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Breakbulk Europe Moves to September

breakbulk europe

Breakbulk Europe Moves to September

Breakbulk Europe, the world’s largest event for the project cargo and breakbulk industry, has been postponed until September in light of the global novel coronavirus pandemic. The event will now take place at Messe Bremen in Bremen, Germany, from 29 September to 1 October 2020.

“We have been closely monitoring the impact of COVID-19 not only in Germany, but across the world, and have decided to move the event to September to ensure the safety of our customers,” stated Nick Davison, Portfolio Director for Breakbulk and CWEIME events, Hyve Group. “We know that this is the most important gathering for the breakbulk and project cargo industry and we want to be sure our customers can meet in a safe environment. The pandemic has had a significant impact on the global supply chain and bringing the industry to Breakbulk Europe will provide an opportunity for leaders to discuss the best way forward.”

To accommodate the new dates for Breakbulk Europe, Breakbulk Americas has been postponed to later in 2020. A new date will be announced shortly.

Meanwhile, Breakbulk Events & Media has launched BreakbulkONE, a weekly newsletter and web portal for industry updates around the effects and responses to the crisis. “Breakbulk events have built a reputation for hosting leaders across the industrial supply chain at the event conferences where they share insights and business strategies,” Leslie Meredith, Breakbulk’s Marketing and Media Director said. “We wanted to extend this support to provide a platform for industry members to share their own news by tapping into the resources of our media team who runs Breakbulk Newswire and Breakbulk magazine. We hope this also reinforces the feeling that our industry is a unified one and that we can find better solutions together.”

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About Breakbulk Europe

Breakbulk Europe has become the global hub for the industrial project supply chain, including the world’s foremost manufacturers, oil & gas companies, EPCs, carriers, ports, logistics firms, specialized transporters and related service providers. This year’s event is expected to bring together around 10,000 professionals from more than 120 countries. To request exhibiting and sponsorship information and to register for the event, visit europe.breakbulk.com.

Breakbulk Europe is one of four Breakbulk global events, along with Breakbulk Asia in Shanghai, 3-4 Aug. 2020, Breakbulk Americas in Houston, 29 Sept.-1 Oct. 2020 and Breakbulk Middle East in Dubai, 9-10 Feb. 2021.

About Hyve Group plc
Hyve Group plc is a next-generation FTSE 250 global events business whose purpose is to create unmissable events, where customers from all corners of the globe share extraordinary moments and shape industry innovation. Hyve Group plc was announced as the new brand name of ITE Group plc in September 2019, following its significant transformation under the Transformation and Growth (TAG) programme. Our vision is to create the world’s leading portfolio of content-driven, must-attend events delivering an outstanding experience and ROI for our customers.

Press contact: Leslie Meredith, Marketing & Media Director Breakbulk Events & Media

E: Leslie.Meredith@breakbulk.com

T: +1 801 201 5971

U.S. Strengthens Sanctions Targeting the Government of Venezuela

On August 5, 2019, the Trump Administration intensified pressure on the administration of Nicolás Maduro by imposing broad economic sanctions against the Government of Venezuela, a move that could escalate existing tensions with Venezuela’s supporters, Russia and China.  In a late-night Executive Order, President Trump announced that all property, and interests in property, of the Government of Venezuela, including its agencies, instrumentalities, and any entity owned or controlled by the foregoing, that are within the jurisdiction of the United States would be blocked.

The Order further suspended entry into the United States of sanctioned persons absent a determination from the Secretary of State. The Order also authorizes the Secretary of the Treasury to impose additional secondary sanctions on non-U.S. persons who materially support or provide goods or services to the Government of Venezuela.

Background

In January 2019, after months of economic turmoil and political unrest under Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro, the United States formally recognized Juan Guaidó, the leader of the Venezuelan National Assembly, as the country’s legitimate head of state.  More than fifty nations followed suit, asserting that President Maduro’s 2017 reelection was illegitimate and that Guaidó was the rightful interim president under the Venezuelan constitution.

