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GSP Special Tariff Status Expired at End of 2020

special tariff

GSP Special Tariff Status Expired at End of 2020

U.S. Customs and Border Protection (“CBP”) issued a notice announcing the lapse of the Generalized System of Preferences (“GSP”) special tariff program, effective December 31, 2020, unless renewed by an act of Congress. The GSP is the oldest U.S. trade preference program and was established by the Trade Act of 1974. GSP effectively promotes the economic development of countries by eliminating duties on thousands of products when imported from one of 119 designated beneficiary countries and territories.

This specialized tariff treatment status is denoted by “special tariff program indicators” (“SPI”) “A,” “A+,” and “A*” in the Harmonized Tariff System of the United States (“HTSUS”). Under the GSP, the symbol “A” indicates that all GSP countries are eligible for duty-free treatment, “A*” indicates that certain GSP countries are ineligible for duty-free treatment, and “A+” indicates approximately 1,500 additional tariff items for which only the “Least Developed Beneficiary Developing Countries” are eligible for duty-free treatment. As a result of the lapse, GSP eligible goods entered or removed from the warehouse for consumption will be assessed “General” or “Column 1” duty rates as of January 1, 2021.

CBP encourages importers to instruct their broker to flag entries of GSP eligible items with SPI “A” until further notice, starting on January 1, 2021, but importers may not file SPI “A” without paying normal duties at the time of entry. On post-importation GSP claims, CBP states the following: “CBP will continue to allow post-importation GSP claims made via post summary correction (PSC) and protest (19 USC 1514, 19 CFR 174) subsequent to the expiration of GSP, for importations made while GSP was still in effect. CBP will not allow post-importation GSP claims made via PSC or protest subsequent to the expiration of GSP, for importations made subsequent to expiration.”

The GSP program has been reauthorized 14 times since it was originally scheduled to expire in 1985, but only 4 of those reauthorizations occurred prior to the expiration of the program. The most recent extension of GSP by Congress was part of the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2018, which extended the GSP program until December 31, 2020. With the economic stimulus negotiations currently dominating the discussion in Congress, it is currently unclear whether GSP reauthorization will be included in any year-end legislation, though GSP reauthorization last passed the House and Senate in 2018 with strong bipartisan support. It is possible that the next Congress will renew the GSP program with retroactive effect, which has been done several times in the past.

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Nithya Nagarajan is a Washington-based partner with the law firm Husch Blackwell LLP. She practices in the International Trade & Supply Chain group of the firm’s Technology, Manufacturing & Transportation industry team.

Cortney O’Toole Morgan is a Washington D.C.-based partner with the law firm Husch Blackwell LLP. She leads the firm’s International Trade & Supply Chain group.

Camron Greer is an Assistant Trade Analyst in Husch Blackwell LLP’s Washington D.C. office.

RCEP

What the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement Means for U.S. and Foreign Companies

The Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) Agreement is a mega free trade agreement signed on November 15, 2020 by 15 Asia-Pacific countries, including Australia, Brunei, Cambodia, China, Indonesia, Japan, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, New Zealand, the Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, Thailand, and Vietnam. The 15 countries represent nearly 30 percent of the world’s GDP and 2.2 billion people. Meanwhile, RCEP brings together China, Japan, and South Korea for the first time under a single free trade agreement. The Peterson Institute for International Economics estimates that by 2030, the RCEP could add $186 billion to global national income annually. India originally planned to join RCEP but later pulled out in November 2019.

Summary of RCEP

The RCEP Agreement consists of 20 chapters covering a wide range of areas including trade in goods, rules of origin, customs procedures and trade facilitation, sanitary and phytosanitary measures, intellectual property rights, trade in services, E-commerce, and government procurement. Although the RCEP Agreement does not establish unified standards on labor and environmental protection, many scholars and practitioners believe that RCEP will effectively remove some common trade barriers in Asian countries.

Rules of Origin. Under the RCEP Agreement, the rules of origin will be unified for all member states, which means that companies only need to acquire one certificate of origin for trading in all member states. Surprisingly, only 40 percent of RCEP regional value of content is required for goods to meet the rules of origin requirement.

Trade in Goods. The chapter addressing trade in goods consists of key clauses that implement the member states’ goods-related commitments, including granting national treatment to other member states; reduction or elimination of customs duties, and duty-free temporary admission of goods. For example, tariffs likely will be eliminated on 86 percent of industrial goods exported from Japan to China. Overall, under RCEP the total number of zero-tariff products in trade in goods exceeds 90 percent of total products.

Investment. The chapter addressing investment includes several investment protection standards commonly used in other trade and investment treaties such as most-favored-nation treatment, fair and equitable treatment, and just compensation. Additionally, RCEP stipulates the rules for expropriation and covers both direct and indirect expropriation. In order to rise to the level of indirect expropriation, several factors must be exercised including the economic impact of government actions; whether the government actions violate its prior binding written commitments to the investor; and the nature of the government actions.

E-Commerce. Considering the digitalization of the trade and commerce among the member states, the chapter focused on e-commerce aims to promote e-commerce among the member states and use of e-commerce globally. This chapter requires all member states to adopt legal mechanisms to create a conducive environment for e-commerce transactions and development, including protection of personal data and information, and cross-border information transfer. In addition, all member states are required to maintain the current practice of not imposing duties for electronic transmissions.

What U.S. and Foreign Companies Can Expect

Lenient Rules of Origin. For U.S. and foreign companies doing business and operating in ASEAN, China, and other Asia Pacific region, RCEP probably offers the most lenient rules of origin compared to other major free trade agreements. As discussed above, the basic value of the content rule of 40 percent RCEP content is surprisingly low and is favorable to many U.S. and foreign companies. For example, a U.S. company may manufacture a product with 60 percent U.S. content and then export the product to Indonesia where the remaining 40 percent of content (from any other RCEP member) is added. Once the U.S. company establishes the 40 percent RCEP content, it can label the products as “Made in Indonesia,” and export the products to any RCEP member state, including China, and enjoy low or zero tariffs.

Supply Chain and End Market. In response to the worsening U.S. – China trade relationship, many U.S. companies have started to optimize and diversify their global supply chains throughout Southeast Asia. Because RCEP lowers tariffs, reduces non-tariff trade barriers, and improves market access for goods and services in the region, investment in Southeast Asia becomes even more attractive and economically feasible for those companies looking to sell their products or services in the region. For example, for many U.S. companies, buying Chinese components and/or selling products in China can be an expensive proposition due to the many tariffs and non-tariff barriers that exist between the countries. However, U.S. companies now have an opportunity to avoid these burdens by importing parts from China and completing the manufacturing process in an RCEP member state, and then selling the final products to China’s huge market while taking advantage of the benefits of RCEP.

