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OFAC Issues Venezuela General License 8G Extending Authorization of Certain Transactions for U.S. Oil & Gas Companies

8G

OFAC Issues Venezuela General License 8G Extending Authorization of Certain Transactions for U.S. Oil & Gas Companies

The U.S. Department of Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (“OFAC”) issued General License 8G (“GL 8G”), which authorizes five (5) U.S. oil and gas companies to engage in transactions “ordinarily incident and necessary to the limited maintenance of essential operations, contracts or other agreements”, as well as transactions necessary to the wind-down of operations in Venezuela involving Petroleos de Venezuela, S.A. (“PdVSA”) or any entity which PdVSA owns a 50% or greater interest and that were in effect prior to July 26, 2019.

Effective November 17, 2020, GL 8G replaces and supersedes GL 8F which was set to expire on December 1, 2020, effectively extending its deadline through 12:01 eastern daylight time on June 3, 2021. GL 8G applies specifically to the following entities and their subsidiaries: Chevron Corporation, Halliburton, Schlumberger Ltd., Baker Hughes (a GE company), and Weatherford International, PLC.

Notably, GL 8G does not authorize the drilling, lifting, processing of, purchase or sale of, or transport or shipping of any Venezuelan-origin petroleum or petroleum products. It does not authorize the provision or receipt of insurance for such transactions/activities, or any work on oil wells or other infrastructure for the provision of goods or services. The GL also does not authorize the payment of a dividend, the provision of any loans to PdVSA, or any other transaction/activity otherwise prohibited by the Venezuela Sanctions Regulations (“VSR”).

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Cortney O’Toole Morgan is a Washington D.C.-based partner with the law firm Husch Blackwell LLP. She leads the firm’s International Trade & Supply Chain group.

Grant Leach is an Omaha-based partner with the law firm Husch Blackwell LLP focusing on international trade, export controls, trade sanctions and anti-corruption compliance.

Camron Greer is an Assistant Trade Analyst in Husch Blackwell LLP’s Washington D.C. office.

military end user

Unpacking U.S.-China Sanctions and Export Control Regulations: The China “Military End Use” and “Military End User” Rule and the Department of Defense List

This is the second in a series of articles by Eversheds Sutherland partners Jeff Bialos and Ginger Faulk explaining the legal and regulatory impacts of certain recent US sanctions and export control actions targeting various Chinese entities. Each article explains the regulatory context of the recent rules. Recognizing that this is a highly charged political topic, the article does not condone or promote any governmental actions discussed here but is only explanatory in nature.

As part of the overall realignment of US national security strategy toward China, the US government has taken a series of actions this year to target the Chinese military sector through sanctions and export controls imposed against a range of Chinese companies. The recent promulgation of the expanded China “military end-use” and “military end user” rule mark an expansion of a longstanding US policy to bar certain exports of US “dual-use” goods and technologies that can contribute to China’s military capability. This, combined with the recent release by the Department of Defense of a list of companies considered to be “owned or controlled” by the Chinese military – pursuant to a 20-year-old law – signals increased US government pressure on China and its firms that are viewed as instruments of the Chinese government. These rules together threaten to limit significantly the availability of “dual-use” US goods and technology to Chinese companies on the list.

Unpacking the China “Military End User” Rule

A recent amendment to the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) targeting a broader range of “military end-uses” and “military end-users” in China is designed to curtail exports and re-exports of a range of US origin “dual-use” technology, software, and goods to China’s private sector but only where the private sector end-user is determined to support the Chinese military. Per the US Commerce Department, the new rule “will require increased diligence with respect to the evaluation of end-users in China, particularly in view of China’s widespread civil-military integration.”

Previously, the rule applied only when the item was intended for military end-use, e.g., incorporation into a military end-item. The new rule now expands this approach beyond exports for military end-use, and now requires an export license for exports or transfers of listed items to China if the item is intended entirely OR in part for a “military end-user” in these countries. Under this expanded control, the rule potentially proscribes exports and re-exports not only to the military (e.g., the Peoples Liberation Army (“PLA”)) but also to police, national guard, intelligence organizations and “any person or entity whose actions or functions are intended to support ‘military end-uses.’” In other words, an export of a subject item to a private sector company which also contracts with the Chinese government could be prohibited even if the item itself is neither destined for the military (defined in a traditional sense) nor for a military application.

In addition, the new rule expands the definition of “military end-use” by no longer just restricting exports for “the use, development, production of, or incorporation into” military items, but now also extending to an export that “supports or contributes to the operation, installation, maintenance, repair, overhaul, refurbishing, ‘development,’ or ‘production’ of military items.” A subject item that supports even one of these functions triggers the “military end-use” rule.

The rule also adds products to the scope of the rule under the categories of materials processing, electronics, telecommunications, information security, sensors and lasers, and propulsion. Importantly, now subject to the rule are 5G-capable microprocessors, devices, and components. Finally, the new rule subjects certain exports to China to new country-based licensing controls under a “regional stability” control.

Heightened Due Diligence Obligations for Exporters of Goods, Software and Technologies

Significantly, the new “military end user” rule imposes a broader obligation on US exporters to identify potential military links of Chinese counterparts and assure against diversion of technology to the Chinese military. It places the burden on US exporters to not only (i) determine the end-user of subject items, even if those items are transferred to a third country, but also to (ii) evaluate and determine whether the identified end-user would be considered a “military end user” by virtue of potential links with Chinese military agencies. This applies to exports of all subject items (e.g., 5G devices and certain electrical components, among others) regardless of how the export in question will ultimately be used.

In practical terms, this means enhanced due diligence to identify potential military affiliations of Chinese and third-country customers, distributors, procurement agents, and other intermediaries with respect to all dual-use exports to China. It also means re-evaluating technology sharing arrangements between US companies and Chinese joint venture partners such as commercial partners, research institutes, and academic institutions.

Note, the EAR controls apply not just to US goods and equipment but also foreign manufactured goods and equipment that incorporate US-origin content. The “dual-use” items that are subject to the military end-user rule are listed by category at Supplement No. 2 to the EAR 15 CFR Part 744 and include certain controlled materials and materials processing equipment, telecommunications equipment and software (e.g., 5G technologies), sensors and laser technology, and marine and space vessels. So, technology and software companies in any country whose products rely on these US technologies face a binary choice: either to police China business partners for even tangential connections to the military sector or divorce their China supply chains and technology/software flows from the US.

The PLA/DoD List

Similarly, on June 25th, 2020, the US Department of Defense (DoD) issued a list of 20 “communist Chinese military companies” operating in the US that meet the criteria of section 1237 of the National Defense Authorization Act (“NDAA”) for FY 1999. Eleven new additions to the list were issued on August 28, 2020. [1] Companies on these lists include massive Chinese state-owned companies in the aerospace, construction and engineering, chemical, electronics, nuclear, telecommunications, and other sectors. The issuance of this list and the Commerce Department’s new end-user” rules are connected in that this list of companies is likely to guide determinations under the EAR “military end user” rule and the direction of future US-China sanctions actions. The DoD List may be a natural place for the US government to start in identifying Chinese “military end-users” subject to further restriction. Thus the implications for US technology partnerships with Chinese companies in these are potentially quite significant.

In 1999, Congress enacted a provision authorizing the DoD to issue a list of “communist Chinese military companies” operating in the US that are “owned or controlled by the People’s Liberation Army” and are “engaged in providing commercial services, manufacturing, production or exporting.”

