its potential can Vietnam live up to the hype as China’s best alternative?

It is without a doubt that Vietnam has been rising eyebrows the last decade as a low-cost manufacturing destination. Since early 2000s, supply chains have been shifting quickly to this small, Southeast nation. In recent years, foreign direct investment (FDI) from China, Taiwan, Japan, and South Korea have been pouring in, boosting its manufacturing base. For the last several decades Vietnam has been an export leader in textiles, electronics parts, machinery, and cell phones, with no signs of slowing down.

Vietnam’s manufacturing potential has been creating a buzz—and for good reason. One of the most dynamic countries in Southeast Asia, Vietnam’s population is just under 100 million to which a 70% of the population is under the age of 35. A young, vibrant, hungry and able population make for an attractively strong workforce. As labour prices and raw materials continue to climb in China, manufacturers are enticed by Vietnam’s low-cost labor often at one-third less to that of China.

Government stability, fostered by Vietnam’s communist government, is also an attractive condition many businesses require before investing whole-heartedly. Finally, geographically, Vietnam is blessed as sits strategically to the south of China and is at the cross-roads of some of the busiest maritime trading routes in the world and within easy access to its economically growing ASEAN neighbors. For these reasons, Vietnam is a standout among its peers.

Despite the country’s potential, however, when it comes to manufacturing investors are quickly discovering that Vietnam is no China. For one, the overall country’s infrastructure is underdeveloped and in bad need of repairs and upgrades: roads, bridges, ports and railways all lag many of its neighbors. To the government’s credit, there are major infrastructure and developmental projects in the works, such as commuter metro trains in both Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City and updated shipping ports, however, Vietnam needs to press on in major ways if it wishes to compete in the 21 century global economy.

Though Vietnam boasts a young and energetic workforce, the reality is that the majority of its workers are low-skilled, lacking any modern manufacturing training and skill sets essential to meeting the current manufacturing surge. This phenomenon dates back to the historically poorly plagued educational system, including its outdated vocational training, facilities, and know-how. Third, production infrastructure, proper facilities, and quality raw materials are in short supply, compounding this problem. For these very reasons, Vietnam may not be the silver bullet many are hoping for.

Vietnam’s stunning export growth is backed by impressive numbers. In 2019, exports to the USA increased 28.8% compared to last year. The investment bank Nomura in one estimate credits the US-China trade war to boosting Vietnam’s economy 8%. Everything from telephone electronics parts, furniture, and automatic data processing machines have all seen an uptick. Light industry manufacturers such as textiles and electronic components have all benefited in recent months.

Though the lack of modern infrastructure has plagued Vietnam’s growth, in recent years the government has been investing heavily in industrial parks, answering the calls by large corporation demands and their needs for up-to-date facilities.

While Vietnam is rising as a quick alternative to China, obstacles could quickly derail this apparent boon. For one, in late June of this year American President Donald Trump, in a news briefing with reporters who asked what his thoughts are about the quick shift in manufacturing from China to Vietnam, remarked, “Vietnam is one of the worst offenders. Sometimes even worse than China.” He followed up by threatening that as president he would consider tariffs against Vietnam. If President Trump were, indeed, to follow through on his threat doing so would quickly sap Vietnam’s headlining potential. Moreover, as Vietnam nudges forward as an export leader, its neighboring countries are also quickly upping their manufacturing, technology and export industries in earnest, adding to the competition in the process.

Thailand, Cambodia, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Indonesia—all members of ASEAN— are ramping up their industrial competitive advantage. Finally, rampant corruption at both the provincial and national level as well as the increasing environmental destruction and pollution are cause for concern. The result is the lack in the ease of doing business; foreign direct investment and attracting skilled foreign expats to work in Vietnam are increasingly being jeopardized. Vietnam’s recent gains, though substantial, are fragile are at risk of unraveling at a moment’s notice.

Vietnam finds itself at an opportune crossroads at a time to reap the benefits made by the US-China trade war. This emerging market holds great potential which has already proven itself as an industry leading manufacturer in electronics, small parts, and textiles. However, despite Vietnam’s enormous strides in recent years, the country falls short in several key areas, mainly, skilled workers with modern training and know-how, outdated facilities, lack of quality raw material, and overall poor infrastructure.

Despite these deficiencies, with government leadership, input from business leaders, continued foreign investment, and the implementation of the rule of law and decreased corruption, Vietnam may not only be a convenient alternative to China but emerge as an economic Asian tiger in its own right.