How Member States and U.S. Companies May Benefit

RCEP will benefit its member states by reducing trade and investment barriers and increasing the economic integration among the members. U.S. companies may also benefit by reconfiguring their global supply chains to include more trade and investment in the region which will allow these companies to avoid many of the currently high tariffs and regulatory burdens that they currently experience.

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Frank Xue and John Scannapieco are attorneys at Baker Donelson and members of the firm’s Global Business Team.

logistics

2021 Logistics & Transportation Forecast: Here’s What to Prepare for in the New Year

The US-China trade war, COVID-19, regulations and compliance, economic disruptions, and more all contributed to a hectic year for players in the global logistics and transportation arenas. It’s safe to say that 2021 will inevitably require a new level of innovation and predictions compared to how operations used to be. Sophisticated forecasting and agility take on a new meaning for proactive measures to prove successful in the new normal. With the hope of 2021 on the horizon, Deepak Chhugani, founder and CEO of Nuvocargo, the first digital freight forwarder and customs broker for US/Mexico trade, lists what he considers to be some of the most significant events to prepare for in 2021 and how shippers, manufacturers, and other industry players can prepare.

-Mexico is now the USA’s #1 trade partner, according to the US Census Bureau’s 2019 report. The China-US trade war, as well as the COVID-19 pandemic, are driving more US companies to establish new supply chains and we anticipate explosive growth as Mexico becomes the new China. Companies are nearshoring and moving their US supply chains closer to home in favor of Latin America and more specifically Mexico. The automakers especially should continue to see a big boom and reliance on Mexico as it favors homegrown manufacturing. The auto industry will continue to see a shift, in particular the Bajio region of Mexico, which is flush with trucking capacity.

-Digitization, software, and giving shippers and carriers efficient tech tools are critical as technology continues to disrupt this industry. COVID-19 has forced the traditional and analog logistics industry to adopt technology as its primary way of doing business. Everyone is working from home, switching in-person and paper processes with digital transactions and signatures. Digital freight forwarding technology can help businesses ease this transition from offline to online and empower them with tools to smoothly transition towards more digital and modern ways of managing their cargo and supply chains.

-Changes to the global logistics industry (trucking, maritime, and others) that inherently impact the cross-border world is mainly the result of the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) and tariff schedules. The expectation was that the USMCA would increase annual US exports to Canada and Mexico significantly.  As exports increase, that results in more cross-border truckloads between the US and Mexico which will lead to more capacity crunches as several trucking players have exited the marketplace in recent years and volumes will only increase. This should also increase reliance on cross-docking shipments to leverage trucking capacity on both sides of the US/Mexico borders.

-Politics will also play a role in 2021 as we can anticipate a Biden administration will bring more stability and predictability to trade relationships, especially after the recent signing of the new North American Free Trade Agreement USMCA. An expected increase in US government spending and a policy refocus on middle and lower classes could also prove beneficial to Mexico’s production capabilities, as additional consumption incentives are created. Finally, with the tight grip on China not likely to loosen in the near future, both countries (US/Mexico) could benefit from embracing the shift of global supply chains to bring more manufacturing to North America.

-Transportation of COVID-19 vaccinations will create more demand and we’ll see an increase in shipping, especially refrigerated cargoes and cold-chain solutions. The U.S. Department of Transportation just announced that “all of its necessary regulatory measures have been taken for the safe, rapid transportation of the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) vaccine by land and air.” As a result, there will be additional safeguards and support in place for the trucking industry. Also, the importance of freight forwarders is likely to increase as the complexity of vaccine distribution reaches never-before-seen levels. Freight forwarders’ role as the “connective tissue” of logistics will be key and will take the pressure of managing the logistics of pharmaceutical companies. On the flip side, prioritizing vaccines means that some non-essential cargo will get bumped, increasing rates and affecting businesses that are not properly prepared for this unprecedented time.

-COVID-19 and border restrictions continue to impact customer’s exporting needs as they move their freight into the US. Since most of the available equipment is retained at the border and looking to move southbound from Laredo, the export/import ratio of 8:1 continues to impact the overall capacity into specific areas such as Guadalajara, Bajio, and Mexico City which creates challenges. Companies will have to be nimble and diligent as they navigate and comply with their customer’s requirements.

export controls

UNPACKING US-CHINA SANCTIONS AND EXPORT CONTROL REGULATIONS: PRACTICAL COMPLIANCE STRATEGIES

This is the fourth in a series of articles by Eversheds Sutherland partners Jeff Bialos and Ginger Faulk explaining the legal and regulatory impacts of certain recent US sanctions and export control actions targeting various Chinese entities. Each article explains the regulatory context of the recent rules.

Our previous articles have discussed recent developments in US sanctions and export controls affecting trade with China, including US export controls on software and semiconductor technology, the Department of Defense list of Chinese military companies, the Commerce Department’s “Military End User” rule, and the use of the US “Entity List” to target various concerns from export control to human rights to Iran sanctions. The last month has also seen efforts to restrict foreign investments in publicly traded securities of companies associated with the Chinese military.

The purpose of this article is to provide a framework and practical guidance for complying with existing and emerging US-China export controls and sanctions. In other words, how does a company establish an effective compliance program that appropriately manages risk, limits potential liability exposure, and, at the same time, if things go wrong, confirms to regulators and prosecutors that the company took compliance seriously, thereby mitigating penalties and avoiding a criminal referral?

The best approach to trade compliance is a multidisciplinary approach

As a starting point, if recent developments in US-China trade policies have taught us anything, it’s that US trade restrictions can apply to everything from technical exchanges (internal and external) and product shipments to intracompany shipments and financial transactions and investments. As such, a company’s approach to compliance with US-China trade rules and well as the broader range of other sanctions regimes should be multidisciplinary and capable of responding to emerging requirements in any and all of these areas.

Recent US-China trade policies have targeted certain products, technology, and software; third parties; financial flows and financial institutions; inbound foreign investment; imports and tariffs; and even access to capital market financing. As a result, in considering your multinational company’s compliance obligations and risk exposure, you should consider the implications across business units and functions, including:

-Research and Development

-Sales and Marketing

-Procurement

-Shipping and Logistics

-Finance and Accounting

-Banking and Insurance

-Customer Service

-IT Systems, and others.

These rules can apply to intra-company, as well as external, activities. Even if one segment of your business has a particular type of heightened risk exposure, it does not mean that is the only segment of your business that may be exposed.

Ensure accountability and support for trade compliance

Overall, an effective compliance program requires a number of core elements: 1) leadership commitment and the allocation of resources to the compliance function; 2) robust procedures and processes integrated into the company’s business; 3) internal controls that can test the efficacy of the procedures on an ongoing basis; and 4) training that ensures that the company’s personnel understand their compliance obligations and internalize them in their work routines.

