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Can Reshoring Manufacturing Spark a New Era of Resilience in Supply Chains?

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Can Reshoring Manufacturing Spark a New Era of Resilience in Supply Chains?

The fragility of global supply chains has never been more evident. The need for supply chain resilience has become painfully clear after the COVID-19 pandemic, the war in Ukraine, semiconductor shortages and other disruptions. The reshoring of manufacturing will play a crucial role in fostering that flexibility.

Outsourcing production to foreign nations has been the standard in manufacturing for years due to cost benefits. The industry is shifting since organizations have experienced firsthand disruptions from outsourced manufacturing.

The Current Wave of Manufacturing Reshoring

Reshoring and foreign direct investment (FDI) job announcements surpassed 360,000 positions in 2022, an all-time high. That’s 53% higher than the previous record, which the manufacturing industry set just one year earlier in 2021. Reshoring led this growth, accounting for 58% of these new positions.

Nearshoring has also grown, though not as rapidly. U.S. companies nearshored roughly 10,000 jobs to Canada and 40,000 to Mexico between 2010 and 2022. Those figures will increase as supply chain resilience initiatives grow, but reshoring will likely remain the more popular strategy.

When asked about their reasons for reshoring, most manufacturers cited government incentives. The availability of a skilled workforce and reducing supply chain disruption risk came as the second and third most popular answers, respectively.

How Reshoring Can Build Supply Chain Resilience

Even if companies’ primary reason for reshoring manufacturing isn’t to boost resilience, they still experience it as a secondary benefit. Businesses that reshore or nearshore production build strength through several means.

Shorter Transit Times

The reshoring of manufacturing’s most direct impact on supply chain strength is shortening transit times. In these strategies, manufacturers become physically closer to their downstream supply chain partners, making them less prone to disruption and more likely to withstand unexpected delays.

Sudden demand shifts and inventory distortion are less impactful when companies receive goods in less time. Even if it takes domestic manufacturers just as long as foreign alternatives to increase output, lead times are still shorter because there’s less ground to cover between facilities. Faster shipping times also reduce risk factors related to transportation costs.

New automated technologies take these benefits further. Next-generation servo technology can enable manufacturing speeds two to four times faster than conventional systems, further shortening domestic lead times.

Increased Transparency

Reshoring also boosts supply chain resilience by increasing visibility. It can be challenging to manage offshore manufacturing processes because of distance and language barriers. Domestic production eliminates those obstacles.

The only way to reliably get timely updates from overseas suppliers is through Internet of Things (IoT) tracking, which not every company can afford at scale. By contrast, manufacturers in the same country operate in similar, if not the same, time zones, letting them respond in detail when required. Removing the need for an interpreter further streamlines this communication.

After reshoring, businesses and their suppliers will face the same geopolitical situations. As a result, it’s easier to understand what challenges or opportunities supply chain partners face, informing more accurate and faster decision-making. Company leaders can even personally visit suppliers for closer communication without time-consuming, expensive overseas trips.

Fewer Risky Dependencies

The reshoring of manufacturing minimizes vulnerable third-party dependencies. Supply chains relying on international suppliers are prone to disruption because they often depend entirely on single, large facilities businesses have minimal control over. The ongoing chip shortage — which stopped production for tens of millions of cars — is an excellent example.

Domestic suppliers can still face delays and deficits, but these disruptions are less impactful. Supply chain partners are more likely to see them coming because of the increased transparency and can adapt faster, thanks to shorter lead times. Any dependencies on domestic manufacturers also don’t carry risks from geopolitical tension, which offshore production does.

Reshoring can further reduce risky dependencies by improving supplier diversification. Companies can reshore some production and nearshore or outsource other portions. That way, they get reshoring’s time and resilience benefits while minimizing single dependencies.

Lingering Concerns

Despite these advantages, some organizations are still hesitant about reshoring their manufacturing. These concerns have merit since it brings challenges of its own.

Costs are the biggest obstacle. Even though reshoring means lower transportation expenses, labor is often more expensive. The disruption from ending relationships with overseas suppliers and transitioning to new domestic ones can also incur extra costs in the near term.

Domestic manufacturers may also be unable to support the same capacity or offer identical specialization as large, established overseas companies. The U.S. has the world’s second-largest manufacturing sector, but that doesn’t apply evenly across every subsector. Some specialized sectors — like electronics — have relatively few major American manufacturers.

It’s also worth noting that reshoring often means taking more control over the manufacturing process. That’s advantageous regarding transparency and minimizing disruption, but it also means higher organizational complexity and costs.

The Way Forward for Reshoring and Resilience

Even though these obstacles remain, reshoring is still an excellent way to build supply chain resilience. The extra costs and complexity are worth it in the long run because reshoring mitigates the impact of disruption. Considering there were over 11,000 supply chain disruptions in 2021 alone, that resilience will likely pay off sooner rather than later.

Businesses can also minimize transition-related disruptions by approaching reshoring slowly. Talking with multiple domestic suppliers to find the ideal partner before moving and reviewing legal ties to current overseas companies is crucial. Organizations should also reshore their operations one process at a time over a few years instead of transitioning all at once.

Recent legislation like the CHIPS Act suggests incentives for American manufacturing are growing. Domestic supplier options and capacity will expand as that happens, making reshoring easier.

The Reshoring of Manufacturing Is a Promising Shift

Supply chains are slowly becoming more resilient as more companies reshore their manufacturing. This shift isn’t the only step businesses must take to ensure resilience but it’s critical.

The reshoring movement will cause some initial disruption but will bolster supply chain operations in the long run. U.S. manufacturers, logistics providers and the companies that rely on them will all benefit from the shift.

manufacturing

The New Normal in Manufacturing – A Digitized Future

We can learn a lot from history. In the face of a global pandemic that has upended the business world, the measures taken in the short-term will lead to significant shifts that will last for decades.

We saw how the Great Depression dramatically changed the role of government within financial markets. Likewise, how the Great Recession of 2007-08 created a shift in value from ownership to experiences.

The global pandemic has already introduced and accelerated several trends that will likely become entrenched into our daily lives for years to come. We see a virtual shift happening with consumer trends like work-from-home, video communication, online purchasing, e-learning, streaming services, and more taking hold.

This is the new normal in which we live, work, and trade. And it’s here to stay. For manufacturers, the new normal is an opportunity to address short-term challenges and lay the groundwork for future resilience.

Acceleration of Industry 4.0

COVID-19 created immediate challenges for manufacturers.

1. Consumer demand shocks in both volume and variety of manufactured goods

2. Workforce shifts with social distancing regulations, hygiene mandates, and employee health-related absences

3. Supply chain fragility resulting in raw material and finished good shortages, impacts to just-in-time production processes, and stockouts

To address these short-term issues, manufacturers undertook various initiatives to build supply chain resiliencies to improve visibility, diversify their supply chains through reshoring, and deploying innovative technologies.

It’s fair to say that the pandemic is the catalyst that pushed the smart factory vision (Industry 4.0) forward faster.

