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The Asian-Pacific Goat Meat Market to Retain Robust Growth

goat meat

The Asian-Pacific Goat Meat Market to Retain Robust Growth

IndexBox has just published a new report: ‘Asia-Pacific – Goat Meat – Market Analysis, Forecast, Size, Trends and Insights’. Here is a summary of the report’s key findings.

The Asia-Pacific goat meat market expanded rapidly to $30.1B in 2019, growing by 9.9% against the previous year. This figure reflects the total revenues of producers and importers (excluding logistics costs, retail marketing costs, and retailers’ margins, which will be included in the final consumer price). The total market indicated a prominent expansion from 2007 to 2019: its value increased at an average annual rate of +1.8% over the last twelve-year period. The trend pattern, however, indicated some noticeable fluctuations being recorded throughout the analyzed period. Based on 2019 figures, consumption increased by +56.7% against 2014 indices. The level of consumption peaked in 2019 and is expected to retain growth in years to come.

Consumption by Country

The country with the largest volume of goat meat consumption was China (2.4M tonnes), comprising approx. 61% of total volume. Moreover, goat meat consumption in China exceeded the figures recorded by the second-largest consumer, India (502K tonnes), fivefold. The third position in this ranking was occupied by Pakistan (352K tonnes), with a 9.1% share.

In China, goat meat consumption increased at an average annual rate of +1.9% over the period from 2007-2019. In the other countries, the average annual rates were as follows: India (-0.5% per year) and Pakistan (+2.8% per year).

In value terms, China ($22.7B) led the market, alone. The second position in the ranking was occupied by India ($2.4B). It was followed by Pakistan.

The countries with the highest levels of goat meat per capita consumption in 2019 were Nepal (2.47 kg per person), Myanmar (1.89 kg per person) and Pakistan (1.72 kg per person).

Market Forecast 2019-2030

Driven by increasing demand for goat meat in Asia-Pacific, the market is expected to continue an upward consumption trend over the next decade. Market performance is forecast to retain its current trend pattern, expanding with an anticipated CAGR of +1.5% for the period from 2019 to 2030, which is projected to bring the market volume to 4.6M tonnes by the end of 2030.

Production in Asia-Pacific

In 2019, goat meat production in Asia-Pacific rose to 3.9M tonnes, with an increase of 2% on 2018 figures. The total output volume increased at an average annual rate of +1.8% from 2007 to 2019; the trend pattern remained consistent, with somewhat noticeable fluctuations being observed in certain years. The growth pace was the most rapid in 2016 with an increase of 3.4% y-o-y. Over the period under review, production reached the peak volume in 2019 and is likely to see gradual growth in the immediate term. The general positive trend in terms output was largely conditioned by a mild expansion of the number of producing animals and a relatively flat trend pattern in yield figures.

In value terms, goat meat production soared to $36.8B in 2019 estimated in export prices. Overall, production posted a remarkable increase. Over the period under review, production hit record highs in 2019 and is expected to retain growth in the immediate term.

Production by Country

China (2.4M tonnes) remains the largest goat meat producing country in Asia-Pacific, accounting for 61% of total volume. Moreover, goat meat production in China exceeded the figures recorded by the second-largest producer, India (502K tonnes), fivefold. The third position in this ranking was occupied by Pakistan (353K tonnes), with a 9.1% share.

In China, goat meat production increased at an average annual rate of +1.9% over the period from 2007-2019. In the other countries, the average annual rates were as follows: India (-0.5% per year) and Pakistan (+2.7% per year).

Producing Animals in Asia-Pacific

In 2019, the number of animals slaughtered for goat meat production in Asia-Pacific expanded to 291M heads, picking up by 1.6% compared with the previous year. This number increased at an average annual rate of +1.5% over the period from 2007 to 2019; the trend pattern remained relatively stable, with somewhat noticeable fluctuations in certain years. The growth pace was the most rapid in 2009 when the number of producing animals increased by 5.3% year-to-year. Over the period under review, this number hit record highs at 291M heads in 2016; however, from 2017 to 2019, producing animals failed to regain the momentum.

Yield in Asia-Pacific

The average goat meat yield amounted to 13 kg per head in 2019, leveling off at the year before. Over the period under review, the yield saw a relatively flat trend pattern. The most prominent rate of growth was recorded in 2017 with an increase of 5.1% y-o-y. Over the period under review, the goat meat yield hit record highs in 2019 and is likely to see steady growth in years to come.

Imports in Asia-Pacific

In 2019, the amount of goat meat imported in Asia-Pacific contracted to 8.8K tonnes, waning by -9.2% on 2018. The total import volume increased at an average annual rate of +1.2% from 2007 to 2019; however, the trend pattern indicated some noticeable fluctuations being recorded throughout the analyzed period. The pace of growth was the most pronounced in 2014 when imports increased by 25% against the previous year. As a result, imports reached the peak of 12K tonnes. From 2015 to 2019, the growth imports remained at a somewhat lower figure.

In value terms, goat meat imports declined to $43M (IndexBox estimates) in 2019. Overall, imports, however, recorded buoyant growth. The level of import peaked at $57M in 2017; however, from 2018 to 2019, imports yet failed to regain the momentum.

Imports by Country

The purchases of the four major importers of goat meat, namely Taiwan, Viet Nam, South Korea and Hong Kong SAR, represented more than two-thirds of total import. It was distantly followed by Japan (460 tonnes), making up a 5.2% share of total imports. China (317 tonnes), Macao SAR (292 tonnes), India (209 tonnes), Sri Lanka (185 tonnes), Malaysia (177 tonnes) and the Philippines (169 tonnes) followed a long way behind the leaders.

From 2007 to 2019, the most notable rate of growth in terms of purchases, amongst the key importing countries, was attained by India, while imports for the other leaders experienced more modest paces of growth.

In value terms, the largest goat meat importing markets in Asia-Pacific were Taiwan ($12M), South Korea ($9.4M) and Hong Kong SAR ($6.4M), together comprising 64% of total imports. These countries were followed by Japan, Viet Nam, Macao SAR, China, Malaysia, Sri Lanka, the Philippines and India, which together accounted for a further 32%.

Among the main importing countries, India recorded the highest growth rate of the value of imports, over the period under review, while purchases for the other leaders experienced more modest paces of growth.

Import Prices by Country

In 2019, the goat meat import price in Asia-Pacific amounted to $4,887 per tonne, waning by -2.2% against the previous year. Import price indicated a perceptible increase from 2007 to 2019: its price increased at an average annual rate of +4.5% over the last twelve years. The trend pattern, however, indicated some noticeable fluctuations being recorded throughout the analyzed period. Based on 2019 figures, goat meat import price decreased by -15.8% against 2017 indices. The growth pace was the most rapid in 2016 when the import price increased by 22% year-to-year. Over the period under review, import prices reached the peak figure at $5,802 per tonne in 2017; however, from 2018 to 2019, import prices failed to regain the momentum.

There were significant differences in the average prices amongst the major importing countries. In 2019, the country with the highest price was Macao SAR ($7,657 per tonne), while Viet Nam ($1,613 per tonne) was amongst the lowest.

From 2007 to 2019, the most notable rate of growth in terms of prices was attained by Macao SAR, while the other leaders experienced more modest paces of growth.