US regulatory agencies expect a company to assign responsibility to a person or function within a company for ensuring trade compliance and to provide that function sufficient access to, and support from, senior management. Often, this means designating a compliance officer who reports to the board of directors. Regulators will look not only at a company’s “culture of compliance,” but also assess whether the company provided adequate compliance resources commensurate with the size and nature of its operations. Recognizing that a corporate parent may be held liable for its subsidiaries’ trade control violations resulting from inadequate supervision, companies are advised to establish centralized policies and procedures for ensuring and monitoring compliance by each of their subsidiaries. Compliance integration under these policies should be part of every post-acquisition integration effort.

Know Thyself: Assessing your own business risks

A centerpiece of modern regulatory compliance is prudent risk management. In many regulatory areas, including sanctions, it is challenging for firms to achieve 100% compliance at all times.  Rather, the goal is to establish a program to appropriately manage and mitigate compliance risk.

US foreign trade and investment regulatory and enforcement agencies emphasize the importance of conducting a risk assessment in order to identify compliance risks that are particular to your business. OFAC’s Framework for Compliance Commitments advises companies in developing compliance measures to consider the risk profiles of the company’s “customers, supply chain, intermediaries, and counter-parties; (ii) the products and services it offers, including how and where such items fit into other financial or commercial products, services, networks, or systems; and (iii) the geographic locations of the organization, as well as its customers, supply chain, intermediaries, and counter-parties.” [1]

You should also understand how sanctions laws may apply in the context of your company’s multinational structure and operations. It is a mistake to believe that companies operating outside of the US cannot be touched by US sanctions and export controls. Many times violations arise from US person “facilitation” of sanctioned activities and interactions by non-US companies with the US financial system, e.g., through US dollar-denominated financial transactions. For this reason, some US-based multinationals have elected to apply sanctions and export control compliance throughout not only their US, but also foreign, operations – even in areas where the controls are not fully extraterritorial. The application of corporate liability rules in a multinational enterprise where US persons have some level of involvement around the globe otherwise makes compliance more challenging than it needs to be.

In assessing its exposure to US trade controls, a company must look not only at the location of management and administrative support personnel, but also the geographic footprint of its entire product and R&D supply chains, i.e., the location of internal technology and software development and the location of manufacturing of products, parts, components and materials and the development of software and technology on which they are based. Consider not only software and technology shared with third parties but also internal (intracompany) cross-border or domestic transfers of software and technology and establish effective internal controls.

Implement a program to manage identified risks effectively, including Know Your Counterparty (KYC) controls

As impressive as a compliance program may appear on paper, the only worthwhile compliance program is one that is effective. To be effective, a compliance program should work with company’s existing structures and information flows and be integrated with day to day internal work instructions. It needs to be able to incorporate and screen in real-time existing third-party information and implement stop-hold procedures for transactions that trigger risk. This usually calls for a customized screening and software solution.

In developing a trade compliance program, US regulators and enforcement agencies encourage companies to build around certain basic core elements

Management Commitment – As discussed above, demonstrate and document senior management approval of the compliance program and foster a “culture of compliance” with a positive “tone from the top.”

(2) Risk Assessment – Again, a compliance program must be responsive to identified risks, and there is no “one-size-fits-all” approach.

(3) Internal Controls – Per OFAC, this refers to “policies and procedures, in order to identify, interdict, escalate, report (as appropriate), and keep records pertaining to activity that may be prohibited by the regulations and laws.” These internal policies should be clearly set out in writing and consistently implemented and enforced. Heightened review is recommended for transfers of dual-use and military items and dealings with high-risk destinations or counter-parties.

Beyond day-to-day KYC screening, numerous companies have recognized that their foreign collaborative engagements can involve significant risk, which can vary depending on the country, industry, and the particular party involved. Thus, firms often establish a special committee to vet engagements with third parties, whether agents, distributors, or joint venture partners. Individual business units may propose these engagements, and the company will evaluate them on an enterprise-wide basis after due diligence and the assessment of risks, advising also on the structuring of legal arrangements to mitigate such risks.

(4) Testing and Auditing – Regular monitoring of trade compliance is encouraged and, in some cases, expected. Regular auditing can occur at a global level or may rotate to focus on certain business units, functions, or procedures. Testing and auditing may be conducted by internal audit or external subject matter experts.

(5) Compliance training – Much of trade compliance depends on employees knowing how to spot and address “red flags” of sanctions and export control issues. Compliance training should provide information that is readily useable and easily accessible, risk-focused, and tailored to the duties and responsibilities of the participants.

To summarize, in today’s global business, complying with US-China trade policies requires a holistic review of a company’s external and internal operations. The best compliance programs are developed on the basis of a realistic review of a company’s compliance risk exposure; designed to be able to respond to ever-changing targets and regulations; and implemented effectively to work with a company’s existing systems and structures.

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Ginger T. Faulk, partner at Eversheds Sutherland, represents multinational companies in matters involving US government regulation of foreign trade and investment. She has extensive experience advising and representing global companies, counseling clients in matters arising under US sanctions, export controls, import and other national security and foreign policy trade-related regulations.

Jeffrey P.  Bialos, partner at Eversheds Sutherland, assists clients in making multi-faceted business decisions, structuring transactions and complying with complex regulatory requirements. A former Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Industrial Affairs, he brings deep experience in defense, homeland security and national security matters, including antitrust, export controls, foreign investment, industrial security, the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, and mergers and acquisitions, and procurement.

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[1] OFAC Framework for Compliance Commitments, at https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/126/framework_ofac_cc.pdf; see also BIS Elements of an Effective Compliance Program, available at at https://www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/documents/pdfs/1641-ecp/file; see also US Department of Justice, National Security Division, “Export Control and Sanctions Enforcement Policy for Business Organizations,” Dec. 14, 2019, available at https://us.eversheds-sutherland.com/portalresource/ces_vsd_policy_2019.pdf.

strategic sourcing

Strategic Sourcing and Supply Chain Management in a post-COVID World

While it might seem premature to discuss the post-COVID world as we are nearing what is hopefully the peak of the pandemic this winter, it is also clear that the crisis will pass as better treatment and vaccines become available and immunity spreads in the population.

Remaining however will be key macro trends that were sparked or drastically accelerated by the pandemic:

Forced adoption of e-commerce: E-commerce penetration into late adopter segments was drastically accelerated during COVID and the lockdowns that followed. Consumers who did not shop online were forced to do so and now prefer it. By some estimates, this steep change compressed five years of projected online shopping adoption into about three months.

Location irrelevance of knowledge labor: During the lockdowns, all non-essential service labor that could be performed remotely was done so, and it largely worked quite well. Fast network access speeds, low-cost video conferencing options, and sheer necessity finally made video conferencing common and socially acceptable; far easier, quicker, and cheaper via Zoom than actual physical meetings.