Vinh Ho is a Manager at APAC Consulting 

expert logistics

U.S. BUSINESS PREPARES FOR NEXT WAVE OF TARIFFS ON 100% OF GOODS FROM CHINA

Over several days in late June, trade policymakers in Washington listened to the testimony of hundreds of businesses and industries from sports fishing to booksellers, bakers and bicycle makers, logistics companies, and inventors of healthcare and high tech products. Most wish to avoid the next wave of tariffs that would apply to nearly 100 percent of the goods we import from China.

Meanwhile, more microeconomic effects can be understood by examining the thousands of requests that companies and associations have made to the administration, each asking that specific products be excluded from tariffs already in effect. To achieve an exclusion, applicants must explain how the product needed might be too costly or not widely available for purchase outside China.

They must also analyze whether the product is strategically important or relevant to China’s Made in China 2025 industrial ambitions.

Economists Christine McDaniel and Danielle Parks break down the status of how the administration is responding to these product exclusion requests. TradeVistas offers this graphic to summarize their detailed investigation, and to help you keep track of “tranches” or waves of tariffs announced or implemented by the administration over the last year or so.

Feel free to use and share our graphics.

Wave of China Tariffs TradeVistas

Want to dive deep into the product exclusion process and outcomes to date? Read McDaniel’s full paperInvestigating Product Exclusion Requests for Section 301 Tariffs with links to full data sets.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Andrea Durkin is the Editor-in-Chief of TradeVistas and Founder of Sparkplug, LLC. Ms. Durkin previously served as a U.S. Government trade negotiator and has proudly taught international trade policy and negotiations for the last fourteen years as an Adjunct Professor at Georgetown University’s Master of Science in Foreign Service program.

 

This article originally appeared on TradeVistas.org. Republished with permission.

RENEWING RARE EARTH THREATS, CHINA DIGS DEEP FOR LEVERAGE IN TRADE WAR

Optics and Symbolism

On May 28, the South China Morning Post reported that upon visiting one of China’s major rare earth mining and processing operations in Jiangxi Province, President Xi Jingping commented he would give priority to domestic demand over exports. Beside him was his lead negotiator in trade talks with the United States. At the same time, his top economic planning agency leaked it would not rule out using rare earths as a bargaining chip in the trade war.

The visit and Xi’s signal came just days after the Trump administration ratcheted up U.S. tariffs on $200 billion worth of Chinese goods followed by China’s response that it would increase in tariffs on $60 billion worth of U.S. goods.

When it comes to trade in rare earths, we’ve been here before. It’s a story worth unpacking as yet another cautionary tale about the perils of China’s meteoric rise to dominance in supplying the world with critical inputs, in this case the metals that lie behind today’s — and tomorrow’s — modern electronics, high-tech and advanced military applications

Magic Pixie Dust in the Earth’s Crust

There’s a group of 17 chemical elements on the periodic table that are classified as rare earth elements or rare earths. They can discharge and accept electrons and mix well with other elements to convey magnetism, luminescence, added strength and other key properties.

For example, neodymium helps power the magnets in hard drives and hybrid cars; praseodymium is deployed to create strong metals for aircraft engines; gadolinium is used in MRI scanning equipment; yttrium, terbium and europium are used to produce our computer, TV and device screens.

As our consumer tech and industrial products become more sophisticated and new uses are discovered, demand for rare earths will only grow. Rare earths also play a key role in some of our military’s most advanced defense tools from stealth technologies to guidance systems and armored vehicles.

REE table

Not Rare, But Hard to Harvest

The issue is not that rare earth deposits are scarce, but that they are challenging and costly to mine. Rare earths tend to be scattered rather than clustered, and bond easily with other minerals, so the elements must be separated in painstaking and costly processes that produce toxic and hazardous waste. Significant investments over years are required to get a mine and processing facility up and running and to control for environmental risks.

China’s Rise to Top Producer, User and Exporter

Although China began mining rare earths in the 1950s, the Chinese government put the capacity to mine and produce rare earths on its critical path toward economic modernization in the 1980s. Rare earths are now part of China’s Made in China 2025 plan to achieve global advantage in advanced manufacturing, high tech and green technologies.

As was the case in other industries such as steel, glass, paper and auto parts, the Chinese government deepened its intervention in the rare earths sector in 1990s to ensure access to low-cost supplies for domestic producers. Government support enabled Chinese companies to ramp up mining and processing of rare earths even while operating at a loss.