On June 24, 2020, nearly 22 years later, DoD finally issued the list. This was in response to a letter sent by a bipartisan group of Senators to Secretary of Defense Mark Esper requesting that DoD issue the list as a tool to confront China and its stated strategy of “military-civilian fusion” to achieve its national objectives. The DoD compiled the list of companies that support the Chinese military as the basis for subsequent US policy actions to address the competitive Chinese threat. The specific risks under consideration included: 1) the transfer of “dual-use” technology to these companies that could, in turn, be used for military purposes given their relationships with the PLA; and 2) the supply chain risks associated with the participation of these companies in US supply chains (e.g., through providing equipment such as semiconductors). Such supply chain risks include the risks that such Chinese firms could introduce malevolent software into US products or use its equipment as a basis for surveillance (i.e., espionage).

It should be recognized that the companies on the DoD List by no means encompass the universe of Chinese government-owned or controlled companies, as there are numerous such state-owned or controlled companies not on the DoD List. Rather, the focus is on companies considered to be owned or controlled by the PLA itself. Further, the term “control,” as used in this context, appears to be broad in scope and seems to be utilized by DoD to reach companies that have some significant engagement with the PLA (i.e., where it might be the case that the PLA supervises or directs some functional activity or area at the company). In this regard, there are at least several companies on the DoD list not generally considered to be government-owned or controlled, let alone PLA owned or controlled in a traditional sense—a small number of which are publicly traded. Thus, in these circumstances, the “control” must relate to some functional areas of engagement.  For example, in the case of Huawei, the control might arguably relate to the idea that the PLA can direct Huawei to utilize its platforms and equipment for surveillance or other activities.

Notably, being listed on the DoD list has no direct and immediate legal consequences for the listed companies. However, the law does make it easier for the president to impose sanctions. Once a company is on the section 1237 list, the president can impose the full array of economic sanctions without any additional finding, including prohibitions on US persons doing business with that company, export restrictions, and the like. Note also that the president can also impose an import ban on companies on the DoD list upon declaring an international economic emergency – an action that, if undertaken, is not subject to challenge in federal courts.

Further, as noted above, the recent listings of Chinese companies on the DoD List are likely to lead to additional export control restrictions on the named parties under the new Commerce rule that requires licenses, and establishes a “presumption of denial” policy, for exports, re-exports, or transfers (in-country) of certain products and technologies to Chinese “military end-users.” Since this new rule defines “military end-users” to include any “person or entity whose actions or functions are intended to support ‘military end uses,” it is reasonably likely that Commerce will find that parties listed on the DoD list would be considered a military “end-user,” and as such, any license applications for covered products and technologies will be subject to a presumption of denial.    

Finally, the list is a tool that can generally build pressure on China. In releasing the list, DoD officials observed that “As the People’s Republic of China attempts to blur the lines between civil and military sectors, ‘knowing your supplier’ is critical … We envision this list will be used as a tool for the US government, companies, investors, academic institutions and like-minded parties to conduct due diligence with regard to partnerships with these entities….”

In conclusion, while the DoD/PLA list itself has no direct legal effect, in combination with the EAR’s military end-user rule, it signals a US desire to limit the availability of “dual-use” American technologies to these companies. To comply with the rule exporters and re-exporters of the listed US technologies must conduct heightened diligence of Chinese SOE end-users and will require a US export license where an end-user also uses, develops or produces items for the Chinese military. This places the impetus on the Chinese companies to demonstrate to US exporters and to the US government that, as applicable: 1) there is sufficient separation between subsidiaries with defense-related operations and those engaged in purely commercial activities; or 2) for those with purely commercial operations, they are not providing US-based dual-use products or technologies to support China’s military.

In some circumstances, it also means that Chinese companies on the list may be forced to look elsewhere (outside of the United States) for the equivalent non-US technologies and products and restructure their supply chains accordingly. Notably, the US position places it as an outlier among allied Western governments. If the US has a new President in 2021, we would expect to see a more multilateral approach on these and other China-related trade issues.

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[1] Both lists are available here.

Jeffrey P.  Bialos, partner at Eversheds Sutherland, assists clients in making multi-faceted business decisions, structuring transactions and complying with complex regulatory requirements. As former Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Industrial Affairs, he brings deep experience in defense, homeland security and national security matters, including antitrust, procurement, export controls, industrial security and the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.

Ginger T. Faulk, partner at Eversheds Sutherland, represents multinational companies in matters involving US government regulation of foreign trade and investment. She has extensive experience advising and representing global companies, counseling clients in matters arising under US sanctions, export controls, import and other national security and foreign policy trade-related regulations.

gas

The Next Big Disruption of the Supply Chain Network

Turkey and Greece Clash Over Oil and Gas in the Eastern Mediterranean: 14 Actions to Take to Keep Your Cargo Moving and Your Supply Chain Agile and Resilient.

While the Mediterranean Sea as a whole has been the center of oil and gas explorations, it is in the Eastern Mediterranean Sea that massive gas fields exist. “According to a 2010 study by the US Geological Survey, the Eastern Mediterranean could hold as much as 122 trillion cubic feet of natural gas in total, equivalent to the reserves of Iraq.” However, the discovery of oil and natural gas in the region has reignited territorial conflicts between Turkey and Greece, both of whom are members of NATO.

Turkey has always felt that the Treaties of Sèvres and Lausanne were not only humiliating but that they stripped the country of valuable territory which is now very promising financially, economically, and logistically. In addition to Turkey and Greece, the discovery of gas affects Cyprus, Lebanon, Israel, Syria, Jordan, Egypt, and Libya. But for Turkey especially, it could be a means to leverage itself into a much stronger regional power.

In addition, Turkey felt that excluding it from the regional energy development talks in the Eastern Mediterranean, was a slap in the face. As a result, both Turkey and Greece are boosting their military presence in the Eastern Mediterranean Sea. There is no doubt that 2 events emboldened Turkey’s actions; the world is busy fighting the coronavirus and the strides made in technological advancement which made manufacturing and acquiring weapons a lot cheaper than what it used to be.

BCOs (Beneficial Cargo Owners) operating in this geopolitical climate should consider these long- term strategies:

-Rethink your supply chains by examining the geographical locations, financial and logistical strengths, weaknesses, agility, and resiliency of your suppliers.

-Add 2 to 3 weeks to your transit times. This will protect you from unexpected weather delays, blank sailings, removal of ships from service, or even the cancellation of sailings altogether if the conflict escalates and waterways and bridges are closed.

-Increase your lead time and inventory level, which may seem expensive at first, but will actually be less expensive in the long run, when you will be forced to resort to shipping by air in order to maintain high service levels and promises to customers.

-Review and revise your forecasts weekly.

-Increase your buffer stock and inventory when necessary; doing so won’t necessarily reduce your cash flow if you negotiate good credit terms with your suppliers.

-Build-in your budget increases in spend on ocean freight rates, BAF, and WRS.

-Assume the worst-case scenario and have alternative procurement sources should sanctions be imposed or should war break out.

-Account for the increases in duty should the alternative suppliers be located in countries subject to higher duty rates.

-Make sure that your cargo carries additional insurance coverage to mitigate war risk.

-Avoid the carriers whose ships carry the flag of the conflicting countries.

