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New Customs Duty Drawback Refund Program Helps Mitigate the Impact of China Tariffs

duty drawback

New Customs Duty Drawback Refund Program Helps Mitigate the Impact of China Tariffs

The Trade Facilitation and Enforcement Act of 2016 (known by its acronym TFTEA) profoundly liberalized the unique tariff mitigation strategy commonly referred to as duty drawback refunds. This represented the culmination of a nearly 12-year collaboration effort between the Drawback Trade Community and Customs and Border Protection in an effort to modernize the drawback refund program to make this valuable export incentive program more accessible to U.S. Business.

The duty drawback law originally enacted in 1789 by the first U.S. Congress allows for the refund of Customs duties on imported merchandise subsequently exported from the U.S. either in the same form or following a manufacturing process.

As an example, a producer of eyewear in China imports sunglasses into its distribution facility located in the U.S. at a duty rate of 2.5%. Eighty percent of the glasses are sold in its stores in the U.S. but twenty percent are exported to its stores in Canada and Latin America. Upon reexport to Canada and Latin America, the eyewear company is eligible for a refund of the 2.5% regular duty and if applicable, the 25% China tariff.

The implementation of the new drawback program in 2018 could not have been timelier as it coincided with the Trump Administration’s decision to levy 25% punitive tariffs on nearly $400  billion in value on imports from China. The purpose of the tariff was an effort to balance a massive trade deficit, address a variety of alleged unfair trade practices by Beijing, and benefit American manufactures, and by extension, U.S. factory workers.

One major electronics company we represent went from paying under a few million a year in duty to nearly $50 million following the impositions of the China Tariffs. The duty drawback program will allow them to recapture nearly $20 million in duties thus substantially reducing the cost impact of the tariff. Another alcohol company we work with withstands to recover nearly $15 million in federal excise tax (also eligible for a refund via the drawback program in addition to duties and tariffs). They are taking advantage of the drawback program that allows not only for the refund of future imports and exports but provides refunds on duties associated with 5 years of historical activity!

The imposition of these massive tariff increases disrupted supply chains as it sent U.S. importers scrambling for compliant strategies to mitigate the additional 25% cost on much of the import activity from China. Selecting the correct strategy for U.S. importers among a number of options was further complicated by one primary unknown variable – how long would the tariffs last? In addition to duty drawback refunds, U.S. businesses evaluated many strategies that included petitioning the Trump Administration for product exclusions, shifting supply chains to source products from outside of China, adjustments to classification/valuation, foreign trade zones, and bonded warehouses.

The duty drawback program with its minimal start-up costs and with no disruption to existing product flows and supply chains offers significant advantages to other tariff mitigation strategies but is limited to those companies with significant export volumes from the United States. Companies that only import into the U.S. with no offsetting export volume, are better served by other compliant tariff minimization methods.

Understanding the Drawback Substitution Methodology  

The new drawback law substantially liberalized the substitution rules to allow more flexibility when matching import and export activity for drawback purposes. Understanding how substitution works is key to determining a company’s recovery potential. The substitution method allows a drawback claimant to match “like” merchandise instead of directly linking an export back to the original importation using lot number or serial number tracing. Under the previous substitution drawback rules prior to the 2018 amendment of the law, the imported and exported merchandise needed to share the same material code and/or product specifications. With the new rules implemented in 2018, the import and the export need only share the same tariff classification number at either the 8th or the 10th digit of the HTS number.

As an example, under the previous drawback regime, a U.S. importer and exporter of orange juice would need to match on the basis of grade and specification. Since many Florida orange juice distributors source juices from multiple countries including Mexico and Brazil (two of the world’s largest producers of OJ) in addition to procuring domestic juice, the exported juice and the imported juice needed to be commercially interchangeable in the marketplace, a very narrowly defined standard. Today, the same company can match export Florida grade A juice and reclaim the duty assessed on imported Brazilian Grade B juice because both fall under the same general tariff classification – grade, specification, or material code are no longer relevant.

The liberalization of this substitution standard places additional recovery on the table for a number of industries while simplifying the process of preparing drawback claims. Returning to the example of sunglasses, the eyewear company could now export a pair of U.S.-made sunglasses and offset the duty paid on imported glasses from China. In the case of beer, there is only one harmonized tariff classification for beer, so an exported Coors light would be interchangeable with Molson beer imported from Canada.

The first step in the drawback process is to conduct a thorough evaluation of a company’s drawback potential both for the past five years as well as moving forward. As the saying goes, a company must first determine if the “juice is worth the squeeze.” For many large importers/exporters, the answer is a resounding “yes”, and given the opportunity for retroactive recovery, the first-year refunds can provide a significant boost to the bottom-line while assisting many importers in reducing the impact of the Trump tariffs.

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Anthony Nogueras, the founder and current CEO of Alliance Drawback Services, brings nearly 30 years of drawback specific experience to Alliance’s  extensive list of clients that includes many Fortune 500 firms. In 2020, Alliance cumulative drawback filings exceeded $100 million in drawback refunds.

During his extensive career as a drawback specialist, he has spoken on drawback matters before a host of organizations including National Associations of Purchase Managers, The Juice Products Association and  the International Titanium Association in addition to many international trade organizations.    He has also been published in the Journal of Commerce, and numerous other trade industry publications.

Mr. Nogueras drawback experience includes the management of drawback accounts in a variety of industries including retail, petrochemicals, metals, and agricultural products.  In 1989 he graduated with high honors from San Francisco State University with a bachelor’s degree in International Relations and Economics.  He is also a Licensed Customs Broker.

burma

BIS Implements New Burma Export Controls and Adds Four Entities to the Entity List

The U.S. Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (“BIS”) issued final rules amending the Export Administration Regulations (“EAR”) by implementing new export controls on Burma (Myanmar), and adding four entities linked to the recent coup to the Entity List. These final rules effective March 8, 2021 come less than a month after President Biden imposed sanctions blocking U.S. property and interests of Burmese military and government officials.

