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EVOLUTION OF BUY AMERICAN POLICIES

american

EVOLUTION OF BUY AMERICAN POLICIES

President Trump has used Executive Orders to extend the reach of how “Buy American” legislation is implemented by federal agencies in their procurement evaluations. Presidential candidate Joe Biden has pledged to “use taxpayer dollars to buy American and spark American innovation”. Recent polling shows Americans believe Buy American policies support job creation.

While support for “Made in the USA” products appears politically trendy right now, the concept of maximizing taxpayer spend on goods and services with high U.S. content is far from new. In fact, it extends all the way back to our foundation. Recent polling shows Americans believe Buy American policies support job creation.ing. Here’s a primer on the evolution of Buy American policies.

1770s: Birth of America, Birth of Buy American

By the late 1760s, American colonists start a “non-consumption movement” against British goods in the attempt to force Britain to repeal its taxes. In Boston, merchants vote to block English trade, a move that culminates in the famous Boston Tea Party and the dumping of 45 tons of British tea into the harbor. The First Continental Congress of 1774 threatens a boycott of British goods. Patriotic colonists are expected to purchase goods made in America. Daughters of Liberty hold spinning and weaving parties to whip up American textiles. At his first inauguration, George Washington wears a brown suit of broadcloth from Hartford, Connecticut in a show of American-made symbolism.

1930s: The First Buy American Act

Newspaper magnate William Randolph Hearst decorates his mastheads with American flags to launch a popular Buy American campaign to bring the United States out of the Great Depression. Hearst’s own views and politics were tinged with racism. His anti-immigrant sentiment and reporting was likely a contributing factor to the Japanese-American internment that occurred during World War II.

On his last day in office, President Herbert Hoover signs the foundational Buy American Act of 1933. Above a certain dollar threshold, the federal government’s direct purchases must prefer domestic goods, defined as 100 percent manufactured in the United States with at least 50 percent domestic content. The requirement does not apply to third parties like private sector contractors who win funding through government procurement awards. The Act is promoted to safeguard American jobs for major infrastructure projects, including the Hoover Dam.

Historical Timeline of Buy American Legislation

1970s – 1980s: Manufacturing in Decline

The Buy America Act of 1982, a provision of The Surface Transportation Assistance Act, is introduced in reaction to capital flight in the 1970s and the beginning of steady decline in manufacturing employment. The requirements are extended to purchases made by third party agencies, as well as those made directly by the federal government. The act applies to the construction of highways, railways, and rapid transit systems.

The definition of “American-made” becomes more complex: all steel and iron components of end products must be mined, melted and manufactured in the United States, with an exception for “minimal use” if the materials constitute a low value or low percentage of the overall contract value.

1990s: Defense Purchases and the Berry Amendment

The Berry Amendment to the Fifth Supplemental Department of Defense Appropriations Act of 1941 gives preference in defense procurement to a range of products including clothing, food, and fabrics grown, produced or manufactured in the United States. It imposes stricter domestic content requirements on such purchases than the Buy American Act and is made permanent in 1994.

Trump's Buy American EOs

2000s: Trump Executive Orders

In the 2000s, the Obama administration approves Buy American requirements in the 2009 American Recovery and Reinvestment Act. All public projects backed by the Act’s funding were required to use domestically-produced iron, steel and manufactured goods unless the cost of doing so increased the overall project cost by 25 percent.

During his presidency, Trump has made extensive use of Executive Orders to shape federal agency implementation of Buy American requirements. He signs the Executive Order on Buy American and Hire American on April 18, 2017 “to promote economic and national security and to help stimulate economic growth, create good jobs at decent wages, strengthen our middle class, and support the American manufacturing and defense industrial bases.” The Order reaffirms that all aspects of steel and iron production must occur in the United States.

The Buy America Act does not apply to the acquisition of goods that are not commercially available in the United States in sufficient quality or quantity, or when it would be “inconsistent with the public interest.” Buy America preferences may also be waived if inconsistent with commitments made to U.S. trading partners under the WTO Government Procurement Agreement or U.S. free trade agreements.

Trump’s 2017 Executive Order directs federal agencies to scrutinize their compliance with Buy America requirements and to minimize their use of such waivers to purchase foreign goods and services. In addition, the Order mandates that, “to the extent permitted by law, before granting a public interest waiver, the relevant agency shall take appropriate account of whether a significant portion of the cost advantage of a foreign-sourced product is the result of the use of dumped steel, iron, or manufactured goods or the use of injuriously subsidized steel, iron, or manufactured goods.”

Foreign End Products in Fed Procurement

Trump signs an Executive Order on Strengthening Buy-American Preferences for Infrastructure Projects on January 31, 2019. The Order extends the previous order, targeting infrastructure projects that receive federal financial assistance awards, greatly widening the scope of affected programs and projects.

On July 15, 2019, Trump signs an Executive Order on Maximizing Use of American-Made Goods, Products, and MaterialsThe Order reinterprets the so-called “component test” to increase the thresholds for U.S.-origin components. Iron and steel end products must contain 95 percent or greater U.S. origin “parts or materials”. Other products must contain 55 percent or more U.S. parts or materials.

Most recently, President Trump issued an Executive Order on Ensuring Essential Medicines, Medical Countermeasures, and Critical Inputs Are Made in the United States on August 6, 2020 in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. With the goal of reducing dependence on foreign supply chains and strengthening domestic ones, the order declares U.S. policy to accelerate domestic production of essential medicines; ensure long-term demand for the medicines produced; create and maximize domestic production for Critical Inputs and Finished Drug Products; and combat the trafficking of such medical equipment and products.