-Monitor the financial stability of all links in the value chain frequently, especially the stability of ocean carriers given the consolidations and reorganizations that have been taking place lately.

-Make sure that the air freight cost is accounted for and that your customer will accept the additional charges should you have to resort to airlift any cargo. Having these contingency plans negotiated and agreed upon in advance will eliminate delays, surprises, and even possible plant closures due to last-minute disagreements.

-Communicate, plan, and execute with internal and external stakeholders frequently. Constant communication cannot be emphasized enough. So is the frequent evaluation of all suppliers and service providers for products, services, and contract revisions if necessary due to the volatility and complexity of today’s supply chains.

-Stay abreast of events in the whole Middle East region given the daily geopolitical developments some of which may affect the movement of cargo between that region and the world.

This is a conflict that, at first sight, seems to be between Turkey and Greece but, in reality, it’s much more complicated than that because now the USA and the EU are involved. As a matter of fact, the EU is considering sanctions against Turkey.

The best course of action would be for the clashing countries to renegotiate the treaties that caused their grievances including but not limited to their territorial waters and the Law of the Sea.

Lastly, the latest military escalation was not the result of the discovery of gas only as it carries within its centuries of territorial and religious conflicts. Most importantly, this is happening between Turkey and Greece who at one time were glorious empires and who are intent on bringing that glory back.

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Omar Kazzaz specializes in business strategy, BPI (Business Process Improvement) as well as supply chain design, planning and execution. He has 28 years of experience in international business, global logistics and supply chain.   

Mr. Kazzaz is a long-standing member of the Global Thinkers Roundtable. In addition, he has been involved in numerous panel discussions on global trade and global logistics. His comments and articles on international trade agreements, global manufacturing and supply chain have been quoted in many publications. 

Mr. Kazzaz holds an MBA in International Management from Thunderbird, The American Graduate School of International Management in Glendale, AZ, and a BA in German and Economics from The University of North Carolina at Charlotte. Besides his native Arabic language, Mr. Kazzaz speaks French and German. 

export controls

The Effects of COVID-19 on Sanctions and Export Controls

The global outbreak of the novel COVID-19 virus and resulting pandemic have disrupted nearly all fields of commerce throughout the world. While the situation continues to develop and has had broader implications, the effect both on U.S. and EU sanctions and export control policies is notable. We summarize below some of the changes to U.S. sanctions and export controls that have occurred in recent weeks in response to the pandemic. We also present the European response to this crisis with respect to export control regulations. Because the situation is dynamic, compliance professionals should continue to monitor further developments closely.

The U.S. Response to COVID-19

Favorable Licensing for COVID-19 Related Goods and Services for the Time Being

For the time being, many items related to the coronavirus response are subject to general authorization and otherwise favorable review standards. Already the U.S. government has issued general licenses to facilitate the provision of humanitarian goods to Iran, where the virus has had a devastating impact. Specifically, on February 27, 2020, the U.S. Department of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control (“OFAC”) – the U.S. agency responsible for administering and enforcing most U.S. sanctions – issued General License 8. That general license authorizes payments and related transactions involving the Central Bank of Iran for exports of food, medicine, and medical devices. The general license builds upon several existing authorizations, which are summarized in a new Frequently Asked Question issued on March 6, 2020, and broadly permits certain donations and other humanitarian aid to Iran, so long as the recipients are not the Government of Iran, Specially Designated Nationals, or otherwise prohibited parties.

To date, there have been no similar general licenses issued by the U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security (“BIS”), which is the U.S. agency responsible for dual-use export controls on goods and technology. For the time being, we anticipate that license requests for COVID-19 related items that would require authorization from BIS will generally be reviewed favorably by the agency, consistent with the policy underlying OFAC’s General License 8. In particular, on February 7, 2020, BIS issued guidance specifying that the COVID-19 virus is classified as EAR99, meaning that samples of the virus subject to the EAR (by, for example, being present in the United States) generally may be exported, re-exported, or transferred to most countries without a destination-based license. This is notable because the related virus from the SARS outbreak in 2003 is classified under ECCN 1C351.a.46, which is subject to more stringent licensing requirements. The current classification of the COVID-19 virus as EAR99 could, therefore, more easily facilitate international research on treatments and vaccines for the virus.

However, as the crisis continues to unfold, if certain essential resources become globally scarce – such as respirators and certain medicines – it is possible that BIS could control such items under its existing powers applicable to goods in “short supply,” which are described in Part 754 of the Export Administration Regulations. In the immediate aftermath of the outbreak, a number of countries around the world instituted unilateral trade controls on medical equipment and other supplies needed to respond to the pandemic.  Indeed, according to one report, as of March 21, 2020, at least 54 governments had instituted such controls. In addition, following restrictions by some individual member states, the EU instituted a license requirement for the export of personal protective equipment. Other counties – including Russia, Turkey, and India – have imposed similar restrictions or outright bans on export. The White House is also reportedly drafting a “Buy American” executive order intended to bring pharmaceutical and medical supply manufacturing back to the United States, but has been met with opposition within the administration.  In addition, on April 3, 2020, the White House used the Defense Production Act to block U.S.-based 3M from exporting surgical face masks abroad, signaling perhaps a more aggressive approach towards controls on items used to contain the outbreak.

Timing Delays

With the metropolitan Washington, D.C. area and other major cities throughout the United States subject to shelter-in-place orders, all but essential government employees have moved their work from their normal physical locations to home.  Inefficiencies, distractions, and family needs could delay and expand the review timelines of license applications and other requests for authorization. If a large number of the personnel responsible for license reviews or their immediate family members become ill, delays could be extended even further.

In addition, even for exports or re-exports that are authorized, finding available shippers and freight forwarders may prove challenging, with many non-essential shipments being delayed to free up supply-chain resources necessary to effectively respond to the pandemic. Shippers, such as FedEx, have reduced their capacity in response to the slowing economy, and have suspended their service guarantees in anticipation of delays.

Further, ongoing regulatory objectives may be put on pause or delayed. In particular, the Export Control Reform Act of 2018 directed BIS (in conjunction with the Departments of Defense, Energy, State, and other agencies as appropriate) to define the terms “emerging technologies” and “foundational technologies,” and to impose controls on such technologies that are “essential to the national security of the United States.” In late 2018, BIS issued an Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking to solicit comments on the criteria that should be considered in defining “emerging technology,” and recently – in January 2020 – issued an interim rule with the first restrictions applicable to artificial intelligence software. A proposed definition for “emerging technology” had been expected by the end of 2019, but it is likely that the COVID-19 crisis will result in further delay of additional rulemaking on this issue.

Enforcement Remains Steady

Nevertheless, enforcement activity – at least throughout the early part of the crisis – has continued. For example, during the week of March 16, 2020 alone, OFAC took three separate enforcement actions to designate nearly twenty parties involved in exporting Iranian petroleum products. Similarly, on March 26, 2020, U.S. Department of Justice announced that a federal grand jury had indicted Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro on drug trafficking and money-laundering charges, even as courts across the country began to close and suspend proceedings in response to the crisis.  The devastating effect that the virus has had thus far in Iran in particular has drawn international pressure for the U.S. to lift sanctions targeting that country and others, with one of the most prominent calls coming on March 31, 2020, from the UN Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food. However, Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin vowed, “The Trump administration will continue to target and isolate those who support the Iranian regime.”