Burma Removed from Country Group B with Significant Repercussions

As of March 8, Burma is now in the more highly controlled Country Group D:1 (it was previously in Country Group B). Because of Burma’s move to Country Group D:1, transactions involving Burma are no longer eligible for the following License Exceptions under the EAR:

-Shipments of Limited Value (“LVS”);

-Shipments to Group B Countries (“GBS”); and

-Technology and Software under Restriction (“TSR”).

Additionally, the move to Country Group D:1 limits the availability of the following EAR License Exceptions for transactions involving Burma:

-Temporary Imports, Exports, Reexports, and Transfers (in-country) (“TMP”);

-Servicing and Replacement Parts and Equipment (“RPL”);

-Aircraft, Vessels, and Spacecraft (“AVS”);

-Additional Permissive Reexports (“APR”);

-Encryption Commodities, Technology, and Software (“ENC”); and

-Computers (“APP”)

–(APP was suspended for use to Burma along with LVS, GBS, and TSR effective February 17, 2021, but with the March 8 final rule APP is now available again on a limited basis with Burma now placed in Computer Tier 3.)

Burma’s new Country Group D:1 status will also impose new restrictions on exports, reexports and in-country transfers to Burma involving microprocessors under EAR Section 744.17, export activities to certain foreign vessels and aircraft under EAR Section 744.7, and reexports to Burma of foreign-produced direct products of certain U.S.-origin technology and software under EAR Section 736.2.

MEU and National Security Restrictions Now Apply

Burma joins China, Russia, and Venezuela as one of four countries subject to BIS “military end-use” and “military end user” restrictions. Exports, reexports, and transfers (in-country) of specific items listed in Supplement No. 2 to 15 CFR Part 744 to Burma with “knowledge” that the items are intended for a “military end-use” or a “military end-user” will now require licensing from BIS and BIS will evaluate these license applications with a presumption of denial. The EAR’s definitions of “knowledge”, “military end-use” and “military end-user” are all quite broad and as a result, these new rules could potentially capture a large amount of transactions.

Additionally, items that are “subject to the EAR” and controlled for national security (NS) reasons will continue to require BIS licensing when exported, reexported or transferred (in-country) to Burma. However, BIS will now add an additional layer of review when reviewing those applications in order to determine whether the transactions present a risk of diversion to a “military end-user” or a “military end-use”.  BIS will then apply a presumption of denial when it evaluates whether the subject transactions would materially contribute to Burma’s ability to develop, produce or operate weapons systems, subsystems and assemblies.

Four Entities Added to BIS Entity List

BIS announced on February 18 that “[e]ffective immediately, BIS will apply a presumption of denial for items subject to the EAR requiring a license for export or reexport when destined to Burma’s Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Home Affairs, armed forces, and security services.”  Most recently, on March 8, BIS added four military or military-linked entities to the Entity List. Licenses are required for exports, reexports, or transfers in-country of all items “subject to the EAR” (including EAR99 items) to entities on the Entity List. The four newly designated entities are:

-Ministry of Defence, a.k.a. Ministry of Defense or MOD;

-Ministry of Home Affairs, a.k.a. MOHA;

-Myanmar Economic Corporation, a.k.a. MEC;

-Myanmar Economic Holdings Limited, a.k.a. MEHL, Myanma Economic Holdings Limited, Myanma Economic Holdings Public Company Limited, Myanmar Business Holdings Public Company Limited, Myanmar Economic Holdings Public Company Limited, UMEH, Union of Myanmar Economic Holdings Company Limited, Union of Myanmar Economic Holdings Limited.

The Federal Register notice clarifies no license exceptions are available for export activities to the four newly designated entities above. Anyone applying to BIS for a license to export to the named entities will face a presumption of denial review policy.

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Cortney O’Toole Morgan is a Washington D.C.-based partner with the law firm Husch Blackwell LLP. She leads the firm’s International Trade & Supply Chain group.

Grant Leach is an Omaha-based partner with the law firm Husch Blackwell LLP focusing on international trade, export controls, trade sanctions and anti-corruption compliance.

Tony Busch is an attorney in Husch Blackwell LLP’s Washington, D.C. office.

cross-border

CROSS-BORDER CARGO TRANSPORTATION CHALLENGES AND SOLUTIONS

Managing a streamlined supply chain for cross-border cargo transportation entails much more than identifying the fastest, most efficient method of getting cargo from point A to point B. Current market challenges have been amplified due to the pandemic and now go beyond ensuring cargo arrives at the final destination on time. The safety of transportation workers as a result of internal processes is now at the forefront of cross-border transportation. After all, if the truck driver is not healthy enough to deliver the products, the products do not move. In the new normal, worker safety is more important than ever.

“Some of the challenges out there are found more so in the area of the trucks that are crossing and the drivers,” says Michael Ford, vice president of Government and Industry Affairs at BDP. “If I was a trucking company, how do I ensure my driver’s safety? When that driver gets in the cab every day, do I know they are healthy?”

Ford continues, “Setting up those types of protocols internally, ensuring that I’m putting a safe driver on the road and that they’re able to perform those tasks as if there’s any type of cross border is critical, especially now. Coordinating, communicating, setting that up, and ensuring that everything is in play really becomes important.”

When driver safety has been established, coordination efforts are challenged once again depending on the region the cargo is crossing. Each region presents a unique set of roadblocks from customs to short and long-haul planning times. Cross-border transport from the U.S. to Canada is a much different process than what U.S. to Mexico transport requires for success.

Although these challenges are not new, they include more variables that require streamlined coordination from the very beginning. Trade lanes are now more open and traveler impact has shifted, presenting opportunities along with the challenges.

“In the past, we have seen much more congestion than we do currently,” Ford notes. “It has always been there between the U.S. and Mexico. But now, while there is less cargo and less traffic running back and forth, it has improved processing time. So, less cargo, less travel. If anything, it has improved and allows U.S. and Mexico customs to do what they need to do–which is all about security and ensuring the right cargo is coming through.”