Source: IndexBox AI Platform

semiconductor

CONTROLS ON SEMICONDUCTOR TRADE ARE A HARBINGER FOR “TECHNO-NATIONALISM”

Major nations are in a race to achieve supremacy in the “technologies of the future” that include data analytics, robotics, AI and machine learning, surveillance technology and 5G networks. What all these new technologies have in common is the semiconductor microchips that drive them. Gaining the technology upper hand requires the secure production or supply of advanced semiconductors, which makes the controls on trade in semiconductors a harbinger for how “techno-nationalist” trade policies are reshaping global supply chains.

China’s failure to launch?

The global semiconductor industry was historically dominated by a small group of primarily American semiconductor companies. In the past two decades, a handful of Asian semiconductor companies including Toshiba (Japan), Samsung (South Korea) and TSMC (Taiwan), have managed to grow market share. Latecomers in Asia benefited from a combination of ambitious industrial policies and government support, a narrow focus on specialization and innovation, and access to key foreign partnerships and foreign direct investment.

The Chinese government seeks to replicate these models on a much larger scale under its Made in China 2025 industrial policy. Geopolitics may prevent China from achieving its goals. Key Chinese tech firms, including Huawei, HikVision, and SenseTime, now find themselves on a U.S. restricted entities list, which means “controlled” American technology may not be sold to them.

Global Semi Shares

China’s push to reduce semiconductor tech dependence

The Chinese market is almost entirely dependent on foreign firms for microchips. Domestic production accounts for just nine percent of China’s semiconductor consumption – leaving 91 percent of China’s demand to be satisfied by imports, 56.2 percent from the United States.

Yet semiconductor technology is vital to China’s manufacturing base and to China’s top exports that include smartphones, personal computers, and smart televisions. China’s continued dependence on U.S. and foreign semiconductor technology has been a catalyst for Beijing to double down on policies to promote homegrown companies.

China’s National Integrated Circuit Plan calls for $150 billion in R&D funding from central, provincial and municipal governments, twice as much as the rest of the world combined. U.S. companies spent $32.7 billion on R&D in 2018, followed by European companies ($13.9 billion), Taiwanese companies ($9.9 billion), Japanese companies ($8.8 billion) and Korean companies ($7.3 billion).

Some 30 new semiconductor facilities are either under construction or in the planning stages in China – more than any other country in the world. But even the most sophisticated fabricator in China must rely on licensing chip designs from foreign firms and on high-volume commercial production lines outside of China. And foreign firms still dominate niches in China’s semiconductor market such as microchip packaging and testing, semiconductor equipment, memory and AI chips, as well as contract microchip making.

National champions require international supply chains

China is not alone in its interdependence on global value chains. Leading American, European, Japanese and South Korea semiconductor companies have all developed and optimized geographically dispersed production networks. Research and development, design, manufacturing, assembly, testing and packaging have become hyper-specialized with activity taking place across multiple countries as microchips cross borders dozens of times before being finally embedded into a finished product.

Chinese tech companies have been able to grow and innovate because of unfettered access to collaborative relationships with foreign research and academic institutions, as well as access to foreign companies through acquisitions and (often state-funded) mergers – until recently.

Semi R&D Spending

American trade countermeasures

The U.S. government has taken steps to block Chinese acquisitions and investments in American technology companies and has also made critical changes to the U.S. export controls program. The U.S. Department of Commerce manages a list of “emerging” and “foundational” commercial technologies or products which can be used for military purposes. It recently expanded the technologies included on the Controlled Commodity List (CCL). Technologies on the CCL require issuance of an export license prior to sale and transfer to a foreign market.

An export control is not, by itself, a prohibition to sell or buy a traded good. In the vast majority of cases, when the facts surrounding a controlled item are reviewed (including who the buyer is and how the controlled item will be used), U.S. government agencies issue export licenses. But export controls and related measures add a layer of uncertainty to global value chains, potentially turning long-time suppliers into unreliable suppliers.

Part and parcel of the Chinese Communist Party’s approach to leapfrogging in the semiconductor industry is to appropriate special technology funding toward “military-civil fusion,” designed to bring tech startups and private companies together with the People’s Liberation Army. The deepening of those direct links virtually ensures that innovations and technologies pertaining to industries of the future will be considered by the U.S. government as dual use technologies subject to scrutiny, control and prohibitions when it comes to exporting them from the United States, especially to China.

A special designation

U.S. companies or individuals may also be denied or restricted from doing business with restricted entities/parties or with “specially designated nationals”. In May 2019, the U.S. government designated Huawei, China’s telecommunications giant, a restricted entity. In this scenario, the application for an export license to a Huawei entity would be presumed denied, effectively banning the sale of American technology to Huawei or any of its 68 non-U.S. affiliates in other countries.

The designation has widespread ripple effects. Huawei purchased some $70 billion components and parts from more than 13,000 suppliers globally in 2018 – approximately $11 billion worth of microchips from American technology companies alone. American companies may not sell to Huawei and Huawei must replace all U.S. technology from its smart phones, which previously included U.S. radio frequency chips, DRAM and NAND chips, design software and Google’s Android operating system.

Prohibitions may be applied to individual end-users, to financial institutions that may seek to process transactions for a restricted buyer or supplier, and to academic and research institutions that may be prevented from using technologies from restricted entities in their research.

Driving a wedge and choosing sides

Washington’s countermeasures aim to impede the Chinese Communist Party’s ability to promote U.S. technology and intellectual property transfer to Chinese entities – either by stopping sales of technology, stifling investment flows into China’s semiconductor industry, or blocking the acquisition of strategic assets from U.S. and foreign companies by Chinese state-backed entities.

This evolving trade policy landscape will inevitably lead to the reconfiguration of global value chains as companies comply with export restrictions. Foreign companies that seek to maintain their relationship with a restricted entity must reduce the value of U.S. content to below an acceptable “de minimis” level, increase the value of non-U.S. made products in their sourcing and production, or avoid doing business with U.S. companies altogether. This has induced companies to move value-added operations out of the United States, to ring-fence operations in China, or to consolidate into more vertically integrated value chains.

In an attempt to close the de minimis loophole, the U.S. government has modified the “foreign direct product” rule. In the example of Huawei, this change prevents foreign manufacturers from supplying Huawei, the Chinese tele-communications manufacturer, with microchips and other products, if the production of these items uses any U.S. technology, including manufacturing equipment, designs or software. U.S. firms dominate these technology niches.

This change was clearly aimed at Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC), which manufacturers microchips for HiSilicon, Huawei’s subsidiary. Cutting off the supply of microchips to HiSilicon presents an existential crisis for Huawei, as no Chinese companies are capable of producing leading-edge microchips on par with TSMC and other foreign manufacturers.

Compliance has become more complicated as the ranks of restricted entities swell. Nearly 170 Chinese individuals and entities (across a wide swathe of industries) are on the U.S. Specially Designated National list. U.S. companies must navigate restrictions that are enforced by more than a dozen different U.S. government agencies.

American firms are also concerned about diminished opportunities to do business in key global value chains, effectively ceding market share to Chinese and other foreign firms not under similar restrictions. Limited or foregone sales in China may reduce funds for R&D. Restrictions also choke off collaborative innovation across specialized clusters and between human capital networks. Huawei and other Chinese tech companies are looking to withdraw from U.S.-influenced supply chains, forming alliances with non-American technology companies, putting TSMC, Samsung and others in the position of having to choose sides.

Just the beginning

When Washington announced Huawei would be placed on the U.S. Restricted Entity List, Huawei’s management tapped 10,000 engineers, requiring them to work continuously in shifts to re-write code and re-design specifications so that Huawei might minimize the damage of U.S. export controls.