It is therefore imperative that companies remain vigilant in their compliance efforts, even while juggling a myriad of unprecedented and difficult challenges. In particular, employees working from home should exercise care, especially when utilizing technical data subject to export controls, to avoid inadvertent “deemed” exports to unauthorized persons. Compliance officers should also stress that companies’ compliance procedures – such as screening and third-party due diligence – remain in effect throughout the crisis.

The EU’s Response to COVID-19

In response to the crisis, EU Member States have aimed to protect the supply of goods and technologies within the medical and healthcare sector at the country level, while at the same time regulating EU exports to third countries at the European level.

The EU’s Limitations on Export Restrictions Between Its Member States

According to Article 168 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (“TFEU”), public health falls within the jurisdiction of Member States themselves. Member States are therefore, in principle, free to organize and supply their healthcare systems as they see fit.

However, EU action can, by its own terms, “supplement” and “support” these national policies. As such, Article 4 of the TFEU and Article 168 of the TFEU provide for shared jurisdiction between the EU and Member States on common security and public health issues. This shared jurisdiction includes such issues as disease prevention, combating major health scourges, and combating serious cross-border threats to health. Nevertheless, it should be noted that the EU’s ability to legislate and adopt legally binding texts on these matters is limited to those that do not require legislative or regulatory harmonization of Member States’ national laws.

For their part, Member States have the obligation to respect the fundamental principle of the free movement of goods within the single EU market, as provided for in Articles 26 and 28 to 37 of the TFEU, and barriers to the trade of goods may only be re-established in certain circumstances, such as the protection of public health.

In this vein, since the beginning of the health crisis in Europe, several countries, including France and Germany, have taken national measures introducing requisitions of personal protective equipment (“PPE”) – which includes equipment such as masks, protective goggles and visors, face shields, oral-nasal protective equipment and protective clothing – and restrictions on the export of this PPE. For example, France seized all stocks of anti-projection and FFP2 type surgical masks from national producers and distributors, and then extended this requisition to other types of surgical masks. These national requisitions have de facto restricted all exports of masks outside French and German territories.

To respond to this seeming retreat within national boundaries, and in order to ensure the free movement of goods between Member States, the EU has reacted twofold: to provide a coordinated response to the health crisis and ensure unhindered access to medical supplies within the EU.

First, on March 13, 2020, the European Commission reminded the French and German governments, without naming them directly, that “[i]t is essential to act together to secure production, stocking, availability and rational use of medical protective equipment and medicines in the EU, openly and transparently, rather than taking unilateral measures that restrict the free movement of essential healthcare goods.”  In so doing, Brussels therefore called upon the crucial importance of solidarity between Member States during the current health crisis.

Second, the Commission issued new guidelines on border management measures to protect public health and ensure the availability of essential goods and services. The text emphasizes that “[t]he coronavirus crisis has highlighted the challenge of protecting the health of the population whilst avoiding disruptions to the free movement of persons, and the delivery of goods and essential services across Europe.” The EU, through these guidelines, thus reminded its Member States that safeguarding the functioning of the single market is essential to address shortages that would exacerbate the social and economic difficulties Member States are already experiencing.

In response to the Commission’s call, France and Germany decided to withdraw their restrictive measures on transfers of PPE to ensure that “the [PPE] equipment held goes where it is needed, to patients, doctors, hospitals, health care staff, etc.” By way of example, at the end of March, France and Germany each sent more than a million masks and 200,000 protective suits to Italy.

Export restrictions between EU Member States and third countries

The Commission has adopted Regulations (EU) 2020/402 and (EU) 2020/426, requiring PPE exports from the EU to non-EU states to be subject to prior authorization by the competent authorities of the Member States.

This measure is applicable for a period of six weeks starting on March 15, 2020. However, exports to Norway, Iceland, Liechtenstein, and Switzerland, as well as to the Overseas Countries and Territories (i.e., those countries identified in Annex II of the TFEU which are described in Article 198 of the TFEU as “non-European countries and territories which have special relations with Denmark, France, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom”), the Faroe Islands, Andorra, San Marino and Vatican City, will not be subject to these restrictions.

In France, it is the Service des Biens à Double Usage (i.e., the French Dual-Use Goods Agency, the “SBDU,” attached to the Ministry of the Economy), that has been designated by the Commission as the authority for issuing export authorizations for the medical protection goods listed in the Schedule to Regulation 2020/402 of March 13, 2020. The SBDU is authorized to receive applications, organize the administrative process, and make licensing decisions according to the criteria set out in the aforementioned Regulation.

Conclusion

The COVID-19 outbreak presents new and unprecedented challenges. Its effect on the U.S., EU and international approach to sanctions and export controls may be felt for months or even years to come. While the crisis is still in its early stages, compliance professionals should monitor developments daily, ensuring their respective companies are continuing to maintain appropriate risk-based compliance efforts.

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By Ryan Fayhee, Roy (Ruoweng) Liu, Alan G. Kashdan, Olivier Dorgans, Tyler Grove and Camille Mayet at Hughes Hubbard & Reed LLP

humanitarian

ECONOMIC SANCTIONS EXEMPT HUMANITARIAN TRADE

Ailing Relations

Iran has been among the worst affected countries from COVID-19, having emerged as an early hotspot outside China. As of April 7, there were an estimated 62,589 confirmed cases with over 3,800 deaths. Iran’s cases appear to have peaked in late March, but exact numbers are unknown due to the secretive nature of its totalitarian regime. Other countries throughout the Middle East began reporting cases in late February and continue to battle spread of COVID-19 due to travel linked to Iran.

U.S. offers of assistance were rejected by Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who said publicly on March 22, “You might give us a medicine that would spread the disease even more or make it last longer.”

According to the U.S. State Department, the United States has offered more than $100 million in medical assistance to foreign countries, including to the Iranian people, and reports that Iranian health companies have been able to import testing kits without obstacle from U.S. sanctions since January. The U.S. government has urged Iranian leaders to be more truthful about its efforts to contain the virus.

Iran assistance

Humanitarian Trade Exemptions

U.S. economic sanctions against Iran include a general exemption for U.S. exports of agricultural commodities, food, medicines and medical devices to Iran and an authorization process to obtain licenses for a specific list of medical supplies and equipment not covered under the general exemption. Such licenses are usually given for one year.

The U.S. government recently reinforced its messaging that sanctions are directed at the Iranian regime, stating: “[Sanctions] are not directed at the people of Iran, who themselves are victims of the regime’s oppression, corruption, and economic mismanagement.”

A 2019 Congressional Research Service report suggests U.S. sanctions have limited access by the Iranian population to “expensive Western-made medicines such as chemotherapy drugs,” due to a lack of bank financing for such transactions and that the limited supplies that exist have gone to elites.

Role of Financing

Between 2018 and 2019, overall U.S. trade with Iran went from small to very small under tightened sanctions. In 2018, U.S. exports to Iran were valued at $425.7 million. In 2019, U.S. exports had decreased 82 percent to $73.1 million.

Underlying that decrease in trade, even of humanitarian-related goods and services, reflects a tendency toward over-compliance by banks and multinational firms that avoid transactions with Iran to minimize possible violations of U.S. sanctions. Doing so, even inadvertently, could cut off their access to vital U.S. financial markets. The U.S. government has also explicitly cited concerns about the Iranian regime’s abuse of humanitarian trade to evade sanctions and launder money.

