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OFAC Sanctions Four Ukrainian Officials for Acting on Russia’s Behalf; Additional Russia Sanctions Could Follow

russia

OFAC Sanctions Four Ukrainian Officials for Acting on Russia’s Behalf; Additional Russia Sanctions Could Follow

As tensions run high between Washington and Moscow over a possibly imminent Russian invasion of Ukraine, the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (“OFAC”) designated today four (4) current and former Ukrainian officials under Executive Order (“EO”) 14024 dated April 15, 2021. In a press release issued earlier today, OFAC asserted the Russian Federal Security Service (“FSB”) “recruit[s] Ukrainian citizens in key positions to gain access to sensitive information, threaten the sovereignty of Ukraine, and then leverage these Ukrainian officials to create instability in advance of a potential Russian invasion.” OFAC also noted that Russian agents have sought to influence U.S. elections since at least 2016.

In today’s action, OFAC added two (2) current Ukrainian Members of Parliament – Taras Kozak and Oleh Voloshyn – to the Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List (“SDN List”) and labeled them FSB “pawns”. OFAC accused Kozak of amplifying false narratives regarding the 2020 U.S. elections and Voloshyn of undermining Ukrainian government officials and advocating Russian interests. OFAC also added two (2) former Ukrainian officials to the SDN List – Volodymyr Oliynyk and Vladimir Sivkovich. OFAC asserts Oliynyk gathered information about Ukraine’s critical infrastructure for the FSB and Sivkovich engaged in influence and disinformation campaigns targeting both the Ukraine and the U.S.

All four (4) SDN designations were made pursuant to EO 14024, which authorizes OFAC to impose sanctions on persons who act or purport to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, the Government of the Russian Federation. As a result of the designations, all property and interests in property of these persons in the U.S. or controlled by U.S. persons must be blocked and reported to OFAC. U.S. persons are prohibited from sending or receiving any provision of funds, goods, or services to/from these newly designated SDNs. According to OFAC’s “50% Ownership Rule,” these sanctions also extend to any entities in which these SDNs directly or indirectly hold, either individually or in the aggregate with other SDNs, an ownership interest of 50% or more.

The U.S. has also recently signaled its readiness to impose additional sanctions if Russia proceeds with an invasion of Ukraine, but has not shared many details of its plans. On January 21, 2022, Deputy Secretary of the Treasury Wally Adeyemo in a conversation with Ukraine Minister of Finance Serhiy Marchenko “emphasized that the United States and its allies and partners are prepared to inflict significant costs on the Russian economy if Russia further invades Ukraine.” Some news reports have forecasted that restrictions on semiconductor exports to Russia, sanctions against Russian financial institutions, and controls on foreign-produced goods going to Russia are among the options under consideration by the White House. However, any additional sanctions beyond the four (4) SDN designations reported in this post are purely speculative at this time.

Husch Blackwell’s Export Controls and Economic Sanctions Team continues to monitor U.S. sanctions and export controls against Russia and will provide further updates if additional developments occur.

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Tony Busch is an attorney in Husch Blackwell LLP’s Washington, D.C. office and is a member of the firm’s International Trade & Supply Chain practice team.

Cortney O’Toole Morgan is a Washington D.C.-based partner with the law firm Husch Blackwell LLP. She leads the firm’s International Trade & Supply Chain group.

Grant Leach is an Omaha-based partner with the law firm Husch Blackwell LLP focusing on international trade, export controls, trade sanctions and anti-corruption compliance.

telecommunications

U.S. Government Imposes Sanctions and Issues Joint OFAC/BIS Telecommunications Fact Sheet to Support Cuban Protests

During the past month, the U.S. Department of Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (“OFAC”) has issued three separate rounds of Specially Designated Nationals & Blocked Persons List (“SDN List”) designations in order to support protests in Cuba that began on July 11th. Further, OFAC and the U.S. Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (“BIS”) issued a joint fact sheet describing existing OFAC general licenses (“GLs”) and BIS license exceptions that facilitate certain telecommunications equipment, software, and services exports to Cuba without prior approval by the U.S. government.

SDN Designations

Using its authority under the Global Magnitsky Act, OFAC added a total of five Cuban government officials and three Cuban government entities to the SDN List on July 22ndJuly 30th, and August 13th. All property and interests in property of these SDNs that are or come within the U.S. or the possession or control of U.S. persons are blocked as of the below effective dates, and U.S. persons are generally prohibited from engaging in transactions involving such SDNs unless authorized by OFAC.