Manufacturers are now able to gain a competitive advantage by adapting and building on this new normal. According to Bain & Company, “For companies willing to take the right actions during this critical recovery phase: the rewards may prove transformative, propelling them into the ranks of true performance leaders.”

The Future of Manufacturing Looks Digitized

A McKinsey survey of manufacturers found that:

-93% of manufacturing and supply-chain leaders plan to focus on the resilience of their supply chain

-39% have already implemented a nerve-center/control-tower approach to increase end-to-end transparency in their supply chain

-A quarter are fast-tracking automation programs to address worker shortages

-90% plan to invest in talent for digitization

As manufacturers look to advance their long-term strategies of building supply chain resiliency, reshoring production, introducing new distribution strategies, and implementing Industry 4.0 technologies, the key to success will be creating a digital muscle.

Supply chain resiliency – manufacturers must establish end-to-end visibility of the supply chain to improve resiliency. Enhanced visibility is made possible through technology, such as manufacturing execution systems, that can deliver network agility and visibility, digital collaboration, insights for decision-making, and team empowerment.

Reshoring – to reshore production, effective inventory management and supply chain tools that provide tracking and authentication are necessary. Automation of manufacturing processes will also be essential to make reshoring economical and attract technology-savvy workers.

New Distribution Strategies – direct-to-consumer (D2C) strategies have proven valuable during the pandemic. While it will take a cultural change to implement D2C in manufacturing, it will also require integrating technology systems, such as warehouse management systems and manufacturing execution systems.

Industry 4.0 technologies – manufacturers have rapidly deployed technologies that have better positioned them in the new normal. These technologies include 5G connectivity, IoT sensors, advanced automation, AI-powered analytics, and robotics solutions. With many of these rollouts completed in record time, manufacturers need to keep their eye on the big picture and look to further optimize these systems to increase efficiencies and transform capabilities across the supply chain.

A Partner for Your Digital Journey

At Generix Group North America, we are experts in creating efficiencies across the entire supply chain. With over 20 years of experience and a global team of 600+ experts, our series of solutions within our Supply Chain Hub product suite can help build the resilience and visibility your organization needs across your manufacturing operations and supply chain.

Our solutions are in use around the world by more than 6,000 customers and our experience is second-to-none. We invite you to contact us to learn more.

You can also read our eBook, Manufacturing and the New Normal: Moving Forward from 2020, to learn more about how digitization will prepare your manufacturing organization for the future.

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Doug Mefford has more than 25 years experience in the Supply Chain industry.  His diverse background includes roles across many operational functions, from inventory control to operational leadership within an Omni Channel distribution operation.  Additionally, within the software space he has held roles including quality and business analyst, design lead and product management.  He brings his cross functional experience in supply chain operations and software product delivery to bear in helping define the direction for Generix Group North America’s Solochain WMS. Prior to his time at Generix, Mefford was the operations manager for the Dallas Cowboys for eight years, overseeing their warehouse operations, retail distribution, silk screen manufacturing and direct-to-consumer order fulfillment. Doug studied at Northern Illinois University, and is greatly involved in the Illinois Special Olympics

North America

Out of Asia: Promise from Pandemic of a Manufacturing Renaissance in North America (Part 3)

In their first two installments (which you can view here and here), George Y. Gonzalez and Jesus Alcocer respond to the gaps exposed in the supply chain by the pandemic by proposing a shift away from overreliance on China and a shift towards reshoring manufacturing closer to home. In their final installment, they will explore how the potential cost of reshoring out of Asia to North America could be lessened if capacity is relocated to Mexico, a natural alternative. Wrapping up their discussion, they will also examine how Houston may serve as a central hub for cross-national manufacturing and trade.

Mexico Has Also Been a Beneficiary of This Shift Out of China

Mexico has benefited from this rearrangement almost as much as Vietnam. According to A.T. Kearney, manufacturing imports from Mexico rose $13 billion to $20 billion in 2019. Thanks to this climb, the U.S. now imports 42 cents from Mexico for every dollar it purchased from LCAs, up from 37 cents during the past seven years. This pattern has also extended into 2020. In the first quarter of this year, imports in maintenance and repair, construction, and insurance sectors all grew in the triple digits, while imports of information and communications technology products (“ICT”) grew 20% year-on-year.

The trade relationship between the two North American countries has developed in spite of political obstacles. The Trump Administration imposed tariffs on Mexico-produced steel in 2018 but removed those barriers in May 2019. Likewise, Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador, Mexico’s president since 2018, was widely regarded as a nationalist suspicious of international trade. According to the Congressional Research Service, “in the area of foreign policy, President-elect López Obrador generally has maintained that the best foreign policy is a strong domestic policy.… Some observers feared that López Obrador might roll back Mexico’s market-friendly reforms and adopt a more isolationist foreign policy.” Against these inauspicious circumstances, bilateral trade has grown steadily since 2016. Mexico surpassed Canada as the U.S.’s largest trade partner in 2019. In 2013, Canada exported 8.3% more to the United States than Mexico. Now the order has reversed, with Mexico exporting .5% more than Canada into the U.S.

Growing imports can be partly explained by a hike in U.S. FDI in Mexico, which grew approximately 5.2% between 2018 and 2019 to $100.89 billion. Investment in primary and prefabricated metals manufacturing close to doubled from 2015 to 2019 to close to $2.27 billion, while FDI in machinery manufacturing grew about 25% during that same period. These are some of the industries where U.S. FDI in China has dropped most sharply, as explained above. Rising FDI stock was driven by waves of U.S. companies establishing a base or increasing their footprint in Mexico, following the market-oriented reforms in that country in the last decade. According to A.T. Kearney, by 2016 more than half of U.S. companies with manufacturing operations in Mexico had relocated production therefrom places such as China to supply the U.S. market.

Moreover, according to the Boston Consulting Group, some major Chinese consumer electronics manufactures have been adding capacity in Mexico to serve demand in Latin America. This broadly corresponds to the Chamber survey referenced above, which indicates that while LACs are still the top relocation choice for U.S. firms, North America is an increasingly popular option. Close to 17% of the firms dislocating their operations from China in 2020 indicated they would move that capacity to Mexico or Canada, up from 10% in 2019. An additional 22% reported they would move it to the U.S., up from 17% in 2019.

Mexico as a Natural Alternative

Mexico is already the U.S.’s largest trading partner, as well as the manufacturing base for a substantial part of its products. Last year, Mexico traded $614 billion with the U.S. – surpassing Canada ($612 billion) and China ($558 billion). “Merchandise trade between the two countries in 2018 was six times higher (in nominal terms) than in 1993, the year NAFTA entered into force,” according to the Congressional Research Service. Among the leading U.S. exports to Mexico are “petroleum and coal products ($28.8 billion or 11% of exports to Mexico), motor vehicle parts ($20.2 billion or 8% of exports), computer equipment ($17.4 billion or 7% of exports), and semiconductors and other electronic components ($13.1 billion or 5% of exports).” On the other hand, the top U.S. imports from Mexico in 2018 included “motor vehicles ($64.5 billion or 19% of imports from Mexico), motor vehicle parts ($49.8 billion or 14% of imports), computer equipment ($26.6 billion or 8% of imports), oil and gas ($14.5 billion or 4% of imports), and electrical equipment ($11.9 billion or 3% of imports).”