To close these loopholes, in October 2019 the Treasury Department announced a new payment mechanism “to facilitate legitimate humanitarian exports to Iran.” The measure restricts the role of the Central Bank of Iran in facilitating humanitarian trade, which the U.S. government views as financing terrorism. It also imposes rigorous reporting requirements to thwart diversion of funds intended for humanitarian use.

By late February 2020, as the COVID-19 medical crisis unfolded in Iran, the U.S. Treasury Department issued a general license authorizing certain humanitarian trade transactions involving the Central Bank of Iran while also approving the use of a Swiss financial channel to finance such transactions.

The Swiss Humanitarian Trade Arrangement (SHTA) enables Swiss-based exporters and trading companies in the food, pharmaceutical and medical sectors to access a secure payment channel with a Swiss bank to guarantee payments for their exports to Iran. Novartis was the first Swiss company to send medicine for use in cancer treatments. Germany, France and Britain have also used this new channel to offer a $5.5 million package to Iran to help fight the coronavirus.

exemptions in sanctions

Trade in Food and Medicine

Much has been written recently about governments restricting exports and otherwise increasing the cost of traded medical supplies during the pandemic.

For two decades now, the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000 (TSRA) has ensured that each U.S. country-based sanctions program provides for trade of agriculture, medicine and medical devices under a broad humanitarian exemption. This is intended to limit potential adverse effects on civilian populations who are not the target of sanctions.

The United Nations Security Council maintains 14 active sanctions programs that also include humanitarian exemptions driven by the belief that a supportive and healthy citizen population is necessary to achieve improvements in a sanctioned regime.

Recently, the United Nations Security Council approved a humanitarian exemption to sanctions against North Korea (DPRK) requested by the World Health Organization for diagnostic and medical equipment to address COVID-19. The United States supported this decision.

Exemptions Thwarted by Totalitarian Regimes

The health impacts of embargoes are difficult to isolate and quantify. They may not become apparent until years after resource shortages occur. Domestic production challenges can also play a role. For example, Iran produces 97 percent of its medicines locally, but a third of these drugs rely on active ingredients that are imported, according to the head of Iran’s Food and Drug Organization.

Although humanitarian trade exemptions are intended to mitigate shortages of essential supplies, totalitarian regimes are known for putting their goals before the needs of their citizens. The negative impacts of sanctions are often compounded by inequitable distribution or outright theft of essential goods and ongoing civil conflicts.

In any case, it’s difficult to know the net effect of sanctions and humanitarian trade exemptions because data on key indicators of health effects are often missing or unavailable from embargoed regimes. However, it is clear that enabling trade in essential goods like food and medical supplies has served a role in health diplomacy for decades.

During her career in international trade and government affairs, the author worked with pharmaceutical and medical device manufacturers to navigate U.S. sanctions policies and requirements.

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Sarah Smiley is a strategic communications and policy expert with over 20 years in international trade and government affairs, working in the U.S. Government, private sector and international organizations.

This article originally appeared on TradeVistas.org. Republished with permission.

cosco

U.S. Lifts Sanctions on Cosco Vessel that Moved Iranian Oil

The U.S. Treasury Department and Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) of removed sanctions on shipping tanker COSCO Dalian on Jan. 31.

On Sept. 25, 2019, OFAC designated COSCO Dalian and a second vessel from China’s largest shipping company on the Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List for transporting Iranian crude oil to China.

That had an enormous and immediate impact on the oil and shipping industries since a handful of COSCO subsidiaries and dozens of vessels were also considered sanctioned by OFAC and effectively removed from the petroleum shipping market.

“OFAC hasn’t announced the policy rationale yet, but [it] likely resulted from receiving credible assurances that the Chinese company would no longer ship Iranian oil,” observes Beau Barnes, an attorney at the global firm Kobre & Kim. “The speed of the removal is lightning fast by OFAC’s standards, and likely stems from the company’s critical role in the global supply chain.”

Some have opined that ongoing U.S.-China trade talks played a role in the OFAC delisting.

“COSCO’s original designation had caused increased global tanker freight rates to increase, leading OFAC to issue two waivers to temporarily allow transactions with the company,” notes Barnes, who represents clients in white-collar criminal defense matters, investigations, regulatory actions and commercial litigation, with a particular focuses on matters related to national security, economic sanctions, export controls, economic espionage and cybersecurity.

export control

New DOJ Sanctions and Export Control Enforcement Policy Incentivizes Self-Disclosure

On December 13, the U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”) released a revised policy that expands and clarifies certain incentives for voluntary self-disclosure of potential criminal sanctions and export control violations.

The new policy (the “VSD Policy”), which is effective immediately, has important ramifications for companies and their interactions with DOJ regarding potentially willful violations of US sanctions and export control laws.

Notably, the DOJ’s policy now extends to financial institutions and establishes disclosure benefits in mergers and acquisitions for acquiring companies who discover misconduct through “thorough and timely due diligence.” The policy also establishes a presumption of a non-prosecution agreement for companies that meet certain criteria in the absence of aggravating circumstances, as well as substantial mitigation credit where a penalty is warranted.

Components of the VSD Policy

Most notably, the VSD Policy specifies that, subject to certain conditions and absent aggravating factors, there will be a presumption that a company will receive a non-prosecution agreement and will not pay a fine for self-disclosed sanctions and export control violations. In order to be subject to such a presumption, the company must (1) voluntarily self-disclose violations, (2) fully cooperate with DOJ and (3) timely and appropriately remediate any violations.1

The VSD Policy also sets out specific definitions for these criteria. For instance, in order to “voluntarily self-disclose” pursuant to the VSD policy, a disclosure must be:

-Prior to an imminent threat of disclosure or government investigation;

-Within a reasonably prompt time after a company becomes aware of the offense; and

-Include all relevant facts known to the company at the time of disclosure, including with respect to individuals substantially involved or responsible for the disclosed violations.2

Importantly, voluntary self-disclosures must be made to DOJ in order for the VSD Policy to apply. In other words, companies that make self-disclosures to regulatory agencies but not to DOJ will not be able to receive the benefits of the VSD Policy. Equally of note is that any company receiving the benefits of the VSD Policy, including one that receives a non-prosecution agreement, will not be permitted to retain any gains from the unlawful conduct and will be required to pay all disgorgement, forfeiture, and/or restitution stemming from the disclosed violations.

The VSD Policy sets forth a number of specific requirements that companies must meet in order to “fully cooperate.” In order to “fully cooperate” under the VSD Policy, a company must:

-Disclose all facts relevant to the wrongdoing on a timely basis. This includes, inter alia, relevant facts from an internal investigation and updates to those facts (as well as updates on an internal investigation), attributed to specific sources. Such facts must include those related to involvement in criminal activity by officers, employees, or agents and facts about potential criminal conduct by third parties.

-Proactively, rather than reactively, cooperate. This proactive cooperation must include the timely disclosure of relevant facts, even if the company is not asked to do so.

-Preserve, collect, and disclose relevant documents and information in a timely manner. These actions include the disclosure of overseas documents (as well as where they are located and who found them), the facilitation of third-party production of documents, and document translations where appropriate.