Entities:

-Brigada Especial Nacional del Ministerio del Interior (“SNB”) – Also known as the Boinas Negras or Black Berets, the SNB is a special forces unit under the Cuban Ministry of the Interior – Blocked July 22, 2021

-Policia Nacional Revolucionaria (“PNR”) – A police unit under the Cuban Ministry of the Interior – Blocked July 30, 2021

-Tropas de Prevencion (“TDP”) – Also known as the Boinas Rojas or Red Berets, the TDP is a military police unit of Cuba’s Revolutionary Armed Forces, which is commanded by Cuba’s Ministry of Revolutionary Armed Forces – Blocked August 13, 2021

Individuals:

-Lopez Miera, Alvaro – Minister of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Cuba – Blocked July 22, 2021

-Callejas Valcarce, Oscar Alejandro – Director of the PNR – Blocked July 30, 2021

-Sierra Arias, Eddy Manuel – Deputy Director of the PNR – Blocked July 30, 2021

-Martinez Fernandez, Pedro Orlando – Chief of the Political Directorate of the PNR – Blocked August 13, 2021

-Sotomayor Garcia, Romarico Vidal – Chief of the Political Directorate of the Cuban Ministry of the Interior – Blocked August 13, 2021

OFAC’s “50% Ownership Rule” will also extend these blocking sanctions to any entities owned 50 percent or more, individually or in the aggregate, directly or indirectly, by one or more of these newly designated SDNs.

Joint Fact Sheet: “Supporting the Cuban People’s Right to Seek, Receive, and Impart Information through Safe and Secure Access to the Internet”

Cuba remains comprehensively sanctioned by the U.S. government and most transactions between the U.S. and Cuba remain prohibited. However, in a jointly issued fact sheet dated August 11th, 2021, OFAC and BIS outlined existing OFAC GLs and BIS license exceptions available to exporters of telecommunications equipment, software, and services to Cuba under the Cuba Assets Control Regulations (31 CFR § 515.101, et seq., the “CACR”) and the Export Administration Regulations (15 CFR § 730.1, et seq., the “EAR”). The fact sheet serves as a reminder that despite the embargo on Cuba, there are certain avenues for trade that the U.S. government allows without any prior review, so long as there is strict adherence to the CACR and the EAR.  OFAC GLs highlighted by the fact sheet include:

-Exportation or reexportation of services incident to the exchange of communications over the internet, and installation, repair, or replacement services for certain described items. See CACR §§ 515.578, 515.533.

-Exportation or reexportation of telecommunications-related services and related payments. See CACR § 515.542.

-Transactions necessary to maintain a physical presence undertaken by various enumerated types of organizations such as news bureaus, educational organizations, religious organizations, humanitarian organizations, telecommunications services providers, and internet-based services providers. See CACR § 515.573.

-Provision of internet-based distance learning. See CACR § 515.565.

-Exportation or reexportation of information and informational materials (including of a commercial nature) so long as certain requirements are met. See CACR §§ 515.206(a), 515.545.

BIS license exceptions highlighted by the fact sheet include:

-Consumer Communications Devices (“CCD”). Authorizing the export and reexport of certain items such as mobile phones and modems to individuals and independent non-governmental organizations in Cuba. See EAR § 740.19.

-Items in Support of the Cuban People (“SCP”). Authorizing the export and reexport of certain EAR99-designated items and of certain telecommunications infrastructure items. See EAR § 740.21.

Each of the above OFAC GLs and BIS license exceptions impose specific limitations, terms and conditions which must be complied with carefully. None of the above GLs or license exceptions would authorize a transaction involving an SDN or an entity controlled 50 percent or more by SDNs— specific licenses would be required under such circumstances. Additionally, depending on the specific facts and circumstances of a given activity, many of the above-listed OFAC GLs will prohibit direct financial transactions between persons subject to U.S. jurisdiction and persons listed on the U.S. State Department’s Cuba Restricted List.

The fact sheet also indicated that OFAC and BIS will provide favorable licensing treatment for activities benefiting the free flow of information to and from Cuba that are not otherwise authorized under the above-described OFAC GL’s and BIS license exceptions.  For OFAC’s licensing policy, the fact sheet states that “For prohibited transactions not otherwise authorized by OFAC general licenses, OFAC considers specific license requests on a case-by-case basis and will prioritize license applications, compliance questions, and other requests that may concern internet freedom in Cuba . . . OFAC has a favorable licensing posture towards specific license requests involving transactions that are ordinarily incident and necessary to ensure that the Cuban people have safe and secure access to the free flow of information on the internet.” Likewise, for BIS’s licensing policy, the fact sheet states that “A general policy of approval applies to [BIS] license applications for telecommunications items and internet-related items intended to improve communications to, from, and among the Cuban people (emphasis supplied).”

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Cortney O’Toole Morgan is a Washington D.C.-based partner with the law firm Husch Blackwell. She leads the firm’s International Trade & Supply Chain group.

Grant Leach is an Omaha-based partner with the law firm Husch Blackwell focusing on international trade, export controls, trade sanctions and anti-corruption compliance.