Real estate “Zoom Doom”:  I estimate that only 50% of the office space utilized prior to the pandemic will be re-occupied, as both employers and employees prefer remote work for many jobs. Employers save and employees can live wherever they want. While driving through rural parts of the US over the summer, I saw several housing developments with billboards advertising nothing but their high internet access speeds.

While obviously net positive for the economy, this transition will be quite jarring, as the $3.7 trillion of commercial mortgages will lose significant and possibly permanent value, severely damaging banks’ balance sheets. This may trigger a financial crisis similar to 2008, but if the Federal Reserve Bank and the Federal Government apply the lessons learned in 2008 proactively, the worst might be avoided.

Focus on supply chain diversity: Prior to the pandemic, many companies paid lip service to true supply chain diversity and instead focused on lowest-cost sourcing, depending heavily on China. President Trump’s China tariffs were the first test and many companies responded by diversifying to other Asian countries as best they could. When the pandemic hit, China initially shut down and prioritized their domestic needs, but came back surprisingly quickly. Companies are now scrambling to enhance diversity and increase non-China and US domestic sources.

Smart companies should use this crisis as an opportunity – To strategically re-source core supply chains for both better long-term pricing and more diversity and robustness.

2021 is the time to do this. Suppliers are highly motivated and seek long-term partnerships. A proper strategic sourcing approach is grounded in microeconomic principles and designed to reduce costs for both parties in the long-term.

Here are the key steps:

Envision target supply chain: A desired end state vision is a useful planning device, but companies should remain flexible and include suppliers they may not have used in the past and consider them for development. It’s important not to restrict the solution before all the facts and data have been gathered and terms have been fully negotiated. Restricting the degree of freedom by presupposing an answer can be very costly and highly counter-productive.

Design the correct pricing model: The method of pricing is the most powerful lever in strategic sourcing. The way one asks for a price determines how suppliers respond, how much of the spend is covered, what we learn about the supplier economics, it enables long-term relationships and most importantly, aligns incentives to reduce cost and innovate long-term pricing contracts. Unlike cost-plus approaches, pricing models are industry-based, competitive, and centered around buyers’ requirements.

Perform disaggregated analysis on bidding data: A bidding process or request for proposal is the main source of data and can be quite complex. Strategic sourcing analysis is usually about uncovering many small improvements that add up to meaningful savings, blocking and tackling, tedious iteration, and outworking the suppliers, rather than big, brilliant insights. The availability of big data methods enables sophisticated analysis.

Negotiate for optimal supplier configuration: Negotiation is the iterative process of leveraging the fact that the buyer is now in possession of more information than the suppliers. Based on the highly disaggregated analysis, one can find each supplier’s ‘sweet spots’ and configure a preferred supplier base, where each purchase is routed to the most competitive source. It is critical that all bidders remain convinced that they can gain a lot or lose a lot of business and that there is no preference for anyone outside cold, hard economics and math.

Implement for ongoing competition: Even the most sophisticated and thoughtful pricing arrangements cannot account for unknowable innovation, temporary excess capacities, new entrants, etc.  Therefore, it is critical to maintain ongoing competition while balancing the commitment to the preferred supplier base. This can be accomplished by allowing purchase level competition subject to an agreed-upon pricing umbrella with minimum / maximum market shares within the preferred supplier set.

Strategic buyers should not go back to business as usual, but instead create a competitively differentiating supply chain for the long-term. The COVID supply chain experience provides the organizational urgency to act and the likely ongoing weakness in the world economy provides the motivation to suppliers to cooperate.

Most strategic sourcing initiatives take about six to nine months and return three to five times their investment within the first year of implementation, but require a high level of expertise and analytical sophistication. If such resources are not available internally, senior management should build or bring in the talent and capabilities required before this opportunity passes.

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Hans Dau is the CEO of the Mitchell Madison Group (https://www.mmgmc.com/), hosting deep experience consulting across many industries, including banking, insurance, manufacturing, technology, entertainment, and retail, with a focus on short-term earnings improvement through strategic sourcing, pricing optimization and marketing analytics. The views expressed are his own.

voters

NEW POLL: TRADE WAS A TOP ISSUE FOR MANY 2020 VOTERS

Nearly Half of U.S. Voters Identified Trade as a Top Issue in Presidential Election

In a likely reflection of the front-and-center emphasis President Donald Trump has put on trade policy in his Administration, nearly half of U.S. voters identified trade as a top issue influencing their vote for president in 2020, according to TradeVistas’ latest survey.

Our poll also found that over the next four years, Americans want to prioritize policies supporting the U.S. production of goods and services, such as increasing U.S. exports abroad and promoting “Buy American” at home.

In our post-election survey of 1009 American adults, conducted by Lincoln Park Strategies, 22 percent of respondents said trade was “the most important issue to me” in determining their 2020 vote, while 27 percent said it was “one of the most important issues” to them. Of the rest, 32 percent said while trade was important, it didn’t affect their vote, and 20 percent said they were not sure or that it’s “not an issue I really care about.”

Importance of Trade in Vote for President

Over 60 Percent of Republicans Said Trade Was “Most” or “One of Most” Important Issues

Republicans were more likely to see trade as a top concern, with 61 percent saying it was the most important or one of the most important issues to their vote (versus 45 percent of Democrats. Independents, on the other hand, were the most likely to say it did not influence their vote (43 percent). Men were more likely to say trade was “the most important” issue to them (31 percent), while women were more likely to say a candidate’s position on trade did not affect their vote (39 percent).

Importance of Trade to Vote by Party

Trade as a Proxy for the General Economy

While the salience of trade as an election issue might seem surprising to some, there are a couple of potential explanations for our results. First, many voters may see trade policy as a proxy for their concern about the economy more generally. (In national exit polls, 37 percent of U.S. voters – including 83 percent of those voting for President Trump – said the economy was the issue that mattered most to their vote.) Moreover, Trump has made trade policy a centerpiece of his economic agenda, particularly with his trade war against China, the renegotiation of NAFTA as USMCA, and his promises to bring back jobs lost to offshoring. The President’s advocacy of policies like “Buy American” also explicitly linked the creation of U.S. jobs to U.S. production, which has arguably led to the conflation of trade and economic policy in the public mind.

Buy American to Remain a Top Priority

As our September survey found, Buy American enjoys immense bipartisan support, and respondents in our post-election poll indicated that this policy is their top priority among the options we tested. In our survey, 33 percent of respondents said policies like Buy American are “extremely important” to pursue over the next four years, compared to 26 percent who believed it extremely important to negotiate new trade agreements with other countries and 24 percent who said the same of increasing the export of U.S. goods and services. Consistent with our September survey, men and Republicans were somewhat more likely to consider Buy American to be “extremely important” (40 percent and 43 percent respectively). Overall, 61 percent of Americans said Buy American was “extremely important” or “very important,” while 59 percent said the same of new trade deals and more exports.