The United States is not alone in its trade countermeasures. Europe is also turning to techno-nationalism. Brussels recently issued a report that emphasized the importance of working with America to create an economic model that would compete directly with Beijing, particularly with the intent of blocking the Chinese Communist Party’s attempts to influence global standards in 5G and other next-gen technologies. Japan has blocked Huawei 5G technology.

By enacting policies intended to protect against theft or transfer of domestic semiconductor technology from opportunistic or hostile state and non-state actors, governments have opened more fronts in the deepening tech war with China, which portends to reshape existing global value chains for semiconductor production. And semiconductors are just the beginning.

This article is drawn from a detailed research report: Semiconductors at the heart of the US-China tech war

__________________________________________________________________

Alex Capri

Alex Capri is a Research Fellow with the Hinrich Foundation, Senior Fellow at the National University of Singapore, and Lecturer in the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy. He was previously the Partner and Regional Leader of KPMG’s International Trade & Customs practice in Asia Pacific, based in Hong Kong.

This article originally appeared on TradeVistas.org. Republished with permission.
manufacturing

Why Technology – Not Tariffs – Is the Key to Reviving US Manufacturing

Reshoring has captured the imaginations of politicians and economic developers for years, particularly in parts of the country hit hard by the loss of manufacturing jobs. The COVID-19 crisis gave reshoring advocates another rallying cry, as supply chain disruptions rippled through the economy and the general public awoke to the fact that we are dependent on Chinese manufacturing for most of our medical supplies.

Some will no doubt call for a response in the form of tougher trade policies – tariffs that aim to level the playing field and to deter Chinese “dumping” of cheap, below-profit goods with which US manufacturers can’t hope to compete.

But while tariffs can be an effective weapon in the short term, they won’t help revive American manufacturing. In fact, they might do serious damage, especially amid an economic downturn. Most economists now believe the 1930 Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act, which leveled crippling tariffs on US imports from all over the world, played a significant role in sinking the country deeper into what would become the Great Depression.

Fortunately, tariffs aren’t the only way. We can reverse the decline of domestic manufacturing and return factory jobs and investment to US soil, but the key isn’t policy – it’s technology.

American manufacturers can regain their global competitive advantage by widely investing in and deploying automation and robotics that will enable them to produce everything from auto parts to cellphone screens cheaper, faster and better than factories in China and elsewhere.

The technology won’t replace workers. They’ll be needed to operate and maintain the sophisticated machinery involved. Much of the investment I’m calling for will be in people – training Americans to work with the kind of technology that can transform and revive our manufacturing sector. We call this Industry 4.0.

Doing What Americans Do Best

Before I explain further, I should lay some groundwork. Even as wages for Chinese workers have risen in recent years, they remain much lower than US workers’ pay. Other countries can undercut China, leaving Europe as the only part of the world where American manufacturers have any sort of cost advantage.

That means we must do what America does best: innovate. If we can get ahead of the curve by investing technologies such as robotics, Internet of Things and 3D printing, we can automate shop floors in a way that speeds production, sparks new-product development and creates new high-skilled factory jobs. We can also produce competitively priced goods that enable our local manufacturers to grow by taking market share from rivals overseas.

Jergens Inc. is a 78-year-old company in Cleveland, with a campus on an abandoned railyard site. The company, one of the world’s largest manufacturers of standard tooling components, vises and other workholding equipment, has fully embraced automation – but not as a way to eliminate jobs.

“With every robot, more jobs at Jergens are created,” says Jack Schron, the company’s president. “We use one robot to get higher production on one of our popular items. Right next to that robot are skilled technicians assembling these same items for small-run, custom applications. Because of the one, the other follows.”

Automation has actually increased headcount in some Jergens departments; because the robots helped increase production and broaden its offerings, Jergens has hired more sales, marketing and shipping workers.

A Technological Cold War

Jergens is far from alone, even among the subset of Northeast Ohio manufacturers I work with. What we learn from them is that automation is more affordable, more accessible and more effective than ever.

Unfortunately, far too many small and mid-sized companies in our industrial heartland understand this. That’s partly why few have taken the first steps toward automation. In a February survey by our organization, 94 percent of manufacturers in Northeast Ohio said they were actively innovating – but more than 60 percent said they weren’t using or just starting using automation, and half said they didn’t plan to increase automation spending.

Too many American manufacturers don’t understand the technology, or how their shop floors or market strategies could benefit from automation. Others see the potential but don’t have the funds to invest, or see the investment as too risky, or fear the lag between investing and seeing a return would destroy their balance sheets.

None of those things is true, but various combinations of flawed perceptions, lack of knowledge, lack of funding and risk aversion prevent factory owners and leaders from investing in technology that would make them more profitable and competitive.

Meanwhile, China has been investing in automation technology for years. The country has now become the world’s largest and fastest-growing market for industrial robotics, according to the International Federation of Robotics. The mental image of Chinese sweatshops is no longer accurate (though other countries still use those methods). Google “manufacturing process” and you’ll see highly automated, high-tech manufacturing facilities in China.

Put simply, we’re in a cold war of technological advancement that very few people – including many manufacturing leaders – see and even fewer understand. And we’re losing. Could COVID-19 provide the motivation we need to fully embrace innovation, advance toward Industry 4.0 and win the innovation war? It absolutely could. Or perhaps American manufacturers will embrace Industry 4.0 for simple business reasons – it will undoubtedly make them more profitable.

Whatever it takes, investment in technology is a critical step toward a new, sustainable era of reshoring. And at the very least, widespread investments in technology will create better-paying, safer, more stable jobs in parts of our country hit hardest by the deindustrialization of the last 30 years.

That is the promise of Industry 4.0.

________________________________________________________________

Dr. Ethan Karp is an expert in transforming companies and communities. As President and CEO of the non-profit consulting group MAGNET, he has helped hundreds of manufacturing companies grow through technology, innovation, and talent. He is passionate about driving economic prosperity in his home region of Northeast Ohio. Dr. Karp is a recognized thought leader on manufacturing issues and a frequent media commentator on the future of manufacturing in America. Prior to joining MAGNET in 2013, Dr. Karp worked with Fortune 500 companies at McKinsey & Co. He received undergraduate degrees in biochemistry and physics from Miami University and a Ph.D. in Chemical Biology from Harvard University.

MAGNET is part of the NIST and Ohio Manufacturing Extension Partnership (MEP) program to support small and medium manufacturers across the US.

section 232

Commerce Commences Section 232 Investigation on Imports of Vanadium

The Commerce Department announced on June 2, 2020, that it is starting another Section 232 investigation that could result in the imposition of tariffs or potentially other restrictions on imports of vanadium. The agency stated that it will review and determine “whether the present quantities or circumstances of vanadium imports into the United States threaten to impair the national security.”

Vanadium is a chemical element with the symbol “V” and is assigned atomic number 23.  A general description of it is a hard, silvery-grey, malleable transition metal. It is an artificially isolated element, which is rarely found in its natural state, but one of its key properties once isolated artificially is to prevent oxidation. Various applications that rely on vanadium include use in the production of ferrovanadium, which is a steel additive. The chemical properties of vanadium also increase the strength of the steel and it is therefore used in products such as high-carbon steel alloys and high-speed tool steels for use “aircraft, jet en­gines, ballistic missiles, energy storage, bridges, buildings, and pipelines. Vanadium is a key component in aerospace applications due to its strength-to-weight ratio, the best of any engineered material,” Commerce said and “U.S. demand is supplied entirely through imports.”