Tony Busch is an attorney in Husch Blackwell’s Washington, D.C. office.

sanctions

New Executive Order Authorizes Imposition of Additional Sanctions on the Government of Belarus and Certain Sectors of the Belarusian Economy

On August 9, 2021, President Biden issued Executive Order 14038 (the “EO”) which expanded the scope of the national emergency previously declared in EO 13405 of June 16, 2006. The EO imposes additional sanctions in response to conduct by the Government of Belarus (“GoB”) and the President Alyaksandr Lukashenka regime which the Biden Administration described as “long-standing abuses aimed at suppressing democracy and the exercise of human rights and fundamental freedoms.” As specific examples, the EO cites the “fraudulent” August 9, 2020 election administered by the GoB, in which Lukashenka was reelected, and the GoB’s forced grounding of an international flight to arrest Belarusian journalist Raman Pratasevich and his partner Sofia Sapega.

Among other things, the EO gives the U.S. Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (“OFAC”) the discretionary authority, in consultation with the U.S. Secretary of State, to impose blocking sanctions on GoB agencies, GoB leaders and officials, and individuals and companies operating in the defense and related materiel, security, energy, potassium chloride (potash), tobacco products, construction or transportation sectors of the Belarusian economy. The EO also authorizes OFAC to sanction individuals and entities “responsible for or complicit in” activities such as “actions or policies that threaten the peace, security, stability, or territorial integrity of Belarus,” suppression of human rights and freedom of the press, electoral fraud, deceptive transactions, and public corruption.

OFAC immediately used its authority under the EO in order to add multiple persons and entities to its Specially Designated Nationals & Blocked Persons List (“SDN List”). Those added to the SDN List under the EO include:

-BelKazTrans and Closed Joint-Stock Company New Oil Company, who were sanctioned for operating in the energy sector of the Belarusian economy;

-Inter Tobacco, Energo-Oil and Grodno Tobacco Factory Neman, who were sanctioned for operating in the tobacco product sector of the Belarusian economy;

-Cyprus-based Dana Holdings Limited, who was sanctioned for operating in the construction sector of the Belarusian economy; and

-Belaruskali OAO, who was sanctioned for being owned by the GoB and for operating in the potassium chloride (potash) sector of the Belarusian economy.

The U.S. Treasury Department published a separate press release which identifies all of the SDNs designated by OFAC under the EO. As a result of these designations, all property and interests in property of these SDNs that are or come within the U.S. or the possession or control of U.S. persons are blocked, and U.S. persons are generally prohibited from engaging in transactions involving such SDNs unless authorized by OFAC. OFAC’s “50% Ownership Rule” will also extend these blocking sanctions to any entities owned 50 percent or more, individually or in the aggregate, directly or indirectly, by one or more of these newly designated SDNs. Additionally, the EO gives OFAC the authority to impose blocking sanctions on any non-U.S. persons who provide material assistance to any SDN designated pursuant to the EO.

For Belaruskali OAO, OFAC issued General License 4, which authorizes the wind down of transactions involving Belaruskali OAO, or any entity owned 50% or more by Belaruskali OAO, through 12:01 a.m. eastern standard time on December 8, 2021. OFAC issued FAQ 918 to provide additional information regarding General License 4.

OFAC also issued FAQ 917 which clarifies the scope of the EO’s sector-based sanctions as follows:

The identification of a sector pursuant to E.O. of August 9, 2021 provides notice that persons operating in the identified sector risk exposure to sanctions; however, the identification of a sector does not automatically block all persons operating in that sector of the Belarus economy. Only persons designated on OFAC’s Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List (SDN List), and entities owned 50 percent or more, individually or in the aggregate, directly or indirectly, by one or more such persons, are subject to blocking sanctions.

As a result, the EO does not automatically sanction persons operating in the identified sectors of the Belarusian economy, but it does provide OFAC with the authority to impose blocking sanctions on such persons at any time.

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Cortney O’Toole Morgan is a Washington D.C.-based partner with the law firm Husch Blackwell. She leads the firm’s International Trade & Supply Chain group.

Grant Leach is an Omaha-based partner with the law firm Husch Blackwell focusing on international trade, export controls, trade sanctions and anti-corruption compliance.

Tony Busch is an attorney in Husch Blackwell’s Washington, D.C. office.

burma

US Government Adds 4 Military-Connected Entities in Burma to Entity List and Sanctions 22 Burmese Individuals

As part of the U.S. Government’s ongoing response to the military coup in Burma (Myanmar), the Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (“BIS”) added four entities to the Entity List effective July 6, 2021 and the Department of Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (“OFAC”) added twenty-two individuals to the Specially Designated Nationals & Blocked Persons List (“SDN List”) effective July 2, 2021.