Increasing the cross-border manufacturing prompted by NAFTA may be the most practical way for the U.S. to eliminate its cost gap with China. “Many economists credit NAFTA with helping U.S. manufacturing industries, especially the U.S. auto industry, become more globally competitive through the development of supply chains in North America. A significant portion of merchandise trade between the U.S. and Mexico occurs in the context of production sharing as manufacturers in each country work together to create goods.” Mexico’s wage growth is on par with Vietnam’s, but Mexico’s productivity is about 5.2 times higher. Mexico’s combination of low labor costs and relatively high productivity result in production costs that are 20-30% lower than in the U.S. (including transportation and associated fees).

Mexico also has an important advantage vis-à-vis China with respect to transportation costs, which account for a significant portion of costs in industries like metals and automotive parts. Shipping a 40-foot container loaded with automotive parts from Shanghai to Los Angeles cost an average of $1,374.03 – $1,518.66 (before taxes and duties) in July 2020. Shipping that same container from Veracruz, in the Gulf of Mexico, to New York, cost $1,102.24 – $1,218.27. Sending that same container by truck from northern Tamaulipas, where a large portion of the country’s manufacturing base is located, to Houston cost an average of $304.11 – $336.12 – four to five times less than shipping it from China. Mexico also maintains a clear edge in delivery time. It takes 75% less time to transport goods to the customer from Mexico than from Asia. Proximity is an essential advantage in industries that are shifting towards highly personalized products, including electronics, automotive, and clothing. The short distance can also be exploited to combine the countries’ supply chains across the border, one of the main drivers of economic growth under NAFTA.

According to the Center for Car Research, between 80 and 90% of U.S. automotive trade is intra-industry, and parts produced in Mexico and the U.S. cross the border up to eight times along the manufacturing process before they are delivered to consumers. In fact, on average, close to 40% of the content of a vehicle produced in Mexico was initially imported from the United States. This tight integration was only achieved after the NAFTA, which allowed producers to spread their supply chain across the border. Before 1993, for example, the vehicles produced in Mexico contained only 5% of parts produced in the U.S

The Effect of the USMCA

NAFTA completely changed the landscape of North America by driving unprecedented integration in the region and generating a dramatic increase in trade and cross-border investment. NAFTA also had an essential role in promoting Mexico’s privatization, where state-owned enterprises represented a substantial part of production until at least 1988. Between 1988 and 1994, 390 Mexican businesses were privatized – close to 63% of large corporations in the country. Telling of Mexico’s explosive development in this era is that before 1988 there was only one billionaire family in Mexico: Monterrey’s Garza Sada, who made their fortune selling beer and steel. In 1994, however, Forbes’s ranks included 24 Mexican billionaires. Between 1993 and 1994 alone, the number of multimillionaires in the country rose by 85%.

The USMCA, which consists of 34 chapters, four annexes, and 14 side letters, will further encourage growth by maintaining the most important aspects of NAFTA: a legal framework with protections for foreign investors and a free-market zone between the three nations. It will also maintain investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) “between the United States and Mexico for claimants regarding government contracts in the oil, natural gas, power generation, infrastructure, and telecommunications sectors; and maintains U.S.-Mexico ISDS in other sectors provided the claimant exhausts national remedies first.” According to the Congressional Research Service, ratification of the treaty was expected to remove some investors’ unease about domestic policy uncertainty and the international economy. “Longer-term prospects for export-oriented manufacturing, as well as oil production, appear positive,” according to that report. After the elimination of steel tariffs on Mexico and Canada in May of last year,  the International Monetary Fund (IMF) estimates that the USMCA will increase trade between the three North American countries by approximately $15 billion.

Among the most significant achievements of the USMCA is that it will accelerate the integration of energy [utilization] on both sides of the U.S.-Mexico border. The treaty maintains NAFTA’s zero tariffs for energy products,   which have made Mexico “the No. 1 export market for U.S. natural gas and refined products and the No. 4 export market for upstream oil and gas equipment.” It also locked in Mexico’s historic 2013 energy reform, which allowed foreign investment in oil and gas.  Previously, state-owned Pemex was the only company allowed to invest in Mexico’s energy sector, a state of affairs that NAFTA explicitly acknowledged. The USMCA also facilitates the transport of energy products. For example, it allows “hydrocarbons transported through pipelines to qualify as originating, provided that any diluent, regardless of origin, does not constitute more than 40% of the volume of the good.”  Lastly, it maintains the automatic export approvals for U.S. liquified natural gas (LNG) that is exported to Mexico or Canada.

Another key feature of the treaty is the customs administration chapter. This section mandates streamlined procedures that lower the time, complexity, and cost of exporting and importing many goods. According to the IMG, “most of the benefits of USMCA would come from trade facilitation measures that modernize and integrate customs procedures to reduce trade costs and border inefficiencies further.” The international organizations indicate these new procedures could lead to “one-tenth of a percent reduction in regional merchandise trade cost.” This section will also boost the trade of low-value products because it raises the value-thresholds for products eligible for tax-free, duty-free, streamlined customs, treatment. Mexico’s $50 limit for tax-free entry has remained the same, but products up to US $117 can now enter duty-free entry through a simplified customs processes. The IMF expects these modifications to benefit small and medium businesses, as well as online retailers.  They may also have an impact on manufacturing processes where the value of parts that cross the border is low.

The treaty also strengthens IP protections. Intellectual property is one of the U.S.’s most significant exports, and IP-intensive industries generate 45 million jobs in the U.S., as well as close to $6 trillion dollars per year (38% of the GDP). This is also one of the sectors where the U.S. has enjoyed a significant and consistent trade surplus. According to the Congressional Research Service, “IP-intensive goods and services are an important part of U.S. trade with Canada and Mexico.” Chapter 20 of the USMCA established a committee on IP rights, which will deal with concerns related to trade secrets and patent litigation, as well as a mediator in some IP disputes. The USMCA also extended minimum copyright protection to 70 years, up from 50 years under NAFTA, and retains a minimum of 20 years for patent protections. Moreover, it empowers copyright possessors to “expeditiously” enforce their rights in online settings. Law enforcement officers are also entitled  to “stop suspected counterfeit or pirated goods at every phase of entering, exiting, and transiting through the territory of any Party.” Lastly, many violations of copyright and trade secrets, now carry criminal sanctions under the treaty, including cyber theft — even if the perpetrator is a state-owned entity.

The USMCA’s strong IP protection contrasts with the perceived weaknesses of China’s IP regime. In 2018, a U.S. Trade Representative’s investigation indicated that the U.S. government would take actions to curve China’s “forced technology transfer requirements, cyber-theft of U.S. trade secrets, discriminatory licensing requirements, and attempts to acquire U.S. technology to advance its industrial policies.”  For instance, U.S. Customs and Border Protection reported stopped $1.2 billion of IP-infringing goods at coming into the U.S., with China being the largest source.