Criticism of Buy America Requirements

A 2018 study by the Government Accounting Office (GAO) found that of the $196 billion in federal obligations in fiscal year 2017 to purchase end products, just $7.8 billion or 4 percent were foreign end products purchased using exceptions to Buy America requirements. 47.1 percent of that amount went to end products used outside the United States and just 7 percent of the amount was purchased using waivers associated with free trade agreement obligations.

Beyond the waivers for purchasing foreign goods, critics argue that instead of being a boon to U.S. contractors, domestic content requirements create additional and costly regulatory burdens for U.S. companies competing for federal contracts. Buy America requirements may reduce procurement choices for federal agencies like the Department of Defense while potentially increasing costs to U.S. taxpayers. The jobs argument behind Buy America has also been scrutinized. In one economic analysis by trade economist Tori Smith, Smith argues that the steel purchasing requirements in Buy American legislation have done little to stem employment losses in the U.S. steel industry, in steady decline since 1980.

Neither is the United States out of line when it comes to imports as a percentage of overall public procurement. The average is 4.4 percent, which is the U.S. rate of purchases. Put in further context, imports as a percentage of U.S. GDP is generally lower than its peers in the OECD, at just 17 percent. The United States may have more to lose economically by reducing opportunities for foreign suppliers in the U.S. procurement market. In 2018, the global procurement market was worth an estimated $11 trillion. In a boomerang effect, U.S. companies could lose the ability to bid on foreign government projects if other countries expand their own Buy European or Buy China requirements.

Imports as Share of Procurement

Where Trump and Biden Meet

Presidential candidate Joe Biden has put forward his own version of Buy American as part of his platform to “ensure the future is made in all of America by all of America’s workers.” Biden promises to use taxpayer dollars to buy American and spark American innovation.

In the debate over which candidate can out-“buy-American” the other, only one thing is clear: the United States is not the only country looking for ways to help its domestic economy recover from COVID-19. But buyer beware: domestic purchase requirements can have adverse effects on the companies they are intended to help while putting additional strain on federal agency budgets. The more countries that impose them, the greater the chance that gains from global government procurement trade policies will be reduced.

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Andrea Durkin is the Editor-in-Chief of TradeVistas and Founder of Sparkplug, LLC. Ms. Durkin previously served as a U.S. Government trade negotiator and has proudly taught international trade policy and negotiations for the last fifteen years as an Adjunct Professor at Georgetown University’s Master of Science in Foreign Service program.

trade

A Tipping Point in the Trade War? 4 Tips to Consider Now.

While reassured by a recommitment to the U.S.-China trade agreement, companies still need to be vigilant in protecting their supply chains from pandemic aftershocks – and election-year unpredictability.

Think back – way back – to January 2020. The U.S. and China signed the Phase 1 trade accord, agreeing to roll back tariffs, expand trade purchases and renew pledges on intellectual property.

Many global shippers felt encouraged by the prospect of improved trading days ahead. And various American businesses welcomed the chance to equalize their trade footing and to counteract China’s intellectual property practices.

While many companies continue to manage through the hefty impact of the various trade remedy measures of Sections 201, 232, and 301 of the Trade Act, there was hope that Phase 2 of the trade deal between the U.S. and China would signal even better prospects.

But then the coronavirus claimed center stage. Its supply-chain side effects dominated the global marketplace, turning it into a de facto PPE-and-sanitizer delivery system – presenting shippers and manufacturers with an entirely different set of obstacles.

Many global manufacturers and suppliers pivoted to face mask production. French winemakers turned fine wine into the finest hand sanitizer. And American companies in search of these supplies turned to new sources globally, navigating the choppy waters of U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) importing requirements and those of other government agencies in the process.

The administration’s 90-day deferral of import tax payments offered temporary relief to some companies. But for nearly eight months, manufacturers and shippers remained in a state of suspended apprehension when it came to the future of trans-Pacific trading.

Finally, on August 24, U.S. and China trade representatives officially recommitted to carrying out Phase 1 of the trade accord.

The chessboard today
Now, as the U.S. presidential election comes into view, the spotlight is once again on the global chessboard of tit-for-tat tariff moves, amplified by the Trump administration’s desire to counter the practices of U.S. trade partners and address the U.S. trade deficit.

As part of a longstanding dispute over aircraft subsidies, the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) initially imposed 10% tariffs on Airbus aircraft – but increased that to 15% in March. Also announced this August, the USTR decided to maintain 15% tariffs on Airbus aircraft and threatened 25% tariffs on other European goods, such as food, wine, and spirits, including a tariff on imported French makeup and handbags, in retaliation against France’s Digital Service Tax (DST). However, no tariffs have been imposed yet as France has not implemented DST.

Trade winds have been equally tempestuous on both sides of the U.S. border. After the U.S. imposed tariffs on aluminum from Canada, Canada retaliated with its own trade penalties.

And the new U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement, which took effect this past July, was reassuring for many companies that even dubbed it the new NAFTA. While some North America cross-border shippers are still grappling with compliance and weighing potential trade gains, its changes to cross-border trade overall have been well received by many businesses.

Now, businesses are speculating on the potential supply chain effects in the months to come. Will U.S. tariffs on a long list of Chinese goods be rolled back during the next round of negotiations? That has become the $350 billion question.

Many answers, and potential changes, hinge on the upcoming presidential election.

Be ready for new rollouts
You may recall that the USTR announced – and imposed – some section 301 tariffs quickly after their announcement. While tariffs were suspended on $160 billion in Chinese goods (List 4B) – pending the success of Phase 1 of the agreement – it’s not known if they are suspended indefinitely or if these tariffs could again come into play, further spiking import costs.

Although most believe a swift post-election reversal is unlikely, it’s easy to see the two main party presidential nominees have different strategies on how they would carry out international trade and tariffs post-November. For that reason, the safest course is to be prepared for any outcome. Here’s what you should consider in the coming months to help your company prepare:

1. Speak up about exclusions
So far, the USTR has granted about 2,000 exclusions related to section 301 tariffs, and over 75 exclusions from other section tariffs – many in response to importers’ petitions. In fact, the USTR has announced exclusions to multiple product lists. And while comment periods are over for now, it’s important for companies to voice their opinion for or against tariffs as they’re proposed.