-De-conflict witness interviews in order to align a company’s internal investigation with an investigation by DOJ when requested and appropriate (although, the VSD Policy notes, DOJ will not affirmatively direct a company’s internal investigation); and

-Make company officers and employees possessing relevant information available for interviews by DOJ when requested, including former employees and those located overseas, and facilitate interviews of third-party witnesses when possible.3

Finally, in order to “timely and appropriately remediate” pursuant to the VSD Policy, there are several actions that a company must undertake:

-A “root cause” analysis that analyzes underlying conduct and remediates those root causes where appropriate;

-The implementation of a compliance program, which would be updated periodically. The VSD Policy acknowledges that such a program will vary depending on the organization’s size and resources, but notes that it may include information on:

-A company’s culture of compliance, including that criminal conduct will not be tolerated by the company;

-Company resources dedicated to compliance, as well as the compensation and promotion of compliance personnel and their quality and experience;

-The independence of a company’s compliance function, the auditing of the compliance program, the access of the board of directors to compliance expertise, and the reporting structure of compliance personnel; and

-Details about a company’s risk assessment, its effectiveness, and how a compliance program has been tailored based on that risk assessment;

-Discipline of employees, including those responsible for misconduct and those with oversight and supervisory authority;

-Retention of business records and the prohibition on the improper destruction of such records, including guidance and controls on personal communications; and

-Any additional steps necessary to demonstrate recognition of misconduct, the acceptance of responsibility, and measures to reduce the risk of future misconduct.4

Aggravating Factors

As noted, the presumption of a non-prosecution agreement and the absence of a fine will only be available under the VSD Policy in cases of voluntary self-disclosures where there are no aggravating factors. The VSD Policy includes a non-exhaustive list of such aggravating factors, and specifies that if such factors are substantially present, a “more stringent” resolution may result:

-Exports of items controlled for nuclear nonproliferation or missile technology reasons to a proliferator country;

-Exports of items known to be used in the construction of weapons of mass destruction;

-Exports to a Foreign Terrorist Organization or Specially Designated Global Terrorist;

-Exports of military items to a hostile foreign power;

-Repeated violations, including similar administrative or criminal violations in the past; and

-Knowing involvement of upper management in the criminal conduct.5

Even if such aggravating factors are present, the VSD Policy provides incentives for companies to voluntarily self-disclose violations, cooperate with DOJ, and timely and appropriately remediate, consistent with the definitions in the VSD Policy. In such instances, DOJ will recommend a fine that is capped at 50 percent of the amount otherwise available. In addition, if the company has implemented an effective compliance program, DOJ will not require the appointment of a monitor for the company.

Takeaways for Companies

DOJ’s new VSD Policy is a clear effort by the agency to encourage and reward timely voluntary self-disclosure by companies that identify potential willful violations of export control and sanctions laws. The VSD Policy brings DOJ’s practices closer in line with those of the Office of Foreign Assets Control and the Bureau of Industry and Security, both of which also incentivize self-disclosure by limiting penalties. DOJ’s incentives aim to encourage the private sector to implement effective compliance programs to prevent and detect violations in the first place and report them to DOJ in a timely manner if they occur. A clear goal of the VSD Policy is also to provide DOJ with the information and resources to prosecute individuals responsible for wrongdoing.

Notably, unlike previous guidance issued by DOJ, the VSD Policy does not include a carve-out for financial institutions. As a result, these entities will be able to take advantage of the VSD Policy going forward. Additionally, the VSD Policy provides incentives for self-disclosure in mergers and acquisitions. Specifically, the VSD Policy specifies that a successor entity that makes a timely voluntary self-disclosure (even as a result of post-acquisition due diligence) will be able to take advantage of the incentives set forth in the VSD Policy. Companies wishing to review or strengthen their compliance programs should consult sanctions and export control counsel in order to ensure that such programs are tailored to the criteria set forth by DOJ and reflective of the risk involved in the company’s activities.

Also worth noting is that while the VSD Policy aims to incentivize self-disclosure to the DOJ by providing certain defined benefits, those benefits are not without cost or risk. Companies with a potential sanctions or export control violation should consult experienced sanctions and export control counsel to provide guidance on the decision of whether to self-disclose, which involves a complicated balance of numerous factors.

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1 U.S. Department of Justice, Export Control and Sanctions Enforcement Policy for Business Organizations, 2, Dec. 13, 2019 (hereafter “VSD Policy”).

2 VSD Policy at 2.

3 VSD Policy at 3-4.

4 VSD Policy at 5-6.

5 VSD Policy at 6.

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Greg Deis is a partner in Mayer Brown’s Chicago office and co-chair of the firm’s White Collar Defense & Compliance practice.

Ori Lev is a partner in Mayer Brown’s Washington DC office and a member of the Financial Services Regulatory & Enforcement practice and the Consumer Financial Services group.

Tamer Soliman is a partner in Mayer Brown’s Washington DC and Dubai offices, global head of the firm’s Export Control & Sanctions practice and a member of the International Trade practice.

Margaret-Rose Sales is counsel in Mayer Brown’s Washington DC office and a member of the International Trade practice.

Mickey Leibner is an associate in the Public Policy, Regulatory & Political Law, International Trade and Cybersecurity & Data Privacy practices in Mayer Brown’s Washington DC office.

Syria

Civil War in Syria: How Conflict Erodes Trade

Syria has a turbulent history. Numerous nations, factions and leaders have wrestled for control of the country at turns over the last 100 years. The present conflict, a civil war raging for eight years now, has drastically affected Syria’s trade by destroying infrastructure, displacing its productive workforce, and weakening business confidence in the region. The World Bank estimates the current conflict has produced a cumulative loss in Syria’s GDP at $226 billion as of 2017, an amount equal to four times Syria’s GDP in 2010.

Syrian Trade Throughout History

The region now called Syria was home to one of the most ancient civilizations on earth. Evidence of early trade relations dates as far back as 10,000 BC. Many of the greatest human achievements had their origins in the area known as the Cradle of Civilization. Its location on the Silk Road enriched Syria with wealth and strategic importance during the Roman Empire.

Throughout the 20th century, Syria experienced French control, uprisings, nationalization, regional wars, and conflict among rival factions. The economic outlook for Syria seemed to be improving in the 1990s and early 2000s. The World Bank considered it a fast-growing, lower-middle-income country. Syria’s main exports were crude and refined oil and information and communications technologies. Syria also enjoyed a healthy travel and tourism industry.

Impacts of the Civil War

The civil war has either eliminated or drastically reduced all of Syria’s main trading industries, exacerbating the suffering for Syrian civilians. In 2010, exports totaled around $19 billion. By 2016, they had fallen to $555 million. Syria’s ranking as a global exporter fell from 88th in 2011 to 141st in 2015.

Syria trade profile post civil war

Sanctions, Destruction and Displacement

A consequence of the conflict, Syria is subject to numerous sanctions by the United States, Canada, European Union, Arab League and Turkey. These include embargoes on investment, blocks on trade in key industries such as oil, financial services and precious metals, and the freezing of assets. The aim of such sanctions is to pressure Syrian leaders to end the conflict, but average Syrians also suffer the economic fallout.

As in any war, destruction is rampant. Mortar fire and airstrikes have damaged and demolished key infrastructure for trade. Bridges, grain silos, roads and other economically significant assets are strategic targets for both sides. Access to fuel and electricity is limited, denying Syrian businesses the productive factors necessary to produce goods to trade as well as the means to transport them. Schools, food sources and medical buildings have also been targeted. As of 2017, seven percent of housing stock has been destroyed, and 20 percent damaged. Trade necessarily takes a back seat when citizens struggle to have their basic physical needs met.

