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ECONOMIC SANCTIONS EXEMPT HUMANITARIAN TRADE

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ECONOMIC SANCTIONS EXEMPT HUMANITARIAN TRADE

Ailing Relations

Iran has been among the worst affected countries from COVID-19, having emerged as an early hotspot outside China. As of April 7, there were an estimated 62,589 confirmed cases with over 3,800 deaths. Iran’s cases appear to have peaked in late March, but exact numbers are unknown due to the secretive nature of its totalitarian regime. Other countries throughout the Middle East began reporting cases in late February and continue to battle spread of COVID-19 due to travel linked to Iran.

U.S. offers of assistance were rejected by Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who said publicly on March 22, “You might give us a medicine that would spread the disease even more or make it last longer.”

According to the U.S. State Department, the United States has offered more than $100 million in medical assistance to foreign countries, including to the Iranian people, and reports that Iranian health companies have been able to import testing kits without obstacle from U.S. sanctions since January. The U.S. government has urged Iranian leaders to be more truthful about its efforts to contain the virus.

Iran assistance

Humanitarian Trade Exemptions

U.S. economic sanctions against Iran include a general exemption for U.S. exports of agricultural commodities, food, medicines and medical devices to Iran and an authorization process to obtain licenses for a specific list of medical supplies and equipment not covered under the general exemption. Such licenses are usually given for one year.

The U.S. government recently reinforced its messaging that sanctions are directed at the Iranian regime, stating: “[Sanctions] are not directed at the people of Iran, who themselves are victims of the regime’s oppression, corruption, and economic mismanagement.”

A 2019 Congressional Research Service report suggests U.S. sanctions have limited access by the Iranian population to “expensive Western-made medicines such as chemotherapy drugs,” due to a lack of bank financing for such transactions and that the limited supplies that exist have gone to elites.

Role of Financing

Between 2018 and 2019, overall U.S. trade with Iran went from small to very small under tightened sanctions. In 2018, U.S. exports to Iran were valued at $425.7 million. In 2019, U.S. exports had decreased 82 percent to $73.1 million.

Underlying that decrease in trade, even of humanitarian-related goods and services, reflects a tendency toward over-compliance by banks and multinational firms that avoid transactions with Iran to minimize possible violations of U.S. sanctions. Doing so, even inadvertently, could cut off their access to vital U.S. financial markets. The U.S. government has also explicitly cited concerns about the Iranian regime’s abuse of humanitarian trade to evade sanctions and launder money.

To close these loopholes, in October 2019 the Treasury Department announced a new payment mechanism “to facilitate legitimate humanitarian exports to Iran.” The measure restricts the role of the Central Bank of Iran in facilitating humanitarian trade, which the U.S. government views as financing terrorism. It also imposes rigorous reporting requirements to thwart diversion of funds intended for humanitarian use.

By late February 2020, as the COVID-19 medical crisis unfolded in Iran, the U.S. Treasury Department issued a general license authorizing certain humanitarian trade transactions involving the Central Bank of Iran while also approving the use of a Swiss financial channel to finance such transactions.

The Swiss Humanitarian Trade Arrangement (SHTA) enables Swiss-based exporters and trading companies in the food, pharmaceutical and medical sectors to access a secure payment channel with a Swiss bank to guarantee payments for their exports to Iran. Novartis was the first Swiss company to send medicine for use in cancer treatments. Germany, France and Britain have also used this new channel to offer a $5.5 million package to Iran to help fight the coronavirus.

exemptions in sanctions

Trade in Food and Medicine

Much has been written recently about governments restricting exports and otherwise increasing the cost of traded medical supplies during the pandemic.

For two decades now, the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000 (TSRA) has ensured that each U.S. country-based sanctions program provides for trade of agriculture, medicine and medical devices under a broad humanitarian exemption. This is intended to limit potential adverse effects on civilian populations who are not the target of sanctions.

The United Nations Security Council maintains 14 active sanctions programs that also include humanitarian exemptions driven by the belief that a supportive and healthy citizen population is necessary to achieve improvements in a sanctioned regime.

Recently, the United Nations Security Council approved a humanitarian exemption to sanctions against North Korea (DPRK) requested by the World Health Organization for diagnostic and medical equipment to address COVID-19. The United States supported this decision.

Exemptions Thwarted by Totalitarian Regimes

The health impacts of embargoes are difficult to isolate and quantify. They may not become apparent until years after resource shortages occur. Domestic production challenges can also play a role. For example, Iran produces 97 percent of its medicines locally, but a third of these drugs rely on active ingredients that are imported, according to the head of Iran’s Food and Drug Organization.