Commerce Secretary Gina M. Raimondo noted that the four entities include a satellite communications services provider to the Burmese military and three entities that have revenue-sharing agreements with Myanmar Economic Holdings Limited (“MEHL”), an entity that generates revenue for the Burmese military and which was previously added to the Entity List. As a result of the additions, licenses are required for exports, reexports, and in-country transfers of all items “subject to the EAR” to the four entities and BIS will employ a presumption of denial license review policy. The entities are:

-King Royal Technologies Co., Ltd.;

-Myanmar Wanbao Mining Copper, Ltd.;

-Myanmar Yang Tse Copper, Ltd.; and

-Wanbao Mining, Ltd.

The twenty-two individuals added to the SDN List under Executive Order 14014 include two members of the State Administrative Council currently participating in governance of Burma and the Ministers of Information; Investment and Foreign Economic Relations; Labor, Immigration, and Population; and Social Welfare, Relief, and Resettlement. Fifteen of the twenty-two added to the SDN List were added because of being either spouses or adult children of persons on the SDN List.

As a result of the SDN designations, all property and interests in property of these persons in the US or controlled by US persons must be blocked and reported to OFAC. US persons are prohibited from sending or receiving any provision of funds, goods, or services to/from these newly designated SDNs. According to OFAC’s “50% Ownership Rule,” these sanctions also extend to any subsidiaries in which these SDNs directly or indirectly hold, either individually or in the aggregate with other SDNs, an ownership interest of 50% or more.

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Cortney O’Toole Morgan is a Washington D.C.-based partner with the law firm Husch Blackwell LLP. She leads the firm’s International Trade & Supply Chain group.

Grant Leach is an Omaha-based partner with the law firm Husch Blackwell LLP focusing on international trade, export controls, trade sanctions and anti-corruption compliance.

Tony Busch is an attorney in Husch Blackwell LLP’s Washington, D.C. office.

OFAC

OFAC Implements Hong Kong-Related Sanctions Regulations Pursuant to E.O. 13936

The U.S. Department of Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (“OFAC”) published regulations in the Federal Register on January 15, 2021, to implement Executive Order 13936 (“E.O. 13936”), titled “The President’s Executive Order on Hong Kong Normalization.”  The President determined on July 14, 2020, in E.O. 13936 that Hong Kong was no longer sufficiently autonomous to justify special treatment under U.S. law, due to the implementation of the Law of the People’s Republic of China on Safeguarding National Security in the Hong Kong Administrative Region (“National Security Law”). Additionally, E.O. 13936 directed the Department of Treasury to implement sanctions on persons undermining democracy in Hong Kong.

OFAC’s Hong Kong regulations formally block transactions prohibited by E.O. 13936 and establish the process by which persons and entities are added to OFAC’s Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List (“SDN List”). On January 15, 2021 OFAC also added six (6) persons to the SDN List pursuant to E.O. 13936. These persons were found to have been involved in the implementation of the National Security Law and to be undermining democratic processes in Hong Kong. As a result, all property and interests in property of 50% or greater belonging to these persons—which are in the U.S. or held by U.S. persons—must be blocked and reported to OFAC.

OFAC stated in its final rule that the regulations “are being published in abbreviated form at this time for the purpose of providing immediate guidance to the public,” and that OFAC intends to supplement with “a more comprehensive set of regulations.” However, since the OFAC regulations are a published final rule, they are not impacted by the President’s “Regulatory Freeze Pending Review Memorandum” and are therefore in effect until amended or withdrawn.

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Cortney O’Toole Morgan is a Washington D.C.-based partner with the law firm Husch Blackwell LLP. She leads the firm’s International Trade & Supply Chain group.

Grant Leach is an Omaha-based partner with the law firm Husch Blackwell LLP focusing on international trade, export controls, trade sanctions and anti-corruption compliance.

Julia Banegas is an attorney in Husch Blackwell LLP’s Washington, D.C. office.

Camron Greer is an Assistant Trade Analyst in Husch Blackwell LLP’s Washington D.C. office.

Venezuela

OFAC Sanctions CEIEC for Its Support to Venezuela Regime

The U.S. Department of Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) has sanctioned CEIEC (China National Electronic Import-Export Company), a Chinese technology exporter, for its alleged support to the Maduro government in Venezuela. As a result of CEIEC’s addition to OFAC’s Specially Designated Nationals List, all property and interests belonging to CEIEC, or any entity in which it owns a 50% or greater interest—and which are in the United States or in the possession or control of U.S. persons—must be blocked and reported to OFAC.

