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Commerce Announces Addition of Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, and Switzerland to Global Export Controls Coalition

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Commerce Announces Addition of Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, and Switzerland to Global Export Controls Coalition

Today, the U.S. Commerce Department, through the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS), is issuing a rule that formally adds the nations of Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, and Switzerland to the growing global coalition of nations that are cooperating in the stand against Russian aggression, and Belarusian complicity, through their implementation of similarly stringent export controls. Multilateral application of export controls is a force-multiplier in cutting Russia and Belarus off from the commodities, technologies, and software necessary to sustain their aggression, depriving their defense, aerospace, and maritime sectors of key materials.

US Secretary of Commerce, Gina M. Raimondo in his remarks made it known today that the more countries that agree to implement tough export controls, the less chance Vladimir Putin has to obtain the commodities, software, and technologies that he needs to sustain his brutal war machine, saying the US welcome the commitment of Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, and Switzerland to joining the U.S. and 33 other allies and partners in standing together against Putin’s aggression.

Deputy Secretary of Commerce Don Graves added that today’s rule recognizes the strong partnership they have with Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, and Switzerland in standing up for democracy and in solidarity with the people of Ukraine. He in his speech also mentioned that the effectiveness of export controls is enhanced greatly when they are joined by committed international allies and partners., recognizing that the more the coalition with foreign countries grows, the fewer places Putin and the Kremlin can turn for aid.

Under a rule issued and implemented today by BIS, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, and Switzerland are added to the list of countries that are excluded from certain license requirements of the U.S. Russia/Belarus Sanctions rules, including the foreign direct product (FDP) rules for Russia/Belarus and Russian/Belarusian Military End Users (MEUs). Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, and Switzerland join Australia, Canada, the 27 member states of the European Union (EU), Japan, the Republic of Korea, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom, bringing the total number of countries excluded from application of the FDP rules to 37.

Specifically, under the Export Administration Regulations (EAR), countries that have made a commitment to implement substantially similar export controls on Belarus and Russia under their domestic laws may receive full or partial exclusions, as appropriate, from the FDP rules’ license requirements, and such license requirements are not used to determine controlled U.S.-content under the EAR’s de minimus rules provided certain criteria set forth under the new Russia-Belarus restrictions (§746.8 of the EAR) are met.

Adoption of substantially similar export controls by the countries in the coalition expands the scope of products that cannot be obtained by Russia and Belarus. Countries that apply substantially similar controls to those of the United States through their own laws are excluded from application of the FDP rules for Russia/Belarus and Russian/Belarusian MEUs because their own domestic controls duplicate the effects of these FDP rules. These partners are sharing in the effort required to implement these controls globally through their own legal systems, educating companies on compliance responsibilities under their domestic laws, and leveraging their law enforcement resources. The United States will continue to work tirelessly with our partners to share information and enforcement resources, and to coordinate on the commodities, technologies, and software to be controlled, which will result in an increasingly effective global effort.

These BIS actions were taken under the authority of the Export Control Reform Act of 2018 and its implementing regulations, the Export Administration Regulations (EAR).

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How Will the Russia-Ukraine War Reshape the World? (Part 3)

A nuclear apocalypse

Despite valiant, grassroots Ukrainian efforts to sabotage Russia’s invasion, a number of the country’s cities are reduced to rubble. In such circumstances, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy refuses to negotiate with Moscow. In the West, pressure builds for forms of intervention beyond arms shipments and humanitarian assistance. The United States and other NATO members step up supplies of weaponry to a steadfast Ukrainian insurgency, providing it with clandestine training and a safe haven on the Polish side of the border. The war grinds on as the pace of Ukrainians exiting the country accelerates. Armed militias continue the fight even in parts of Ukraine “pacified” by Russian troops and call on the West for more active help.

In Russia, meanwhile, Western sanctions are crushing ordinary people in worse ways than during the country’s 1998 financial crisis. There is a large-scale exodus of members of the middle class—scientists, engineers, teachers, tech professionals, and other white-collar types, many under the age of forty—that risks forfeiting Russia’s future. Despite burgeoning inflation, the Kremlin authorizes a special “victory bonus” to all Russian citizens to boost its domestic support. Moscow bans wheat exports and freezes the cost of rent and food essentials in major cities. Russian police brutally suppress growing protests against the harsh tactics of the Russian military in Ukraine.