Although humanitarian trade exemptions are intended to mitigate shortages of essential supplies, totalitarian regimes are known for putting their goals before the needs of their citizens. The negative impacts of sanctions are often compounded by inequitable distribution or outright theft of essential goods and ongoing civil conflicts.

In any case, it’s difficult to know the net effect of sanctions and humanitarian trade exemptions because data on key indicators of health effects are often missing or unavailable from embargoed regimes. However, it is clear that enabling trade in essential goods like food and medical supplies has served a role in health diplomacy for decades.

During her career in international trade and government affairs, the author worked with pharmaceutical and medical device manufacturers to navigate U.S. sanctions policies and requirements.

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Sarah Smiley is a strategic communications and policy expert with over 20 years in international trade and government affairs, working in the U.S. Government, private sector and international organizations.

This article originally appeared on TradeVistas.org. Republished with permission.

U.S.-China

U.S.-China Trade War of 2019 Spills into 2020 for Ports, Shippers and Manufacturers

The Jan. 15 signing of a U.S.-China Phase One agreement did spawn a sigh of relief among those troubled by the trade tensions between the two nations. But six days later, a warning came from a couple experts closely watching the unfolding events on behalf of ports, shipping lines and manufacturers. The crux of that warning? Stay tuned.

“This is a truce,” said Phil Levy, chief economist at Flexport, a San Francisco-based freight forwarding and custom brokerage company. “This is not the end of the trade war.”

Levy shared that opinion as he joined his company’s CEO Ryan Peterson in leading a webinar on Jan. 21 that was listened in on electronically by some of their 10,000 clients in more than 200 countries. Those who rely on the company’s expertise in ocean, air, truck and rail freight, drayage & cartage, warehousing, customs brokerage, financing and insurance–all informed and powered by Flexport’s unique software platform—heard Levy say of the U.S.-China trade war: “We haven’t seen a retaliatory escalation of this magnitude in the post-World War II era. … This really was a 2019 story that worsened throughout the year.”

He pointed to a graphic that showed trade between the world’s two biggest economies fell markedly last year, and that no one overseeing trans-Pacific supply chains were immune from economic harm. Many webinar participants could relate as 64 percent of Flexport’s customers rely on the trans-Pacific trade routes, according to Peterson.

Yes, the Phase One deal was a positive first step, but Levy pointed to some examples of lasting victims from the trade war. It exposed the continued “decay,” as the economist put it, of the World Trade Organization (WTO), which is supposed to prevent the escalation of trade disputes. The “keeper of peace” amid trade tensions was largely frozen out of U.S.-China talks and, therefore, silent as events transpired.

A second heavy blow came in December 2019, when the WTO’s appellate body ceased to function, according to Levy, who noted that the formation of the “WTO system was one of core achievements since World War II.”

Peterson found equally worrisome the first-ever disappearance of peak season when it comes to shipping. As many known, imports grow during the fall and really heat up by November’s holiday shopping season. That not happening in 2019, couple with a steady decline is U.S. imports from China after years of solid growth, is a reason for concern, according to the CEO, who maintained, “global trade is down due to tariffs.”

For one thing, not having a peak season to rely on, coupled with steadily declining trade, “from our perspective makes life very hard to plan for,” Peterson said.

He did see on the horizon what many may view as a green lining: lower freight fees and consumer prices. “Lower prices do sound good,” Peterson conceded, “until someone goes bankrupt. We want stability, predictability. Things getting too cheap is unpredictable. You are playing with fire.”

Feel the burn? Peterson called our current “degree of uncertainty relatively unprecedented. We learn about things in a tweet. Was that really implemented or not?” As an example, he cited France proposing a digital tax and President Donald Trump striking back with threats of tariffs on cheese and wine. “Is that policy or not?” Peterson asked rhetorically. “Right now it’s a tweet. It makes it very hard to plan for.”

Levy warned “there is no safe play.” You can withstand the brunt of the tariffs and see what that does to your bottom line, or you can figure out a way to work around them and then have a trade deal come along with no way to return to normal operations quickly enough.

As Peterson pointed out, it’s not just the sting of the tariffs but the amount of paperwork and other adjustments one must handle while trying to remain agile. That time takes away from other things you need to be doing with your business.

Speaking of time away, Levy believes there will be no further movement in deescalating trade tensions between the U.S. and China until after America’s November presidential election. He suspects that China agreed to the Phase One conditions, which were much more weighted against that country than the U.S., “to buy a year of peace.” He added that China could be playing it coy in the weeks ahead as Beijing awaits the outcome that determines whether they will continue to deal with Trump or a new White House occupant. “If Trump loses, it’s likely the trade agreement will change anyway,” Levy said.