The onset of the COVID-19 pandemic has revamped reported IP violations of Chinese entities in the pharmaceutical industry. The Wuhan Institute of Virology recently applied for a patent of a compound based on Gilead Sciences -produced Remdesivir, which has been hailed as a potential medication for COVID-19 patients. China-based BrightGene Bio-Medical Technology Co. is also in the process of manufacturing a Remdesivir generic. It is worth noting “that Gilead’s patent application in China for Remdesivir use in coronaviruses has been pending since 2016.” The Chinese government has also found a potent tool to promote technology transfer through its antitrust law. “China has required technology transfer in antitrust reviews of foreign firms in China 2025 sectors,” according to the Congressional Research Service.

Finally, the treaty includes new rules that will require Mexico to increase the wages of some of its workers in the automotive industry and to source a larger part of its manufacturing materials within North America. Vehicles must now contain at least 75% of content sourced in North America to be eligible for tariff exemptions. Likewise, it dictates that at least 70% of a producer’s steel and aluminum purchases must originate in North America to be eligible for exemptions and eliminates several loopholes that allowed for transshipments under NAFTA. These sections were aimed in part at encouraging member states to displace Asia as the source of steel, aluminum, and electronic components, according to a professor at the business school of the Tecnológico de Monterrey.

The Mexican government has been in talks with a host of Asian steel producers, including South Korea’s POSCO, Japan’s Nippon Steel Corp, and Mitsubishi Corp, about the possibility of manufacturing steel for the auto sector in Mexico, in order to take advantage of the local content rule, according to Reuters. The news agency also reported that Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador’s administration is enticing Apple to set up manufacturing bases in the country. “These phones don’t have to be produced in China … there is an enormous opportunity to produce them” in Mexico, Economy Minister Graciela Marquez told Reuters.

The  Mexico Texas Relationship

The relationship of Mexico with Texas is historical and current. The Lone Star State was part of Mexico until 1836. Today, people of Mexican ancestry account for close to 36.6% of Texas’s residents, and Spanish is spoken in the homes of close to 30% of Texans, according to data from the U.S. Census Bureau. Their economic ties are as strong as their cultural and ethnic ones. Texas accounts for 44.41% of the U.S.’s trade with Mexico, followed by California – which accounts for 11.6%. Mexico is also Texas’s largest foreign trading partner, representing 43.79% of its exports and 35.15% of its imports. China, in contrast, makes up for 8.7% of Texas’s exports, and 14.6% of its imports  Texas also carries approximately 72% of all imports by value coming from Mexico to the U.S. Laredo, which received $132 billion in imports from Mexico by truck last year, itself accounts for about 40% of all truck cargo from Mexico into the U.S., according to data from the Department of Transportation.

Mexico and Texas’s heavy trade in oil products and vehicles underscore the robustness of their trade relationship. Oil and bitumen substances corresponded to 21.8% of Texas’s total exports to Mexico in 2017. Texas also accounted for 61.5% of propane and 40.9% natural gas Mexico purchased from the U.S. Likewise, oil represented close to 10% of Mexico’s exports to Texas, which is about 69% of all oil Mexico exports to the U.S. The USMCA, by maintaining zero tariffs in energy products and reinforcing Mexico’s energy reform, will potentiate trade in this area. Mexico exported approximately $5.3 billion worth of vehicles to Texas in 2018, close to 23% of the total value of the vehicles it exported to the U.S. that year. An important part of this trade takes place within the automotive manufacturing process, where energy cost is a critical component.

Can Houston Become North America’s Hong Kong?

Houston is well-positioned to serve as a hub for the growing trade cross-national manufacturing base in the U.S.-Mexico border. Houston serves as a gateway for a substantial portion of foreign trade in the U.S. and is ranked as one of the easiest places to do business in North America. Texas’s ports receive more cargo than any other state at 573 million tons – which accounted for approximately 23% of all waterborne cargo in the U.S. in 2018. Neighboring Louisiana is the second largest with 569 million tons. California, in contrast, carried 249 million tonnes – less than half of Texas’s amount, according to data from the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers.

Houston itself was the largest carrier of international cargo in 2018, at 191 million tons (up 10% year on year). The port of Houston, however, is not the only one in the metropolitan area. The ports of Texas City, Beaumont, Port Artur, and Lake Charles (Louisiana) together account for approximately 508 million tons of water cargo, including 336 million in foreign cargo. This is equivalent to about 20% of the total tonnage of the largest 150 ports of the U.S., as well as 22% of foreign cargo.

In terms of shipping, the city of Houston plays a similar role as Hong Kong does within the China ecosystem. Hong Kong’s port handled 19.6 million TEU in 2018, while China processed approximately 245.6 million TEU, according to the World Bank. Based on this data, Hong Kong accounted for about 8% of container shipping by TEU in China, while the port of Houston accounted for about 10% of U.S. sea cargo by weight. Similarly, when conflated with the nearby ports of Shenzhen and Guangzhou, Hong Kong constitutes about 28% of container trade in China. Houston, along with nearby ports and the Port of Southern Louisiana, accounted for close to 31% of the total cargo by weight in the U.S.

Houston’s role in the U.S.’s overall economy is also similar to Hong Kong’s role in China. The Houston metro area generated approximately $478 billion in 2018 or close to 2.2% of the country’s total. This is analogous to the proportion that Hong Kong contributed to China in 2019. Last year, China’s GDP by purchasing power parity (PPP) was approximately $21.4 trillion ($14.3 trillion in current dollars), while Hong Kong’s stood at $467 billion that same year  ($366 billion in current dollars). Hong Kong, therefore, accounted for approximately 2.5% of China’s GDP.

manufacturing

Out of Asia: Promise from Pandemic of a Manufacturing Renaissance in North America (Part 2)

In their first installment (which you can view here), George Gonzalez and Jesus Alcocer examined the current supply chain against the backdrop of the COVID-19 pandemic, highlighting the need for restructuring and underscoring the challenges presented by our overreliance on Chinese manufacturing. The following will focus on how to reshore manufacturing in North America through domestic policy and government support.

Potential Governmental Role in Accelerating Reshoring

Some U.S. firms are already reshoring without any government support. A large-scale reshoring, however, may require the government to subsidize part of the capital expenditure (“capex”) of relocating, as well as the higher cost of manufacturing in the U.S. Other nations have put in place efforts to reshore and reduce their reliance on China for strategically important products. Japan provides a recent example.