Tariff Fatigue Could Go Either Way

One policy that did not enjoy as strong support was the idea of imposing new tariffs. Just 20 percent said imposing new tariffs on foreign goods was “extremely important,” while an almost equal number – 19 percent – said new tariffs were not important (13 percent) or were opposed to the idea (6 percent).

On the other hand, low rates of opposition to new tariffs could indicate newfound acceptance of tariffs as a tool (or cudgel) in future trade policy.

Importance of Different Trade Policies

The Next Four Years

What all this means for the next four years is that Americans want to see and will support trade policies that aggressively promote American economic interests abroad and will create new jobs at home.

Methodology: Lincoln Park Strategies conducted 1009 interviews among adults age 18+ were from November 9-10, 2020 using an online survey. The results were weighted to ensure proportional responses. The Bayesian confidence interval for 1,000 interviews is 3.5, which is roughly equivalent to a margin of error of ±3.1 at the 95% confidence level.

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Anne Kim

Anne Kim is a contributing editor to Washington Monthly and the author of Abandoned: America’s Lost Youth and the Crisis of Disconnection, forthcoming in 2020 from the New Press. Her writings on economic opportunity, social policy, and higher education have appeared in numerous national outlets, including the Washington Monthly, the Washington Post, Governing and Atlantic.com, among others. She is a veteran of the think tanks the Progressive Policy Institute and Third Way as well as of Capitol Hill, where she worked for Rep. Jim Cooper (D-TN). Anne has a law degree from Duke University and a bachelor’s in journalism from the University of Missouri-Columbia.

complaint system

EU Releases New Complaint System to Address Trade Deal Violations and Market Barriers

On November 16, 2020, the European Commission (“EC”) debuted their new complaints system for stakeholders to report harmful trade barriers and violations to European Union (“EU”) trade agreements. The “Single Entry Point” complaints system allows member states, companies, trade associations, civil society groups and EU citizens to report any market access barriers and non-compliance of Trade and Sustainable Development (“TSD”) commitments which are part of EU trade agreements or under the Generalised Scheme of Preferences (“GSP”).

Executive Vice-President and Commissioner for Trade Valdis Dombrovskis said that the EC “has made enforcement a top priority” and that, notably, under the new system, complaints related to “sustainable development commitments” will receive the same level of attention as complaints related to market access barriers.

As outlined in the published operating guidelines, received complaints will be prioritized based on three criteria:

1. The likelihood of success for resolving the issue;

2. The legal basis for the complaint;

3. The seriousness or degree of economic/systemic impact of the alleged market access barriers or violations of TSD/GSP commitments.

The new system has two separate complaint forms, one for market access barriers and another for non-compliance with TSD/GSP commitments. Both of the forms require that the complainant provide the legal basis and a full description of the issue being reported. Additionally, if the commission finds that enforcement action is necessary, they will inform the complainant and issue an enforcement action plan tailored to the specific violation or trade barrier.

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Nithya Nagarajan is a Washington-based partner with the law firm Husch Blackwell LLP. She practices in the International Trade & Supply Chain group of the firm’s Technology, Manufacturing & Transportation industry team.

Turner Kim is an Assistant Trade Analyst in Husch Blackwell LLP’s Washington, D.C. office.

Camron Greer is an Assistant Trade Analyst in Husch Blackwell LLP’s Washington D.C. office.

North America

Out of Asia: Promise from Pandemic of a Manufacturing Renaissance in North America (Part 3)

In their first two installments (which you can view here and here), George Y. Gonzalez and Jesus Alcocer respond to the gaps exposed in the supply chain by the pandemic by proposing a shift away from overreliance on China and a shift towards reshoring manufacturing closer to home. In their final installment, they will explore how the potential cost of reshoring out of Asia to North America could be lessened if capacity is relocated to Mexico, a natural alternative. Wrapping up their discussion, they will also examine how Houston may serve as a central hub for cross-national manufacturing and trade.

Mexico Has Also Been a Beneficiary of This Shift Out of China

Mexico has benefited from this rearrangement almost as much as Vietnam. According to A.T. Kearney, manufacturing imports from Mexico rose $13 billion to $20 billion in 2019. Thanks to this climb, the U.S. now imports 42 cents from Mexico for every dollar it purchased from LCAs, up from 37 cents during the past seven years. This pattern has also extended into 2020. In the first quarter of this year, imports in maintenance and repair, construction, and insurance sectors all grew in the triple digits, while imports of information and communications technology products (“ICT”) grew 20% year-on-year.

The trade relationship between the two North American countries has developed in spite of political obstacles. The Trump Administration imposed tariffs on Mexico-produced steel in 2018 but removed those barriers in May 2019. Likewise, Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador, Mexico’s president since 2018, was widely regarded as a nationalist suspicious of international trade. According to the Congressional Research Service, “in the area of foreign policy, President-elect López Obrador generally has maintained that the best foreign policy is a strong domestic policy.… Some observers feared that López Obrador might roll back Mexico’s market-friendly reforms and adopt a more isolationist foreign policy.” Against these inauspicious circumstances, bilateral trade has grown steadily since 2016. Mexico surpassed Canada as the U.S.’s largest trade partner in 2019. In 2013, Canada exported 8.3% more to the United States than Mexico. Now the order has reversed, with Mexico exporting .5% more than Canada into the U.S.

Growing imports can be partly explained by a hike in U.S. FDI in Mexico, which grew approximately 5.2% between 2018 and 2019 to $100.89 billion. Investment in primary and prefabricated metals manufacturing close to doubled from 2015 to 2019 to close to $2.27 billion, while FDI in machinery manufacturing grew about 25% during that same period. These are some of the industries where U.S. FDI in China has dropped most sharply, as explained above. Rising FDI stock was driven by waves of U.S. companies establishing a base or increasing their footprint in Mexico, following the market-oriented reforms in that country in the last decade. According to A.T. Kearney, by 2016 more than half of U.S. companies with manufacturing operations in Mexico had relocated production therefrom places such as China to supply the U.S. market.

Moreover, according to the Boston Consulting Group, some major Chinese consumer electronics manufactures have been adding capacity in Mexico to serve demand in Latin America. This broadly corresponds to the Chamber survey referenced above, which indicates that while LACs are still the top relocation choice for U.S. firms, North America is an increasingly popular option. Close to 17% of the firms dislocating their operations from China in 2020 indicated they would move that capacity to Mexico or Canada, up from 10% in 2019. An additional 22% reported they would move it to the U.S., up from 17% in 2019.