In the meantime … uncertainty. Peterson noted that one Flexport client had to close a manufacturing plant due to the tariffs. Levy held onto the hope that an eventual U.S.-China trade deal will be beneficial economically, pointing to markets that opened up with the U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement replacing the North American Free Trade Agreement. But you never know, as evidenced by USMCA having also resulted in some restricted trade, particularly in the automobile sector. “That was disappointing,” he admitted.

Don’t be surprised if the pain ultimately spreads, as Levy predicted what will happen after the U.S.-China trade war comes to a head. “There are a lot of signs the president will turn his trade policy focus away from China and toward Europe,” said Levy, who later noted Trump has also begun accusing Vietnam of cheating when it comes to trade.

So what to do about all this?

“My stance is there is nothing more important than agility, the ability to adapt,” Peterson said of dealing with tariffs, real or threatened. “It can mean restructuring a supply chain or seeking exemptions.” Companies that foster a culture with an ability to adapt can look at these challenges, Peterson says, and respond: “Bring it on, bring on the change.”

iranian

US Imposes Additional Sanctions on Key Sectors of Iranian Economy

On Friday, January 10, 2020, President Trump issued a new Executive Order, “Imposing Sanctions With Respect to Additional Sectors of Iran” (“E.O.”), which authorizes the imposition of sanctions against persons operating in or transacting with Iran’s construction, mining, manufacturing or textile sectors. The E.O. also imposes secondary sanctions against foreign financial institutions (“FFIs”) that engage in “significant financial transactions” within these sectors. Concurrently, the US Department of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control (“OFAC”), designated several Iranian and third-country metal producers and mining companies, a number of senior Iranian officials, and third-country entities that have transacted in the Iranian metal and mining sectors. This Legal Update provides a brief summary of these new sanctions and designations and discusses their impact on US and non-US businesses and financial institutions.

Designations. Concurrently with the E.O., OFAC designated several Iranian and third-country entities, including 17 Iranian metal producers and mining companies (described as the largest metals manufacturers in Iran); an Oman-based steel supplier; a network of three China- and Seychelles-based entities; and a vessel involved in the purchase, sale and transfer of Iranian metals products, as well as in the provision of critical metals production components to Iranian metal producers. OFAC also designated, pursuant to pre-existing authorities, several senior Iranian officials who have “advanced the regime’s destabilizing objectives.”[i]

New Targeted Sanctions. The E.O. imposes sanctions on the construction, mining, manufacturing and textile sectors of the Iranian economy, expanding on those already imposed on the country’s energy, shipping and financial sectors under Executive Order 13846 (“E.O. 13846”) and the iron, steel, aluminum and copper sectors under Executive Order 13871 (“E.O. 13871”). The aim of the new E.O. is to “deny the Iranian government revenues, including revenues derived from the export of products from key sectors of Iran’s economy, that may be used to fund and support its nuclear program, missile development, terrorism and terrorist proxy networks, and malign regional influence.” The new sanctions come amid rising tensions between the United States and Iran and only days after targeted, tit-for-tat military actions by both countries.

The E.O. authorizes the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary of State, to block all property and interests in property that are in the United States, or within the possession or control of any US person, belonging to any person (meaning an individual or an entity) determined to:

1. be operating in the construction, mining, manufacturing, or textile sectors of the Iranian economy;

2. have knowingly engaged, on or after January 10, 2020, in a significant transaction for the sale, supply, or transfer to or from Iran of significant goods or services used in connection with one of the aforementioned sectors of the Iranian economy;

3. have materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of, any persons whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to the E.O.; or

4. be owned or controlled by, or to have acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, any person whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to the E.O.[i]

Importantly, the E.O. authorizes the Treasury Department to designate as a Specially Designated National (“SDN”), any “person,” including non-Iranian and non-US persons, who operates in or knowingly engages in a significant transaction in these sectors of the Iranian economy. The E.O. also permits the Treasury Secretary to designate other sectors of the Iranian economy to be subject to sanctions in the future.

Secondary Sanctions on Foreign Financial Institutions. In addition to the targeted sanctions discussed above, the E.O. permits the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary of State, to impose correspondent account and payable-through-account (“CAPTA”) secondary sanctions on any FFI that, on or after January 10, 2020, knowingly conducts or facilitates any “significant financial transaction”:

i. for the sale, supply, or transfer to or from Iran of significant goods or services used in connection with one of the aforementioned sectors of the Iranian economy; or

ii. for or on behalf of any person whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to this order.

CAPTA sanctions “may prohibit the opening, and prohibit or impose strict restrictions on the maintaining” of such accounts in the US by FFIs determined to have engaged in the conduct described in the E.O.