According to OFAC, CEIEC has provided software, training, and technical expertise to the government of Venezuela since 2017, which has been used to oppress the Venezuelan people. OFAC specified CEIEC’s support to Venezuela National Telephone Company (CANTV), the state-owned telecoms company which provides 70% of internet service in Venezuela, and described CEIEC’s suite of software and hardware that it provided to CANTV as a “commercialized version” of China’s “Great Firewall” system of internet censorship. “The illegitimate Maduro regime’s reliance on entities like CEIEC to advance its authoritarian agenda further illustrates the regime’s prioritization of power over democratic values and processes,” said Treasury Secretary Mnuchin.

OFAC issued Venezuela-related General License 38 (GL 38) on November 30, 2020, authorizing the wind-down of transactions involving CEIEC. According to the related Frequently Asked Question 854 (FAQ 854), GL 38 authorizes U.S. persons to engage in transactions and activities prohibited by Executive Order 13692 (E.O. 13692) that are ordinarily incident and necessary to the wind-down of transactions and activities involving CEIEC, or any entity in which CEIEC owns a 50% or greater interest, until January 14, 2021.

Non-U.S. persons may also wind down transactions and activities with CEIEC without being sanctioned under E.O. 13692, provided that such wind-down activity is consistent with GL 38 and is completed prior to January 14, 2021.

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Cortney O’Toole Morgan is a Washington D.C.-based partner with the law firm Husch Blackwell LLP. She leads the firm’s International Trade & Supply Chain group.

Grant Leach is an Omaha-based partner with the law firm Husch Blackwell LLP focusing on international trade, export controls, trade sanctions and anti-corruption compliance.

Camron Greer is an Assistant Trade Analyst in Husch Blackwell LLP’s Washington D.C. office.

ofac

More or Less Denied: The OFAC 50% Ownership Rule

The OFAC 50% ownership rule is a compliance requirement that, when overlooked, can lead to severe penalties and reputation damage. What exactly is the 50% rule and for which companies is it most relevant?

50% Rule: What is It?

Sorry, German soccer lovers—this 50% rule relates to Denied Party Screening. In 2014,the United States Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) clarified 2008 guidance in relation to doing business with companies that are not on any OFAC denied parties lists (DPL), but that are in fact owned by people or companies that are on the DPL. The European Union has similar regulations and, as far as OFAC is concerned, the math is simple: if one or more people or entities that are on a DPL own in total 50% or more of an entity that is not listed, that (latter) entity is considered to be under the control of one or more denied parties and cannot be engaged for business.

That seems clear enough, but the bonus question is of course: how do you find out if the company you are planning to do business with is not controlled by actors on the DPL? And how exactly does the math work: is it direct ownership only or do other relations count as well (e.g., what if a denied person’s spouse owns 50.01%)?

Digging Deeper

The only opportunity to flag if an entity is 50% owned by a denied party is to have this information available when denied (or restricted) party screening occurs. Especially for companies with larger transaction volumes and many one-time sales, this implies a gigantic amount of research, which is practically impossible given the usual limited resources compliance departments have available.  Luckily, there are a few companies that have done the research and are also keeping it up to date. Tag their lists on to the regular DPL when screening and all bases are covered.

It’s relevant to note that the amount of research is staggering and performed in old fashion digging style. Typically, entities appearing on the DPL are well aware of that fact and bury their ownership in (at first sight) legit companies three or four layers deep, which is more research than most companies can handle, especially when large parts of it may be in a foreign language.

Obviously, some verticals are subject to both more scrutiny and fraud attempts when it comes to the 50% ownership rule. That soccer jersey sale might not raise too many flags but, for example, in the financial sector, the movement of dual-use goods or complex international agreements (oil, anyone?) calls attention to the necessity to screen all parties involved to the finest detail possible. Or not, in which case preparing for some generous penalties, revoking of business licenses and perhaps jailtime would be time well spent. Recent cases (2018-2020) have seen OFAC dish out penalties in excess of $1.3 billion with a growing part of that related to 50% ownership. In general, most (higher) penalties have been related to the financial sector (the first high profile case was the 50% penalty imposed on Barclays Bank).

As for the relationship part, it is only the actual names on the debarred lists that count towards the 50%. Ownership by their known family and (political) friends does not count toward the 50%, as long as these relations are not on the OFAC lists themselves. Practically, though, a few eyebrows or more should be raised if those relationships do come to light. Either way, if it is under the header of due diligence, reasonable care, or ‘know your customer’ (KYC), the burden is on the exporter/seller to ensure no laws are violated and goods do not end up in debarred hands.

A Closer Look

To illustrate the reach of the 50% rule, consider the following from the aforementioned Barclays case. Barclays US worked with Barclays Bank of Zimbabwe Limited on some of its customers that were not on OFAC’s Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List (SDN List). Yet, the Industrial Development Corporation of Zimbabwe was on the list (since 2008) and owns 50% or more of these customers. That means Barclays should have effectively blocked these customers and not engaged with them. When business was conducted, Barclays violated the 50% rule and was penalized.