As production grew, exports were encouraged through export rebates, attracting more Chinese entrants to the industry. Excess production flooded global markets, setting in motion a downward spiral in prices and profitability for producers in other countries. Between 2002 and 2005, rare earth prices dropped to historic lows, forcing most of the world’s mines outside China to close.

Chinas Share of REE

An Overplayed Hand?

Having achieved global dominance, producing over 90 percent of the world’s rare earths, China created a two-tier pricing system through a variety of export controls. According to data from the U.S. International Trade Commission, by the beginning of 2010, U.S. importers were paying an average $5,589 per metric ton for rare earths from China.

When China announced in July 2010 it would restrict exports of rare earths by 70 percent and impose minimum export price levels, rare earth prices surged by the fall of 2011 to $158,389 per metric ton. By applying export duties, quotas and price floors to exports, China created a two-price system, keeping low-priced supplies for itself. U.S. manufacturers had no alternative but to curb spending on Chinese rare earths, causing a drop in U.S. imports.

In March 2012, the United States, European Union and Japan initiated a dispute settlement case in the WTO against China’s rare earth restrictions. Two years later, a WTO dispute panel agreed that China had violated commitments it made when it joined the WTO to eliminate dual pricing practices, certain export duties, and price controls. The panel also found China violated other aspects of other WTO agreements such as those governing the administration of export quotas. After losing its appeal, China agreed to remove quotas by December of 2014 and abandon its export tariffs by May 2015.

Damage Done

Life goes on in the global economy and for industry players over the two years that WTO cases are being decided. In a 2017 National Review article, Mike Fredenburg explains what happened to the U.S. company Molycorp that owned the Mountain Pass mine in California, which at one time was the largest producer in the world.

“In 2012, U.S.-based Molycorp, attracted to the higher prices that resulted from the Chinese government’s efforts to boost profits by restricting REE [rare earth elements] exports, made plans to ramp up domestic REE production, investing nearly $800 million in state-of-the-art mining operations in California. At the moment when the project was poised to succeed, China flooded the market with REEs just long enough to knock Molycorp out of the market. After its Chapter 11 bankruptcy reorganization, Beijing is allowing Molycorp to continue operations in China. But once again, the U.S. has no domestic REE production.”

China lost in the WTO. But in effect, China no longer needs the trade tools that violated its WTO obligations. The Molycorp mine was bankrupt, its rare earth assets sold to a consortium of buyers that included a Chinese firm with ties to the government.

The Next Chapter for Rare Earths Production and Use

China’s experiments restricting exports served as a wake up call for global manufacturers and foreign governments, who are working on Plan B to China’s dominance in rare earths. Leading manufacturers including General Electric and Toyota among others have openly announced they would cultivate and support alternative suppliers while finding ways to reduce their use of rare earth elements by reengineering their product designs.

China controls 36 percent of the world’s reserves, so government agencies have stepped up efforts to find more deposits. Mining companies around the world are reevaluating old rare earth prospects for possible development and are working to develop innovative extraction techniques to achieve what fracking did for the natural gas industry in the United States.

World REE Production and Reserves

Back to the China Playbook

China will not go quietly into that good night when it comes to the advantage it created in rare earths production. Following its playbook, China is working to consolidate the number of domestic rare earths producers (all have ties to the state) and tighten oversight of resource use and production rights. No need for WTO-illegal export restrictions when state-owned or state-directed companies can directly limit their business sales with foreign buyers.

Recognizing that domestic demand could outstrip production, China is hedging its bets by purchasing rare earth resources in other countries, though not always successfully. Notably, the China Non-Ferrous Metal Mining Co. made a $250 million bid for Australia-based Lynas back in 2009-10, but was rejected by Australia’s Foreign Investment Review Board.* The Chinese state has also acquired multinational firms with science and technology assets critical to helping Chinese manufacturers move up the value chain to produce the intermediate goods and advanced technologies that use rare earths.

Meanwhile, China is stockpiling rare earths. Why?

Is the government trying to induce foreign manufacturers to produce in China? Would China withhold rare earths in the race to global use of 5G on Chinese technology platforms? Or does China simply need to ensure access to this valuable resource for the development of its own advanced manufacturing sectors?

When commenting about the role of rare earths in the trade war, a representative from the National Reform Development Commission said, “If anyone wants to use the products made from our rare earth exports to try to counter China’s development, then the people from the southern Jiangxi Communist revolutionary base would not be happy, and the people of China will not be happy.”