Mexico as a Natural Alternative

Mexico is already the U.S.’s largest trading partner, as well as the manufacturing base for a substantial part of its products. Last year, Mexico traded $614 billion with the U.S. – surpassing Canada ($612 billion) and China ($558 billion). “Merchandise trade between the two countries in 2018 was six times higher (in nominal terms) than in 1993, the year NAFTA entered into force,” according to the Congressional Research Service. Among the leading U.S. exports to Mexico are “petroleum and coal products ($28.8 billion or 11% of exports to Mexico), motor vehicle parts ($20.2 billion or 8% of exports), computer equipment ($17.4 billion or 7% of exports), and semiconductors and other electronic components ($13.1 billion or 5% of exports).” On the other hand, the top U.S. imports from Mexico in 2018 included “motor vehicles ($64.5 billion or 19% of imports from Mexico), motor vehicle parts ($49.8 billion or 14% of imports), computer equipment ($26.6 billion or 8% of imports), oil and gas ($14.5 billion or 4% of imports), and electrical equipment ($11.9 billion or 3% of imports).”

Increasing the cross-border manufacturing prompted by NAFTA may be the most practical way for the U.S. to eliminate its cost gap with China. “Many economists credit NAFTA with helping U.S. manufacturing industries, especially the U.S. auto industry, become more globally competitive through the development of supply chains in North America. A significant portion of merchandise trade between the U.S. and Mexico occurs in the context of production sharing as manufacturers in each country work together to create goods.” Mexico’s wage growth is on par with Vietnam’s, but Mexico’s productivity is about 5.2 times higher. Mexico’s combination of low labor costs and relatively high productivity result in production costs that are 20-30% lower than in the U.S. (including transportation and associated fees).

Mexico also has an important advantage vis-à-vis China with respect to transportation costs, which account for a significant portion of costs in industries like metals and automotive parts. Shipping a 40-foot container loaded with automotive parts from Shanghai to Los Angeles cost an average of $1,374.03 – $1,518.66 (before taxes and duties) in July 2020. Shipping that same container from Veracruz, in the Gulf of Mexico, to New York, cost $1,102.24 – $1,218.27. Sending that same container by truck from northern Tamaulipas, where a large portion of the country’s manufacturing base is located, to Houston cost an average of $304.11 – $336.12 – four to five times less than shipping it from China. Mexico also maintains a clear edge in delivery time. It takes 75% less time to transport goods to the customer from Mexico than from Asia. Proximity is an essential advantage in industries that are shifting towards highly personalized products, including electronics, automotive, and clothing. The short distance can also be exploited to combine the countries’ supply chains across the border, one of the main drivers of economic growth under NAFTA.

According to the Center for Car Research, between 80 and 90% of U.S. automotive trade is intra-industry, and parts produced in Mexico and the U.S. cross the border up to eight times along the manufacturing process before they are delivered to consumers. In fact, on average, close to 40% of the content of a vehicle produced in Mexico was initially imported from the United States. This tight integration was only achieved after the NAFTA, which allowed producers to spread their supply chain across the border. Before 1993, for example, the vehicles produced in Mexico contained only 5% of parts produced in the U.S

The Effect of the USMCA

NAFTA completely changed the landscape of North America by driving unprecedented integration in the region and generating a dramatic increase in trade and cross-border investment. NAFTA also had an essential role in promoting Mexico’s privatization, where state-owned enterprises represented a substantial part of production until at least 1988. Between 1988 and 1994, 390 Mexican businesses were privatized – close to 63% of large corporations in the country. Telling of Mexico’s explosive development in this era is that before 1988 there was only one billionaire family in Mexico: Monterrey’s Garza Sada, who made their fortune selling beer and steel. In 1994, however, Forbes’s ranks included 24 Mexican billionaires. Between 1993 and 1994 alone, the number of multimillionaires in the country rose by 85%.

The USMCA, which consists of 34 chapters, four annexes, and 14 side letters, will further encourage growth by maintaining the most important aspects of NAFTA: a legal framework with protections for foreign investors and a free-market zone between the three nations. It will also maintain investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) “between the United States and Mexico for claimants regarding government contracts in the oil, natural gas, power generation, infrastructure, and telecommunications sectors; and maintains U.S.-Mexico ISDS in other sectors provided the claimant exhausts national remedies first.” According to the Congressional Research Service, ratification of the treaty was expected to remove some investors’ unease about domestic policy uncertainty and the international economy. “Longer-term prospects for export-oriented manufacturing, as well as oil production, appear positive,” according to that report. After the elimination of steel tariffs on Mexico and Canada in May of last year,  the International Monetary Fund (IMF) estimates that the USMCA will increase trade between the three North American countries by approximately $15 billion.

Among the most significant achievements of the USMCA is that it will accelerate the integration of energy [utilization] on both sides of the U.S.-Mexico border. The treaty maintains NAFTA’s zero tariffs for energy products,   which have made Mexico “the No. 1 export market for U.S. natural gas and refined products and the No. 4 export market for upstream oil and gas equipment.” It also locked in Mexico’s historic 2013 energy reform, which allowed foreign investment in oil and gas.  Previously, state-owned Pemex was the only company allowed to invest in Mexico’s energy sector, a state of affairs that NAFTA explicitly acknowledged. The USMCA also facilitates the transport of energy products. For example, it allows “hydrocarbons transported through pipelines to qualify as originating, provided that any diluent, regardless of origin, does not constitute more than 40% of the volume of the good.”  Lastly, it maintains the automatic export approvals for U.S. liquified natural gas (LNG) that is exported to Mexico or Canada.

Another key feature of the treaty is the customs administration chapter. This section mandates streamlined procedures that lower the time, complexity, and cost of exporting and importing many goods. According to the IMG, “most of the benefits of USMCA would come from trade facilitation measures that modernize and integrate customs procedures to reduce trade costs and border inefficiencies further.” The international organizations indicate these new procedures could lead to “one-tenth of a percent reduction in regional merchandise trade cost.” This section will also boost the trade of low-value products because it raises the value-thresholds for products eligible for tax-free, duty-free, streamlined customs, treatment. Mexico’s $50 limit for tax-free entry has remained the same, but products up to US $117 can now enter duty-free entry through a simplified customs processes. The IMF expects these modifications to benefit small and medium businesses, as well as online retailers.  They may also have an impact on manufacturing processes where the value of parts that cross the border is low.