The Trump Administration followed its recognition of Mr. Guaidó as interim president with sweeping sanctions on the Venezuelan government. The measures included designating Venezuela’s state-run oil company, Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A. (“PdVSA”), as a Specially Designated National (“SDN”), thereby prohibiting U.S. persons from engaging in transactions with PdVSA, as well as transactions by non-U.S. persons conducted in U.S. dollars, unless otherwise authorized by the U.S. Department of Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control (“OFAC”).  (We previously summarized the PdVSA SDN designation here.)

Despite the increasing U.S. pressure, President Maduro has refused to cede power.  He retains the support of the Venezuelan military, and Russia, China, Iran, Cuba, and Turkey have continued their economic and diplomatic relationships with the regime.

Sanctions Overview

Through this new Executive Order, the Trump Administration has ratcheted up its efforts against the Maduro regime, asserting that further measures are necessary to combat “human rights abuses,” “interference with freedom of expression,” and “ongoing attempts to undermine Interim President Juan Guaidó and the Venezuelan National Assembly’s exercise of legitimate authority in Venezuela.”

However, contrary to initial press reports, the action does not create a comprehensive embargo against Venezuela (on the model of the U.S. sanctions against Iran) that would prevent U.S. persons from engaging in almost all transactions. Instead, the new measures focus on the Venezuelan government by blocking all property and interests in property of the government that are currently in the United States, will be brought into the United States, or come into the possession or control of a U.S. person. There is, however, an exception for humanitarian goods, such as food, clothing, and medicine.  The Order applies regardless of contracts entered into, or licenses or permits granted, prior to the Order.

Further, the Order could have a broad impact outside of the United States by authorizing secondary sanctions against any party determined by OFAC to “have materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of” the Government of Venezuela.  U.S. National Security Advisor John Bolton warned the day after the Order, “We are sending a signal to third parties that want to do business with the Maduro regime: proceed with extreme caution.  There is no need to risk your business interests with the United States for the purposes of profiting from a corrupt and dying regime.”

In conjunction with the Order, OFAC also revised twelve existing general licenses (“GLs”) and issued thirteen new GLs.  Notably, GL 28 authorizes through 12:01 a.m. on September 4, 2019, transactions necessary to wind-down contracts with the Government of Venezuela.  GL 31 also authorizes transactions with the Venezuelan National Assembly and the shadow government of Interim President Juan Guaidó, underscoring that the target of the action is the administration of Nicolás Maduro.

The GLs and related guidance make clear that the people of Venezuela are not the target of the sanctions.  Specifically, OFAC released a document entitled “Guidance Related to the Provision of Humanitarian Assistance and Support to the Venezuelan People,” which emphasized that “humanitarian assistance and activities to promote democracy are not the target of U.S. sanctions and are generally excepted from sanctions . . . ”  OFAC simultaneously issued four new Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs).  FAQ 680 stresses that “U.S. persons are not prohibited from engaging in transactions involving the country or people of Venezuela, provided blocked persons or any conduct prohibited by any other Executive order imposing sanctions measures related to the situation in Venezuela, are not involved.”

OFAC also issued a number of GLs to authorize humanitarian transactions and transactions necessary for communications involving Venezuela, including new GLs 24 (telecommunications and common carriers), 25 (Internet communications), 26(medical services), and 29 (broadly authorizing certain non-governmental organizations).

Further, U.S. persons in Venezuela are not targeted by the sanctions.  Section 6(d) of the Order exempts from the definition of Government of Venezuela “any United States citizen, any permanent resident alien of the United States, any alien lawfully admitted to the United States, or any alien holding a valid United States visa.”  Further, GL 32authorizes U.S. persons resident in Venezuela to engage in ordinary and necessary personal “maintenance” transactions, including “payment of housing expenses, acquisition of goods or services for personal use, payment of taxes or fees, and purchase or receipt of permits, licenses, or public utility services.”

Such measures targeting an entire government have rarely been used by the United States, and there are many questions about how the restrictions and related authorizations will be interpreted and applied.  As Bolton observed, “This is the first time in 30 years that [the U.S. is] imposing an asset freeze against a government in this hemisphere.”