The Kremlin is increasingly worried about how much the Russian military is stretched in trying to hold Ukrainian territory while fighting an active insurgency. When Russia’s intelligence service, the FSB, alerts Putin to the safe haven for Ukrainian insurgents in Poland, the Russian president recalls the Soviet nightmare in Afghanistan and becomes determined to squash such assistance. At the United Nations Security Council, Russia’s permanent representative shows pictures of the Central Intelligence Agency-run training base and the stockpiles of lethal arms there.

Then comes a sharp escalation that shatters the global taboo against nuclear-weapons use that has prevailed since the end of World War II: Putin authorizes his forces to detonate a tactical nuclear missile on the Ukrainian side of the border with Poland in a lightly populated area, not directly hitting the US/NATO safe haven but nonetheless sending a forceful message about his opposition to its existence.

In response, Poland invokes NATO’s Article 5 to rally other Alliance members to its defense. NATO convenes an emergency summit. US hawks call for a proportional nuclear response, but the Biden administration decides to first deliver an ultimatum to Putin, backed up with a credible threat of nuclear retaliation. The United States sets out the terms for ending what is now a much-widened NATO-Russia conflict: Russia must immediately withdraw troops from all of Ukraine, including Crimea and the Donbas region. There will be no promise of keeping Ukraine out of NATO. For all US sanctions to be dropped, Russia must pay reparations for the damages it has caused in Ukraine. European leaders like French President Emmanuel Macron and German Chancellor Olaf Scholz argue against what amounts to demanding an unconditional surrender from Russia. But with emotions running high against the backdrop of an unprecedented nuclear conflict in Europe, they are outvoted.

Putin agrees to a negotiation but refuses the terms presented by the United States and its allies. NATO reacts by firing several conventional cruise missiles to destroy a Russian military base in Ukraine close to the Russian border. Likening the NATO attack to another Nazi invasion, Putin wins the backing of the Russian public even as members of the Russian elite seek to unseat him without success. Russia retaliates by launching two more strikes with tactical nuclear missiles, this time over the border in Poland.

A series of nuclear-weapons exchanges ensues: the United States hits Russian military targets while Russia hits NATO bases in Germany and US facilities in Guam and Alaska. Despite the focus on military targets, thousands of civilians are killed in the strikes amid mounting worries about more deaths to follow from radiation poisoning. Both the United States and Russia use artificial intelligence and offensive cyberattacks to take out each other’s nuclear command-and-control infrastructure in space. In contrast to World War II, the fighting is concentrated in Europe, as China (which, along with France, unsuccessfully tries to mediate between the belligerents) and countries in the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America stake out neutrality. Nevertheless, World War III has begun.

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How Will the Russia-Ukraine War Reshape the World? (Part 2)

A double cold war

Peace talks between Russia and Ukraine have been deadlocked for several months, as the Ukrainians held out hope that new Western military supplies would tip the balance of the conflict in their favor. But with several Ukrainian cities turned into rubble, it becomes clear that no one can truly win the war.

France and Germany make new efforts to get both sides to consent to a peace deal in which Ukraine would become a neutral country akin to nonaligned Austria, agreeing to excise the goal of NATO membership from its constitution contingent on the total pullout of Russian troops from the country. The harder issues, such as a permanent status for Russian-annexed Crimea and the two breakaway regions of Donetsk and Luhansk, are tabled for the moment. After several unsuccessful attempts, Zelenskyy and Putin strike a ceasefire deal under pressure from not just Paris and Berlin but also Washington. The European Union (EU) offers increased humanitarian and development assistance to Ukraine and some reduction in sanctions against Russia so long as the Kremlin removes all its troops from Ukraine except those in contested areas of the country. The EU also helps with the resettlement of refugees in their homes in Ukraine.