Technology continues to play a critical role in ensuring worker safety and the efficient transport of cargo. The pandemic created an environment where technology is no longer simply an option but a requirement for the continuation of operations as it provides alternatives to paper-processes and close-contact for workers and customs agents.

“Previously when trucks cross, the driver pulls over, gets out of the cab, and hands paperwork over,” Ford says. “So, the question now is how do we achieve that full paperless experience on both sides in the U.S., Canada, and Mexico? When the driver pulls off, I need to know I have the driver, the driver’s ID, etc. and technology supports the keeping up with this information. It also keeps the driver in the cab and allows whatever information needed to be accessed.

“Advanced data has allowed a lot of that to take place. Being able to share and obtain better inter-agency  cooperation goes a long way to helping the flow of cargo across the borders.”

Technology is a part of the bigger picture. Without technology, the constant exchange of information and obtaining updated data is slowed down. Without inter-agency communications along with customs collaborations, cross-border operations are at risk for further delay. Collaborations between customs agents are the key to making operations for cross-border providers more simplified and accelerated. This incorporates security and accuracy while verifying the right cargo continues to its final destination.

“U.S. Customs has been working with Mexico and vice versa to establish points inside of the other’s country and allowing personnel to set up there,” Ford says. “In the case of letting Mexican Customs come into U.S. territory and process the clearance, it allows that truck to go all the way through, eliminating the need for stopping at the border area. This makes a world of a difference and it speeds everything up. It requires the need for cooperation of the companies that want to improve their business flow. Changing to a brand-new environment for cross borders is big.”

Beyond reducing interactions, the overall reduction of paper processes and redundancies continues to be at the top of mind for companies engaging in cross-border operations. Along with its other supply chain disruptions, COVID-19 has pushed logistics players toward paperless and contactless operations, adding more pressure to the already complex market. For some, utilizing the technology toolbox (such as blockchain) could be the very thing that overcomes the hurdles presented by the pandemic.

“We hear a lot about blockchain, and there are applications inside of this cross-border sector where blockchain can be used as a piece of technology,” Ford says. “Instead of paper, using a blockchain technology to prove that your goods qualify under the USMCA agreement should be in play, for example.”

Regardless of whether the world is battling a pandemic, streamlined collaboration will ultimately pave the way for successful cross-border trade. This requires the latest data for every participant, thorough internal and external communications, and solid business relationships with a common goal to ensure products are received safely and accurately.

“Everybody needs to be involved,” Ford maintains. “It is everybody working together: the carrier, the custom-house broker, the government, and all others. It is also about forming that type of relationship where information is being shared and collected, and as much in advance as possible is part of the success that needs to happen.”

He concludes: “Things can’t just stay the way they have been. But on the other side of things, we need cargo security and the customs officers from the U.S. and Mexico need to be safe. We talk about COVID-19 and workers, but we are also asking those officers to be on the front lines. Keeping that in play becomes a big challenge.”

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Michael Ford is a career professional with more than 40 years of experience in international transportation, specializing in import/export documentation and regulatory compliance. Among his other affiliations, Mr. Ford is the co-chair for Trade on the Export Committee in the development of the new Customs ACE system and has served with Customs as a member of COAC (Commercial Operations Advisory Council), chair of the Mid-Atlantic District Export Council and the partner sector with the American Chemistry Council, Responsible Care Committee. He can be reached at michael.ford@bdpint.com

This article was originally published in December 2020

Burma

OFAC Announces Burma Sanctions in Response to Coup

On February 10, 2021, President Biden issued a much-anticipated executive order in response to the military coup in Burma that occurred on February 1, 2021. On February 11, pursuant to that executive order, the U.S. Department of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) designated certain individuals and entities controlled by the Burmese military deemed responsible for the coup. Concurrently, the U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) implemented a series of restrictions on exports of sensitive items to Burma’s Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Home Affairs, armed forces, and security services, while the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) shifted $42.4 million in funding from programs benefitting the Government of Burma.

Background

On February 1, 2021, the Burmese military overthrew the country’s democratically elected government in a coup d’état, detaining its civilian leadership, shutting down the country’s internet, and seizing control of the Burmese government. The actions came immediately prior to what would have been the swearing-in of Burma’s newly elected Parliament, formalizing the results of the country’s November 8, 2020 general election, which was a landslide victory for civilian leader Aung San Suu Kyi over her military-backed challenger.

In response, the Biden Administration announced a series of actions against persons and entities associated with the coup, demanding that the Burmese military “immediately restore power to the democratically elected leadership, end the state of emergency, release all those unjustly detained, and respect human rights and the rule of law, including by ensuring peaceful protestors are not met with violence.”

Targeted Sanctions

The Biden administration designated 10 individuals and three entities for their association with the military apparatus responsible for the coup. These were:

Six members of the National Defense and Security Council, including Commander-in-Chief of the Burmese military forces Min Aung Hlaing and Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Burmese military forces Soe Win, who were “directly involved in the coup,” and were designated pursuant to the new executive order for being foreign persons who are or were “leaders or officials” of the “military or security forces of Burma.”

Four members of the State Administration Council, including the Minister of Defense, General Mya Tun Oo, and the Minister for Transport and Communications, Admiral Tin Aung San, who were appointed after the coup to their positions by the Burmese military.

Three Burmese gem companies, which were wholly-owned subsidiaries of a large conglomerate run by the Burmese military, for being foreign persons that are owned or controlled by, or that have acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, the military or security forces of Burma.

As expected, the U.S. did not to resort to broad comprehensive sanctions of the past, which can be difficult to undo and carry broader harm for the fragile economy, but the Executive Order leaves open the possibility of more wide-reaching restrictions. The sanctions target elements of the military and, importantly, their business interests. Secretary of State Blinken explained in a press statement that “[t]hese designations specifically target current or former members of the military who played a leading role in the overthrow of Burma’s democratically-elected government. They do not target the economy or people of Burma, and we have gone to great lengths to ensure we do not add to the humanitarian plight of the Burmese people.”