Earlier this year, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe announced a ¥240 billion yen ($2.2 billion) plan to help companies reshore to Japan. The subsidies cover up to two-thirds of investments for major companies, and three quarters for small and medium-sized companies, according to the Economy, Trade and Industry Ministry. Abe stated that the plan is targeted at high value-added products for which Japan relies heavily on a single country. The government will also encourage firms to diversify their low value-added production bases to Southeast Asia. The government set apart an additional ¥23.5 billion ($220 million) for this last initiative, as well as ¥3 billion to repatriate active pharmaceutical ingredients. As of early June, only one company, consumer products manufacturer Iris Ohyama, announced it was taking advantage of the program. The company expects the government to supply 75% of its ¥3 billion ($28 million)investment in a factory that will drastically ramp up its production of protective masks in Japan. Once the project is complete, Iris Ohyama calculates its output will increase from 60 to 150 million masks.

Japan has attempted to reduce its dependence on China for close to a decade. Since the early 2000s, Japanese companies have been implementing a “China plus one strategy,” through which they aim to establish manufacturing bases in at least one location outside of China. The supply chain vulnerabilities exposed by the COVID-19 pandemic, however, have made officials more explicit advocates of reshoring. Japanese Economy Minister Yasutoshi Nishimura, for example, told reporters in June that the country had become too reliant on China, after Japanese factories in the auto sectors were forced to temporarily suspend operations in February, following the closure of a substantial portion of Chinese suppliers. Imports into Japan from China nearly halved in February, resulting in a supply shock that affected everything from personal computers to the handover of homes — which were left without toilets and bathtubs.

According to Nikkei, Japan relies on China for about 20% of its parts and materials needs. In 2018, 80% of face masks in Japan were imported, mainly from China, according to the Japan Hygiene Products Industry Association. Likewise, “car parts from China accounted for 36.9% of Japan’s total imports in 2019, while phone handsets from the Asian neighbor accounted for 85.5% of the total import value,” according to the Japanese Finance Ministry. However, data from the World Bank, indicate that Japan may be less vulnerable than the U.S. to a supply shock, especially in regard to electronic products and industrial machinery. In 2018, the U.S. maintained a more significant trade deficit than Japan with China in all sectors, except raw materials, fuels, vegetables, food, minerals, and animal products.

U.S. Reshoring Policy in Process

Similar federal support for U.S. reshoring out of China has been discussed in Washington D.C., but legislation has yet to be drafted. Among the most widely reported ideas is a $25 billion reshoring fund similar to the Japan initiative above. On relative terms, the U.S. initiative would be 10 times larger than the Japanese plan, even though the U.S.’s FDI stock in China is slightly lower than Japan’s ($116.5 billion, and $126 billion,  respectively).

The Wall Street Journal and Reuters reported earlier this month that there was “widespread discussion underway”  for a reshoring fund aimed to “drastically revamp their [(the U.S.’s)] relationship with China,” according to two anonymous administration officials cited by Reuters. The details of the plan are not public yet, but these officials indicated states could be in charge of managing the funds.

While several congressional aides have acknowledged the existence of this plan, no U.S. lawmaker embraced it publicly. In particular, Reuters indicated the issue is unlikely to be addressed in the next COVID-19 fiscal stimulus. Still, other sources suggested that lawmakers hope to include reshoring provisions in the National Defense Authorization Act (“NDAA”) – a $740 billion bill setting policy for the Pentagon that Congress passes every year. The plan reportedly faces stiff opposition within the administration. One of the sources cited mentioned that pure subsidies are not an option. “Internally, some are questioning why we should be providing funds to companies that have left [the U.S.] in recent years,” the source indicated.

Even if the reported fund does not come to fruition, the government is already taking some steps to promote reshoring. For example, President Donald Trump signed an executive order that gave the U.S.  overseas investment agency new powers to help manufacturers in the U. S. The president indicated the order would help “produce everything America needs for ourselves and then export to the world, and that includes medicines.” Others within the administration are considering attracting investment to the U.S. through tax incentives. Larry Kudlow, the Director of the United States National Economic Council, has publicly spoken about using such incentives. Several members of Congress have backed similar proposals. Senator Marco Rubio (R-FL) introduced a bill on May 10 that would “bar the sale of some sensitive goods to China, and raise taxes on U.S. companies’ income from China.”

Other plans have focused on the healthcare sector. Peter Navarro, the NDAA policy coordinator, indicated an order would soon require federal agencies to purchase U.S.-made medical products, and the administration would work to make it easier for pharmaceuticals to operate in the U.S. by deregulating the industry. Similar recommendations have been put forward by lawmakers. Senator Josh Hawley (R-MO) proposed stringent local content rules for medical products, and subsidies to encourage domestic production of related components. Senator Tom Cotton (R-AR) and Congressman Mike Gallagher (R-WI) also introduced legislation calculated to decrease the U.S. dependence on Chinese pharmaceuticals.

Surveys suggest that the public may be more receptive to measures like this in the wake of the pandemic. An analogy may be drawn to the public’s reaction to the recent $32 billion rescue deal for the airline industry. The bailout initially faced stiff opposition because the airline industry experienced unusually high profits over the five years leading to 2020 but failed to build a war chest to confront eventualities. Voters, however, became increasingly supportive of the measure as the effects of the pandemic propagated. For example, in a poll conducted by Morning Consult between March 17-20, only 31% of people surveyed approved of the bailout, but close to 51% did so during a poll conducted on March 27-29. Moreover, closer to 86% of voters approved of the $2 trillion COVID-19 rescue package in late March.

Why is Government Support Critical?

The U.S. should consider seeking to reshore critical and advanced manufacturing in the short term for at least four reasons. First, China will likely retain a labor cost advantage for many years. According to Goldman Sachs, the average manufacturing wage in China was close to $750 per month in 2015, while that in the U.S. was slightly higher than $4,000 per month. This computes to a six-seven-fold differential. Wages are not an accurate metric of labor cost, however. How much a worker produces in an hour is as important as how much he or she gets paid during that time. The productivity adjusted wage of a U.S. worker (and a Japanese worker) is close to $40 per hour, while that of a Chinese worker is closer to $20. This gap has been declining at about 1% per year since 2012, driven not by increasing U.S. productivity, but by an upsurge of wages in China.

However, relying on further wage Chinese growth to reduce this labor cost gap is not likely to be a successful strategy. Additionally, the U.S. is also losing ground against other countries, including France and Germany, which reduced their labor cost by 5% and 4% per year with respect to the U.S. Second, while wages are rising in the affluent areas of coastal China, labor is cheaper in the inner provinces. Manufacturers, faced with high costs in Guangzhou and Shanghai, can shift inland to retain a competitive edge.

Third, maintaining manufacturing capacity abroad may prevent the U.S. from developing a robust base of skilled labor. China employed about 113 million people in manufacturing in 2013, while the U.S. employed only 12 million in manufacturing. In addition, China purchased about three times as many robots for production as the U.S. in 2015, further deepening this productive capacity gap. These differences may keep growing, as manufacturing processes become more skill-intensive. Chinese universities have awarded close to 1.2 million engineering degrees per year since 2013, and the number is steadily growing. The U.S., in contrast, has awarded close to 180,000 per year since 2013. Without an appropriate pool of trained workers, lower production costs will not necessarily improve the U.S. productive capacity.