The refunds are retroactive, so some importers stand to gain millions in refunds for previously paid duties.

Since an early exclusion request can produce earlier duty exclusions, vigilance in monitoring and applying for exclusions is vital. But the submission process can be lengthy and complex, requiring businesses to record and report all import product categories that relate to each applicable tariff number or specific product. This is an instance where having a knowledgeable customs broker and trusted advisor, who you can rely on to help and provide expertise, can come in handy.

2. Reconsider drawback and deferment programs
The trade programs you ruled out in the past could be a financial boon now. For example, it may be worth revisiting duty drawback programs, which provide a refund on previously imported goods that are subsequently exported, so consider your current import/export balance. Also, consider if 301 tariffs were to subside, would continuing the program still be practical for your supply chain?

Because formal application to this program can be quite rigorous, consider handing this task off to a 3rd party expert.

You may also want to reconsider bonded warehousing or using a foreign trade zone. Companies that produce major equipment or large machinery, for example, often experience significant lag times between production and sale – incurring duty payments of $200,000 or more per machine.

If you’re not planning on selling major equipment over the next 6 months, it might make sense to import the product into a foreign trade zone and deploy duty deferment tools.

3. If you haven’t already, explore alternative sourcing or production options
The pandemic has reminded companies that diversification is key to business resilience. In practice, that may mean onboarding alternative suppliers or preparing to change production venues in the event of a coronavirus outbreak.

To protect margins as the price of Chinese goods, materials and tariffs climb, many U.S. businesses are turning to lower-priced suppliers in Vietnam and Malaysia. Not only do imports from these countries allow for the avoidance or reduction of tariffs, they can also provide the assurance of a ready workforce and steady material supply.

4. Above all, stay informed
Like most business processes, proficient supply chain management hinges on your ability to manage countless moving parts, and plan and anticipate likely change.

During a global pandemic, amid an economic downturn, and in an election year, change may be the only thing we can predict. Efficiency and preparedness have never mattered more.

Stay current on policy changes and new trade regulations. Consult the USTR website often. Sign up for automated logistics updates and trade advisories. Stay close to your trade association, like the National Association of Manufacturers (NAM) and other industry-specific groups. And turn to a proven 3PL before your internal logistics department becomes overwhelmed.

And then, fasten your seatbelt as we navigate the many changes on the horizon.

wechat

U.S. Scheduled Bans on TikTok and WeChat Apps Delayed

China-based smartphone apps, TikTok and WeChat, have each received a reprieve from the respective bans, which were originally ordered by President Trump on August 6, 2020, against both parties and were scheduled to take effect on September 21, 2020. Please see our previous post covering the Executive Orders. Pursuant to the Executive Orders banning the apps on national security grounds, the U.S. Department of Commerce (“Commerce”) published final rules for implementing the bans on September 19, 2020, which were subsequently withdrawn. Commerce then delayed the order to withdraw TikTok from U.S. app stores until September 27, 2020, at 11:59 pm. Meanwhile, Commerce’s order to withdraw WeChat has been suspended temporarily due to an injunction granted by the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California.

In an effort to come into compliance with the Executive Order and avoid the ban, TikTok’s parent, ByteDance Ltd. (“ByteDance”), negotiated a deal with Oracle and Walmart to keep TikTok operating in the United States. Under the terms of the agreement, based on media reports, TikTok will be spun off into a U.S.-based company majority-owned by its Chinese parent ByteDance, while Oracle and Walmart will take up to a twenty (20) percent stake of the new U.S. company. ByteDance will maintain control over the app’s algorithm, while user data will be stored in the U.S.  It is possible that the ban on TikTok may be formally lifted once the deal is finalized since President Trump has given his personal approval of the agreement, though that is unclear at this time.

A judge from the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California granted a nationwide injunction on September 19, 2020, temporarily suspending Commerce’s order for Apple and Google to remove WeChat from their app stores. Plaintiffs U.S. WeChat Users Alliance, et al. allege that the ban violates First Amendment rights, especially for Chinese Americans. Judge Beeler stated that the plaintiffs “have shown serious questions going to the merits of the First Amendment claim” and that “the balance of hardships tips in the plaintiffs’ favor”.

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Cortney O’Toole Morgan is a Washington D.C.-based partner with the law firm Husch Blackwell LLP. She leads the firm’s International Trade & Supply Chain group.

Grant Leach is an Omaha-based partner with the law firm Husch Blackwell LLP focusing on international trade, export controls, trade sanctions and anti-corruption compliance.

Camron Greer is an Assistant Trade Analyst in Husch Blackwell LLP’s Washington D.C. office.

free trade

WANT PEACE? PROMOTE FREE TRADE.

Frédéric Bastiat famously claimed that “if goods don’t cross borders, soldiers will.”

Bastiat argued that free trade between countries could reduce international conflict because trade forges connections between nations and gives each country an incentive to avoid war with its trading partners. If every nation were an economic island, the lack of positive interaction created by trade could leave more room for conflict. Two hundred years after Bastiat, libertarians take this idea as gospel. Unfortunately, not everyone does. But as recent research shows, the historical evidence confirms Bastiat’s famous claim.

To Trade or to Raid

In “Peace through Trade or Free Trade?” professor Patrick J. McDonald, from the University of Texas at Austin, empirically tested whether greater levels of protectionism in a country (tariffs, quotas, etc.) would increase the probability of international conflict in that nation. He used a tool called dyads to analyze every country’s international relations from 1960 until 2000. A dyad is the interaction between one country and another country: German and French relations would be one dyad, German and Russian relations would be a second, French and Australian relations would be a third. He further broke this down into dyad-years; the relations between Germany and France in 1965 would be one dyad-year, the relations between France and Australia in 1973 would be a second, and so on.