The Burma Executive Order nevertheless offers a range of options for the United States if it later chooses to adopt a more aggressive approach. Among the foreign persons that could be targeted, but have not yet, include:

-Those responsible for or complicit in, or to have directly or indirectly engaged or attempted to engage in actions or policies that “threaten the peace, security, or stability of Burma,” or that “prohibit, limit, or penalize the exercise of freedom of expression or assembly by people in Burma, or that limit access to print, online, or broadcast media in Burma.”

-Leaders or officials of “the Government of Burma on or after February 2, 2021.”

-Any “political subdivision, agency, or instrumentality of the Government of Burma.”

Targeted Export Restrictions

In parallel to OFAC designations, BIS imposed a series of restrictions on exports of sensitive items to the Burmese military and security services. Effective as of February 11, 2021, BIS will:

-Apply a presumption of denial for items requiring a license for export and reexport to Burma’s Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Home Affairs, armed forces, and security services.

-Revoke certain previously issued licenses to these departments and agencies which have not been fully utilized.

-Suspend certain license exceptions previously available to Burma as a result of its current Country Group placement under the Export Administration Regulations (EAR), including Shipments to Country Group B countries (GBS) and Technology and Software under restriction (TSR).

-Assess additional actions, including possible Entity List additions, adding Burma to the list of countries subject to the EAR’s military end-use and end-user (MEU) and military intelligence end-use and end-user (MIEU) restrictions, and downgrading Burma’s Country Group status in the EAR.

BIS’s actions, as with OFAC’s, target Burma’s military and security services, rather than aim more broadly at exports to Burma as a whole. The Department of Commerce explained that “[b]y taking immediate action to prevent the Burmese military from benefiting from access to sensitive U.S. technology, we are sending a direct message that the United States stands with the people of Burma and their lawful democratic institutions.”

Redirected Humanitarian Aid to Burmese People

In keeping with its efforts to target those responsible for the coup, but lessening the adverse impact on the Burmese people, the Biden Administration shifted $42.4 million in USAID assistance from projects that benefit the Government of Burma to programs that “support and strengthen civil society and the private sector.” The Administration will also continue to support the Burmese people with approximately $69 million for programs that provide “direct benefits to sustain and improve the health of the people of Burma, including efforts to maintain democratic space, foster food security, support independent media, and promote peace and reconciliation in conflict-affected regions.”

This latter step may be critical to building a multilateral consensus for future sanctions actions targeting the military-led government.

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By Ryan Fayhee, Roy (Ruoweng) Liu, Tyler Grove and Joshua Rosenthal at Hughes Hubbard& Reed LLP  

OFAC

OFAC Implements Hong Kong-Related Sanctions Regulations Pursuant to E.O. 13936

The U.S. Department of Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (“OFAC”) published regulations in the Federal Register on January 15, 2021, to implement Executive Order 13936 (“E.O. 13936”), titled “The President’s Executive Order on Hong Kong Normalization.”  The President determined on July 14, 2020, in E.O. 13936 that Hong Kong was no longer sufficiently autonomous to justify special treatment under U.S. law, due to the implementation of the Law of the People’s Republic of China on Safeguarding National Security in the Hong Kong Administrative Region (“National Security Law”). Additionally, E.O. 13936 directed the Department of Treasury to implement sanctions on persons undermining democracy in Hong Kong.

OFAC’s Hong Kong regulations formally block transactions prohibited by E.O. 13936 and establish the process by which persons and entities are added to OFAC’s Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List (“SDN List”). On January 15, 2021 OFAC also added six (6) persons to the SDN List pursuant to E.O. 13936. These persons were found to have been involved in the implementation of the National Security Law and to be undermining democratic processes in Hong Kong. As a result, all property and interests in property of 50% or greater belonging to these persons—which are in the U.S. or held by U.S. persons—must be blocked and reported to OFAC.

OFAC stated in its final rule that the regulations “are being published in abbreviated form at this time for the purpose of providing immediate guidance to the public,” and that OFAC intends to supplement with “a more comprehensive set of regulations.” However, since the OFAC regulations are a published final rule, they are not impacted by the President’s “Regulatory Freeze Pending Review Memorandum” and are therefore in effect until amended or withdrawn.

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Cortney O’Toole Morgan is a Washington D.C.-based partner with the law firm Husch Blackwell LLP. She leads the firm’s International Trade & Supply Chain group.

Grant Leach is an Omaha-based partner with the law firm Husch Blackwell LLP focusing on international trade, export controls, trade sanctions and anti-corruption compliance.

Julia Banegas is an attorney in Husch Blackwell LLP’s Washington, D.C. office.

Camron Greer is an Assistant Trade Analyst in Husch Blackwell LLP’s Washington D.C. office.

regulations

UNPACKING US-CHINA SANCTIONS AND EXPORT CONTROL REGULATIONS: OUTLOOK FOR 2021

This is the fifth in a series of articles by Eversheds Sutherland partners Jeff Bialos and Ginger Faulk explaining the legal and regulatory impacts of certain recent US sanctions and export control actions targeting various Chinese entities. Each article explains the regulatory context of the recent rules and intends to be explanatory in nature.

During a seemingly interminable and challenging transition period, the Trump administration has layered on an array of additional China sanctions. What are the impacts of these actions? What approach is the Biden administration likely to adopt and what changes can we expect? These are the topics that are addressed in this article, the last in this five-part series.

China-related Sanctions since November 6, 2020

Specifically, since November 6, 2020, the Trump administration has:

1. issued an Executive Order banning US persons from trading in the publicly traded securities of more than 35 “Communist Chinese Military Companies;”

2. named no less than 60 Chinese entities to the US Commerce Department Entity List, which establishes a license requirement for nearly all exports to such firms and general presumption of denial for such exports;

3. designated 58 entities as China “Military End Users” under the Export Administration Regulations (EAR), which also results in restrictions on a wide range of high-tech exports; and

4. removed Hong Kong as a separate destination from China under the Export Administration Regulations, which removes its preferential treatment for export licensing.