With the ceasefire holding and Russia beginning to withdraw its forces, French President Emmanuel Macron and German Chancellor Olaf Scholz propose a broader peace conference that would jumpstart arms-control talks between NATO and Russia. Their intent is to avoid a new cold war in Europe. Washington, however, is opposed to the idea of the conference, with many US foreign-policy elites believing that Putin has not paid enough for his unjustified invasion of Ukraine. Leading members of Congress from both parties urge the president to not lift even some of the stiffest financial sanctions on Russia—a step Macron and Scholz believe is needed to strengthen the tenuous peace. The US position is bolstered by opposition to the Franco-German initiative among several of the EU’s eastern members.

While the US administration refuses to bow to congressional pressure to revoke the New START nuclear arms-reduction treaty with Moscow, it does not feel in this climate that it can back Franco-German efforts to launch NATO-Russian negotiations on placing restrictions on conventional weapons. Heeding growing calls by Eastern European allies for reinforced support against Russia, the United States and its Western European allies begin adding new forces along the new East-West divide at the borders of Poland and the Baltic states. Russia and Belarus mirror these moves.

Having followed through on his plans for fortifying Germany’s armed forces, Scholz urges stronger EU defense. Macron reiterates his proposal to extend France’s nuclear weapons as a European deterrent against any aggressors.

Oil prices come down but remain in the range of seventy-five to ninety-five dollars per barrel. Europe accelerates its efforts to bolster renewable-energy sources, including nuclear energy. EU economic growth, after a recession in 2022-23, amounts to less than 1 percent on an annual basis following the war, while the United States experiences higher growth at 2 percent and China drops below 5 percent. As global growth plunges below 4 percent, there is a growing realization that the world may be mired in an extended period of slow economic development. Price spikes and riots escalate in parts of Africa and the Middle East that were dependent on Ukrainian wheat exports.

Russia, meanwhile, becomes increasingly dependent on Chinese and other Asian markets for its sluggish economic recovery, and speeds up the export of its energy eastward. China expands its Cross-Border Interbank Payment System to allow the two neighboring powers to increasingly bypass the Belgium-based SWIFT international payment system. Russia and China settle more trade in digital yuan, reducing the need for dollars. China also launders Russian gold reserves, which are believed to be worth some one hundred billion dollars, by converting them into yuan that Russia can use to buy Chinese goods.

In light of China’s support for Russia, Washington widens the new cold war that’s emerging to Beijing in addition to Moscow. The United States sanctions some Chinese banks and calls on its allies to blacklist an expanding list of Chinese technology firms. European leaders, for their part, are reluctant to take on China but don’t feel they are well-positioned to resist US demands. The United States cuts off exports of semiconductor chips to China as well, causing distress to its own industry and accelerating China’s efforts to build technological self-reliance. The US government also ends its posture of “strategic ambiguity” on Taiwan, declaring that it would intervene militarily in response to any Chinese aggression against the island, while the Taiwanese debate declaring independence from China. Moscow and Beijing, in turn, deepen their political cooperation.

Xi sees advantages to the expanding cold war with the United States. He revs up his nationalistic rhetoric, rallying support for the regime’s fight with the West and suppressing growing unease with his rule among those in the Communist Party who want to introduce market reforms to boost the country’s shaky economy and find an accommodation with the United States.

In this environment, an informal bloc of nonaligned nations emerges that includes India, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Vietnam, Turkey, and Brazil. Most of these countries maintained good relations with Russia during the Ukraine war despite Western pressure to isolate Moscow. Dependent economically on their trade with China, they also want good relations with Beijing.

International cooperation on everything from climate change to common economic challenges, global tech standards, and development assistance for poorer countries becomes harder. The internet further splinters, as the increasing US-China rivalry leads each power to recruit as many countries as possible to its side on digital matters. Global economic growth continues its downward trend and de-globalization advances. International multilateral institutions, from the United Nations to the World Trade Organization and World Health Organization, go into decline.

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Seized Yachts Need to Be Decommissioned to Mitigate Safety and Environmental Risks, Warns Surveyor

Van Ameyde McAuslands, the leading marine, surveying and consulting firm in UK has warned against the hazards and environmental risks of improper close down of Yachts.