Using these dyad-years, McDonald analyzed the behavior of every country in the world for the past 40 years. His analysis showed a negative correlation between free trade and conflict: The more freely a country trades, the fewer wars it engages in. Countries that engage in free trade are less likely to invade and less likely to be invaded.

Trading partners

The Causal Arrow

Of course, this finding might be a matter of confusing correlation for causation. Maybe countries engaging in free trade fight less often for some other reason, like the fact that they tend also to be more democratic. Democratic countries make war less often than empires do. But McDonald controls for these variables. Controlling for a state’s political structure is important, because democracies and republics tend to fight less than authoritarian regimes.

McDonald also controlled for a country’s economic growth, because countries in a recession are more likely to go to war than those in a boom, often in order to distract their people from their economic woes. McDonald even controlled for factors like geographic proximity: It’s easier for Germany and France to fight each other than it is for the United States and China, because troops in the former group only have to cross a shared border.

The takeaway from McDonald’s analysis is that protectionism can actually lead to conflict. McDonald found that a country in the bottom 10 percent for protectionism (meaning it is less protectionist than 90 percent of other countries) is 70 percent less likely to engage in a new conflict (either as invader or as target) than one in the top 10 percent for protectionism.

Trade and Conflict

Protectionism and War

Why does protectionism lead to conflict, and why does free trade help to prevent it? The answers, though well-known to classical liberals, are worth mentioning.

First, trade creates international goodwill. If Chinese and American businessmen trade on a regular basis, both sides benefit. And mutual benefit disposes people to look for the good in each other. Exchange of goods also promotes an exchange of cultures. For decades, Americans saw China as a mysterious country with strange, even hostile values. But in the 21st century, trade between our nations has increased markedly, and both countries know each other a little better now. iPod-wielding Chinese teenagers are like American teenagers, for example. They’re not terribly mysterious. Likewise, the Chinese understand democracy and American consumerism more than they once did. The countries may not find overlap in all of each other’s values, but trade has helped us to at least understand each other.

Trade helps to humanize the people that you trade with. And it’s tougher to want to go to war with your human trading partners than with a country you see only as lines on a map.

Second, trade gives nations an economic incentive to avoid war. If Nation X sells its best steel to Nation Y, and its businessmen reap plenty of profits in exchange, then businessmen on both sides are going to oppose war. This was actually the case with Germany and France right before World War I. Germany sold steel to France, and German businessmen were firmly opposed to war. They only grudgingly came to support it when German ministers told them that the war would only last a few short months. German steel had a strong incentive to oppose war, and if the situation had progressed a little differently—or if the German government had been a little more realistic about the timeline of the war—that incentive might have kept Germany out of World War I.

% reduction in conflict

Third, protectionism promotes hostility. This is why free trade, not just aggregate trade (which could be accompanied by high tariffs and quotas), leads to peace. If the United States imposes a tariff on Japanese automobiles, that tariff hurts Japanese businesses. It creates hostility in Japan toward the United States. Japan might even retaliate with a tariff on U.S. steel, hurting U.S. steel makers and angering our government, which would retaliate with another tariff. Both countries now have an excuse to leverage nationalist feelings to gain support at home; that makes outright war with the other country an easier sell, should it come to that.

In socioeconomic academic circles, this is called the Richardson process of reciprocal and increasing hostilities; the United States harms Japan, which retaliates, causing the United States to retaliate again. History shows that the Richardson process can easily be applied to protectionism. For instance, in the 1930s, industrialized nations raised tariffs and trade barriers; countries eschewed multilateralism and turned inward. These decisions led to rising hostilities, which helped set World War II in motion.

These factors help explain why free trade leads to peace, and protectionism leads to more conflict.

Free Trade and Peace

One final note: McDonald’s analysis shows that taking a country from the top 10 percent for protectionism to the bottom 10 percent will reduce the probability of future conflict by 70 percent. He performed the same analysis for the democracy of a country and showed that taking a country from the top 10 percent (very democratic) to the bottom 10 percent (not democratic) would only reduce conflict by 30 percent.

Democracy is a well-documented deterrent: The more democratic a country becomes, the less likely it is to resort to international conflict. But reducing protectionism, according to McDonald, is more than twice as effective at reducing conflict than becoming more democratic.

Here in the United States, we talk a lot about spreading democracy. We invaded Iraq partly to “spread democracy.” A New York Times op-ed by Professor Dov Ronen of Harvard University claimed that “the United States has been waging an ideological campaign to spread democracy around the world” since 1989. One of the justifications for our international crusade is to make the world a safer place.

Perhaps we should spend a little more time spreading free trade instead. That might really lead to a more peaceful world.

This article was originally published on FEE.org.

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Julian Adorney

Julian Adorney is a Young Voices contributor. He’s written for FEE, National Review, The Federalist, and blogs at The Empathetic Libertarian.

tariffs

WTO Rules that U.S. Section 301 Tariffs on Chinese Imports Violate International Trade Rules

The World Trade Organization (WTO) dispute settlement body ruled that the tariffs imposed by the U.S. on imports from China are inconsistent with the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), and recommended that the U.S. “bring its measures into conformity” with its obligations under the GATT. Beginning in 2018, at the direction of President Trump, the U.S. imposed tariffs on $400 billion worth of imports from China over 4 different lists or tranches. The U.S. and China negotiated a “phase one” trade deal earlier this year, however, most of the tariffs were still left in place.