Moreover, during the same period, President Trump signed an executive order blocking transactions with companies that “develop or control” certain Chinese connected mobile and desktop applications and related software – namely Alipay, CamScanner, QQ Wallet, SHAREit, Tencent QQ, VMate, WeChat Pay, and WPS Office. At the same time, earlier executive orders banning transactions with the owners of TikTok and WeChat were halted by federal courts and the effective date of these orders has been suspended pending the outcome of ongoing litigation.

In particular, compliance with the recent securities trading ban has proven challenging for the financial community, forcing banks and investment companies to divest or restructure hundreds of products containing publicly traded securities of the named “Communist Chinese Military Companies” and other companies whose names “closely match” the names of the listed companies. The term “securities” is broadly defined under US law, and OFAC has interpreted the ban to apply to any security that “designed to provide investment exposure” to the securities of a named entity. Thus, the ban includes, for example, a mutual fund which includes in its portfolio one or more of the subject securities or an insurance policy that has a mutual fund option for insureds holding the securities of such named entities. The ban also applies to securities held on a US or foreign exchange if the investor is a US person. The NYSE has announced the delisting of these companies, and both the NASDAQ and MCSI have announced they will remove the listed companies from their indices.

In short, while other lame duck presidents have taken actions that make things easier for their successors, the Trump administration has taken the opposite tack in an apparent effort to lock in a hard-line China policy. It will be more challenging for the Biden administration to easily unwind. In response, China has adopted its own regulations prohibiting Chinese companies and individuals from complying with “punitive measures mandated by foreign governments.”

Outlook under President Biden 

Whether and to what degree the Biden administration will implement, unwind or limit the scope or applicability of these and other pre-existing Trump administration restrictions against China remain to be seen. As a threshold matter, we expect an initial waiting period as the Biden administration gets its new team in place, evaluates its overall strategic approach toward China, and considers these particular restrictive measures in the context of its overall strategy.

Generally, based on public statements to date, we believe that the Biden administration will in all probability share the basic view that China is a strategic competitor and potential adversary. However, how to deal with China, a major power whose cooperation the United States needs on some important issues, is another matter – there are a range of possible approaches. In this regard, at this early juncture, we believe that US policy toward China under President Biden is likely to reflect a number of elements:

-selective disengagement with China in certain areas viewed as more central to national security and cooperative in other areas where national security risks are considered less significant;

-more cooperation with allies to shape shared approaches to addressing areas of concern with respect to China;

-stronger views on human rights violations by China; and

-more direct engagement with China on areas of concern with a view toward seeking sensible solutions.

It is within this overall policy framework that the Biden administration will evaluate and approach the new and existing China restrictions imposed by the Trump administration. Certainly, the Biden administration has the legal authority to undo or roll back nearly all of the Trump Administration’s actions.

At the same time, the new administration undoubtedly will recognize that any major actions to roll back China sanctions will be controversial and raise questions among policy hard-liners who believe stringent dual-use export control sanctions are strongly justified in light of China’s “military-civil fusion” strategy (i.e., whereby any dual-use exports to commercial firms could wind up in China’s military sector).  Indeed, even small actions to curtail or limit China sanctions (e.g., removing companies from lists, creating new licenses or issuing new interpretations) will send political signals both at home and abroad. Meanwhile, the business community will monitor and interpret such measures in Talmudic fashion to divine if there is a new wind blowing in this area.

For these and other reasons, we do not foresee an imminent reversal of most of the Trump administration’s actions. Rather, we expect a more balanced and incremental approach than we have seen in the last four years, with more careful sculpting of existing sanctions to ameliorate the effects (with FAQs, licenses and the like) while taking a strong line against China in other areas in coordination with close allies.

Previous installments can be found here.

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Jeffrey P.  Bialos, partner at Eversheds Sutherland, assists clients in making multi-faceted business decisions, structuring transactions and complying with complex regulatory requirements. A former Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Industrial Affairs, he brings deep experience in defense, homeland security and national security matters, including antitrust, export controls, foreign investment, industrial security, the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, and mergers and acquisitions, and procurement.

Ginger T. Faulk, partner at Eversheds Sutherland, represents multinational companies in matters involving US government regulation of foreign trade and investment. She has extensive experience advising and representing global companies, counseling clients in matters arising under US sanctions, export controls, import and other national security and foreign policy trade-related regulations.

export controls

UNPACKING US-CHINA SANCTIONS AND EXPORT CONTROL REGULATIONS: PRACTICAL COMPLIANCE STRATEGIES

This is the fourth in a series of articles by Eversheds Sutherland partners Jeff Bialos and Ginger Faulk explaining the legal and regulatory impacts of certain recent US sanctions and export control actions targeting various Chinese entities. Each article explains the regulatory context of the recent rules.

Our previous articles have discussed recent developments in US sanctions and export controls affecting trade with China, including US export controls on software and semiconductor technology, the Department of Defense list of Chinese military companies, the Commerce Department’s “Military End User” rule, and the use of the US “Entity List” to target various concerns from export control to human rights to Iran sanctions. The last month has also seen efforts to restrict foreign investments in publicly traded securities of companies associated with the Chinese military.

The purpose of this article is to provide a framework and practical guidance for complying with existing and emerging US-China export controls and sanctions. In other words, how does a company establish an effective compliance program that appropriately manages risk, limits potential liability exposure, and, at the same time, if things go wrong, confirms to regulators and prosecutors that the company took compliance seriously, thereby mitigating penalties and avoiding a criminal referral?

The best approach to trade compliance is a multidisciplinary approach

As a starting point, if recent developments in US-China trade policies have taught us anything, it’s that US trade restrictions can apply to everything from technical exchanges (internal and external) and product shipments to intracompany shipments and financial transactions and investments. As such, a company’s approach to compliance with US-China trade rules and well as the broader range of other sanctions regimes should be multidisciplinary and capable of responding to emerging requirements in any and all of these areas.