Perhaps the stockpiling is emblematic that China thinks the United States is trying to contain China’s economic expansion. Threatening to withhold rare earths could be China’s way of digging into this trade war with the United States.

More reading:

For context see Congressional Research Service ReportChina’s Rare Earth Industry and Export Regime

For contemporary commentary see Stewart Patterson’s Rare Earths: The Threat of Embargo and the Clash of Systems

*Editor’s note: this sentence contains a correction from the originally posted version.

Andrea Durkin is the Editor-in-Chief of TradeVistas and Founder of Sparkplug, LLC. Ms. Durkin previously served as a U.S. Government trade negotiator and has proudly taught international trade policy and negotiations for the last fourteen years as an Adjunct Professor at Georgetown University’s Master of Science in Foreign Service program.

This article originally appeared on TradeVistas.org. Republished with permission.

Tariffs & Shippers

IS THE CARGO SHIP SAILING ON NEW TARIFFS?

Demand for Space on Cargo Ships is Surging Ahead of Anticipated Tariffs on China

As over 300 witnesses present testimony in Washington, DC this week and next on the impact of proposed China tariffs on their businesses, uncertainty hangs in the air.

Following the hearing process, committee review and publication of tariff schedules, new tariffs could be imposed as soon as late July or August, which means the cargo shipping rush is on to beat the potential hikes.

Don’t Miss the Boat

The prospect of tariff hikes acts like an “early bird” registration rate as companies are incentivized to lock in better prices now. Many retailers are competing just to find space for their goods on an ocean carrier. Air shipments are an alternative, but far costlier. The shipment surge has resulted in massive congestion at ports and warehouses that are bursting at the seams.

This scenario is familiar. Retailers scrambled last year to book cargo to get ahead of tariffs. Importers front-loaded holiday merchandise shipments to beat the 10 percent tariffs on $200 billion of Chinese imports in the fall of 2018, and then front-loaded spring 2019 merchandise imports late in the year when they anticipated the tariffs would go up from 10 to 25 percent on January 1, 2019. That threat temporarily subsided when President Trump extended the negotiation deadline with China, but reemerged in May 2019. This time, the tariff threat materialized. Goods would remain at 10 percent only if they were exported from China to the United States prior to May 10, 2019 and entered into the United States before June 15, 2019.

New Tariffs, New Shipping Surge

The President has said he will make a decision after the June 28-29 G-20 meetingwhether to impose 25 percent tariffs on an additional $300 billion in Chinese imports, meaning a tariff on nearly everything the United States imports from China, including the kitchen sink (yes, kitchen sinks are on the tariff list).

Retailers generally import most of their holiday goods in August and September, but many are moving up this timetable in anticipation of higher tariffs, accelerating the traditional holiday peak shipping season. If major importers all do the same, advancing the shipment of months of inventory, how will shipping lines manage the demand and allocate vessel space? Where does all this volume sit when it arrives? What is the impact on costs for shippers?

All of this can add up to some choppy trade waters.

Hold My Spot

Retailers, who are the “shippers” of goods, may negotiate service contracts with ocean carriers under which the shipper commits to provide a certain amount of volume over a given period and the carrier commits to a certain rate schedule and set of services. Typically, the greater amount of volume, the better the rates will be. The alternative to contracts is the less predictable spot rate market. Usually valid for only one shipment, the spot rates fluctuate with market conditions.

Larger established shippers are more likely to have service contracts, while small- and medium-sized businesses are likely to be more at the mercy of the spot rate market. Because retailers generally require more pricing certainty and service guarantees, they may opt for contractual arrangements and lose out on the chance to capitalize on weak spot markets. Spot rates can dip below contract levels, for example, if carriers add too much capacity into the system or volume slows. Some businesses play it both ways, confirming some volume under contract and turning to the spot rate market for the rest.

There can also be price-based competition to secure slots on a particular vessel during peak periods, with carriers able to demand surcharges to protect shippers from being rolled onto a later vessel departure. When tariffs are imminent, shippers are often more willing to pay these surcharges to get space on the next available crossing.

Rather than contracting with an individual shipline, a shipper may choose to work with a common carrier, like UPS, that offers ocean transportation, but does not operate the vessels. These Non-Vessel Owning Common Carriers (NVOCCs) differentiate themselves by pointing to their ability to offer a diversified carrier mix and flexibility in cases of unexpected circumstances, such as a strike at the dock a particular carrier uses. The NVOCC negotiates with ocean carriers for a number of slots on particular trade lanes, in effect negotiating as the shipper, and then offers ocean shipping service to customers.