Given the dire circumstances, over half the country’s pre-war population has been displaced either internally or externally. According to recent estimates, over five million refugees have fled Syria. It’s a human tragedy with immediate and long-term implications. As the workforce collapses, goods are no longer able to be produced, and trade grinds to a halt.

Syria trade exports drop 92%

Distrust, Uncertainty and Disassociation

Businesses are wary to engage in nations experiencing conflict. The Syrian Civil War is complex and associated with a corrupt regime causing suffering for its citizens. International sanctions create a legally uncertain environment. Even if it is possible to engage in trade with Syrian firms, there is no guarantee that in a month or a year it will still be possible — new sanctions may be imposed or the factory producing the goods could be targeted. These risks substantially raise the cost of engaging in trade with Syria.

Adding to Syria’s economic woes is the curtailment of economic development assistance. The World Bank Group ceased all Bank operational activity with Syria at the onset of the war. Previously it provided technical assistance and advisory services on private sector development, human development, social protection and environmental sustainability. Although not directly related to trade, much of this support helps local businesses and the economic health of communities.

Why Trade Matters for Syria

Any kind of conflict can have negative effects on trade, directly by destroying factors of production and dislocating people, and indirectly by causing uncertainty and breaks in connectivity with global supply chains. Reduced trade invariably damages the economy, causing individual suffering which can foment more unrest. Nations become trapped in a vicious cycle.

This seems undoubtedly to be the case in Syria, where the destruction of trade has meant economic suffering that aggravates the humanitarian crisis. The longer conflict persists, the deeper the separation from global society, and the harder it will be to rebuild the economic mechanisms and institutions necessary to increase trade and encourage economic growth.

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Alice Calder

Alice Calder is a graduate research assistant at George Mason University, currently pursuing her MA in Applied Economics. Originally from the UK, where she received her BA in Philosophy and Political Economy from the University of Exeter, living and working internationally sparked her interest in trade issues as well as the intersection of economics and culture.

This article originally appeared on TradeVistas.org. Republished with permission.

sanctions

Getting Caught on the Backswing – Will US Sanctions Undermine the Dollar?

Since the Bretton Woods Agreement in 1944 there has been one currency that eclipses all others for international trade: the U.S. dollar. The dollar dominates when it comes to reserves and the settlement of trades, a hegemony that affords U.S. foreign policy incredible strength on the world stage. However, the U.S. reliance on the strength of the dollar to pursue far-reaching sanctions is also beginning to cut at the roots of that strength, as allies and global trading partners simultaneously pursue their own economic agenda and react to perceived over-reach by U.S. policymaker. 

A View from the Top

In 2019, the dollar comprised over 60% of global debt, more than 60% of global reserves for foreign exchange, and was the medium used in 40% of international payments, according to the European Central Bank (ECB). Despite the economic output of the Eurozone roughly matching that of the U.S., the euro accounted for only 20% of foreign exchange reserves and just over 20% of international debt (1).

This allows U.S. foreign policy a potency lacking in other international currencies. The Trump administration has relied heavily on this dynamic, imposing coercive economic measures on a wide spectrum of targets from Venezuela to North Korea and exponentially increasing the number of sanctioned entities. In fact, the U.S. sanctioned around 1,500 Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons (SDNs) in 2018 alone, almost 50 % greater than in any other single year. 

Growing trends have become noticeable in the financial streams flowing between borders; a rise in the use of the euro, RMB and ruble as forex currencies, development of routes around the conventional financial sector, and flurry of interest surrounding the nascent potential of cryptocurrencies. The major drivers of these changes are unrelated to sanction policy and are more tied to the politicization of U.S. monetary policy or the inherent economic interests of other nations and trading blocs, including turning their own currencies into global standards. Regardless of the drivers, these developments suggest an international system ill-at-ease with the power of the dollar.

Secondary Nature, Primary Threat

The unrivaled strength of the U.S. dollar affords U.S. policymakers a weapon unavailable to any other nation. This is built on by the ‘secondary’ nature of U.S. sanctions – extending the impact of sanctions to non-U.S. entities who do business with sanctioned entities or individuals – that leaves few avenues to evade the regime. 

As virtually all dollar-denominated transactions pass through the U.S. financial system, even if just momentarily when they are “cleared,” very few businesses are able to trade with the targets of primary sanctions without themselves falling under the secondary regime. Violators are potentially liable for sizeable fines or other punishments, including being locked out of the U.S. financial system themselves. 

While this is a useful tool for closing down avenues of terrorism, crime or other illicit activity, it also means countries that disagree with the targets of U.S. sanctions must either comply or place their own industry at risk. The EU-U.S. divergence on the Iranian Nuclear deal, or on U.S. sanctions towards Cuba, are good example of this. 

This increasing sanctions activity provides the seedlings that may undermine the dollar’s strength, as it prompts allies that disagree with sanctions regimes to develop alternatives to the dollar – such as the Euro, Chinese RMB or Russian ruble. Special Purpose Vehicles, such as the EU-Russian INSTEX, are created – albeit with difficulty – to provide routes around the conventional financial system. 

Alternatives

Against this politicization of the dollar, various countries are developing alternatives. The euro is staking its claim with the development of the INSTEX vehicle and a declaration by Jean Claude Juncker, then-president of the European Commission, “to do more to allow our single currency to play its full role on the international sector” (2).

Similar gauntlets are being thrown by the ruble – Russia has been developing its own payments system since the Crimean sanctions in 2014 – and the RMB, with the Chinese Cross-Border Interbank Payment System (CIPS) launched in 2015. Given the size of the Chinese market and its growing world position, the RMB could theoretically pose a challenge to the dollar. However, the politicization of the RMB’s value – witnessed most recently in its rapid devaluation targeted at injuring the U.S. as part of the trade war – undermines its use as a global currency in the near to medium term. 

Another potential pitfall for the dollar is the development of new financial technologies, including the much-discussed Blockchain and cryptocurrencies. Such systems allow for the circumvention of the U.S. financial system and enable payments in relation to sanctioned activities, and have already have been used to facilitate illicit payments in North Korea and Iran. 

Mobile payments are also on the rise, further reducing global exposure to the dollar. However, as with other examples above, the use of some of these alternatives are being driven in significant part by illicit activity, which may lay the seeds of its own demise or limited adoption. 

The dollar’s strength on the international stage is undeniable, affording U.S. foreign policy unparalleled reach and potency. However, increasing international attention is being given to the Trump Administration’s fondness for relying on coercive economic measures in foreign policy, including the imposition of sanctions, tariffs, export controls, and investment restrictions. 

Each time a trading partner or ally objects to the U.S. policy goals but is forced to accept a new sanctions regime because of the dollar’s dominance, that dominance is eroded. While the dollar remains by far the best safe-haven for investments, backed as it is by a resilient economy and a history of stability, the potential corrosive effect of sanctions cannot be ignored. The future use of sanctions should factor in this unintended consequence and overall sanctions policy designed to ensure the long-term dominance of the U.S. dollar. 

 

Matthew Oresman leads Pillsbury Winthrop Shaw Pittman’s International Public Policy practice, carrying out high-profile activities in many of the world’s capital cities. He principally advises governments, political leaders, businesses and NGOs on achieving their most important objectives. He regularly designs and implements legal and policy solutions, including managing integrated U.S. and Europe-based initiatives. He advises global businesses on entry into emerging markets and compliance with U.S. and international regulations.