Recent US-China trade policies have targeted certain products, technology, and software; third parties; financial flows and financial institutions; inbound foreign investment; imports and tariffs; and even access to capital market financing. As a result, in considering your multinational company’s compliance obligations and risk exposure, you should consider the implications across business units and functions, including:

-Research and Development

-Sales and Marketing

-Procurement

-Shipping and Logistics

-Finance and Accounting

-Banking and Insurance

-Customer Service

-IT Systems, and others.

These rules can apply to intra-company, as well as external, activities. Even if one segment of your business has a particular type of heightened risk exposure, it does not mean that is the only segment of your business that may be exposed.

Ensure accountability and support for trade compliance

Overall, an effective compliance program requires a number of core elements: 1) leadership commitment and the allocation of resources to the compliance function; 2) robust procedures and processes integrated into the company’s business; 3) internal controls that can test the efficacy of the procedures on an ongoing basis; and 4) training that ensures that the company’s personnel understand their compliance obligations and internalize them in their work routines.

US regulatory agencies expect a company to assign responsibility to a person or function within a company for ensuring trade compliance and to provide that function sufficient access to, and support from, senior management. Often, this means designating a compliance officer who reports to the board of directors. Regulators will look not only at a company’s “culture of compliance,” but also assess whether the company provided adequate compliance resources commensurate with the size and nature of its operations. Recognizing that a corporate parent may be held liable for its subsidiaries’ trade control violations resulting from inadequate supervision, companies are advised to establish centralized policies and procedures for ensuring and monitoring compliance by each of their subsidiaries. Compliance integration under these policies should be part of every post-acquisition integration effort.

Know Thyself: Assessing your own business risks

A centerpiece of modern regulatory compliance is prudent risk management. In many regulatory areas, including sanctions, it is challenging for firms to achieve 100% compliance at all times.  Rather, the goal is to establish a program to appropriately manage and mitigate compliance risk.

US foreign trade and investment regulatory and enforcement agencies emphasize the importance of conducting a risk assessment in order to identify compliance risks that are particular to your business. OFAC’s Framework for Compliance Commitments advises companies in developing compliance measures to consider the risk profiles of the company’s “customers, supply chain, intermediaries, and counter-parties; (ii) the products and services it offers, including how and where such items fit into other financial or commercial products, services, networks, or systems; and (iii) the geographic locations of the organization, as well as its customers, supply chain, intermediaries, and counter-parties.” [1]

You should also understand how sanctions laws may apply in the context of your company’s multinational structure and operations. It is a mistake to believe that companies operating outside of the US cannot be touched by US sanctions and export controls. Many times violations arise from US person “facilitation” of sanctioned activities and interactions by non-US companies with the US financial system, e.g., through US dollar-denominated financial transactions. For this reason, some US-based multinationals have elected to apply sanctions and export control compliance throughout not only their US, but also foreign, operations – even in areas where the controls are not fully extraterritorial. The application of corporate liability rules in a multinational enterprise where US persons have some level of involvement around the globe otherwise makes compliance more challenging than it needs to be.

In assessing its exposure to US trade controls, a company must look not only at the location of management and administrative support personnel, but also the geographic footprint of its entire product and R&D supply chains, i.e., the location of internal technology and software development and the location of manufacturing of products, parts, components and materials and the development of software and technology on which they are based. Consider not only software and technology shared with third parties but also internal (intracompany) cross-border or domestic transfers of software and technology and establish effective internal controls.

Implement a program to manage identified risks effectively, including Know Your Counterparty (KYC) controls

As impressive as a compliance program may appear on paper, the only worthwhile compliance program is one that is effective. To be effective, a compliance program should work with company’s existing structures and information flows and be integrated with day to day internal work instructions. It needs to be able to incorporate and screen in real-time existing third-party information and implement stop-hold procedures for transactions that trigger risk. This usually calls for a customized screening and software solution.

In developing a trade compliance program, US regulators and enforcement agencies encourage companies to build around certain basic core elements

Management Commitment – As discussed above, demonstrate and document senior management approval of the compliance program and foster a “culture of compliance” with a positive “tone from the top.”

(2) Risk Assessment – Again, a compliance program must be responsive to identified risks, and there is no “one-size-fits-all” approach.

(3) Internal Controls – Per OFAC, this refers to “policies and procedures, in order to identify, interdict, escalate, report (as appropriate), and keep records pertaining to activity that may be prohibited by the regulations and laws.” These internal policies should be clearly set out in writing and consistently implemented and enforced. Heightened review is recommended for transfers of dual-use and military items and dealings with high-risk destinations or counter-parties.

Beyond day-to-day KYC screening, numerous companies have recognized that their foreign collaborative engagements can involve significant risk, which can vary depending on the country, industry, and the particular party involved. Thus, firms often establish a special committee to vet engagements with third parties, whether agents, distributors, or joint venture partners. Individual business units may propose these engagements, and the company will evaluate them on an enterprise-wide basis after due diligence and the assessment of risks, advising also on the structuring of legal arrangements to mitigate such risks.

(4) Testing and Auditing – Regular monitoring of trade compliance is encouraged and, in some cases, expected. Regular auditing can occur at a global level or may rotate to focus on certain business units, functions, or procedures. Testing and auditing may be conducted by internal audit or external subject matter experts.

(5) Compliance training – Much of trade compliance depends on employees knowing how to spot and address “red flags” of sanctions and export control issues. Compliance training should provide information that is readily useable and easily accessible, risk-focused, and tailored to the duties and responsibilities of the participants.

To summarize, in today’s global business, complying with US-China trade policies requires a holistic review of a company’s external and internal operations. The best compliance programs are developed on the basis of a realistic review of a company’s compliance risk exposure; designed to be able to respond to ever-changing targets and regulations; and implemented effectively to work with a company’s existing systems and structures.

________________________________________________________________________

Ginger T. Faulk, partner at Eversheds Sutherland, represents multinational companies in matters involving US government regulation of foreign trade and investment. She has extensive experience advising and representing global companies, counseling clients in matters arising under US sanctions, export controls, import and other national security and foreign policy trade-related regulations.