According to consulting and accounting firm Deloitte, 50% of open positions for skilled workers in the U.S. manufacturing industry were unfilled due to a skills gap in 2018. These positions include skilled production workers, supply chain talent, digital talent, engineers, researchers, scientists, software engineers, and operational managers. This shortage is expected to widen from 488,000 jobs left open today to up to 2.4 million in 2028, resulting in a potential opportunity loss of $2.5 trillion in the next 10 years.

Fourth, the longer the U.S. takes to reshore, the more challenging it will be to match China’s manufacturing. A student who practices math problems every day will become more efficient at solving them relative to a student who only practices once a week. If their studying rates remain constant, the gap between them may become so wide that it will be nearly impossible for the second student to catch up. The same concept applies to manufacturing. Because Chinese producers are manufacturing at a higher rate than their U.S. counterparts, they have more opportunities to identify cost-cutting measures and revenue-generating innovations. China’s manufacturing prowess is already hard to replace. It is the sole producer of many electronic components and sits at the center of the supply chain for many others. Moreover, China is becoming a more integral part of the world’s manufacturing machinery, as rising foreign investments in R&D and advanced manufacturing make it difficult for companies to exit the country altogether.

In a now-classic paper, Bruce Henderson described this phenomenon as the experience curve. Based on company data, Henderson concluded that every time a company’s accumulated production doubles, its production cost drops by 20% to 30%. The manufacturer with the highest share, therefore, should be expected to increase its productivity at a faster pace. In the long term, he predicted, only the competitors with the three highest market shares can survive.

If Henderson is correct, then the U.S. should focus on industries where it still retains the upper hand. In particular, the U.S. retains three key potentially durable competitive advantages: the potential to stay at the cutting edge of automation, low energy cost, and the capacity to innovate. Additionally, as explained below, the U.S. also has nearly unfettered access to the manufacturing base of Mexico, where wages are already lower than in China. McKinsey predicts automation will decrease global trade of goods by 10% in 2030. According to McKinsey, only about 18% of global goods trade is now driven by labor-cost differences – a number the firm expects to decrease further since half of the tasks that workers are paid to complete across industries could technically be automated. The company predicts automation will decrease global trade of goods by 10% in 2030. Amid Abe’s reshoring program, some Japanese firms are predicting they could relocate home thanks to shifts in automation.

The U.S. has a sizable advantage with respect to energy costs. The price of natural gas dramatically dropped in North America following an explosion of shale gas production in 2004. Thanks to “hydraulic fracturing and horizontal drilling…imports of crude oil by the U.S. decreased from 9,213 barrels per day (Kb/d) in 2010 to 7,969 Kb/d in 2017. By 2012, natural gas in North America was six times cheaper than in Asia and three-four times cheaper than in Europe. Continuing to develop North America’s durable competitive advantage with respect to energy cost may be a more efficient and realistic way for the U.S. to bridge its manufacturing cost with China. The contribution of gas and electricity cost to overall cost is 60% as large as the contribution of labor cost to overall cost across industries in China, based on data compiled by BCG. In other words, the U.S. may be able to offset a 10% decline in labor costs in China by decreasing energy prices by less than 20%.

Lastly, the U.S. might seek to enlist its capacity for innovation, ingrained in its world-leading universities, and top-notch corporate research departments. Clay Christiansen, former dean of Harvard Business School, observed that the top companies of one generation rarely retain their leading role in the next generation. His theory of radical innovation explains that newcomers can capture market share in one of two ways. First, they might start by focusing on the needs of less profitable consumers, who are ignored by large players, and use that capital to eventually challenge the incumbent’s dominance of the high-end market. Secondly, companies can aim to focus on markets that are currently not on the radars of incumbents, who are focused on serving and predicting the needs of their current markets. In the same manner, the U.S. can focus on manufacturing emerging technologies, where it can build an advantage from early on while others focus on serving current needs.

supply chain

Rethinking the Supply Chain During COVID-19

For decades, labor cost differences have been a primary influence in the continuous shift of manufacturing production from the U.S. to China. In 1980, the cost of labor in the U.S. was more than 30 times of that in China. As China became less agrarian and more of its population migrated to large cities to work in new factories, wages rose dramatically. By 2018, the U.S.-China wage gap had closed to only four times, rising approximately 200% in the U.S. but over 2,000% in China over nearly 40 years. Yet, despite the sharp rise in Chinese manufacturing wages over the last 20 years, offshoring continued. The U.S. manufacturing industry suffered, including millions of lost jobs, stagnant inflation-adjusted wages and a decline of the middle class.

Change in wages in U.S. and China from 1980-2018

Predictable wage increases in China do not tell the whole story of America’s declining status as a factory for the world. The establishment of special, quasi-free market Special Economic Zones, seemingly endless supply of relatively inexpensive labor, and fully globalized shipping networks allowed China to capitalize on the high cost of manufacturing in the U.S., but perhaps a more important development was the world’s relentless march toward automation and robotics.

The replacement of manual labor by machines and software may have had just as much influence on the decline of the American manufacturing industry as foreign labor costs, domestic labor unions, and international trade policy. Whether attributable to man or machine, parts of the American manufacturing industry have struggled for decades to be competitive and relevant, leading the industry to focus the remaining competitive advantages on the manufacture of niche, value-add, or raw material-dependent products.

Despite a steady increase in their workers’ productivity, most American manufacturers have not been able to automate or reduce logistics costs enough to remain competitive—and offshoring, primarily to Asia, became an unfortunate reality for corporations of all sizes. When any company established a manufacturing presence in China and built a global supply chain, pressure was applied to its remaining competitors in the U.S. to either innovate or follow suit. Among some of the first U.S. manufacturers to offshore en masse were labor-intensive sectors, such as furniture and textiles, followed by manufacturers with relatively low transportation costs, such as pharmaceuticals and semiconductors.

Approximately a decade ago, several institutions in the U.S. converged on a theory that significant changes in U.S. manufacturers’ cost-benefit analysis were occurring and could create a tipping point toward reshoring certain products. The average hourly wages for reliable, competent labor in China and the cost of transporting manufactured goods safely and efficiently to consumers had shifted to such an extent that American manufacturers could potentially reshore their operations to the U.S. or near-shore them to Latin America. Their tipping point theory, predicated on higher Chinese production wages and increasingly complex and expensive global transportation and logistics costs, asserted that over a dozen manufacturing sectors showed formulaic probability of reshoring.

Today, nearly 10 years after the tipping point theory was first publicized, the American manufacturing industry may be on the precipice of another large surge in activity. Through the Great Recession and recovery, American manufacturing was kept buoyant by high-margin, low-volume products. Factoring in the current public health emergency and the current Administration’s response, the U.S. manufacturing sector could regain some of its prior job losses in impacted industries.

The U.S. manufacturing industry is at a unique and unprecedented crossroads. Of the dozen or so manufacturing sectors that previously showed potential for being reshored by rising labor costs and comparatively steep transportation and logistics costs, the tipping point has further shifted, and justification for domestic manufacturing appears stronger. As the world struggles to contain the coronavirus and understand its long-term implications on our social, medical, educational and economic systems, Duff & Phelps has created a new analysis of the prior tipping point theory and integrated several key strategic factors that carry more (or at least equal) weight in a post-COVID-19 world.