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(1)https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2019/html/ecb.sp190215~15c89d887b.en.html

(2) See Juncker, J.C. (2018), “The Hour of European Sovereignty”, State of the Union Address 2018 – https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/soteu2018-speech_en_0.pdf

U.S. Strengthens Sanctions Targeting the Government of Venezuela

On August 5, 2019, the Trump Administration intensified pressure on the administration of Nicolás Maduro by imposing broad economic sanctions against the Government of Venezuela, a move that could escalate existing tensions with Venezuela’s supporters, Russia and China.  In a late-night Executive Order, President Trump announced that all property, and interests in property, of the Government of Venezuela, including its agencies, instrumentalities, and any entity owned or controlled by the foregoing, that are within the jurisdiction of the United States would be blocked.

The Order further suspended entry into the United States of sanctioned persons absent a determination from the Secretary of State. The Order also authorizes the Secretary of the Treasury to impose additional secondary sanctions on non-U.S. persons who materially support or provide goods or services to the Government of Venezuela.

Background

In January 2019, after months of economic turmoil and political unrest under Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro, the United States formally recognized Juan Guaidó, the leader of the Venezuelan National Assembly, as the country’s legitimate head of state.  More than fifty nations followed suit, asserting that President Maduro’s 2017 reelection was illegitimate and that Guaidó was the rightful interim president under the Venezuelan constitution.

The Trump Administration followed its recognition of Mr. Guaidó as interim president with sweeping sanctions on the Venezuelan government. The measures included designating Venezuela’s state-run oil company, Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A. (“PdVSA”), as a Specially Designated National (“SDN”), thereby prohibiting U.S. persons from engaging in transactions with PdVSA, as well as transactions by non-U.S. persons conducted in U.S. dollars, unless otherwise authorized by the U.S. Department of Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control (“OFAC”).  (We previously summarized the PdVSA SDN designation here.)

Despite the increasing U.S. pressure, President Maduro has refused to cede power.  He retains the support of the Venezuelan military, and Russia, China, Iran, Cuba, and Turkey have continued their economic and diplomatic relationships with the regime.

Sanctions Overview

Through this new Executive Order, the Trump Administration has ratcheted up its efforts against the Maduro regime, asserting that further measures are necessary to combat “human rights abuses,” “interference with freedom of expression,” and “ongoing attempts to undermine Interim President Juan Guaidó and the Venezuelan National Assembly’s exercise of legitimate authority in Venezuela.”

However, contrary to initial press reports, the action does not create a comprehensive embargo against Venezuela (on the model of the U.S. sanctions against Iran) that would prevent U.S. persons from engaging in almost all transactions. Instead, the new measures focus on the Venezuelan government by blocking all property and interests in property of the government that are currently in the United States, will be brought into the United States, or come into the possession or control of a U.S. person. There is, however, an exception for humanitarian goods, such as food, clothing, and medicine.  The Order applies regardless of contracts entered into, or licenses or permits granted, prior to the Order.

Further, the Order could have a broad impact outside of the United States by authorizing secondary sanctions against any party determined by OFAC to “have materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of” the Government of Venezuela.  U.S. National Security Advisor John Bolton warned the day after the Order, “We are sending a signal to third parties that want to do business with the Maduro regime: proceed with extreme caution.  There is no need to risk your business interests with the United States for the purposes of profiting from a corrupt and dying regime.”

In conjunction with the Order, OFAC also revised twelve existing general licenses (“GLs”) and issued thirteen new GLs.  Notably, GL 28 authorizes through 12:01 a.m. on September 4, 2019, transactions necessary to wind-down contracts with the Government of Venezuela.  GL 31 also authorizes transactions with the Venezuelan National Assembly and the shadow government of Interim President Juan Guaidó, underscoring that the target of the action is the administration of Nicolás Maduro.

The GLs and related guidance make clear that the people of Venezuela are not the target of the sanctions.  Specifically, OFAC released a document entitled “Guidance Related to the Provision of Humanitarian Assistance and Support to the Venezuelan People,” which emphasized that “humanitarian assistance and activities to promote democracy are not the target of U.S. sanctions and are generally excepted from sanctions . . . ”  OFAC simultaneously issued four new Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs).  FAQ 680 stresses that “U.S. persons are not prohibited from engaging in transactions involving the country or people of Venezuela, provided blocked persons or any conduct prohibited by any other Executive order imposing sanctions measures related to the situation in Venezuela, are not involved.”

OFAC also issued a number of GLs to authorize humanitarian transactions and transactions necessary for communications involving Venezuela, including new GLs 24 (telecommunications and common carriers), 25 (Internet communications), 26(medical services), and 29 (broadly authorizing certain non-governmental organizations).

Further, U.S. persons in Venezuela are not targeted by the sanctions.  Section 6(d) of the Order exempts from the definition of Government of Venezuela “any United States citizen, any permanent resident alien of the United States, any alien lawfully admitted to the United States, or any alien holding a valid United States visa.”  Further, GL 32authorizes U.S. persons resident in Venezuela to engage in ordinary and necessary personal “maintenance” transactions, including “payment of housing expenses, acquisition of goods or services for personal use, payment of taxes or fees, and purchase or receipt of permits, licenses, or public utility services.”

Such measures targeting an entire government have rarely been used by the United States, and there are many questions about how the restrictions and related authorizations will be interpreted and applied.  As Bolton observed, “This is the first time in 30 years that [the U.S. is] imposing an asset freeze against a government in this hemisphere.”

Effect of the Sanctions

There has been some confusion in the media over the breadth of the measures.  Some reports have mischaracterized the Order as a “total embargo;” however, the scope of the Order is limited to property, and interests in property, of the Venezuelan government, its agencies, instrumentalities, and entities owned or controlled by these.  Because many major Venezuelan government entities have already been designated as SDNs in earlier actions, including PdVSA and the Central Bank of Venezuela, the measures appear to be only an incremental expansion of the existing sanctions program.

More significantly, the Order creates a secondary sanctions regime for OFAC to designate non-U.S. parties who continue to do business with the Maduro government.  While these secondary sanctions are most likely to target Cuban, Russian, and Chinese entities that continue to provide aid to the ailing regime, all non-U.S. persons engaging in transactions in the country should carefully assess whether those transactions could benefit the government.  In particular, companies trading with Venezuela should conduct due diligence sufficient to ensure that their counterparties are not owned fifty percent or more by the Government of Venezuela, or are not otherwise controlled by the government.

In addition, from a practical standpoint, although the sanctions only apply to Government of Venezuelan and related entities, the measures may cause financial institutions, insurers, freight forwarders and other companies – who often apply a heighted level of compliance going beyond the minimum required by OFAC – to avoid dealing with Venezuelan entities altogether.

The measures against Venezuela could also escalate existing tensions with Russia and China if the sanctions further restrict the countries’ access to Venezuelan oil.  Russia and China, which have continued to back the Maduro regime, currently import Venezuelan oil as part of a debt relief program.  China is slated to continue receiving oil from Venezuela until 2021, so it stands to suffer substantial losses if it is unable to continue the shipments.  This uncertainty comes in the midst of deteriorating relations between the United States and China due to the ongoing trade war, relations which suffered another blow this week when the Trump Administration labeled China a “currency manipulator.”