This new 232 investigation is the result of the filing of a request by two domestic U.S. vanadium producers, AMG Vanadium and U.S. Vanadium, in November 2019. The allegation claims that the “domestic industry is adversely impacted by unfairly traded low-priced im­ports, limited export markets due to value-added tax regimes in other vanadium producing countries, and the distortionary effect of Chinese and Russian industrial policies,” according to Commerce’s press release.

The notice of initiation, of the 232 investigation was published in the Federal Register on June 3rd. Comments must be filed by July 20, 2020, and any rebuttal comments are due by August 17, 2020.  Those interested in submitting comments should ensure that it addresses the following:

-the quantity of imports,

-domestic production and capacity needed to meet national defense requirements, and

-the impact of foreign competition on the vanadium industry, among other things.

Husch Blackwell continues to monitor the Section 232 investigations and will provide further updates as more information becomes available.

_______________________________________________________________________

Nithya Nagarajan is a Washington-based partner with the law firm Husch Blackwell LLP. She practices in the International Trade & Supply Chain group of the firm’s Technology, Manufacturing & Transportation industry team.

Turner Kim is an Assistant Trade Analyst in Husch Blackwell LLP’s Washington D.C. office.

frozen fish

Global Frozen Fish Market – China Holds 17 Percent of World Exports, with $7.6B in 2018

IndexBox has just published a new report: ‘World – Frozen Fish – Market Analysis, Forecast, Size, Trends and Insights’. Here is a summary of the report’s key findings.

The global frozen fish market revenue amounted to $118.3B in 2018, rising by 6.6% against the previous year. The market value increased at an average annual rate of +2.1% over the period from 2014 to 2018.

Driven by increasing demand for frozen fish worldwide, the market is expected to continue an upward consumption trend over the next decade. Market performance is forecast to decelerate, expanding with an anticipated CAGR of +0.8% for the period from 2018 to 2030, which is projected to bring the market volume to 43M tonnes by the end of 2030.

Frozen Fish Trade 2014-2018

In 2018, the global exports of frozen fish amounted to 17M tonnes, increasing by 6.5% against the previous year. The total export volume increased at an average annual rate of +2.8% from 2014 to 2018; the trend pattern remained relatively stable, with somewhat noticeable fluctuations being recorded throughout the analyzed period. The pace of growth was the most pronounced in 2017 with an increase of 7.1% year-to-year. Over the period under review, global frozen fish exports reached their maximum in 2018 and are likely to continue its growth in the near future.

In value terms, frozen fish exports stood at $43.9B (IndexBox estimates) in 2018.

Exports by Country

The exports of the twelve major exporters of frozen fish, namely China, Russia, the U.S., Viet Nam, Norway, the Netherlands, Chile, Taiwan, Chinese, Japan, Spain, Namibia and India, represented more than half of total export.

From 2014 to 2018, the most notable rate of growth in terms of exports, amongst the main exporting countries, was attained by India, while exports for the other global leaders experienced more modest paces of growth.

In value terms, China ($7.6B) remains the largest frozen fish supplier worldwide, comprising 17% of global exports. The second position in the ranking was occupied by the U.S. ($3.6B), with a 8.2% share of global exports. It was followed by Russia, with a 6.7% share.

Export Prices by Country

In 2018, the average frozen fish export price amounted to $2,574 per tonne, increasing by 2.9% against the previous year. Over the period under review, the frozen fish export price, however, continues to indicate a relatively flat trend pattern. The most prominent rate of growth was recorded in 2018 when the average export price increased by 2.9% y-o-y. Over the period under review, the average export prices for frozen fish attained their maximum at $2,628 per tonne in 2014; afterwards, it flattened through to 2018.

Prices varied noticeably by the country of origin; the country with the highest price was Chile ($5,059 per tonne), while Namibia ($1,334 per tonne) was amongst the lowest.

From 2014 to 2018, the most notable rate of growth in terms of prices was attained by India, while the other global leaders experienced more modest paces of growth.

Imports by Country

In 2018, China (2.2M tonnes), followed by Thailand (1.4M tonnes), Japan (1.4M tonnes), the U.S. (1M tonnes) and South Korea (0.9M tonnes) were the largest importers of frozen fish, together making up 40% of total imports. The following importers – Viet Nam (706K tonnes), Nigeria (581K tonnes), Spain (515K tonnes), the Netherlands (470K tonnes), Germany (436K tonnes), Cameroon (404K tonnes) and Russia (371K tonnes) – together made up 20% of total imports.

From 2014 to 2018, the most notable rate of growth in terms of imports, amongst the main importing countries, was attained by Viet Nam, while imports for the other global leaders experienced more modest paces of growth.

In value terms, the largest frozen fish importing markets worldwide were Japan ($6B), the U.S. ($5B) and China ($4B), together comprising 34% of global imports. Thailand, South Korea, Viet Nam, Germany, Spain, the Netherlands, Russia, Nigeria and Cameroon lagged somewhat behind, together accounting for a further 29%.

Import Prices by Country

The average frozen fish import price stood at $2,582 per tonne in 2018, picking up by 2.2% against the previous year.

There were significant differences in the average prices amongst the major importing countries. In 2018, the country with the highest price was the U.S. ($5,112 per tonne), while Nigeria ($839 per tonne) was amongst the lowest.

From 2014 to 2018, the most notable rate of growth in terms of prices was attained by Russia, while the other global leaders experienced more modest paces of growth.

Source: IndexBox AI Platform

pork

BRINGING HOME THE BACON: U.S. PORK TRADE

The Year That Wasn’t

This year was supposed to mark a comeback for U.S. pork producers. Instead, the industry faces volatile markets and unprecedented supply chain disruptions. COVID-19’s domino effect on farmers, processors, retailers and consumers underscores the complexities of our modern food system.

In late April, meat industry executives warned the United States could soon face a meat shortage after processing facilities closed temporarily due to the spread of COVID-19 among employees. Total meat supplies in cold storage facilities across the United States totaled roughly two weeks’ worth of production. With processing at a standstill, meat supplies for retail grocery stores were expected to shrink by nearly 30 percent by Memorial Day, leading to increases in pork and beef price prices of as much as 20 percent, according to analysis by CoBank.

Shuttered plants also meant that farmers had nowhere to send their mature pigs, creating a massive livestock backlog. While many meat processors have re-opened as of May 2020, hog farmers may yet be forced to euthanize as many as seven million pigs in the second quarter of 2020, a loss valued at nearly $700 million. The Food and Agricultural Policy Research Institute forecasted a total loss of $2.2 billion for the U.S. pork industry in 2020 due to the pandemic.

US 3rd largest pork producer

Going Whole Hog on Exports

According to the United States Department of Agriculture, the United States is the world’s third-largest producer and consumer of pork, shipping on average more than 5 billion pounds of fresh and frozen pork internationally each year since 2010.

But this dominant role in world pork trade is a fairly recent phenomenon. The United States became a net exporter of pork in 1995. Exports jumped from two percent of total production in 1990 to 21 percent in 2016. What made this spike possible?

The U.S. pork industry has gone through a major restructuring since the mid-1980s, shifting from small, independently owned operations to larger, vertically-integrated companies that contract with growers to raise pigs. This structure increased the industry’s productivity and year-round slaughter capacity. Between 1991 and 2009, the number of hog farms in the United States dropped by 70 percent but the number of hogs remained stable.