To refresh the study, Duff & Phelps adjusted for new global economic conditions, plotted current data for all major production categories and determined a new tipping point for sectors across the manufacturing industry. We began our analysis by identifying, measuring, and weighting key metrics for companies with manufacturing operations in China, including cost (labor + logistics), automation (labor productivity), innovation (R&D, IP, patents, etc.), quality and safetysustainability (environmental regulations and pollution), and national security (critical/essential designations). Specifically, our “reshoring analysis” used six objective criteria to analyze 28 sectors of the American manufacturing industry, identified by North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) codes, which were ultimately ranked according to which showed the greatest potential for re-shoring

The following six criteria and circumstantial factors show the highest probability of a given sector to reshore:

Cost: sectors with low labor costs and high logistics costs

Level of Automation: sectors that have seen a major increase in labor productivity

Innovation and Intellectual Property: sectors with relatively high R&D spending, particularly valuable intellectual property embedded within the manufacturing process or significant patent applications

Product Quality and Safety: sectors with stricter quality and safety regulations (e.g., food, drugs)

Essential Business Designation: businesses, sectors or products officially designated as critical or essential by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security or other governmental authority

Environmental Regulations: sectors whose cost of capital justifies capital investment in real or personal property improvements that allow production to meet or exceed U.S. emissions or pollution regulations

In our analysis of the six primary criteria and 28 sectors, a composite of the eight highest-scoring production categories emerged as the most probable candidates to reshore to the U.S. They share the characteristics of relatively low labor and high transportation costs and feature some of the most advanced robotics, automation and manufacturing techniques across all technology-enabled industries.  Their manufacturing processes are more compliant with and conducive to U.S. environmental regulations, labor laws, intellectual property protections and consumer safety standards. Their profit margins and global demand also tend to alleviate concerns associated with reshoring investment costs. Given the U.S. government’s renewed focus on homeland security and essential goods and services in the wake of COVID-19, the following industry sectors will have to reevaluate their manufacturing costs, supply chain reliability and risk of significant business interruption even while the pandemic is still ongoing:

-Automobiles, bodies, trailers and parts

-Other transportation equipment (e.g., boats, rail)

-Navigational, measuring, electromedical and control instruments

-Basic chemicals

-Semiconductor and electronic components

-Medical equipment and supplies

-Communications equipment

-Aerospace products and parts.

U.S.-China trade flows and top candidates for reshoring

Today, cost isn’t the only significant factor influencing U.S. corporations’ manufacturing footprint. Based on the following factors, manufacturing in the U.S. may become economically feasible for more sectors and the U.S. may experience active and passive reshoring effects as companies consider these variables:

Economic

-Rising cost of labor in China

-Increasing transparency into foreign working conditions and safety measures

-Rising logistics costs

-Corporate supply chain risk mitigation and the identification of critical supplies

-Internet/information-driven consumer awareness and sentiment

-Cost and threat of intellectual property theft

Environmental

-Enforcement of environmental laws and regulations in China’s manufacturing sector

-Sustainability and a global shift away from fossil-fuels power

-Reduced consumerism among millennials and younger generations with increased spending power for durable and non-durable goods

Geopolitical

-U.S.-China trade war and tariff impacts

-Anti-globalization and nationalist political, social and cultural trends across the world

-Consumers’ increasing demands for transparency of product content and origin

-The Trump administration’s calls for U.S. companies to reduce China-centric supply chains, even before COVID-19

-U.S.-China tensions over democracy protests in Hong Kong, origins of COVID-19, military escalation along the Indian border and in the South China Sea

-Human rights abuses of millions of ethnic Uyghurs in Chinese detention camps

Domestic Policy

-U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement ratification

-COVID-19 related essential business, industry and product designations by various U.S. agencies

-Potential for new legislation, regulation or designation of previously outsourced or offshored products and services that are now deemed critical to the U.S. economy or economic infrastructure

Regardless of COVID-19’s impact to the global economic structure, many large American manufacturing operations will likely remain anchored in China since production in the U.S. continues to be labor-intensive and/or global distribution is still so cost=efficient. However, our analysis suggests that additional factors beyond economic ones are being weighted more heavily and that many products historically made in China and destined for U.S. consumers or other markets around the world show high potential for being reshored.

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Gregory Burkart is managing director and global leader of Duff & Phelps’ Site Selection and Incentives Advisory practice. Kurt Steltenpohl is a managing director in Duff & Phelps’ Transaction Advisory Services practice and leader of Operations Consulting.

Duff & Phelps’ Danielle Dipietra, Meegan Spicer, Anthony Schum and Wesley Michael also contributed to this article.

A version of this article was previously published in IndustryWeek.

taiwan

Taiwan Takes Business Back: Examining the Shifting Landscape and What it Means for International Trade

In an exclusive Q&A with Dr. Richard Thurston – former Senior Vice President at Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company, Ltd, and “Of Counsel” with Duane Morris, LLP in New York, we take a closer look at the current international trade climate as Taiwan’s efforts to re-shore impact current trade relations while exposing a significant need for bilateral trade agreements and the need to improve opportunities in workforce development. Dr. Thurston walks us through what to expect in the near future as Taiwan takes businesses back from China.

What major advantages are gained by Taiwan reshoring? What risks are associated with this move?

Dr. Thurston: There are several main drivers behind Taiwan’s reshoring of Taiwan businesses from China. First, U.S. geopolitical issues, such as Taiwan companies avoiding US tariffs on China-originated products. Taiwan companies are facing a lot of pressure there.

Second, the protection of the supply chain, not just the supply chain for Taiwan’s consumer product companies, but that of other companies such as Apple, Google, and the whole range of high-tech companies. Thirdly, avoidance of both U.S. criticism, and, more importantly, of potential. U.S. penalties, fines, exclusion orders, etc., relating to possible export control violations. Finally, the Huawei issue. Overall, the challenges are much broader than trade secret protection, driven by U.S. desire to keep actual products incorporating certain advanced technologies from getting into the hands of China’s People’s Liberation Army.

Those factors, along with growing demands for international diversification, are complimented by Taiwan’s corporate concerns over ongoing health, safety, and welfare of their staff and managers working in China. One other motivation of Taiwan’s Government is to bring back to Taiwan experienced talent that had left over the last decade (which had created a great hollowing out of Taiwan’s technological and other capabilities).

On that last point, do you see a reverse effect happening in the workforce going back to Taiwan and aiming efforts on workforce development for the tech industry, or are you anticipating a completely different landscape overall?