The WTO panel concluded that the U.S. failed to demonstrate that the tariff measures are justified under Article XX(a) of the GATT 1994.  As a result, the panel found the U.S. tariff measures to be inconsistent with Articles I:1, II:1(a) and II:1(b) of GATT 1994. In other words, the WTO found that the U.S. tariffs on China were discriminatory and excessive, and the U.S. failed to present justification for an exemption that could have legally allowed for the tariffs.

Despite the WTO’s recommendation, its ruling is highly unlikely to sway the course of U.S. trade policy. This is not only because of the limited authority of the WTO, but also because the administration has argued that the tariffs are justified under U.S. law. Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 provides the U.S. government with the authority to impose trade sanctions on countries that violate trade agreements or engage in unfair trade practices, of which the U.S. has frequently accused China.

The WTO’s ruling is likely to increase the current U.S. administration’s distrust of the WTO. U.S. Trade Representative Robert Lighthizer criticized the ruling, saying “the United States must be allowed to defend itself against unfair trade practices…” and that “[the WTO’s] decision shows that the WTO provides no remedy for such misconduct” by China.

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Nithya Nagarajan is a Washington-based partner with the law firm Husch Blackwell LLP. She practices in the International Trade & Supply Chain group of the firm’s Technology, Manufacturing & Transportation industry team.

Camron Greer is an Assistant Trade Analyst in Husch Blackwell LLP’s Washington D.C. office.

tariffs

Court of International Trade Receives its First Complaint Against Section 301 China Tariffs

On September 10, 2020, HMTX Industries LLC, along with Halstead New England Corporation, and Metroflor Corporation (importers of vinyl tile) filed a complaint (Ct. No. 20-00177) at the Court of International Trade (CIT) challenging both the substantive and procedural processes followed by the United States Trade Representative (USTR) when instituting Section 301 Tariffs on imports from China under List 3.

The List 3 tariffs went into effect on September 24, 2018. This is the first challenge of its kind filed against the administration’s use of Section 301 Tariffs in the ongoing trade war between the United States and China.

The complaint alleges that USTR’s institution of List 3 tariffs violated the Trade Act of 1974 on the grounds that USTR failed to make a determination or finding that there was an unfair trade practice that required a remedy and moreover, that List 3 tariffs were instituted beyond the 12-month time limit provided for in the governing statute (19 U.S.C. § 2414). The complaint also argues that the manner in which in the List 3 tariff action was implemented violated the Administrative Procedures Act (APA).

According to the complainants, USTR failed to provide adequate opportunity for comments, failed to consider relevant factors when making its decision (e.g. no analysis of increased burden on U.S. commerce from unfair trade practices), and failed to connect the record facts to the choices it made by not explaining how the comments received by USTR came to shape the final implementation of List 3.

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Nithya Nagarajan is a Washington-based partner with the law firm Husch Blackwell LLP. She practices in the International Trade & Supply Chain group of the firm’s Technology, Manufacturing & Transportation industry team.

Julia Banegas is an attorney in Husch Blackwell LLP’s Washington, D.C. office.

Turner Kim is an Assistant Trade Analyst in Husch Blackwell LLP’s Washington, D.C. office.

Camron Greer is an Assistant Trade Analyst in Husch Blackwell LLP’s Washington D.C. office.

list 1

USTR to Consider Extending List 1 Exclusions Past October 2nd Expiration Date

On August 3, 2020, the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) issued a notice requesting comments on whether to extend specific exclusions on Chinese imports from the Section 301 List 1 that are set to expire on October 2, 2020. Companies whose List 1 Exclusions products were granted exclusions in notices published on October 2, 2019December 17, 2019, and February 11, 2020 are eligible to submit comments.

The due date for companies to submit their comments is August 30, 2020. USTR has stated that it will focus its evaluation on whether, despite the first imposition of these additional duties, the particular product remains available only from China. Additionally, USTR encourages companies to specifically address the following in their submission:

-Whether the particular product and/or a comparable product is available from sources in the United States and/or in third countries.

-Any changes in the global supply chain since July 2018 with respect to the particular product or any other relevant industry developments.

-The efforts, if any, the importers or U.S. purchasers have undertaken since July 2018 to source the product from the United States or third countries.

-Whether the imposition of additional duties on the products will result in severe economic harm to the commenter.

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Turner Kim is an Assistant Trade Analyst in Husch Blackwell LLP’s Washington D.C. office.

phase one

Trade Secret Protection in China After the US-China Phase One Trade Deal

The US-China Phase One trade deal, signed in January 2020, was viewed by many as a game-changer in causing China to upgrade its enforcement regime against trade secret misappropriation. But how much impact will the deal actually have for US companies trying to prevent trade secret theft in China? As this article explains, while there will likely be an impact, it may be less consequential than anticipated.

The Phase One Agreement’s Trade Secret Provisions

The Phase One Agreement contains a number of provisions aimed at protection of trade secrets and effective enforcement against misappropriation. Although the Agreement’s requirements are bilateral, they mainly consist of obligations by China to take certain steps to enhance its trade secret protection laws to match existing U.S. laws. These steps include enumerating acts of misappropriation to include electronic intrusions, breach of duties not to disclose information that is secret, and unauthorized disclosure or use that occurs after acquisition of a trade secret. The Agreement also calls for burden-shifting in civil proceedings so that “the burden of production of evidence or burden of proof … shifts to the accused party … where the holder of a trade secret has produced prima facie evidence … of a reasonable indication of trade secret misappropriation ….”  Additionally, the Agreement dictates that China provide for prompt and effective provisional measures to prevent the use of misappropriated trade secrets, and identify use or attempted use of claimed trade secret information as an “urgent situation” authorizing judicial authorities to grant preliminary injunctions. Finally, the Agreement requires China to broaden the scope of trade secret cases where criminal liability may ensue.