The National Pork Producers Council calculates that exports account for nearly 36 percent of the total $149 average value of a hog. While American pork is shipped to more than 100 countries, just four countries account for 75 percent of U.S. pork exports: Mexico, Japan, China, and Canada. It’s easy to see why implementation of the U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement is important to U.S. pork producers: Mexico alone accounts for about one-third of all exports by volume. U.S. exports of pork increased 1,550 percent in value since 1989, when the United States first implemented a free trade agreement with Canada.

U.S. pork producers mainly compete with pork producers in the European Union, Canada, and Brazil for sales in overseas markets. American farmers were concerned they could lose market share in Japan after the United States did not join the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for the Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) and Japan made a trade deal with the European Union. Japan is the largest value market for U.S. pork and the second largest market by volume. However, pork exports there have been trending higher in 2020 following the U.S.-Japan Trade Agreement.

Where US pork exports go

Higher on the Hog in China?

For the last two years, American pork producers have found themselves in the crosshairs of a trade war between the United States and China, a key export market. In April 2018, China levied a 25 percent retaliatory tariff on many U.S. pork imports in response to Section 232 tariffs put in place by the United States. In 2019, China again retaliated against American pork, this time in response to Section 301 tariffs.

Before the trade war, China was the second-largest market for U.S. farm exports (after Canada). In 2016, China purchased nearly $20 billion in American farm products but sales dropped sharply in 2018 to $7.9 billion.

The “Phase One” U.S.-China trade agreement went into effect on February 14, 2020. It includes a commitment from China to import an additional $12.5 billion in U.S. agricultural products during 2020 on top of a 2017 baseline of about $24 billion. The agreement also provides access for a larger variety of U.S. pork products and restores access for processed pork products, which had been blocked by China.

As part of this deal, on February 17 China announced tariff exclusions for 696 products, including pork. In the first quarter of 2020, China bought $5.05 billion in U.S. farm goods, up 110 percent from last year. China’s pork imports almost tripled from March 2019, reflecting a major domestic supply gap caused by African Swine Fever (ASF).

However, concerns remain if it is feasible for China to meet the purchase targets set in the agreement. Through March 2020, U.S. Census Bureau data show that U.S. agricultural exports to China were only at 37 percent of year-to-date targets. The American Farm Bureau Federation found that U.S. agricultural exports to China need to accelerate by 114 percent each month from May through the rest of the fiscal year to meet the “Phase One” target.

China ag purchases fall in trade war

Not Exactly “Year of the Pig” for Pork Industry

The possibility of U.S. sales to China going unfulfilled seems surprising. Another virus – ASF – has been ravaging China’s pork output since August 2018. ASF is a highly contagious, deadly pig disease with no known treatment or vaccine. It does not affect humans or food safety but it has had a devastating impact on China’s pork industry, the world’s largest, leaving a shortage in domestic supply.

Despite low officially reported cases of ASF, as many as 350 million pigs died from the disease in China during 2019. (And because the disease continues to spread across borders, one quarter of all the world’s pigs may die from ASF.) After more than a year of declining pork output, China’s total pork supply gap is estimated at 18 million tons – a figure much larger than total global supplies. Chinese consumers have faced record high prices for pork, traditionally their protein of choice. Some parts of the country also faced meat shortages due to disrupted supply chains during the COVID-19 quarantine.

To address persistent high prices, the Chinese government auctioned off a small amount of frozen pork from publicly held pork reserves, but the move was largely symbolic and had a limited short-term impact on prices. The government’s total pork reserve volumes are a national secret and not publicly available.

Enter: Coronavirus

As American hog farmers were positioning to fill China’s need to import more pork, enter the coronavirus in early 2020, which threw the U.S. pork market into extreme volatility.

After COVID-19 forced processing plants to temporarily close, U.S. pig prices dropped 27 percent in about a week, reducing profits for pig producers while consumers paid more for pork at the grocery store. The demand for meat often takes a hit during economic recessions as consumers keep a close eye on their grocery bill. At the same time, the industry lost major food service markets such as restaurants, universities, and elementary schools that were also shut down.

To help pork producers and other farmers, USDA on April 17 announced the Coronavirus Food Assistance Program (CFAP) to provide $19 billion in emergency aid to farmers and ranchers hit by market disruptions. CFAP includes $16 billion in direct payments to producers and $3 billion in purchases of fresh produce, meat, and dairy products for distribution through food banks. USDA will purchase an estimated $100 million per month in pork and chicken, along with other food products, beginning in May. Nonetheless, an industry-funded analysis by Iowa State University found that American hog farmers will lose $5 billion (or $37 per pig) due to reduced prices for pork and shuttered processing plants.

US pork shipments to China

Saving Our Bacon

America’s pork industry has been beset with uncertainty in recent years. The latest Purdue University-CME Group Ag Economy Barometer found that the unknowns surrounding the pandemic have further decreased farmer optimism to a four-year low, with 67 percent of farmers saying they are worried about the impact of the coronavirus on their business.

Prior to COVID-19, U.S. farmers were already reeling from lost sales due to China’s tariffs. The saving grace for U.S. pork producers now is that pork exports are actually ramping up.

During March and April, the number of pigs slaughtered per day decreased by 40 percent, but shipments of U.S. pork to China more than quadrupled, including whole carcasses as well as products that Americans generally don’t eat, like feet and organs. The U.S. Meat Export Federation estimated that so far in 2020, about 31 percent of U.S. pork has been exported with one-third of that volume going to China.

That means that in the near term, increasing exports will remain vital for the U.S. pork industry to weather the coronavirus storm as processing capacity gets back online and domestic sales begin to rebound.

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Sarah Hubbart provides communications strategy, content creation, and social media management for TradeVistas. A native of rural Northern California, Sarah has melded communications and policy throughout her career in Washington, D.C., serving in government affairs, issues management, and coalition building roles in the agricultural sector. She is an alum of California State University, Chico and George Washington University.

This article originally appeared on TradeVistas.org. Republished with permission.
foreign

The Proposed Expansion of Mandatory Foreign Investment Filings During the Pandemic

In the midst of the pandemic, the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (“CFIUS”) has proposed several revisions to its regulations (“Regulations”) that change when short-form filings (called “declarations”) are required with respect to covered foreign investments of U.S. businesses which work with critical technology [2]. What is most significant for foreign investors is that the proposed rules expand the mandatory declaration and required CFIUS review to include critical technology transactions that range well beyond the 27 industries originally designated by CFIUS – to cover all sectors of the economy [3].

The raison d’etre for this proposed CFIUS rule change is not entirely clear. While the modification largely reads as being technical in nature, CFIUS does, however, observe that other, unspecified “national security considerations” are involved. Thus, a reasonable inference from current circumstances is that CFIUS seeks the ability during the Covid-19 crisis to review acquisitions by China in a broader range of business sectors in order to assess in advance the national security risk, if any, in situations where financially struggling U.S. firms with innovative dual-use technology might be more willing than before to consider such investments as a lifeline.

Interested parties in the business community should note public comments are due by June 22, 2020.

The Proposed Expansion of Mandatory Filings for Critical Technology Transactions

By way of background, under the existing Regulations, a mandatory declaration is required for transactions involving certain U.S. businesses that: 1) produce, design, test, manufacture, fabricate, or develop one or more “critical technologies”; and 2) use the critical technology in specified ways in one or more of 27 specified industries. Significantly, under the revisions, CFIUS eliminated the second prong of the requirement – i.e., the nexus to 27 industries, and refocused the requirement instead on companies that have critical technology that would require certain export licenses or other authorizations to export, re-export, transfer (in-country) or retransfer the critical technology to certain transaction parties and foreign persons in the ownership chain.