Seized maritime assets could pose a “significant risk” to ports, harbors and mariners if there is no requirement to ensure mega yachts detained under sanction rules are properly maintained, made safe or deactivated.

Safety concerns raised by Van Ameyde McAuslands, a global firm of marine surveyors and engineering consultants, follows the seizure by port authorities across Europe of a number of high-profile mega yachts thought to be owned by Russian oligarchs.

In London’s Canary Wharf authorities seized the US$38M Phi. The US$75M Axiom was seized in Gibraltar, and in Italy, authorities boarded the $540M SY A, one of the world’s largest privately owned yachts. Yachts thought to be worth more than $16 billion are being held across Europe, in Finland, France, Norway, Spain, and Germany.

Albert Weatherill the Managing Director, Van Ameyde McAuslands, UK warned that When a vessel is seized, it may no longer be in Class and under Flag, and any insurance, including P&I and H&M, is likely to have already been revoked.

From that moment the yacht, by default, becomes a liability of the state. And without insurance, proper loss prevention measures need to be in place to avoid losses and claims. Potential litigation could run into millions of dollars if assets are not properly made safe or shut down correctly. These are not vessels that can be simply turned off and walked away from.

Normally, the annual upkeep of a mega yacht can exceed US$50 million, with flag state requirements calling for minimum manning and planned maintenance. But according to the surveying firm, there is confusion over who will be responsible for carrying out routine maintenance if any is being carried out at all.

If crews are not being paid and walk away or if sanctions prohibit maintenance, what happens if there’s a pollution incident? What happens if the vessel comes adrift or catches fire, if there’s theft or the vessel is sabotaged? There are too many unknowns, and in this industry, unknowns often equate to litigation, Weatherill commented.

Van Ameyde McAuslands believes that seizing authorities, flag states should be aware of the need to take immediate action when a vessel is impounded. Indeed, it is thought that none of the seized yachts to date have been prepared for lay up or surveyed to prevent pollution or disruption to the port.

While it is difficult to predict how long these vessels are going to remain alongside, to make them safe machinery should be deactivated, systems drained down, discharge overboard valves closed, fire systems checked and engines prepared for cold lay-up in accordance with Classification Society and OEM guidelines.

This will prevent any potential damage to machinery, internal cabins, valuables, limiting financial exposure and liability. It will also safeguard against any potential risk to the maritime infrastructure, the environment and the public at large.

Manning, deterioration, damage, fire, theft, danger to people and property, these are all very serious issues. When vessels are dormant for long periods there is potential for things to go wrong and when there is no insurance safety net to fall back on, it’s a big problem.

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Supply Chain Pressures from COVID Lockdowns in China, Russia- Ukraine War and Rising Oil Prices

Implications of the Russia-Ukraine war 

“Logistics companies are wary of trade lanes, trade partners and shipments to and from Russia. Market volatility has caused uncertainties in the market which has caused massive delays and reduced capacities.”

“COVID induced lockdowns in China and the Russia-Ukraine war has torn apart the expectations of recovery of the supply chain, which has been grappling to keep up to the pressures of implications resulting from these and many more disruptions.”

“The War has impacted Europe greatly. First, Containers are stuck in the terminals waiting for transhipments to Russia and the result is a huge pileup there. The second significant impact is on the China- Europe rail. The northern corridor is still open, but volumes are massively reduced due to uncertainty in the market. That has pushed cargo towards sea freight and even in some cases towards air freight. Low-value cargo has largely suffered because high-value cargo has been pushed to the ocean transport.”

“On a more global scale, the rise in oil prices has been a major repercussion as a result of the war. More logistic players are unclear about the restrictions of doing business with many companies because there are second order and third order sanctions that are also required to be considered while doing business. Companies are hesitant to make decisions, selection of new partners is significantly impaired.

China lockdowns  

There is market commentary about expectations of significant decrease in freight rates. I don’t think that will happen necessarily in the short term, but in the mid-term to long term, this will lead to increase in rates.