Parting Thoughts

‘What Lies Beneath’ is not only a movie that can keep you up at night. The guidance on OFAC compliance regulations dictates that exporters must be aware of who they are conducting business with, even if that requires a look underneath the surface. That responsibility cannot be ignored.

cosco

U.S. Lifts Sanctions on Cosco Vessel that Moved Iranian Oil

The U.S. Treasury Department and Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) of removed sanctions on shipping tanker COSCO Dalian on Jan. 31.

On Sept. 25, 2019, OFAC designated COSCO Dalian and a second vessel from China’s largest shipping company on the Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List for transporting Iranian crude oil to China.

That had an enormous and immediate impact on the oil and shipping industries since a handful of COSCO subsidiaries and dozens of vessels were also considered sanctioned by OFAC and effectively removed from the petroleum shipping market.

“OFAC hasn’t announced the policy rationale yet, but [it] likely resulted from receiving credible assurances that the Chinese company would no longer ship Iranian oil,” observes Beau Barnes, an attorney at the global firm Kobre & Kim. “The speed of the removal is lightning fast by OFAC’s standards, and likely stems from the company’s critical role in the global supply chain.”

Some have opined that ongoing U.S.-China trade talks played a role in the OFAC delisting.

“COSCO’s original designation had caused increased global tanker freight rates to increase, leading OFAC to issue two waivers to temporarily allow transactions with the company,” notes Barnes, who represents clients in white-collar criminal defense matters, investigations, regulatory actions and commercial litigation, with a particular focuses on matters related to national security, economic sanctions, export controls, economic espionage and cybersecurity.

compliance freight

11 Common Misconceptions: Compliance & Denied Party Screening

With the growth of eCommerce, business integration, and global connectivity showing no sign of abating, compliance and denied party screening (DPS) have been thrust into the spotlight. The era of the mega fine has emerged, with fluid international sanctions policies impacting unsuspecting companies in unwelcome ways. In addition to the potential for reputational damage, penalties for non-compliance can include substantial fines—multimillions of dollars in some instances—, revocation of export privileges, and criminal charges, including prison time. 

The solution? Screening for restricted and denied parties, and due diligence to ensure that goods, technologies, and services are not destined for a sanctioned or embargoed country—not to mention screening every financial transaction—should be an integral component of every organization’s governance, risk, and compliance strategy. 

WHO NEEDS TO SCREEN?

While homeland security-sensitive industries (e.g., aerospace, defense, telecommunications, IT, energy, research, financial institutions) have a high bar when it comes to complying with U.S. and international export, trade, and financial laws, ordinary businesses from across all industries have an obligation to adhere to compliance requirements as well—and the penalties for non-compliance can be severe.

The reality is that companies found in violation of international trade regulations come from a wide spectrum of industries, not just the usual suspects. In fact, many organizations that have received financial, or even criminal, penalties fall outside the realm of the higher-risk industries. 

Unfortunately, many companies hold the erroneous belief that compliance and DPS do not apply to them. By increasing awareness surrounding the following misconceptions about compliance and restricted party screening, organizations can take a proactive and vigilant approach to mitigating risk and avoiding costly penalties.

DPS MYTHS: DON’T LET THEM HAPPEN TO YOU 

Screening doesn’t apply to our business, industry, or country.

All businesses, not just those operating within homeland security-sensitive industries, have an obligation to screen. Companies both in the U.S. and those outside of the country that engage with the United States in any capacity—including selling products or services in the U.S., or even using American banks and financial services for transactions—are subject to U.S. export and financial compliance laws.

We don’t need to screen because we supply services, not products.

Every time money changes hands, there is an obligation to ensure that the good or service is not destined for an individual or entity on a government watch list; services (e.g., travel agencies) are not exempt. 

We rely on a third party (e.g., freight forwarder) to screen for us.

Many companies make the mistake of thinking that the burden of compliance rests with the shipping or freight forwarding company but this is not always the case. The U.S. government can designate the owner or seller of the merchandise being exported (or imported) as the Exporter of Record, shifting the onus of compliance to both organizations. 

Our company operates domestically so screening is not required.

A significant number of individuals found on watch lists are U.S. nationals or citizens located in the United States who have been found guilty of violating export laws. Consequently, organizations are obligated to screen regardless of shipment destination.

Export laws don’t apply to us because we’re located outside the U.S. 

Regardless of where an organization’s headquarters or subsidiaries are based, it is highly likely that some, if not all, transactions flow through the U.S. financial system at one point in the purchasing or supply chain process. As such, these transactions fall under the purview of the U.S. Department of Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC).

We don’t export to countries under sanctions or embargoes.