Dr. Thurston: Previously, a much different environment existed, where there were two key drivers behind the movement to China that started when President Ma Ying-jeou took over the political reigns. One of the key factors he had in mind was to access the sizable but elusive China market. The Taiwan market of 24 million people is not large enough by itself, to sustain market growth driven by technological innovation. Second, access to talented human capital. A serious Taiwan problem exists because the STEM  (science, technology, engineering, and math) talent pool has continued to dry up in Taiwan. This has been a huge issue faced by TSMC and other technology-driven companies. So, President Ma wanted to access a culturally comparable talent pool as well as to lower costs for land and raw material supply. Finally, the KMT wanted to use Taiwan’s trade and investment in China to neutralize China’s threat against Taiwan independence.

How can Taiwan continue dominating the IP (intellectual property) sector by reshoring? And does this have any impact on its current practice?

Dr. Thurston: Taiwan has had a lot of difficulties in the IP area, and part of it is related to what I just talked about, the significant decline in the STEM talent pool. If you look for other issues, a major one is that Taiwan (because of its political position arising from China’s position against them) is not a member of WIPO (World Intellectual Property Organization), and is not a participant in the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT) and therefore, there are significant barriers against becoming a predominant IP source.

But more importantly, with the exception of a few companies like TSMC, most Taiwan companies continue to operate in the mindset of OEM and ODM companies. That mindset focuses on a slim profit margin. Therefore, they do not truly incorporate intellectual property into their overall strategy because it is expensive to promote and protect IP.

This is very relevant for many companies, especially in some of the new sectors, such as biomedicine, aerospace, clean energy, Big Data and AI labs. For example, Taiwan companies are still reluctant to establish a robust trade secret program. Although the Taiwan government has done a lot for enacting trade secret laws and litigation in its courts, many companies take inadequate measures to protect this most important IP asset and thereby, diluting its IP leadership. While there has been improvement, it has been slow because IP is still not viewed as a key to profitability. The government has been trying to improve that attitude in its companies through its intellectual property laws, so we will see. For now, I think the lack of sufficient and sustainable STEM talent, which affects directly leading-edge creativity and innovation, is a core challenge.

Taiwan is extremely important to the U.S., both commercially, with respect to its supply chain, and defensively, with respect to maintain open and safe sea and air links. What is further of concern is that the U.S. still does not have a bilateral trade agreement with Taiwan. This limits the ability of the free flow of information, business, and protections to Taiwan businesses and U.S. businesses operating in and with Taiwan.

During 2019, Taiwan’s efforts to attract its businesses back to Taiwan, and the short-term assistance it is providing to respective land acquisition and operational subsidies, has generated 160 new projects. Companies have most definitely returned from China to Taiwan. But, the question remains: is that sustainable? That issue will hurt Taiwan along with the declining birth rate out there. The innovation advantage that Taiwan has had in the past may well be limited in the years ahead unless Taiwan shores up its bilateral trade and investment relations with the U.S.

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Richard L. Thurston, Ph.D. is Of Counsel at international law firm Duane Morris where he practices in the area of intellectual property law from its New York and Taipei offices. Prior to joining Duane Morris, Dr. Thurston was Senior Vice President and General Counsel of Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company, Ltd., where he was also Chief Proprietary Information Officer (Trade Secrets) and Corporate Compliance Officer.

reshoring

CAN WE MEASURE WHETHER “RESHORING” IS REAL?

Ribbon Cuttings and Political Ads

Announcements about plant openings and closings make good political fodder. Politicians from both parties are guilty of extracting trends from single events, leaving context behind: “Jobs are coming home!” “Traitorous companies are leaving the United States!”

A popular claim over the years is that Washington policies have succeeded in either shaming or incentivizing American companies to bring manufacturing “back” to the United States, even if manufacturing overseas had been additive to domestic production. How can we know whether such “re-shoring” is actually occurring, and to what degree?

A Reshoring Index

Kearney recently released the seventh edition of their annual Reshoring Index, which attempts to do just that. The U.S. Reshoring Index tracks total manufactured goods imports from 14 traditional offshoring partner countries including China, Taiwan, Malaysia, India, Vietnam, Thailand, Indonesia, Singapore, Philippines, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Hong Kong, Sri Lanka and Cambodia, as a percentage of U.S. domestic gross output of manufactured goods.

After rising almost steadily over the last decade, imports from those 14 countries contracted 7.2 percent in 2019 while U.S. manufacturing output remained steady. The decline is due almost entirely to fewer imported goods from China in reaction to the U.S.-China trade war, which also suppressed U.S. manufacturing exports. Notwithstanding the shock of the trade war, China’s share of the U.S. import market declined for the sixth year in a row.

According to Kearney, the U.S. market imported 12.1 cents worth of offshore production from these Asia-based “low cost countries” (LCCs) for every $1 of domestic manufacturing gross output, down from 13.1 cents in 2018. On the basis of the index, the United States experienced a net reshoring in 2019, as producers chose to source more goods domestically.

imports from LCCs

Diversification Away from China

The Kearney report also began tracking the so-called “rebalancing” of American company-centered supply chains to understand whether U.S. manufacturing imports are diverting from China toward other Asian LCCs. Overall, the LCCs exported $31 billion more in manufactured goods to the United States in 2019 than in 2018, with Vietnam garnering almost half of the shifting imports. Troublingly, a portion of U.S. imports from Vietnam represent China-origin goods diverted through Vietnam to dodge U.S. tariffs.

Nearshoring: Buying More from Mexico

Not only are imports shifting away from China toward the rest of Asia, Kearney finds another trend: increased sourcing of goods from Mexico, characterized as “nearshoring”. Mexico has some advantages over LCCs in Asia and a longer relationship with many U.S. manufacturers through NAFTA.

Over the last seven years that Kearney calculated its near-to-far trade ratio, there were approximately 37 cents worth of manufacturing imports from Mexico for every dollar of U.S. manufacturing imports from Asia LCCs. Last year, however, that ratio increased to 42 cents as U.S. imports of manufactured goods from Mexico shot up 11 percent between 2017 and 2018 and another 4 percent in 2019 as tariffs on goods from China escalated.

Asia LCCs v Mexico

But Not Necessarily for Economic Reasons

As economist Caroline Freund explains, reshoring does not necessarily reduce risk: “A better strategy to reduce the risk of potential supply-chain disruption would be for firms to reduce dependence on any individual supplier.” While it’s not clear the reduction in sourcing from China will benefit domestic suppliers, it does seem apparent that what’s motivating the shift in imports is diversification away from China.

As Freund says, firms will reshore if it is more profitable and less risky to move production close to the market. They will also reshore if compelled to do so through trade and other national policies such as “Buy America” requirements. The big question is whether supply chains restructured on that basis will make economic sense.

We’ll be watching the Kearney Reshoring Index to understand whether continued tension in the U.S.-China trade relationship and post-pandemic policies keep moving the reshoring needle.

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Andrea Durkin is the Editor-in-Chief of TradeVistas and Founder of Sparkplug, LLC. Ms. Durkin previously served as a U.S. Government trade negotiator and has proudly taught international trade policy and negotiations for the last fifteen years as an Adjunct Professor at Georgetown University’s Master of Science in Foreign Service program.

This article originally appeared on TradeVistas.org. Republished with permission.