“It’s almost like in a traffic jam. Some people now stepped on the brakes really heavily and the problem is that this will lead to a significant sort of bulk up in demand for freight services which will essentially be unleashed once the factories reopen. And when the demand is back, the carriers will again not have enough equipment on the ground because not enough equipment went into China during the Port lockdowns and not enough vessels are available so that will push up prices once again.

So this will continue pushing the volatility in the market and the congestion situation on the Transpacific will also not significantly improve because it’s almost like a start-stop situation. It will just come back worse than it was because the way you remove the traffic jam is not by stopping something violently and then hitting the accelerator again. It’s sort of making sure that the traffic flows at a certain speed.”

The impact of COVID lockdowns on key markets will have wider reaching impacts leading to equipment scarcity in China, hike up of rates and worsening of the traffic jam on transpacific.

The problem will continue to remain after that because there are also labour union disputes in the US waiting in the month of May which historically always leads to slow down at the west coast ports.

Into the Future?  

“We will need more resilient supply chains and that means less concentration on high volume routes. While China-US will still be significantly massive, more smaller trade networks will increase to other countries in Southeast Asia, countries potentially in Africa and South America, who will pick up some of this uncertainty and some of the volume that now gets diverted from the big supply nation. This will be a very gradual process. And again, it doesn’t mean that freight demand from China will decrease now, but I think it might not grow as much anymore.”

Emergence of small trade networks 

The implications of emergence of smaller trade networks. One is you don’t really need these huge vessels on smaller trade networks. There will be an increase in demand for smaller vessels. Secondly, the model of just a few stops in China, then crossing the Pacific, then a few stops in the US, and then going back will, I think, decrease in importance.

And there will be an uptick in more complex networks with more stops and longer turnaround times, further increasing the turnaround times of containers because they just spent more time on the water or an increase in trans shipments. So, for example, more stops in Southeast Asia, then all of this goes into, let’s say, Singapore or Hong Kong in a major hub and then re-export to across, for example, the Pacific. That again, not only increases sort of intraregional traffic, but it also increases the importance of these transit hubs, which will need to build up further capacity to cope with the demand.

And then lastly, I think it will increase the importance of smaller players in the market, and that can be smaller feeder operators and can be smaller who basically pick up this intra-regional traffic or even the transpacific traffic. But that doesn’t start from the big hubs, depending on, I guess, the network model of the carrier.

Pre-pandemic times, supply chain was all about efficient prices and just in time delivery model to make more profits.

Rising Oil prices 

The rising oil prices are bound to have a limited impact on containerized trade in the short run. But generally high oil prices hit hard when the freight rates are very low. Currently, when the freight rates are astronomically high for the past two years (for instance, $10,000 for a 40 ft high cube from China to the US) the impact of a fuel prices hike will not have a large impact on the short term. What remains to be seen in future is how the war pans out in the future and how the supply chain builds resilience in the end.

The Russian Invasion of Ukraine and the Global Energy Market Crisis

The Russian Invasion of Ukraine and the Global Energy Market Crisis

The repercussions of the Russian invasion of Ukraine represent the biggest global energy crisis since the 1973 oil embargo. While the current and potential supply implications of the Ukraine situation alone are significant, especially for Europe, other pre-existing market conditions are conspiring to make this a global crisis across multiple fuels and limiting the effectiveness of traditional responses. There has been no disruption of Russian supplies to Europe yet, but there has been a threat from Russia to stop gas flows through the Nord Stream 1 pipeline on March 7, while the United States has banned energy imports from Russia. EU member countries have stopped short of imposing similar bans on energy imports but have agreed on a fourth package of sanctions which includes revoking Russia’s most favoured nation trade status.

In this piece, Anne-Sophie Corbeau, a global research scholar with the Center on Global Energy Policy, puts the current global gas crisis into perspective and answers questions about the current state of gas markets and the implications of a ban of all Russian energy products for gas markets.

How widespread is this natural gas crisis?