CFIUS indicates that the new focus of the mandatory filing requirement on export control requirements for critical technologies “leverages the national security foundations of the established export control regimes, which require licensing or authorization in certain cases based on an analysis of the particular item and end-user, and the particular foreign country for export, re-export transfer (in-country) or retransfer.” 85 Fed. Reg. 30894.

While that is true enough, in fact, the existing standard already is based on the export control standards. The term “critical technology” was and still is, defined as technologies that are subject to export controls (i.e., articles or services on the U.S. Munitions List, items on the Commerce Department’s Control List, and other specialized lists)[4]. Now, in addition to being subject to export controls (e.g., on one of the enumerated lists of controlled items), the technology must specifically be subject to a licensing requirement.

In effect, CFIUS has doubled down on export controls as the criteria for mandatory filing – the item must be on a controlled list and a license must be required for the particular foreign acquirer that is a party to the transaction.

The Significance of the Proposed Change in Mandatory Filing Requirement

Is this licensing requirement a meaningful distinction for foreign investors? While many of the items on these export control lists do require licenses or other authorizations for export, this is not necessarily the case for the export of all items to all countries for all uses. On some lists (e.g., the Munitions Lists), every article and service requires a license for export to all locations. On others (notably the Commerce List, the main list of “dual-use” technologies), items controlled are only licensable for certain countries and certain purposes to certain end-users, as designated on the list.

Overall, however, the universe of items on controlled lists versus those on the lists where licenses are required probably aren’t all that different – i.e., the range of mandatory filings is not very meaningfully limited by this change. Notably, for certain near-peer competitor countries like China and Russia, the distinction is particularly limited. Indeed, for these countries, many items on the Commerce List will require licenses in any event. Moreover, since China is under a U.S. arms embargo in place for many years, any export of an article or service on the Munitions List would certainly require a license (which would not be granted).

In any event, even if the new nexus to export license requirements narrows somewhat the class of critical technology transactions subject to mandatory declarations, this change is undoubtedly more than offset by the elimination of the required nexus to the 27 specified industries. Under the proposal, foreign acquisition of any U.S. business – regardless of what industry it works in – would require a mandatory declaration where the business utilizes critical technology provided that certain export licenses or other authorizations would be required to export such items to the foreign acquiring party.

On balance, this change is significant. It broadens the scope of the mandatory filing requirement to a wide variety of acquisitions involving critical technology applications from medical devices to commercial vehicles to a wide range of high tech sectors. Foreign investors thus would need to be considerably more diligent in considering the CFIUS risk with respect to structuring a broader range of these acquisitions.

Why the Expansion of the Mandatory Filing Requirement?

Why the expansion of mandatory declarations and does it relate to the pandemic?  CFIUS offers only vague explanations – noting its further consideration of public comments made in prior rulemakings, the Committee’s additional experience assessing mandatory declarations, and “other,” unnamed, national security considerations” [5].

One very possible set of such “national security considerations” is to afford CFIUS the ability to investigate a considerably broader range of transactions involving China where any critical technology requiring a license is involved. Since many dual-use items on the Commerce Control List and everything on the Munitions List do require licenses for China, the expansion of jurisdiction would be significant – as it applies without regard to the industry where the critical technology is used.

The logic of this expanded approach would be that, under Chinese laws and policies on civil-military fusion, any Chinese company, regardless of industry, could be required to divert the critical technology it is acquiring to the state sector for military use. Thus, it arguably makes sense for CFIUS to seek to examine these technology deals across the board.

This action also would be consistent with a range of other recent Administration actions during the Covid-19 crisis – from restrictions on participation in the U.S. bulk-power infrastructure to additional export control restrictions on Huawei – all of which appear to be focused on limiting U.S. high tech engagement with China.

Why now? The pandemic has raised the specter of foreign firms from potential adversaries buying sensitive assets at steep discounts. Numerous European governments are very focused on protecting sensitive assets against distress buying.  In this context, recent comments by Ms. Ellen Lord, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment, suggest concern that during the pandemic smaller U.S. companies that support the aerospace and defense sector could experience “significant financial fragility” and therefore be more vulnerable to acquisition by potential adversaries [6]. She also noted the prospect of “nefarious” acquisitions involving the use of shell companies during the pandemic and indicated a desire for CFIUS to have more authority to address these situations. Thus, it just may be that the proposed revision to the Regulations is an effort to address this felt DoD need.

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A partner in Eversheds-Sutherland, a global law firm, Mr. Bialos [1] previously served as Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Industrial Affairs and co-chairs the firm’s Aerospace and Defense practice.

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References

[1] A partner in Eversheds-Sutherland, a global law firm, Mr. Bialos previously served as Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Industrial Affairs and co-chairs the firm’s Aerospace and Defense practice.

[2] 85 Fed. Reg. 30893 (setting forth amendments to 31 C.F.R. §800). The mandatory filing requirements were established pursuant to the Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act of 2018 (“FIRRMA”).  The proposed amendments also make clarifying changes with respect to mandatory declarations in transactions involving foreign States. Specifically,  section 800.244 of the Regulations (see 85 Fed. Reg 30898) would, among other things, change the definition of “substantial interest” with respect to transactions where a general partner, managing member or the equivalent is involved, to clarify that the foreign state’s interest is only relevant it applies only where a general partner, managing member, or equivalent “primarily directs, controls or coordinates the activities” of the entity that is the acquiring party.  In effect, this change narrows to a limited extent the range of transactions with foreign government involvement where a mandatory declaration is required.

[3] CFIUS accomplishes this expansion through a series of technical amendments to the Regulations: Section 800.254 (defining U.S. “regulatory authorization” to refer to the types of export licenses that require mandatory declarations); section 800.256 (introducing the concept of “voting interest” to include foreign persons in the ownership chain that would need to be analyzed from an export control standpoint to determine if a license would be required to transfer the technology in question to that party); and 800.401 (which re-scopes the mandatory declaration requirement for critical technology transactions).  See 85 C.F.R. 30895-8.

[4] 31 c.f.r. § 800.215.

[5] 85 Fed. Reg. 3894.

[6] See Transcript, Press Briefing of Ellen Lord, Undersecretary of Defense (A&S) Ellen Lord on COVID-19 Response Efforts (April 30, 2020).   Available at: https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/Transcripts/Transcript/Article/2172171/undersecretary-of-defense-as-ellen-lord-holds-a-press-briefing-on-covid-19-resp/

sheepskin

China’s Sheepskin and Lambskin Market Is Estimated at $1.9B

IndexBox has just published a new report: ‘China – Sheepskin and Lambskin – Market Analysis, Forecast, Size, Trends and Insights’. Here is a summary of the report’s key findings.

The revenue of the sheepskin and lambskin market in China amounted to $1.9B in 2018, standing approx. at the previous year. This figure reflects the total revenues of producers and importers (excluding logistics costs, retail marketing costs, and retailers’ margins, which will be included in the final consumer price).

Production in China

In 2018, the sheepskin and lambskin production in China totaled 544K tonnes, flattening at the previous year. The total output volume increased at an average annual rate of +3.0% from 2013 to 2018; the trend pattern remained relatively stable, with somewhat noticeable fluctuations being observed in certain years. The growth pace was the most rapid in 2016 with an increase of 4.6% year-to-year. Over the period under review, sheepskin and lambskin production reached its maximum volume in 2018 and is expected to retain its growth in the near future.