Jeffrey P.  Bialos, partner at Eversheds Sutherland, assists clients in making multi-faceted business decisions, structuring transactions and complying with complex regulatory requirements. A former Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Industrial Affairs, he brings deep experience in defense, homeland security and national security matters, including antitrust, export controls, foreign investment, industrial security, the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, and mergers and acquisitions, and procurement.

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[1] OFAC Framework for Compliance Commitments, at https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/126/framework_ofac_cc.pdf; see also BIS Elements of an Effective Compliance Program, available at at https://www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/documents/pdfs/1641-ecp/file; see also US Department of Justice, National Security Division, “Export Control and Sanctions Enforcement Policy for Business Organizations,” Dec. 14, 2019, available at https://us.eversheds-sutherland.com/portalresource/ces_vsd_policy_2019.pdf.

USITC

USITC To Begin Monitoring Imports of Strawberries and Bell Peppers at USTR’s Request

The U.S. International Trade Commission (“USITC”) announced on December 2, 2020, that it would begin monitoring imports of bell peppers and strawberries pursuant to Section 332 of the Tariff Act of 1930, following a request from the United States Trade Representative (“USTR”) Robert E. Lighthizer. The USITC will monitor imports of the subject products for a 90-day period and will have three weeks to prepare and submit a recommendation to the president with the appropriate trade remedies.

Interested parties may submit written submissions for the record no later than January 15, 2021. The USITC stated that at this time it is seeking submissions to enable its monitoring activities only. Specifically, the USITC is interested in information concerning imports, principal source countries, and the potential impact of the imports on the domestic industry.

Additionally, the USITC expressed its interest in information regarding the condition of the domestic industry, production, employment, profits and losses, and other factors outlined in section 202(c) of the Trade Act. To the extent practical, data and information submitted should include the period 2016-2020 and any subsequent period.

The products in question fall under the following categories of the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States:

-Fresh or chilled strawberries: 0810.10;

-Fresh or chilled bell peppers:

-0709.60.4015,

-0709.60.4025,

-0709.60.4065,

-and 0709.60.4085

_________________________________________________________________

Nithya Nagarajan is a Washington-based partner with the law firm Husch Blackwell LLP. She practices in the International Trade & Supply Chain group of the firm’s Technology, Manufacturing & Transportation industry team.

Turner Kim is an Assistant Trade Analyst in Husch Blackwell LLP’s Washington, D.C. office.

Camron Greer is an Assistant Trade Analyst in Husch Blackwell LLP’s Washington D.C. office.

Venezuela

OFAC Sanctions CEIEC for Its Support to Venezuela Regime

The U.S. Department of Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) has sanctioned CEIEC (China National Electronic Import-Export Company), a Chinese technology exporter, for its alleged support to the Maduro government in Venezuela. As a result of CEIEC’s addition to OFAC’s Specially Designated Nationals List, all property and interests belonging to CEIEC, or any entity in which it owns a 50% or greater interest—and which are in the United States or in the possession or control of U.S. persons—must be blocked and reported to OFAC.

According to OFAC, CEIEC has provided software, training, and technical expertise to the government of Venezuela since 2017, which has been used to oppress the Venezuelan people. OFAC specified CEIEC’s support to Venezuela National Telephone Company (CANTV), the state-owned telecoms company which provides 70% of internet service in Venezuela, and described CEIEC’s suite of software and hardware that it provided to CANTV as a “commercialized version” of China’s “Great Firewall” system of internet censorship. “The illegitimate Maduro regime’s reliance on entities like CEIEC to advance its authoritarian agenda further illustrates the regime’s prioritization of power over democratic values and processes,” said Treasury Secretary Mnuchin.

OFAC issued Venezuela-related General License 38 (GL 38) on November 30, 2020, authorizing the wind-down of transactions involving CEIEC. According to the related Frequently Asked Question 854 (FAQ 854), GL 38 authorizes U.S. persons to engage in transactions and activities prohibited by Executive Order 13692 (E.O. 13692) that are ordinarily incident and necessary to the wind-down of transactions and activities involving CEIEC, or any entity in which CEIEC owns a 50% or greater interest, until January 14, 2021.

Non-U.S. persons may also wind down transactions and activities with CEIEC without being sanctioned under E.O. 13692, provided that such wind-down activity is consistent with GL 38 and is completed prior to January 14, 2021.

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Cortney O’Toole Morgan is a Washington D.C.-based partner with the law firm Husch Blackwell LLP. She leads the firm’s International Trade & Supply Chain group.

Grant Leach is an Omaha-based partner with the law firm Husch Blackwell LLP focusing on international trade, export controls, trade sanctions and anti-corruption compliance.

Camron Greer is an Assistant Trade Analyst in Husch Blackwell LLP’s Washington D.C. office.

exchanges

Congress Passes Bipartisan Legislation Requiring Chinese and Other Firms Listed on US exchanges to meet US Audit Standards

In near lightning speed, Congress now has passed, and the President is expected to imminently sign into law, the Holding Foreign Companies Accountable Act (HFCAA), a bipartisan piece of legislation that, while applicable more broadly, is directed at the audit practices of Chinese companies, especially those owned or controlled by the Chinese government, and establishes a process to delist from US exchanges those companies that do not meet certain US audit standards.

This legislation follows on the heels of the Trump Administration’s action last week to bar US persons from investing in publicly traded securities of Chinese firms determined by the US government to be owned or controlled by the Chinese military. Unlike this more limited investment prohibition, which was established by Executive Order and can be revoked by the new Administration by executive action, the HFCAA is binding legislation that President-elect Biden would have no authority to waive.

Thus, the legislation mandates the process for delisting and directs the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), an independent agency, to implement the listing ban.

HFCAA requirements

The HFCAA, which was first introduced in the Senate in May 2020, passed the Senate by unanimous consent that same month and was just passed in the US House of Representatives by voice vote on December 2, 2020. It now goes to President Trump’s desk to be signed into law.