The treaty also strengthens IP protections. Intellectual property is one of the U.S.’s most significant exports, and IP-intensive industries generate 45 million jobs in the U.S., as well as close to $6 trillion dollars per year (38% of the GDP). This is also one of the sectors where the U.S. has enjoyed a significant and consistent trade surplus. According to the Congressional Research Service, “IP-intensive goods and services are an important part of U.S. trade with Canada and Mexico.” Chapter 20 of the USMCA established a committee on IP rights, which will deal with concerns related to trade secrets and patent litigation, as well as a mediator in some IP disputes. The USMCA also extended minimum copyright protection to 70 years, up from 50 years under NAFTA, and retains a minimum of 20 years for patent protections. Moreover, it empowers copyright possessors to “expeditiously” enforce their rights in online settings. Law enforcement officers are also entitled  to “stop suspected counterfeit or pirated goods at every phase of entering, exiting, and transiting through the territory of any Party.” Lastly, many violations of copyright and trade secrets, now carry criminal sanctions under the treaty, including cyber theft — even if the perpetrator is a state-owned entity.

The USMCA’s strong IP protection contrasts with the perceived weaknesses of China’s IP regime. In 2018, a U.S. Trade Representative’s investigation indicated that the U.S. government would take actions to curve China’s “forced technology transfer requirements, cyber-theft of U.S. trade secrets, discriminatory licensing requirements, and attempts to acquire U.S. technology to advance its industrial policies.”  For instance, U.S. Customs and Border Protection reported stopped $1.2 billion of IP-infringing goods at coming into the U.S., with China being the largest source.

The onset of the COVID-19 pandemic has revamped reported IP violations of Chinese entities in the pharmaceutical industry. The Wuhan Institute of Virology recently applied for a patent of a compound based on Gilead Sciences -produced Remdesivir, which has been hailed as a potential medication for COVID-19 patients. China-based BrightGene Bio-Medical Technology Co. is also in the process of manufacturing a Remdesivir generic. It is worth noting “that Gilead’s patent application in China for Remdesivir use in coronaviruses has been pending since 2016.” The Chinese government has also found a potent tool to promote technology transfer through its antitrust law. “China has required technology transfer in antitrust reviews of foreign firms in China 2025 sectors,” according to the Congressional Research Service.

Finally, the treaty includes new rules that will require Mexico to increase the wages of some of its workers in the automotive industry and to source a larger part of its manufacturing materials within North America. Vehicles must now contain at least 75% of content sourced in North America to be eligible for tariff exemptions. Likewise, it dictates that at least 70% of a producer’s steel and aluminum purchases must originate in North America to be eligible for exemptions and eliminates several loopholes that allowed for transshipments under NAFTA. These sections were aimed in part at encouraging member states to displace Asia as the source of steel, aluminum, and electronic components, according to a professor at the business school of the Tecnológico de Monterrey.

The Mexican government has been in talks with a host of Asian steel producers, including South Korea’s POSCO, Japan’s Nippon Steel Corp, and Mitsubishi Corp, about the possibility of manufacturing steel for the auto sector in Mexico, in order to take advantage of the local content rule, according to Reuters. The news agency also reported that Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador’s administration is enticing Apple to set up manufacturing bases in the country. “These phones don’t have to be produced in China … there is an enormous opportunity to produce them” in Mexico, Economy Minister Graciela Marquez told Reuters.

The  Mexico Texas Relationship

The relationship of Mexico with Texas is historical and current. The Lone Star State was part of Mexico until 1836. Today, people of Mexican ancestry account for close to 36.6% of Texas’s residents, and Spanish is spoken in the homes of close to 30% of Texans, according to data from the U.S. Census Bureau. Their economic ties are as strong as their cultural and ethnic ones. Texas accounts for 44.41% of the U.S.’s trade with Mexico, followed by California – which accounts for 11.6%. Mexico is also Texas’s largest foreign trading partner, representing 43.79% of its exports and 35.15% of its imports. China, in contrast, makes up for 8.7% of Texas’s exports, and 14.6% of its imports  Texas also carries approximately 72% of all imports by value coming from Mexico to the U.S. Laredo, which received $132 billion in imports from Mexico by truck last year, itself accounts for about 40% of all truck cargo from Mexico into the U.S., according to data from the Department of Transportation.

Mexico and Texas’s heavy trade in oil products and vehicles underscore the robustness of their trade relationship. Oil and bitumen substances corresponded to 21.8% of Texas’s total exports to Mexico in 2017. Texas also accounted for 61.5% of propane and 40.9% natural gas Mexico purchased from the U.S. Likewise, oil represented close to 10% of Mexico’s exports to Texas, which is about 69% of all oil Mexico exports to the U.S. The USMCA, by maintaining zero tariffs in energy products and reinforcing Mexico’s energy reform, will potentiate trade in this area. Mexico exported approximately $5.3 billion worth of vehicles to Texas in 2018, close to 23% of the total value of the vehicles it exported to the U.S. that year. An important part of this trade takes place within the automotive manufacturing process, where energy cost is a critical component.

Can Houston Become North America’s Hong Kong?

Houston is well-positioned to serve as a hub for the growing trade cross-national manufacturing base in the U.S.-Mexico border. Houston serves as a gateway for a substantial portion of foreign trade in the U.S. and is ranked as one of the easiest places to do business in North America. Texas’s ports receive more cargo than any other state at 573 million tons – which accounted for approximately 23% of all waterborne cargo in the U.S. in 2018. Neighboring Louisiana is the second largest with 569 million tons. California, in contrast, carried 249 million tonnes – less than half of Texas’s amount, according to data from the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers.

Houston itself was the largest carrier of international cargo in 2018, at 191 million tons (up 10% year on year). The port of Houston, however, is not the only one in the metropolitan area. The ports of Texas City, Beaumont, Port Artur, and Lake Charles (Louisiana) together account for approximately 508 million tons of water cargo, including 336 million in foreign cargo. This is equivalent to about 20% of the total tonnage of the largest 150 ports of the U.S., as well as 22% of foreign cargo.

In terms of shipping, the city of Houston plays a similar role as Hong Kong does within the China ecosystem. Hong Kong’s port handled 19.6 million TEU in 2018, while China processed approximately 245.6 million TEU, according to the World Bank. Based on this data, Hong Kong accounted for about 8% of container shipping by TEU in China, while the port of Houston accounted for about 10% of U.S. sea cargo by weight. Similarly, when conflated with the nearby ports of Shenzhen and Guangzhou, Hong Kong constitutes about 28% of container trade in China. Houston, along with nearby ports and the Port of Southern Louisiana, accounted for close to 31% of the total cargo by weight in the U.S.

Houston’s role in the U.S.’s overall economy is also similar to Hong Kong’s role in China. The Houston metro area generated approximately $478 billion in 2018 or close to 2.2% of the country’s total. This is analogous to the proportion that Hong Kong contributed to China in 2019. Last year, China’s GDP by purchasing power parity (PPP) was approximately $21.4 trillion ($14.3 trillion in current dollars), while Hong Kong’s stood at $467 billion that same year  ($366 billion in current dollars). Hong Kong, therefore, accounted for approximately 2.5% of China’s GDP.

lobsters

LOBSTERS ARE A PRAWN IN THE TRADE WARS

Lobster Trap

TradeVistas has named the lobster the “2020 person of the year” in international trade. It’s a well-deserved honor. The lobster is at the center of a trade war that will go down as one of the most compelling cases of the futility of tariff politics.