While Europe relies on Russia for 34 percent of its natural gas, this is a much larger crisis. The gas market is global, and the impact of what is happening there has and will continue to ripple throughout the regions reliant on gas imports. Europe’s need for more gas will affect other LNG importers in Asia, the Middle East, and Latin America. As LNG prices rise, these countries may look to reduce their gas consumption and switch to other alternative fuels if they can and if alternative fuels are available and are more affordable.

Gas spot prices are not only at record high levels in Europe but also in Asia. As a result, any LNG importer with a contract linked to European or Asian spot prices or that is trying to import spot cargoes through tenders is paying unprecedented prices. These prices may be unaffordable for some developing countries.

How tight were gas markets before the Russian invasion?

Global gas markets progressively tightened over 2021 and reached unprecedented levels of tightness by the end of the year. European gas spot prices spiked to $60/mmBtu in December 2021, due to a combination of six different factors:

  • A rapid economic rebound that supported a strong increase in energy demand,
  • Lower generation from wind and hydropower plants, calling for more gas-fired generation,
  • Longer and colder heating seasons in Asia and Europe and hotter summers, driving heating and power demand to higher levels,
  • Record high coal and carbon prices pushing up the gas switching price—the price level at which coal-fired generation becomes more economic than gas to run and can replace it,
  • A much lower availability of LNG supplies, and
  • Lower gas deliveries from Russia to Europe, due to a combination of a colder winter in 2020/21 in Russia that required higher injections in Russian gas storage, and the absence of spot sales on the Electronic Sales Platform since October 2021.

How do these factors impact the ability of gas importers to react to the Ukraine crisis?

Most energy supply disruption scenarios do not plan for events happening in such extreme conditions. They simulate a supplier or a supply route disruption, sometimes in extreme climate conditions. There was no preparation for a situation in which the European and global energy systems were threatened with a major gas disruption when markets were already exceptionally tight. In this case, fossil fuel prices were already high, and the responses lined up to deal with short-term disruptions had, for the most part, already been deployed.

How does the risk to other Russian energy exports threaten natural gas markets?

While European gas prices are outpacing those of other fuels (Figure 1),  this is a multi-fuel crisis, as Russia is not only the largest natural gas exporter. Russian exports represent 16 percent of global coal trade. It exports 5 million barrels per day of crude (roughly 12 percent of global trade) and 2.85 million barrels per day of oil products (15 percent of refined product trade). These commodity markets are also currently extremely tight, as high prices reflect. Disrupting Russian flows of one commodity will have implications for others.

For example, steps that ban imports of Russian oil and refined products will likely increase the oil price and thus impact the price in oil-linked LNG contracts which accounted for 56 percent of LNG trade as of 2020. Higher oil prices or the unavailability of oil supplies could prevent some LNG importers from switching to oil/oil products in the power and industrial sectors.

In addition, Russia represents 46 percent of EU’s coal imports. Removing Russian coal from the world’s markets would also impact the ability to switch to coal-fired plants in the power sector if gas flows are insufficient.

Finally, depending on how the power market is structured, the increase in fossil fuel prices can also impact power prices. In Europe, gas-fired plants are at the margin and have driven electricity prices to record levels.

Figure 1: Europe’s gas prices are at record high levels

The Russian Invasion of Ukraine and the Global Energy Market Crisis

Ukraine crisis overtakes Covid as biggest threat to global supply chain

Ukraine crisis overtakes Covid as biggest threat to global supply chain

We are now two weeks into the Russia-Ukraine war. As the war continues, more and more companies are ceasing operations in Russia, wreaking further havoc on an already incredibly disrupted supply chain.

Productivity in Ukraine’s export sectors has dropped severely, with grain and wheat yield reducing majorly. Before Russia’s invasion, over 60.0% of Ukraine’s exports of grain and wheat went to former Soviet Republics such as Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus, all major allies of Russia. Ukraine currently holds 11.0% of the world’s grain market – increasing its grain production by 32.0% in 2021 to 85.7m tonnes – and 55.0% of the sunflower oil market. These sectors will be severely impacted by the ongoing conflict in the country. Neighbouring countries such as Poland, which have received huge influxes of refugees, are also showing signs of struggle; VW’s Polish units recently announced it was halting production amid supply chain problems caused by the Ukrainian war.