Comparison to Current Trade Secret Protection Laws in China

China is a civil law country. The laws governing trade secrets are mainly provided in the Anti Unfair Competition Law, with the remaining authority provided in the Civil Law, the Criminal Law, the Labor Law and judicial interpretations issued by the Supreme People’s Court (the “SPC”). The latest amendment of the Anti-Unfair Competition Law in 2019 has already accomplished some steps required by the Agreement, such as the aforementioned expanded list of misappropriation acts and the burden-shifting rule. Similarly, for provisional remedies, a 2018 notice by the SPC provided guidance to all courts on what circumstances constitute “urgent situations” that should merit applications for preliminary injunctions; while the “urgent situations” were not expressly defined at that time to include use or attempted use of claimed trade secret information, when broadly interpreted, they would cover this situation. For these reasons, what US companies now should monitor is how effectively the laws are applied to protect trade secrets.

One of the major difficulties US companies face when enforcing their trade secret rights in China, is obtaining sufficient admissible evidence to prove both misappropriation and damages. This is especially true when the trade secret theft has cross-border elements, whereby the trade secrets are afterwards used in China, e.g. by third parties who are not obviously connected with the perpetrator.

According to China’s Civil Procedure Law, there are eight types of evidence, including statements, documentary evidence, physical evidence, audio-visual materials, electronic data, witness testimonies, court expert opinions and inspection records. However, in practice, documentary evidence is given almost total supremacy over the other types of evidence. This means that, in practice, witness statements and cross-examinations of witnesses carry less evidentiary weight. The prioritization of documentary evidence by China’s courts presents challenges for US companies seeking to use testimony or other non-documentary evidence available in the US to establish in Chinese civil proceedings that the trade secrets being used in China originated from the US (likely via an ex-employee’s breach of confidentiality duties).

Moreover, Chinese law does not provide for discovery procedures. This means that the defendant is not obliged to produce unfavorable evidence at the request of the plaintiff. At the time of filing the claim, the plaintiff must, by and large, submit (documentary) evidence to prove the facts it relies upon, and it must generally locate and produce such evidence on its own. The absence of discovery, as well as the additional formal requirements for receipt of foreign evidence, can make it challenging for trade secret holders to meet their burden of proof.

When facing these challenges, US trade secret holders should proactively think about how to collect necessary evidence cross-border so that they can support filing of a civil claim in China and ultimately stop further leakage or use of the trade secrets. This may involve collecting initial evidence of misappropriation from the US, and then using the US evidence to plead in China for a court investigation order or an order to search and preserve evidence from the defendant. The trade secret holder can leverage its pleading and the investigation and preservation orders, combined with the burden-shifting rule, to prevail on its civil claim.

Apart from civil claims, US IP owners may request that China’s law enforcement agencies pursue criminal liability for perpetrators in trade secret misappropriation cases. The Phase One Agreement calls for China to lower its threshold for initiating a criminal investigation of trade secret theft, including eliminating any requirement that a trade secret holder must establish actual losses as a prerequisite to such an investigation.

At present, Article 219 of the PRC Criminal Law stipulates that whoever commits illegal acts of infringing on trade secrets and thus causes “serious” or “exceptionally serious” losses shall be subject to criminal liability.  Under the Regulations on Prosecution Standards for Economic Crimes of the Supreme People’s Procutorate and the Ministry of Public Security, losses of more than 500,000 yuan can trigger a criminal investigation. However, there are different views from local enforcement agencies on whether the losses should be limited to actual losses and how a trade secret holder should prove its losses. The current prevailing view is that the losses should not include anticipated losses such as reduced market share or loss of competitiveness. Such a narrow reading of losses as a criminal enforcement threshold contributes to insufficient protection of trade secret rights. As an example, for trade secret theft cases involving production know-how, it is difficult to show actual losses when the culprit has started to use the know-how to build a plant or prepare to make products, but it has not yet sold the violative products.

If the Criminal Law is amended to eliminate the requirement of establishing actual losses, this will address a current problem and improve trade secret protection in China.

Conclusions and Alternatives

The Phase One Agreement undoubtedly will enhance some aspects of civil and criminal trade secret protection laws in China.  Ultimately, however, the degree of success of these efforts may depend more on the commitment by China’s courts to reliably implement and enforce these laws.

One final note for US companies to consider is that trade secret enforcement alternatives may be available in US federal courts, even for acts of misappropriation in China. Specifically, the Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016 applies to misappropriation outside the US if “an act in furtherance of the offense was committed in the [US].”  18 U.S.C. § 1837. Such “act[s] in furtherance of the offense,” that would enable a US court to adjudicate misappropriation in China, might be as straightforward as selling or marketing imported products within the US that incorporate the stolen trade secrets.

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Zhen Feng (also known as Katie Feng) is a partner based in Hogan Lovells Shanghai IP Agency.  She specializes in all areas of IP with a focus on IP litigation, IP strategic counseling and brand protection. She advises numerous clients from diverse backgrounds on formulation and implementation of IP enforcement strategies in China through a combination of administrative, civil and criminal actions. Katie has been recognized by several industry publications as a leading IP lawyer in China, such as Top 250 Women in IP 2020 by IP Stars, Top 100 Women in Litigation by Benchmark Litigation Asia-Pacific 2020 and Recommended Individual for Litigation by IAM Patent 1000 2020. She can be contacted at +862161223826 4032 or by email zhen.feng@hoganlovells.com or by wechat account: zhenkatiefeng_wechat

Steve Levitan is co-chair of Hogan Lovells’ global trade secret group. He has led numerous intellectual property lawsuits, with an emphasis on trade secret, patent, trademark and technology contract disputes. He practices before US federal district and appellate courts, California state courts, the US International Trade Commission (ITC), and in International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) and American Arbitration Association (AAA) arbitrations. He also regularly counsels clients on the protection of trade secrets and confidential information. He is based in Hogan Lovells’ Silicon Valley, California office, and can be contacted at +1 (650) 463 4032 or by email: steve.levitan@hoganlovells.com.