Virtually every nation, on every continent, has debarred individuals and entities inside their borders—even Antarctica! Given the dynamic nature of international sanction policies, especially in the current political climate, organizations are at risk of engaging with a denied or restricted person or organization regardless of where they export. 

Our goods are EAR99 so we don’t need to screen.

Although an organization’s goods might be EAR99 (under the jurisdiction of the U.S. Department of Commerce and not listed on the Commerce Control List), selling them to a denied party is still subject to penalty. For reference, the 2017 edition of the Bureau of Industry and Security’s Don’t Let This Happen to You is replete with examples of EAR99 export violations.

We already screened our customers and contacts once.

Denied and restricted party lists change frequently, in many cases daily. To ensure compliance, organizations would be best served by screening all transactions at multiple points throughout the business workflow.

The project we needed to screen for is complete so we’re in the clear.

While exports are commonly associated with the shipment of goods, export controls also encompass the transfer of technology, software, or technical data, even when the transfer occurs in the United States. Case in point: although a project may have concluded, the release of controlled technologies (a.k.a. deemed exports) to foreign nationals is subject to U.S. export laws.

We only need to screen the person to whom we’re shipping.

One of the most misunderstood areas of export compliance is the requirements surrounding end-use. End-use compliance involves requesting documentation from the purchaser to confirm they are the ultimate destination of the goods and that they will use the product as intended. While obtaining an end-user statement doesn’t guarantee the veracity of the purchaser’s claim, this process demonstrates that a company has taken additional measures to ensure adherence to export and trade compliance laws and will stand them in good stead if issues arise. 

We’ll just pay the fine.

Fines incurred as a result of an export of OFAC violation should not be treated as a business expense. In fact, criminal penalties can include jail time and organizations can have their export privileges revoked. Moreover, negative media attention is an increasing concern for risk-adverse organizations attempting to protect their reputation by avoiding conducting business with non-law-abiding people or companies. 

FINAL THOUGHTS

Penalties from any export, trade, or OFAC compliance violation can negatively impact an organization’s bottom line, or ultimately cripple a company’s trade. Implementing a comprehensive screening program that encompasses restricted and denied parties and sanctioned and embargoed countries, coupled with cultivating a culture of compliance within the organization, will help keep goods flowing while minimizing the risk of penalties. 

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Marc Roy is Vice President & General Manager, Compliance Solutions at Descartes Systems Group, the global leader in providing on-demand, software-as-a-service solutions focused on improving the productivity, performance, and security of logistics-intensive businesses. 

U.S. Strengthens Sanctions Targeting the Government of Venezuela

On August 5, 2019, the Trump Administration intensified pressure on the administration of Nicolás Maduro by imposing broad economic sanctions against the Government of Venezuela, a move that could escalate existing tensions with Venezuela’s supporters, Russia and China.  In a late-night Executive Order, President Trump announced that all property, and interests in property, of the Government of Venezuela, including its agencies, instrumentalities, and any entity owned or controlled by the foregoing, that are within the jurisdiction of the United States would be blocked.

The Order further suspended entry into the United States of sanctioned persons absent a determination from the Secretary of State. The Order also authorizes the Secretary of the Treasury to impose additional secondary sanctions on non-U.S. persons who materially support or provide goods or services to the Government of Venezuela.

Background

In January 2019, after months of economic turmoil and political unrest under Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro, the United States formally recognized Juan Guaidó, the leader of the Venezuelan National Assembly, as the country’s legitimate head of state.  More than fifty nations followed suit, asserting that President Maduro’s 2017 reelection was illegitimate and that Guaidó was the rightful interim president under the Venezuelan constitution.

The Trump Administration followed its recognition of Mr. Guaidó as interim president with sweeping sanctions on the Venezuelan government. The measures included designating Venezuela’s state-run oil company, Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A. (“PdVSA”), as a Specially Designated National (“SDN”), thereby prohibiting U.S. persons from engaging in transactions with PdVSA, as well as transactions by non-U.S. persons conducted in U.S. dollars, unless otherwise authorized by the U.S. Department of Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control (“OFAC”).  (We previously summarized the PdVSA SDN designation here.)

Despite the increasing U.S. pressure, President Maduro has refused to cede power.  He retains the support of the Venezuelan military, and Russia, China, Iran, Cuba, and Turkey have continued their economic and diplomatic relationships with the regime.

Sanctions Overview

Through this new Executive Order, the Trump Administration has ratcheted up its efforts against the Maduro regime, asserting that further measures are necessary to combat “human rights abuses,” “interference with freedom of expression,” and “ongoing attempts to undermine Interim President Juan Guaidó and the Venezuelan National Assembly’s exercise of legitimate authority in Venezuela.”