Producing Animals in China

The number of animals slaughtered for sheepskin and lambskin production in China stood at 142M heads in 2018, remaining stable against the previous year. This number increased at an average annual rate of +1.8% from 2013 to 2018; the trend pattern remained consistent, with only minor fluctuations being observed in certain years. The growth pace was the most rapid in 2014 when the number of producing animals increased by 4.6% against the previous year. Over the period under review, this number attained its maximum level at 144M heads in 2016; however, from 2017 to 2018, producing animals failed to regain its momentum.

Yield in China

Average yield of sheep or lamb skins (without wool) in China totaled 3,842 kg per 1000 heads in 2018, standing approx. at the previous year. The yield figure increased at an average annual rate of +1.2% over the period from 2013 to 2018. Sheepskin and lambskin yield peaked in 2018 and is expected to retain its growth in the near future.

Imports into China

In 2018, approx. 311K tonnes of sheep or lamb skins (without wool) were imported into China; jumping by 2.2% against the previous year. Over the period under review, sheepskin and lambskin imports attained their peak figure at 313K tonnes in 2013; however, from 2014 to 2018, imports failed to regain their momentum.

In value terms, sheepskin and lambskin imports totaled $406M (IndexBox estimates) in 2018.

Imports by Country

In 2018, Australia (147K tonnes) constituted the largest supplier of sheepskin and lambskin to China, accounting for a 47% share of total imports. Moreover, sheepskin and lambskin imports from Australia exceeded the figures recorded by the second-largest supplier, New Zealand (51K tonnes), threefold. The third position in this ranking was occupied by the UK (45K tonnes), with a 15% share.

From 2013 to 2018, the average annual growth rate of volume from Australia was relatively modest. The remaining supplying countries recorded the following average annual rates of imports growth: New Zealand (+6.1% per year) and the UK (-4.5% per year).

In value terms, Australia ($238M) constituted the largest supplier of sheepskin and lambskin to China, comprising 59% of total sheepskin and lambskin imports. The second position in the ranking was occupied by New Zealand ($45M), with a 11% share of total imports. It was followed by the UK, with a 8.7% share.

From 2013 to 2018, the average annual rate of growth in terms of value from Australia totaled -4.1%. The remaining supplying countries recorded the following average annual rates of imports growth: New Zealand (-17.4% per year) and the UK (-22.5% per year).

Import Prices by Country

The average sheepskin and lambskin import price stood at $1,305 per tonne in 2018, jumping by 1.9% against the previous year. Over the period under review, the sheepskin and lambskin import price, however, continues to indicate a deep shrinkage. The growth pace was the most rapid in 2017 when the average import price increased by 5% against the previous year. Over the period under review, the average import prices for sheep or lamb skins (without wool) attained their peak figure at $2,230 per tonne in 2013; however, from 2014 to 2018, import prices remained at a lower figure.

Prices varied noticeably by the country of origin; the country with the highest price was Australia ($1,613 per tonne), while the price for the UK ($781 per tonne) was amongst the lowest.

From 2013 to 2018, the most notable rate of growth in terms of prices was attained by Australia, while the prices for the other major suppliers experienced a decline.

Source: IndexBox AI Platform

flatware

U.S. Is the World’s Largest Market for Imported Table Flatware ($515M), Comprising 21% of Global Imports

IndexBox has just published a new report: ‘World – Table Flatware – Market Analysis, Forecast, Size, Trends and Insights’. Here is a summary of the report’s key findings.

The global table flatware market revenue amounted to $6.3B in 2018, increasing by 3.8% against the previous year. This figure reflects the total revenues of producers and importers (excluding logistics costs, retail marketing costs, and retailers’ margins, which will be included in the final consumer price).

Global Exports 2013-2018

In 2018, approx. 340K tonnes of table flatware were exported worldwide; standing approx. at the previous year. In general, table flatware exports, however, continue to indicate a measured setback. The pace of growth was the most pronounced in 2017 with an increase of 7.6% y-o-y. Over the period under review, global table flatware exports attained their maximum at 380K tonnes in 2014; however, from 2015 to 2018, exports failed to regain their momentum.

In value terms, table flatware exports amounted to $2.7B (IndexBox estimates) in 2018.

Exports by Country

China dominates table flatware exports structure, amounting to 274K tonnes, which was approx. 81% of total exports in 2018. Viet Nam (9.6K tonnes), Germany (7.7K tonnes) and India (5.6K tonnes) followed a long way behind the leaders.

Exports from China decreased at an average annual rate of -2.4% from 2013 to 2018. At the same time, Viet Nam (+1.8%) displayed positive paces of growth. Moreover, Viet Nam emerged as the fastest-growing exporter exported in the world, with a CAGR of +1.8% from 2013-2018. Germany experienced a relatively flat trend pattern. By contrast, India (-7.0%) illustrated a downward trend over the same period. China (-10.5 p.p.) significantly weakened its position in terms of the global exports, while the shares of the other countries remained relatively stable throughout the analyzed period.

In value terms, China ($1.9B) remains the largest table flatware supplier worldwide, comprising 70% of global exports. The second position in the ranking was occupied by Viet Nam ($129M), with a 4.8% share of global exports. It was followed by Germany, with a 4.2% share.

In China, table flatware exports remained relatively stable over the period from 2013-2018. The remaining exporting countries recorded the following average annual rates of exports growth: Viet Nam (+0.7% per year) and Germany (-0.3% per year).

Export Prices by Country

In 2018, the average table flatware export price amounted to $7,997 per tonne, jumping by 4% against the previous year. Over the period from 2013 to 2018, it increased at an average annual rate of +2.2%. The pace of growth appeared the most rapid in 2015 an increase of 10% y-o-y. In that year, the average export prices for table flatware attained their peak level of $8,036 per tonne; afterwards, it flattened through to 2018.

There were significant differences in the average prices amongst the major exporting countries. In 2018, the country with the highest price was Germany ($14,767 per tonne), while China ($6,989 per tonne) was amongst the lowest.

From 2013 to 2018, the most notable rate of growth in terms of prices was attained by India, while the other global leaders experienced more modest paces of growth.

Global Imports 2013-2018

In 2018, the global imports of table flatware amounted to 328K tonnes, jumping by 3.7% against the previous year.

In value terms, table flatware imports amounted to $2.5B (IndexBox estimates) in 2018.

Imports by Country

In 2018, the U.S. (61K tonnes), distantly followed by Germany (15K tonnes) were the main importers of table flatware, together comprising 23% of total imports. The UK (14K tonnes), Indonesia (9.4K tonnes), the United Arab Emirates (8.7K tonnes), France (8.6K tonnes), Canada (8.5K tonnes), Iran (8.1K tonnes), the Philippines (7.9K tonnes), the Netherlands (7.6K tonnes), Spain (7.5K tonnes) and Iraq (7.4K tonnes) followed a long way behind the leaders.

Imports into the U.S. increased at an average annual rate of +1.5% from 2013 to 2018. At the same time, Indonesia (+22.3%), Iraq (+11.1%), Spain (+8.6%), the Netherlands (+5.6%) and the Philippines (+5.4%) displayed positive paces of growth. Moreover, Indonesia emerged as the fastest-growing importer imported in the world, with a CAGR of +22.3% from 2013-2018. Canada experienced a relatively flat trend pattern.