 

pork

BRINGING HOME THE BACON: U.S. PORK TRADE

The Year That Wasn’t

This year was supposed to mark a comeback for U.S. pork producers. Instead, the industry faces volatile markets and unprecedented supply chain disruptions. COVID-19’s domino effect on farmers, processors, retailers and consumers underscores the complexities of our modern food system.

In late April, meat industry executives warned the United States could soon face a meat shortage after processing facilities closed temporarily due to the spread of COVID-19 among employees. Total meat supplies in cold storage facilities across the United States totaled roughly two weeks’ worth of production. With processing at a standstill, meat supplies for retail grocery stores were expected to shrink by nearly 30 percent by Memorial Day, leading to increases in pork and beef price prices of as much as 20 percent, according to analysis by CoBank.

Shuttered plants also meant that farmers had nowhere to send their mature pigs, creating a massive livestock backlog. While many meat processors have re-opened as of May 2020, hog farmers may yet be forced to euthanize as many as seven million pigs in the second quarter of 2020, a loss valued at nearly $700 million. The Food and Agricultural Policy Research Institute forecasted a total loss of $2.2 billion for the U.S. pork industry in 2020 due to the pandemic.

US 3rd largest pork producer

Going Whole Hog on Exports

According to the United States Department of Agriculture, the United States is the world’s third-largest producer and consumer of pork, shipping on average more than 5 billion pounds of fresh and frozen pork internationally each year since 2010.

But this dominant role in world pork trade is a fairly recent phenomenon. The United States became a net exporter of pork in 1995. Exports jumped from two percent of total production in 1990 to 21 percent in 2016. What made this spike possible?

The U.S. pork industry has gone through a major restructuring since the mid-1980s, shifting from small, independently owned operations to larger, vertically-integrated companies that contract with growers to raise pigs. This structure increased the industry’s productivity and year-round slaughter capacity. Between 1991 and 2009, the number of hog farms in the United States dropped by 70 percent but the number of hogs remained stable.

The National Pork Producers Council calculates that exports account for nearly 36 percent of the total $149 average value of a hog. While American pork is shipped to more than 100 countries, just four countries account for 75 percent of U.S. pork exports: Mexico, Japan, China, and Canada. It’s easy to see why implementation of the U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement is important to U.S. pork producers: Mexico alone accounts for about one-third of all exports by volume. U.S. exports of pork increased 1,550 percent in value since 1989, when the United States first implemented a free trade agreement with Canada.

U.S. pork producers mainly compete with pork producers in the European Union, Canada, and Brazil for sales in overseas markets. American farmers were concerned they could lose market share in Japan after the United States did not join the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for the Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) and Japan made a trade deal with the European Union. Japan is the largest value market for U.S. pork and the second largest market by volume. However, pork exports there have been trending higher in 2020 following the U.S.-Japan Trade Agreement.

Where US pork exports go

Higher on the Hog in China?

For the last two years, American pork producers have found themselves in the crosshairs of a trade war between the United States and China, a key export market. In April 2018, China levied a 25 percent retaliatory tariff on many U.S. pork imports in response to Section 232 tariffs put in place by the United States. In 2019, China again retaliated against American pork, this time in response to Section 301 tariffs.

Before the trade war, China was the second-largest market for U.S. farm exports (after Canada). In 2016, China purchased nearly $20 billion in American farm products but sales dropped sharply in 2018 to $7.9 billion.

The “Phase One” U.S.-China trade agreement went into effect on February 14, 2020. It includes a commitment from China to import an additional $12.5 billion in U.S. agricultural products during 2020 on top of a 2017 baseline of about $24 billion. The agreement also provides access for a larger variety of U.S. pork products and restores access for processed pork products, which had been blocked by China.

As part of this deal, on February 17 China announced tariff exclusions for 696 products, including pork. In the first quarter of 2020, China bought $5.05 billion in U.S. farm goods, up 110 percent from last year. China’s pork imports almost tripled from March 2019, reflecting a major domestic supply gap caused by African Swine Fever (ASF).

However, concerns remain if it is feasible for China to meet the purchase targets set in the agreement. Through March 2020, U.S. Census Bureau data show that U.S. agricultural exports to China were only at 37 percent of year-to-date targets. The American Farm Bureau Federation found that U.S. agricultural exports to China need to accelerate by 114 percent each month from May through the rest of the fiscal year to meet the “Phase One” target.

China ag purchases fall in trade war

Not Exactly “Year of the Pig” for Pork Industry

The possibility of U.S. sales to China going unfulfilled seems surprising. Another virus – ASF – has been ravaging China’s pork output since August 2018. ASF is a highly contagious, deadly pig disease with no known treatment or vaccine. It does not affect humans or food safety but it has had a devastating impact on China’s pork industry, the world’s largest, leaving a shortage in domestic supply.

Despite low officially reported cases of ASF, as many as 350 million pigs died from the disease in China during 2019. (And because the disease continues to spread across borders, one quarter of all the world’s pigs may die from ASF.) After more than a year of declining pork output, China’s total pork supply gap is estimated at 18 million tons – a figure much larger than total global supplies. Chinese consumers have faced record high prices for pork, traditionally their protein of choice. Some parts of the country also faced meat shortages due to disrupted supply chains during the COVID-19 quarantine.

To address persistent high prices, the Chinese government auctioned off a small amount of frozen pork from publicly held pork reserves, but the move was largely symbolic and had a limited short-term impact on prices. The government’s total pork reserve volumes are a national secret and not publicly available.

Enter: Coronavirus

As American hog farmers were positioning to fill China’s need to import more pork, enter the coronavirus in early 2020, which threw the U.S. pork market into extreme volatility.