However, contrary to initial press reports, the action does not create a comprehensive embargo against Venezuela (on the model of the U.S. sanctions against Iran) that would prevent U.S. persons from engaging in almost all transactions. Instead, the new measures focus on the Venezuelan government by blocking all property and interests in property of the government that are currently in the United States, will be brought into the United States, or come into the possession or control of a U.S. person. There is, however, an exception for humanitarian goods, such as food, clothing, and medicine.  The Order applies regardless of contracts entered into, or licenses or permits granted, prior to the Order.

Further, the Order could have a broad impact outside of the United States by authorizing secondary sanctions against any party determined by OFAC to “have materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of” the Government of Venezuela.  U.S. National Security Advisor John Bolton warned the day after the Order, “We are sending a signal to third parties that want to do business with the Maduro regime: proceed with extreme caution.  There is no need to risk your business interests with the United States for the purposes of profiting from a corrupt and dying regime.”

In conjunction with the Order, OFAC also revised twelve existing general licenses (“GLs”) and issued thirteen new GLs.  Notably, GL 28 authorizes through 12:01 a.m. on September 4, 2019, transactions necessary to wind-down contracts with the Government of Venezuela.  GL 31 also authorizes transactions with the Venezuelan National Assembly and the shadow government of Interim President Juan Guaidó, underscoring that the target of the action is the administration of Nicolás Maduro.

The GLs and related guidance make clear that the people of Venezuela are not the target of the sanctions.  Specifically, OFAC released a document entitled “Guidance Related to the Provision of Humanitarian Assistance and Support to the Venezuelan People,” which emphasized that “humanitarian assistance and activities to promote democracy are not the target of U.S. sanctions and are generally excepted from sanctions . . . ”  OFAC simultaneously issued four new Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs).  FAQ 680 stresses that “U.S. persons are not prohibited from engaging in transactions involving the country or people of Venezuela, provided blocked persons or any conduct prohibited by any other Executive order imposing sanctions measures related to the situation in Venezuela, are not involved.”

OFAC also issued a number of GLs to authorize humanitarian transactions and transactions necessary for communications involving Venezuela, including new GLs 24 (telecommunications and common carriers), 25 (Internet communications), 26(medical services), and 29 (broadly authorizing certain non-governmental organizations).

Further, U.S. persons in Venezuela are not targeted by the sanctions.  Section 6(d) of the Order exempts from the definition of Government of Venezuela “any United States citizen, any permanent resident alien of the United States, any alien lawfully admitted to the United States, or any alien holding a valid United States visa.”  Further, GL 32authorizes U.S. persons resident in Venezuela to engage in ordinary and necessary personal “maintenance” transactions, including “payment of housing expenses, acquisition of goods or services for personal use, payment of taxes or fees, and purchase or receipt of permits, licenses, or public utility services.”

Such measures targeting an entire government have rarely been used by the United States, and there are many questions about how the restrictions and related authorizations will be interpreted and applied.  As Bolton observed, “This is the first time in 30 years that [the U.S. is] imposing an asset freeze against a government in this hemisphere.”

Effect of the Sanctions

There has been some confusion in the media over the breadth of the measures.  Some reports have mischaracterized the Order as a “total embargo;” however, the scope of the Order is limited to property, and interests in property, of the Venezuelan government, its agencies, instrumentalities, and entities owned or controlled by these.  Because many major Venezuelan government entities have already been designated as SDNs in earlier actions, including PdVSA and the Central Bank of Venezuela, the measures appear to be only an incremental expansion of the existing sanctions program.

More significantly, the Order creates a secondary sanctions regime for OFAC to designate non-U.S. parties who continue to do business with the Maduro government.  While these secondary sanctions are most likely to target Cuban, Russian, and Chinese entities that continue to provide aid to the ailing regime, all non-U.S. persons engaging in transactions in the country should carefully assess whether those transactions could benefit the government.  In particular, companies trading with Venezuela should conduct due diligence sufficient to ensure that their counterparties are not owned fifty percent or more by the Government of Venezuela, or are not otherwise controlled by the government.

In addition, from a practical standpoint, although the sanctions only apply to Government of Venezuelan and related entities, the measures may cause financial institutions, insurers, freight forwarders and other companies – who often apply a heighted level of compliance going beyond the minimum required by OFAC – to avoid dealing with Venezuelan entities altogether.

The measures against Venezuela could also escalate existing tensions with Russia and China if the sanctions further restrict the countries’ access to Venezuelan oil.  Russia and China, which have continued to back the Maduro regime, currently import Venezuelan oil as part of a debt relief program.  China is slated to continue receiving oil from Venezuela until 2021, so it stands to suffer substantial losses if it is unable to continue the shipments.  This uncertainty comes in the midst of deteriorating relations between the United States and China due to the ongoing trade war, relations which suffered another blow this week when the Trump Administration labeled China a “currency manipulator.”