By contrast, the UK (-1.6%), Germany (-4.2%), France (-4.7%), the United Arab Emirates (-9.2%) and Iran (-11.2%) illustrated a downward trend over the same period. From 2013 to 2018, the share of Indonesia increased by +1.8% percentage points, while the United Arab Emirates (-1.7 p.p.) and Iran (-2 p.p.) saw their share reduced. The shares of the other countries remained relatively stable throughout the analyzed period.

In value terms, the U.S. ($515M) constitutes the largest market for imported table flatware worldwide, comprising 21% of global imports. The second position in the ranking was occupied by Germany ($176M), with a 7.1% share of global imports. It was followed by the UK, with a 4.6% share.

From 2013 to 2018, the average annual growth rate of value in the U.S. totaled +1.7%. In the other countries, the average annual rates were as follows: Germany (-2.5% per year) and the UK (-0.0% per year).

Import Prices by Country

The average table flatware import price stood at $7,533 per tonne in 2018, approximately reflecting the previous year. There were significant differences in the average prices amongst the major importing countries. In 2018, the country with the highest price was Germany ($11,354 per tonne), while Iran ($3,877 per tonne) was amongst the lowest.

From 2013 to 2018, the most notable rate of growth in terms of prices was attained by Iraq, while the other global leaders experienced more modest paces of growth.

Source: IndexBox AI Platform

global tea

Global Tea Market Overcame $25B, Growing Robustly Over the Last Decade

IndexBox has just published a new report: ‘World – Tea – Market Analysis, Forecast, Size, Trends and Insights’. Here is a summary of the report’s key findings.

The global tea market revenue amounted to $25.9B in 2018, picking up by 7.7% against the previous year. This figure reflects the total revenues of producers and importers (excluding logistics costs, retail marketing costs, and retailers’ margins, which will be included in the final consumer price). Overall, the total market indicated a strong growth from 2007 to 2018: its value increased at an average annual rate of +4.3% over that period. Global tea consumption peaked in 2018 and is likely to continue its growth in the immediate term.

Consumption By Country

China (2.3M tonnes) constituted the country with the largest volume of tea consumption, comprising approx. 35% of total volume. Moreover, tea consumption in China exceeded the figures recorded by the second-largest consumer, India (1.1M tonnes), twofold. Turkey (258K tonnes) ranked third in terms of total consumption with a 3.9% share.

From 2007 to 2018, the average annual growth rate of volume in China amounted to +9.2%. In the other countries, the average annual rates were as follows: India (+2.7% per year) and Turkey (+1.6% per year).

In value terms, China ($10.7B) led the market, alone. The second position in the ranking was occupied by India ($3.4B). It was followed by Turkey.

The countries with the highest levels of tea per capita consumption in 2018 were Kenya (4,903 kg per 1000 persons), Turkey (3,164 kg per 1000 persons) and Viet Nam (2,663 kg per 1000 persons).

Market Forecast 2019-2025

Driven by increasing demand for tea worldwide, the market is expected to continue an upward consumption trend over the next decade. Market performance is forecast to decelerate, expanding with an anticipated CAGR of +2.9% for the period from 2018 to 2030, which is projected to bring the market volume to 9.3M tonnes by the end of 2030.

Production 2007-2018

Global tea production totaled 6.7M tonnes in 2018, surging by 5.5% against the previous year. The total output volume increased at an average annual rate of +4.3% over the period from 2007 to 2018; however, the trend pattern indicated some noticeable fluctuations being recorded in certain years. The general positive trend in terms of tea output was largely conditioned by a strong expansion of the harvested area and a relatively flat trend pattern in yield figures.

Production By Country

The countries with the highest volumes of tea production in 2018 were China (2.7M tonnes), India (1.4M tonnes) and Kenya (740K tonnes), together accounting for 71% of global production.

From 2007 to 2018, the most notable rate of growth in terms of tea production, amongst the main producing countries, was attained by China, while tea production for the other global leaders experienced more modest paces of growth.

Harvested Area 2007-2018

In 2018, approx. 4.2M ha of tea were harvested worldwide; picking up by 4% against the previous year. The harvested area increased at an average annual rate of +3.6% over the period from 2007 to 2018, which largely made the strong growth of tea production feasible.

Yield 2007-2018

In 2018, the global average tea yield stood at 1.6 tonne per ha, stabilizing at the previous year. Over the period under review, the tea yield continues to indicate a relatively flat trend pattern.

Exports 2007-2018

In 2018, the global tea exports stood at 2M tonnes, increasing by 4.1% against the previous year. The total export volume increased at an average annual rate of +1.4% over the period from 2007 to 2018; the trend pattern remained consistent, with only minor fluctuations throughout the analyzed period. In value terms, tea exports stood at $8.4B (IndexBox estimates) in 2018.

Exports by Country

The exports of the four major exporters of tea, namely Kenya, China, Sri Lanka and India, represented more than two-thirds of total export. The following exporters – Viet Nam (77K tonnes), Argentina (74K tonnes), Indonesia (49K tonnes), Malawi (43K tonnes) and the United Arab Emirates (34K tonnes) – together made up 14% of total exports.

From 2007 to 2018, the most notable rate of growth in terms of exports, amongst the main exporting countries, was attained by India, while exports for the other global leaders experienced more modest paces of growth.

In value terms, China ($1.7B), Sri Lanka ($1.6B) and Kenya ($1.4B) appeared to be the countries with the highest levels of exports in 2018, together accounting for 56% of global exports.

Export Prices by Country

The average tea export price stood at $4,134 per tonne in 2018, going up by 3.3% against the previous year. Over the period from 2007 to 2018, it increased at an average annual rate of +3.6%.

There were significant differences in the average prices amongst the major exporting countries. In 2018, the country with the highest price was the United Arab Emirates ($8,419 per tonne), while Argentina ($1,254 per tonne) was amongst the lowest.

From 2007 to 2018, the most notable rate of growth in terms of export prices was attained by China, while the other global leaders experienced more modest paces of growth.

Imports 2007-2018

In 2018, the amount of tea imported worldwide amounted to 2M tonnes, rising by 3.6% against the previous year. The total import volume increased at an average annual rate of +1.4% from 2007 to 2018; the trend pattern remained relatively stable, with somewhat noticeable fluctuations in certain years. In value terms, tea imports amounted to $7.7B (IndexBox estimates) in 2018.

Imports by Country

The imports of the twelve major importers of tea, namely Pakistan, Russia, the UK, the U.S., Egypt, Iran, the United Arab Emirates, Viet Nam, Germany, Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Poland, represented more than half of total import.

From 2007 to 2018, the most notable rate of growth in terms of imports, amongst the main importing countries, was attained by Viet Nam (+50.2% per year), while imports for the other global leaders experienced more modest paces of growth.

In value terms, Pakistan ($570M), Russia ($497M) and the U.S. ($487M) appeared to be the countries with the highest levels of imports in 2018, with a combined 20% share of global imports. The UK, Iran, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Germany, Iraq, Viet Nam and Poland lagged somewhat behind, together comprising a further 31%.

Import Prices by Country

In 2018, the average tea import price amounted to $3,878 per tonne, jumping by 1.9% against the previous year. Over the last eleven years, it increased at an average annual rate of +3.3%.

There were significant differences in the average prices amongst the major importing countries. In 2018, the country with the highest price was Saudi Arabia ($6,921 per tonne), while Viet Nam ($2,062 per tonne) was amongst the lowest.

From 2007 to 2018, the most notable rate of growth in terms of import prices was attained by Egypt, while the other global leaders experienced more modest paces of growth.

Source: IndexBox AI Platform