After COVID-19 forced processing plants to temporarily close, U.S. pig prices dropped 27 percent in about a week, reducing profits for pig producers while consumers paid more for pork at the grocery store. The demand for meat often takes a hit during economic recessions as consumers keep a close eye on their grocery bill. At the same time, the industry lost major food service markets such as restaurants, universities, and elementary schools that were also shut down.

To help pork producers and other farmers, USDA on April 17 announced the Coronavirus Food Assistance Program (CFAP) to provide $19 billion in emergency aid to farmers and ranchers hit by market disruptions. CFAP includes $16 billion in direct payments to producers and $3 billion in purchases of fresh produce, meat, and dairy products for distribution through food banks. USDA will purchase an estimated $100 million per month in pork and chicken, along with other food products, beginning in May. Nonetheless, an industry-funded analysis by Iowa State University found that American hog farmers will lose $5 billion (or $37 per pig) due to reduced prices for pork and shuttered processing plants.

US pork shipments to China

Saving Our Bacon

America’s pork industry has been beset with uncertainty in recent years. The latest Purdue University-CME Group Ag Economy Barometer found that the unknowns surrounding the pandemic have further decreased farmer optimism to a four-year low, with 67 percent of farmers saying they are worried about the impact of the coronavirus on their business.

Prior to COVID-19, U.S. farmers were already reeling from lost sales due to China’s tariffs. The saving grace for U.S. pork producers now is that pork exports are actually ramping up.

During March and April, the number of pigs slaughtered per day decreased by 40 percent, but shipments of U.S. pork to China more than quadrupled, including whole carcasses as well as products that Americans generally don’t eat, like feet and organs. The U.S. Meat Export Federation estimated that so far in 2020, about 31 percent of U.S. pork has been exported with one-third of that volume going to China.

That means that in the near term, increasing exports will remain vital for the U.S. pork industry to weather the coronavirus storm as processing capacity gets back online and domestic sales begin to rebound.

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Sarah Hubbart provides communications strategy, content creation, and social media management for TradeVistas. A native of rural Northern California, Sarah has melded communications and policy throughout her career in Washington, D.C., serving in government affairs, issues management, and coalition building roles in the agricultural sector. She is an alum of California State University, Chico and George Washington University.

This article originally appeared on TradeVistas.org. Republished with permission.
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Global Stock Markets Impacted by Trade War

Understanding the finer points of the stock market and the how and why of its ups and downs is a complex task for anyone. When major shifts in a whole diaspora of fields occur, people often look to the stock market as a gauge for how significant those shifts really are and what the potential results are going to come out as. World news is often reported as to how it has an impact on the world of finance, and this is certainly one such instance, as President Trump trades tariff blows with China in a rapidly escalating trade war. The impact of this trade war certainly didn’t avoid the stock market, which took notice of the shifting costs of exports and imports and created a noticeable response. Let’s take a look at what’s really going on in this recent episode in the global economy.

Trump VS China

The US President’s attitude towards foreign nations is an eternally shifting spectrum, though it does tend to rest somewhere towards antagonistic for the sake of sending a message. Trump’s ‘show of force’ tactics recently got him into a situation with China on a trade front, causing a situation that has impacted all of the global markets, and heavily impacted the American and Chinese markets. “Trump has a latent tension towards China that simply won’t abate, no matter how few tangible issues there are in reality. This drove him most recently to impose some pretty severe tariffs on Chinese goods,” reports Samuel Chang, data analyst at WriteMyx and BritStudent.

US Tariff

The United States began a 15 percent tariff on hundreds of billions of dollars of Chinese goods for import, from tech to clothing. Trump’s explanation for his move relates again to his suspicion of all of the largest global powers, from Russia to China. He spoke out, via his favorite medium Twitter, about the US over-reliance on Chinese exports, and that his tariff was a motivator for US companies to look for alternative solutions for suppliers outside of China, rather than simply turning to some nation over and over again to supply the products they needed.

Trump’s Reasoning

Trump’s steps to disincentivize US trade with China could be viewed as impulsive, since the immediate effects of so drastic a tariff will likely fall on the US consumer, with US household costs potentially rising by up to $1000 a year, with such a large selection of consumer goods now made noticeably more expensive. Similarly, Trump’s plan, though it must have considered the possibility of consequences, didn’t allow for a reaction in the opposite direction as the Chinese trade officials lashed back at the tariff.

The Chinese Response

Not ones to be out-maneuvered, least of all by Trump, the Chinese responded to the tariffs with sanctions of their own that were as much a political response as a practical one, as they delivered a counter punch to Trump’s initial move. China immediately imposed additional tariffs on exported goods on a $75-billion target list, and further tariffs were placed on thousands of items originating from the US. Similarly, China was quick to begin imposing new duties on US crude oil, a predictable but damaging move that has made the potential fallout and impact on global stock markets more noticeable.

The Trade War Fallout

“Such actions from nations as influential as the US and China don’t come without an impact that affects people from all around the world. In this instance, a variety of shifts have left most markets a little worse for wear, but most drastic damage has been avoided”, explains Mark Cherry, a business writer at Australia2Write and NextCoursework. The fallout included the US stock futures dipping 0.7% and the Asian markets are down. A noticeable drop in oil prices was also recorded, as would have been expected after the duties imposed on US crude by the Chinese.

Conclusion

This is the latest in a series of jabs between the US and China, though there is no sense in which these sorts of interactions have all that much of a practical purpose. Though this particular episode abated pretty swiftly, the threat of further escalations has made the market quite jittery.

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Mildred Delgado is a young and responsible marketing strategist at PhdKingdom and AcademicBrits. She works with a company’s marketing team in order to create a fully-functional site that accurately portrays the company. Mildred is also responsible for presenting these details to stakeholders in a series of marketing proposals. You can find her work at OriginWritings.