Impact of the New Iranian Sanctions and Related Designations

The E.O. expands on the sanctions already put into place against Iran following the reimposition of secondary sanctions against the country announced in May 2018 and as expanded under E.O. 13846 (sanctions against Iranian energy, shipping and financial sectors) and E.O. 13871 (sanctions against Iranian iron, steel, aluminum and copper sectors).

Under the current sanctions regime, it remains prohibited for US persons—including US-owned or -controlled entities—to engage in virtually any transaction, directly or indirectly, with Iran without OFAC authorization. US persons are further prohibited from transacting without authorization with those persons and entities designated by OFAC and added to the SDN List, including via this recent round of designations.

The new sanctions introduced by the E.O. increase OFAC’s ability to sanction non-US persons, as the E.O. enables the United States to designate and block the property and interests in property of those non-US persons operating in or engaging in significant transactions with the construction, mining, manufacturing or textile sectors of Iran.[i] This has the effect of cutting off such non-US persons from the US financial system (and the US market more generally). Businesses with a presence in the European Union may continue to face challenges as they take into account this enhanced sanctions authority in light of the EU blocking statute, which prohibits EU companies from direct or indirect compliance with certain US sanctions laws, including Iranian sanctions.

It remains a secondary sanctions risk for FFIs (and non-US businesses) to knowingly engage in significant transactions involving certain Iranian persons on the SDN List.[i] Additionally, as discussed above, CAPTA sanctions may be imposed against FFIs who conduct or facilitate any “significant financial transaction” in one of the sectors of the Iranian economy specified in the E.O., regardless of whether such transactions have a US nexus. FFIs and non-US businesses may now include an evaluation of significant transactions in the Iranian construction, mining, manufacturing or textile sectors as part of their Iran sanctions risk assessments.

While the E.O. does not define either the term “significant transaction” or “significant financial transaction,” we suspect that the Treasury Department will apply a standard similar to previously issued guidance published in relation to E.O. 13871. Accordingly, such a determination will likely be based on a multifactor, totality-of-the-circumstances assessment of a broad range of factors, including the size, number and frequency of the transactions or services; their type, complexity and commercial purpose; and the level of awareness of the institution’s management.[i]

Since reinstating secondary sanctions in 2018, the United States has only designated non-US entities under secondary sanctions in a few limited circumstances.[i] However, this E.O. joins a series of preexisting Iran-related secondary sanctions authorities[ii] and further extends the extraterritorial reach of the Iran sanctions program to advance US policy objectives.

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Endnotes

[1] See Press Release, Treasury Targets Iran’s Billion Dollar Metals Industry and Senior Regime Officials (January 10, 2020), available at https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm870

[1] The E.O., by its terms, does not apply with respect to any person for conducting or facilitating a transaction for the provision (including any sale) of agricultural commodities, food, medicine, or medical devices to Iran.

[1] The blocking provision of the E.O. requires that the property or interests in property comes within the United States or within the possession or control of a US person (e.g., through use of the US financial system in such transactions).

[1] See OFAC FAQ 636, available at https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/faqs/sanctions/pages/faq_iran.aspx

[1] See OFAC FAQ 671, available at https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/faqs/sanctions/pages/faq_iran.aspx

[1] See, e.g., OFAC, “Iran-related Designations; Issuance of Iran-related Frequently Asked Question,” (Sept. 25, 2019), available at https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/OFAC-Enforcement/Pages/20190925.aspx (adding Chinese tanker companies to the SDN list due to their alleged role in transporting Iranian oil).

[1] See, e.g., Mayer Brown Legal Update, “US to Reimpose Secondary Sanctions Against Iran Amid EU Opposition” (May 9, 2018), available at https://www.mayerbrown.com/en/perspectives-events/publications/2018/05/us-to-reimpose-secondary-sanctions-against-iran-am Executive Order 13846, “Reimposing Certain Sanctions With Respect to Iran,” (Aug. 6, 2018).

About the authors:

Tamer Soliman is a partner in Mayer Brown’s Washington DC and Dubai offices, global head of the firm’s Export Control & Sanctions practice and a member of the International Trade practice.

Ori Lev is a partner in Mayer Brown’s Washington DC office and a member of the Financial Services Regulatory & Enforcement practice and the Consumer Financial Services group.

Yoshi Ito is a partner in Mayer Brown’s Washington DC office and a member of the International Trade and Public Policy, Regulatory & Political Law practices.

Brad Resnikoff is a partner in Mayer Brown’s Washington DC office and a member of the Financial Services Regulatory & Enforcement practice.

Liz Owerbach is an associate in Mayer Brown’s Washington DC office and a member of the firm’s Export Control & Sanctions and International Trade practices.

Brad Cohen is an associate in Mayer Brown’s New York office and a member of the Litigation & Dispute Resolution practice.