Specifically, by its terms, the HFCAA establishes that an issuer’s securities will be banned from trading on US national securities exchanges in the event that, for three consecutive years, the issuer utilized a registered public accounting firm that has a branch or office located in a foreign jurisdiction that the US Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) is unable to inspect or investigate completely because of a position taken by an authority in the foreign jurisdiction. Each year in which this occurs is referred to a “non-inspection” year.

The SEC has the authority to eliminate an initial ban if the issuer certifies that it has retained a registered public accounting firm that the PCAOB has inspected, but the SEC may also reinstitute the ban in the event the issuer experiences a subsequent non-inspection year. A reinstituted ban lasts for at least five years, after which the SEC may end the ban if the issuer certifies that it will retain a registered public accounting firm that the PCAOB is able to inspect.

The HFCAA also has important disclosure obligations for issuers that experience non-inspection years. Specifically, among other things, in each non-inspection year the foreign issuer would be required to disclose to the SEC:

-The percentage of the shares of the issuer owned by governmental entities in the foreign jurisdiction in which in the issuer is incorporated or organized;

-Whether governmental entities in the applicable foreign jurisdiction with respect to that registered public accounting firm have a controlling financial interest with respect to the issuer;

-The name of each official of the Chinese Communist Party who is a member of the board of directors of (1) the issuer, or (2) the operating entity with respect to the issuer; and

-Whether the issuer’s articles of incorporation (or equivalent organizing document) contains any charter of the Chinese Communist Party, including the text of any such charter.

The SEC is required to promulgate regulations implementing the HFCAA within 90 days of enactment.

The HFCAA in context

The HFCAA has enjoyed bipartisan support and little organized opposition since it was introduced in the Senate in May 2020. Its passage and impending enactment is the culmination of ongoing public debate in the United States on whether to delist from US exchanges Chinese companies—especially those owned or controlled by the Chinese government—with audit practices that do not meet US standards.

In December 2018, the SEC and the PCAOB, which oversees the auditing of public companies, issued a joint warning to investors about the challenges US regulators face when seeking to conduct oversight of US-listed companies whose operations are based in China and Hong Kong. Chinese law requires that records remain in China, and the Communist Party restricts access to typical accounting information on the grounds of national security and state secrecy.1 In February 2020, the SEC released a statement regarding the difficulties that US regulators face when auditing US-listed companies based in China, and said that US investors and the US capital markets have become generally more exposed to companies with significant operations in China.2

Thereafter, in February 2019, the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission identified 156 Chinese companies—including 11 state-owned enterprises—listed on three of the largest US exchanges with a combined market capitalization of $1.2 trillion.

Subsequently, in July 2020, the Presidential Working Group (PWG) on Financial Markets, at the direction of President Trump, completed its examination of measures to protect US investors and recommended policies consistent with those contained in the Senate and House versions of the HFCAA.3  The PWG was chaired by the US Secretary of the Treasury Steven Mnuchin, and included the Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System Jerome Powell, the Chairman of the SEC Jay Clayton, and the Chairman of the US Commodity Futures Trading Commission Heath P. Tarbert. The PWG ultimately recommended Chinese companies be delisted beginning in 2022 unless US regulators can obtain access to their audits.

The American Securities Association, a securities advocacy group, also issued a report in August 2020 recommending that Chinese firms failing to comply with SEC audit requirements be forced to deregister within six months—a considerably shorter time frame than the three years set forth in HFCAA.

Potential impact of the HFCAA and what comes next

Under the HFCAA, as noted above, any foreign issuers would be delisted from US exchanges if, for three consecutive years, it utilizes a registered public accounting firm with an office or branch in its jurisdiction to conduct its audit and the issuer refuses inspection of the audit report based on the law of said jurisdiction. Additionally, for each “non-inspection year” identified by the SEC, the foreign issuer would be required to submit additional disclosures.

While covering all foreign issuers of securities traded on US exchanges, the HFCAA in fact is directed to Chinese companies listed on US exchanges that utilize auditing firms not subject to standards established by the PCAOB.  For example, SEC Chairman Jay Clayton has stated that “[t]he [HFCAA] is a legislative attempt to get China to comply with the oversight requirements” and that “[t]he status quo is not acceptable.” 4

While some might view this measure as spillover into the financial sector of the ongoing US-Chinese economic and trade tensions, other observers have noted that it is hard to argue with the logic that firms listed on major US exchanges, which are afforded access to the most liquid capital markets in the world, should without exception be subject to transparent and robust audit disciplines compliant with western standards.

Implementation issues

The SEC is required to promulgate implementing regulations within 90 days after enactment, and it is possible the SEC will attempt to push out proposed regulations before President Trump leaves office on January 20, 2021. Any such proposed regulations must go through a public comment period before final regulations are issued and implemented, however. Thus, it is also possible that the latter part of the rulemaking process would occur during the incoming Biden Administration.

As noted at the outset, the HFCAA mandates the delisting process and only affords the SEC the authority to establish rules to implement this process and provide the details of obligatory reporting by covered companies. Moreover, the SEC, as an independent agency, is not directly subject to oversight by the new Administration on its implementation of the HFCAA.

Nevertheless, there is the prospect that some greater flexibility can be injected into the delisting process. In this regard, US news outlets have recently reported that the SEC is also working on a separate proposal that would allow Chinese auditors to comply with the US inspection requirement without violating its own jurisdiction’s laws by permitting the companies to get a second review of their books by an accounting firm based in a country where auditors comply with PCAOB oversight.5  Such a rule would take weeks or months to finalize.

Moreover, it is possible that there could be some negotiations between the US and China over applicable accounting standards for Chinese issuers that meet PCAOB standards. Whether such negotiations occur, however, remains to be seen.

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By Jeffrey P. Bialos, Ginger T. Faulk, Mark D. Herlach and Nicholas T. Hillman at Eversheds Sutherland. Republished with permission.