American lobster and lobster fishers got caught in a trade war being fought on multiple fronts. The United States is battling China on one major front and the European Union (EU) on another, but – as is typical in trade wars – it’s lobster production in another country that’s winning the war. In this case, Canada.

If that weren’t enough, tariffs are the root cause of the trade war, but not in the way you might think. China’s tariffs on U.S. lobsters are in retaliation for President Trump’s China tariffs over intellectual property. The EU didn’t raise its tariffs on U.S. lobster, but rather lowered them on Canadian ones as part of their free trade agreement. In other words, U.S. lobsters were never meant to be the target of either Chinese or EU protectionism.

Trade Person of the Year

Just a Prawn in the Trade Game

How the lobster trade war started isn’t nearly as interesting as the efforts to stop it. The Trump administration has tried to restore market access for American lobster but were outmaneuvered in part through a trade liberalizing measure by China.

Start with China, which hit American lobsters with a 25 percent tariff when President Trump rolled out his China tariffs under Section 301. This tariff hike hurt, but then China moved to lower its lobster tariff at the World Trade Organization (WTO), and this hurt even more. In particular, China slashed its most-favored-nation (MFN) tariff to 7 percent while imposing retaliatory tariffs on U.S. lobster of as much as 40 percent. American lobsters were effectively priced out of the market.

President Trump responded with an Executive order instructing the United States Trade Representative to monitor Chinese imports of lobsters. China’s Phase 1 purchase commitments in the US-China trade deal were to be tracked and “appropriate action” to be taken if China fell short. But these purchase commitments are hard for China to deliver on given the extra import duties on American lobsters. The data speak for themselves: since 2018, U.S. lobster exports to China have fallen by nearly two-thirds.

The irony is that things would be worse were it not for China’s rising trade tensions with Australia, another key supplier of lobsters. Australian lobsters have enjoyed the benefits of zero tariffs under the China-Australia free trade agreement since 2015.

Lobster X to China

Shellfish Trade Liberalization

Then there’s Europe. This front of the lobster trade war is especially interesting because it defies convention. The EU didn’t wage a protectionist campaign against the United States. Instead, since 2017, it has had free trade with Canada. The Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) zeroed out tariffs on Canadian lobsters, leaving their American seafood brethren 8 percent more costly, since U.S. exporters must pay Europe’s MFN rate. In other words, the penalty in the marketplace isn’t because Europe is cheating, but because the United States is falling behind in the race to sign preferential trade agreements.

Back in 2019, Washington had asked Brussels for a deal to offset Canada’s advantage in lobster tariffs. The EU said no, insisting this would violate MFN. Then, this past summer, the EU agreed to zero out it’s lobster tariffs on an MFN basis, retroactive to August 1, in exchange for the United States reducing its tariffs on certain items by 50 percent. This ad hoc approach to trade liberalization, touted as the first tariff cuts in US-EU trade in 20 years, looked like it had plugged the hole. But then came decisions in a longstanding WTO dispute between Boeing and Airbus.

Out of the Blue Sky into the Sea

After more than a decade of WTO litigation, the United States and Europe were both authorized to retaliate. The United States struck first, imposing 15-25 percent tariffs on European food and drink, among other items, up to a maximum of $US7.5 billion. Europe’s authorization was postponed due to COVID-19, but came through this fall, up to a maximum of $US4 billion.

The EU’s original hit list, drawn up to $US25 billion, had included six tariff lines covering frozen and live lobsters. But this week, to the surprise of many, Europe’s revised hit list, redrawn to $US4 billion, spared lobsters entirely. Other seafood was hit, including salmon. But the August deal to walk back the tariff differential caused by CETA had ironically shielded American exporters from WTO-authorized retaliation on civil aircraft. If that doesn’t say it all.

Lobster X to EU

Clawing Back to Normal?

Things may change. A failure to negotiate a US-EU deal on Boeing-Airbus could see Europe yet impose tariffs on American lobsters. But even if that doesn’t happen, the impact of the original 8 percent tariff differential, CETA versus MFN, has been shocking enough.

In 2016, a year before the debut of CETA, U.S. exports of lobsters to Europe were valued at US$152.2 million. In 2019, they stood at US$57.8 million. Through the first nine months of 2020, U.S. exports were valued at US$14.3 million. With these figures in mind, imagine what a 15-25 percent retaliatory tariff would do.

U.S. trade policy has punished the lobster industry for years. Lobster fishermen should be included in the agricultural relief programs enacted by Congress. The takeaway for politicians is that no one set out to wage the lobster trade wars and no one can solve them with more tariffs.

The lobster, as the “person of the year” for 2020, reminds us that freer trade always puts the lie to tariff politics.

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marc busch

Marc L. Busch is the Karl F. Landegger Professor of International Business Diplomacy at the Walsh School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University, a nonresident Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council, and host of the podcast TradeCraft.

Boeing

EU Imposes Tariffs on U.S. Following WTO Decision on Subsidies to Boeing

The European Union (EU) has imposed additional tariffs on approximately $4 billion worth of U.S. goods, after a World Trade Organization (WTO) decision last month authorized proportionate retaliation against the U.S. for its subsidies to Boeing.

According to the European Commission’s (EC) Implementing Regulation (“the Regulation”), published in the Official Journal of the European Union on November 9, 2020, negotiations with the U.S. to settle the dispute over subsidies to their respective aircraft industries “have so far not yielded results,” while the U.S. still maintains tariffs on approximately $7.5 billion worth of European goods as a result of a parallel WTO decision authorizing U.S. retaliation against the EU.

Effective upon the date of publication, the EC has adopted duty rates of 15% for civil aircraft and aircraft parts under the tariff codes 8802.40.0013, 8802.40.0015, 8802.40.0017, 8802.40.0019, and 8802.40.0021. A rate of 25% was adopted for all other listed U.S.-origin imports. The list of goods subject to 25% tariffs, with product descriptions, can be viewed here. The rates of 15% and 25% reflect the rates currently imposed by the U.S. on imports of EU-origin goods.

In U.S. Trade Representative Robert E. Lighthizer’s statement in response to the EU’s announcement of retaliatory tariffs, he expressed disappointment and noted that the main subsidy to Boeing—a Washington State Business & Occupation tax break—that was alleged at the WTO was repealed earlier this year.

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Julia Banegas is an attorney in Husch Blackwell LLP’s Washington, D.C. office.

Emily Lyons is an attorney in Husch Blackwell LLP’s Washington, D.C. office.

Camron Greer is an Assistant Trade Analyst in Husch Blackwell LLP’s Washington D.C. office.