Effect of the Sanctions

There has been some confusion in the media over the breadth of the measures.  Some reports have mischaracterized the Order as a “total embargo;” however, the scope of the Order is limited to property, and interests in property, of the Venezuelan government, its agencies, instrumentalities, and entities owned or controlled by these.  Because many major Venezuelan government entities have already been designated as SDNs in earlier actions, including PdVSA and the Central Bank of Venezuela, the measures appear to be only an incremental expansion of the existing sanctions program.

More significantly, the Order creates a secondary sanctions regime for OFAC to designate non-U.S. parties who continue to do business with the Maduro government.  While these secondary sanctions are most likely to target Cuban, Russian, and Chinese entities that continue to provide aid to the ailing regime, all non-U.S. persons engaging in transactions in the country should carefully assess whether those transactions could benefit the government.  In particular, companies trading with Venezuela should conduct due diligence sufficient to ensure that their counterparties are not owned fifty percent or more by the Government of Venezuela, or are not otherwise controlled by the government.

In addition, from a practical standpoint, although the sanctions only apply to Government of Venezuelan and related entities, the measures may cause financial institutions, insurers, freight forwarders and other companies – who often apply a heighted level of compliance going beyond the minimum required by OFAC – to avoid dealing with Venezuelan entities altogether.

The measures against Venezuela could also escalate existing tensions with Russia and China if the sanctions further restrict the countries’ access to Venezuelan oil.  Russia and China, which have continued to back the Maduro regime, currently import Venezuelan oil as part of a debt relief program.  China is slated to continue receiving oil from Venezuela until 2021, so it stands to suffer substantial losses if it is unable to continue the shipments.  This uncertainty comes in the midst of deteriorating relations between the United States and China due to the ongoing trade war, relations which suffered another blow this week when the Trump Administration labeled China a “currency manipulator.”

Paramount Group

IMDEC 2019: Paramount Group Confirms Sponsorship & Support

Adding to its longstanding relationship with the Ghanaian Navy, Paramount Group confirmed a Platinum Sponsorship for the Ghanaian Navy’s 60th anniversary celebration taking place at this year’s International Maritime Defense Exhibition and Conference (IMDEC 2019 –https://imdecafrica.com/) in Ghana from July 24-25.

“We have a very strong and lasting relationship with the Ghanaian Navy and it is a great privilege to support this momentous occasion of its 60th Anniversary,” said Senior Vice President of Paramount Group, Mr. Eric Ichikowitz. “It is through partnerships like this that governments can unlock the vast benefits of the Blue Ocean economy by creating indigenous and regional naval capabilities that will bolster local manufacturing, skills development and technology transfer.”

The global aerospace and technology company will also participate as one of many delegates at the conference among more than 15 Chiefs of Naval Staff and a multitude of Africa’s public and private sector maritime stakeholders.

“This Conference affords Paramount Group and our stakeholders in the African security and defense space with a timely opportunity to present strategic, localized, and cost-efficient methodologies and solutions necessary to secure some of Africa’s most important assets: its waterways,” added Ichikowitz.

“We are looking forward to deliberate upon lasting solutions for addressing the socio-economical threats of piracy, human and drug trafficking, illegal fishing, bunkering and armed robberies that impact the present security and future potential of Africa’s maritime and coastal waters.” 

Ichikowitz will be leading delegations as a key speaker during the event appropriately themed, “60 Years of Naval Excellence: Securing the Maritime Domain for National Development.” Event attendees have the opportunity to participate in-depth panel discussions, breakout sessions, as well as VIP exhibition tours of elite military facilities including the Sekondi Naval Base.

In addition to its offering of multi-role naval vessels from interceptor light strike vessels, to off-shore patrol vessels, Paramount Group adds more value to its partnership with African navies through its systems installation, integration programmes, and implementing equipment upgrades installation combined with high-skills training. These efforts are combined to ultimately create operations aligned with economic and sustainable efficiencies among shore facilities.

“We are excited to join the Ghanaian Navy at IMDEC 2019, an event we anticipate will foster newfound dialogue and best practice in collaboration and innovation for securitizing the Gulf of Guinea. The ECOWAS is home to one of Africa’s foremost oil and gas enclaves that unfortunately today has grown increasingly volatile, costing the region billions of dollars in economic activity. We look forward to continuing to play a role in safeguarding these coastal waters in tandem with our partners across the region,” Ichikowitz concluded.