Seeking A Port in a Storm

In theory, changes to service contracts must be agreed upon by both parties – carrier and shipper – before taking effect. In practice, however, shippers and carriers sometimes treat service contracts more as guidelines than binding agreements. Import surges have caused some carriers to hike previously agreed rates, and if the shipper won’t pay, the cargo might sit in Shanghai.

Various organizations are developing innovative solutions to address these contract challenges, including through the use of technology to record contract terms and track shipments’ conformity with those terms, financial security tools to ensure penalty settlement, and requirements to pay collateral at the time of contract, unlike the current spot market where no money is exchanged until goods are on the water and either party can cancel at any prior point without an enforceable penalty.

As the race to get goods to shore heats up, shippers not only face cost increases at sea. With ports struggling with containers stacked six or seven high, shippers also face extra charges to get their goods off ships, onto trucks and into warehouses. As one example, the onslaught of containers also means a surge in demand for chassis, the steel frames that allow trucks to carry shipping containers. If sufficient chassis are not available, truckers have to delay deliveries, incurring costs that are passed to the shipper.

With thousands of retailers moving tremendous volume, the issue of warehouse capacity also becomes a challenge. According to Los Angeles Times reporting, Southern California’s warehousing and distribution complex, the largest in the world, has a less than one percent vacancy rate. Some retailers have resorted to storing pallets outside, while others face hefty fees for exceeding storage windows.

Ports part one
China trade

Are China’s Neighboring Ports Ready?

What about sourcing from countries other than China to avoid the tariffs? That’s easier said than done, at least in the short term to beat a looming tariff deadline. Switching to new vendors and manufacturers takes money and time. New vendors must be trained to meet retailer standards and be able to meet needed lead times. Factories must be vetted for quality standards, social welfare conditions and security factors. China also has superb logistics and other supply chain advantages that other countries cannot match.

In a recent piece in The Hill, the Cato Institute’s Dan Ikenson pointed to trade data showing that, as U.S. imports from China fell by 12 percent in the first four months of 2019, imports from Vietnam grew by 32 percent over the same period. However, Vietnam’s transportation infrastructure is reportedly overwhelmed with the new volume, straining the country’s roads and ports. And, Vietnam is facing pressure to adopt more rigorous measures to ensure that Chinese products do not get transshipped through the country and into the United States, merely to avoid U.S. tariffs.

“The Port of Los Angeles and the Port of Long Beach together comprise the San Pedro Bay Port Complex…On the import side, our most recent analysis estimates the current and proposed tariffs directed at China will impact roughly 66% of all imports by value at the San Pedro Bay.”

– June 17 letter to U.S. Trade Representative Robert Lighthizer from Eugene Seroka, Executive Director, Port of Los Angeles

Rough Waters Ahead

Despite the current shipping boom as producers and retailers build inventory to get ahead of tariffs, the shipping industry is concerned about the future impacts of an inevitable falloff in volume, even if the U.S. economy remains strong. When import volumes soften, dockworkers are not called to work, and the demand shrinks for logistics workers, warehouse workers and truckers. The surges and variability caused by tariff threats – some enacted and some not — have generated a boatload of uncertainty across the wide range of industries that make up the supply chain.

That uncertainty affects not only the users of shipping infrastructure, but sometimes the infrastructure itself. The Massachusetts Port Authority (Massport) owns and operates the Conley Container Terminal in the port of Boston, which serves 1,600 regional import and export businesses. After avoiding tariffs last fall on ship-to-shore cranes to service larger container ships, Massport finds the cranes back on the proposed tariff list. The imposition of 25 percent tariffs would add at least $10 million in costs for three new cranes it plans to buy. Currently, there is no U.S. manufacturer for these cranes and the only experienced manufacturer is in China.

The President and CEO of the American Association of Port Authorities is among those testifying at the hearings this week. He will make the case that tariff increases would negatively impact ports’ ability to make investments in infrastructure that are needed to handle significant growth in trade volumes in years to come. Modern transport infrastructure and a return to greater trade certainty will add up to smoother sailing for ports, consumers, and workers across the supply chain.

Leslie Griffin is Principal of Boston-based Allinea LLC. She was previously Senior Vice President for International Public Policy for UPS and is a past president of the Association of Women in International Trade in Washington, D.C.

This article originally appeared on TradeVistas.org. Used with permission.