Re-building after catastrophes such as this war will also come at a great financial expense. In addition, rebuilding efforts will be hindered not only by a shortage of supplies, but also soaring commodity prices. In the medium-term, oil and gas supplies are also running low for Ukraine, with the geopolitical landscape subject to incredible volatility. Raw materials are also seeing shortages, with Ukraine’s trade infrastructure already having taken a large hit that will have large implications down the line for the country regardless of the outcomes from the horrific conflict.

Core metals are also experiencing rocketing prices. Russia produces 14.0% of global aluminium, and, with all factors put into perspective regarding economic sanctions, this will only reduce and cause supply shortages in the future. To add, with a largely reduced number of road freight and trucks making their way into and through Russia, its productivity has started to steadily decline. In Ukraine, with rockets and missiles causing sustained damage to buildings, roads and other infrastructure, the physical act of moving materials across the country has reduced by almost 80.0% in most areas and ceased altogether in the other 20.0%.

Electronics is likely to take the largest hit in the near future, as Russia supplies over 40.0% of the world’s palladium, one of the main resources in the production of semiconductors. Computer chips also require neon, of which Ukraine produces over 70.0% of the world’s total supply. In addition, the two major purifiers for Russian and Ukrainian neon are in Odesa, an area where access is now virtually impossible. Disruption of such supplies is an illustration of the wide-scale global impact the conflict will have, reaching corners of the world presumed to be untouched by the invasion occurring in eastern Europe.

An Achilles Q4 2021 shows data for global supply chains forecasted a tumultuous start to the year, the situation in Ukraine notwithstanding. With the additional tension from the conflict, this will only increase. The restrictions imposed on Russian finances and businesses by the West have caused complete disruption to Russian supply chains, as well as sustained damage to the Federation’s economy. As of March 8 2022, the Ruble is valued at ₽1/$0.0073, entering freefall amidst the sanctions levied on the Russian economy by entities such as the EU, USA, UK and even Switzerland, putting aside its long-standing neutrality in the face of these dreadful acts.

The extent to which local and global supply chains and economies are becoming impacted by the war is slowly becoming clearer. A glimmer of hope is that many regular civilians across Europe are coming to the aid of the refugee issue in western Ukraine, which is reducing human congestion across these normally busy trade and trucking routes. For now, however, the Ukrainian people remain under an unprecedented threat. According to Forbes, the Russia-Ukraine crisis could leave the world facing extended reductions to energy supply, severe sanctions that will likely impact food security as well as rare metal supplies needed to sustain production of key technologies. All of this, coupled with the humanitarian crisis, complicates this unrest further.

Ukraine

Five ways the war in Ukraine will change the world’s economy

The war in Ukraine is a tragedy that will continue to play out for months, with an uncertain ending as far as the sad cost in human life, new alignments in global geopolitics and the stunning damage that will be done to the economies in countries beyond just Russia and Ukraine. Even though the repercussions of this war will reverberate for decades, we can already identify some trends that will impact the global economy in the future.  As with any volatile trade and economic situation, there will be clear losers (the Russian economy), but there will also be potent secondary developments that arise as a result of this aggressive invasion of a democratic, Western-oriented Ukraine.


 

Energy Security / Renewable Energy

The U.S. and EU have spent decades wringing their hands over the Transatlantic joint dependence on oil and gas from ‘bad actors’, including Russia, Saudi Arabia, and Venezuela.  In the last few weeks, attempts to punish Russia economically have been hamstrung due to the fact that much of Europe still receives about half of its gas from Russia, an impossible dependency when it comes to confronting Russia for its illegal actions in Ukraine. While the ‘fracking revolution’ has assisted the U.S. to a certain level of energy independence, a sizeable portion of the nation’s oil still comes from unreliable external sources. The irony of Russia’s attack on a democratic Ukraine is that it might finally push the U.S. and EU to commit to a substantive, immediate and dedicated pursuit of renewable energy sources for which environmental activists and innovative business leaders have been lobbying for decades.  Renewable energy’s strongest proponent just became the national security crowd.

Defense Spending – Globally

The same national security concerns will also lead to a huge rise in defense spending from EU and other nations.  Germany’s proposed budget increase alone will be a critical shot in the arm for the European defense industry, but we can assume that other nations that have put off investments in this area were shaken by Russia’s willingness to break global norms and attack Ukraine and will respond with substantial budget increases.  Images of Turkish Bayraktar drones destroying Russian armor and video of the U.S.-made Javelin helping to stymie the 7th largest army in the world are going to change how smaller nations structure their arms inventory.  More importantly, Russia’s actions have disabused any remaining doubters of the notion that a country like Russia will ‘play by the rules’ of international law in the modern era.  If Russia can so brazenly violate their international agreements and obligations, then so can China – and that realization will have a substantive domino effect on the planning and defense expenditures of everyone from Finland to the Philippines.

Wheat and Foodstuffs – Even Greater Price Inflation

Russia and Ukraine accounted for 30% of the global wheat trade prior to this conflict. But that is not the only food product that will be taken off of the market as a result of the war – sunflower oil, corn and other key products will either be destroyed (or unplanted) as a result of the fighting or will be locked inside Russia’s domestic market due to sanctions and the inevitable tariffs.  The rest of the world will see massive price increases and shortages in certain foodstuffs.  Combined with the global surge in inflation and increasing transportation costs, many global food-producing companies will struggle to provide products that are affordable for their usual clients.  If there is a silver lining to this cloud, it is that locally-sourced products and wheat-alternatives (rice, corn, bulgur) should see a boom in demand.

Cybersecurity and Information Warfare

Russia and China have been fighting a shadow war with the U.S. and EU in the cyber realm for years, but this conflict has pushed that fight into the light of day.  U.S. and European struggles with Russian governmental and pseudo-governmental cyber strikes (from denial of service attacks to outright hacks for information and funds, as well as documented attempts to impact elections in both regions) should have the same impact on corporate and governmental cybersecurity spending as watching Russian tanks roll into Ukraine did for defense spending.  No one wants to be the easy target in this war and corporations that took some risk and saved money on cybersecurity will be scampering to close those gaps as quickly as they can.  Russian desperation to get at global fund sources in the next few months dramatically increases the risk of pseudo-governmental ransomware attacks, and the information warfare we are seeing between Russia/China and the rest of the world is astoundingly blunt (and for Ukraine, remarkably effective in generating global support).  The gloves are off.  Is your company ready to defend its business interests from cyber and information / reputational attacks?

A More Unified, Emboldened EU

The last month has been a litmus test for EU leadership, and they have come out looking much more poised and united than anyone would have believed.  Should they have taken this threat more seriously in the last decade?  Absolutely.  Have they tolerated Putin-loving populists in the EU club for years (Orban, Zeman, Le Pen, Salvini)?  Sadly, yes.  But all of that changed when Russia headed for Kyiv.  Member state leaders closed ranks and the EU turned from a reluctant bystander into ardent supporters of Ukrainian defense efforts in a few short weeks.  From an economic perspective, this more unified and confident EU will disrupt a number of patterns.  They’re likely going to be much more aggressive in nurturing and protecting their internal innovation in technology and defense.  They will redouble efforts to reduce their dependency on external energy sources (to the benefit of renewable technologies, electric vehicle innovations, the nuclear industry and even public transportation ventures).  Most importantly, they can be expected to be stronger proponents of democratic ideals in their foreign political and business affairs.  Countries (and companies) that interact with this new EU will likely find that they are much more insistent on ESG concerns and support for human rights, democratic principles and adherence to the rule of law.

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Kirk Samson is a Director at the International Trade Association of Greater Chicago.  He is a former U.S. diplomat and spent ten years as an international law advisor for the Department of Defense.

global supply chains

Global Supply Chains Brace for Russia-Ukraine Conflict – Four Major Risks

As tens of thousands of Russian troops continue to mass along the Ukrainian border, and with diplomatic talks between the U.S. and Russia yet to bear fruit, the threat of a Russian invasion within the next few weeks appear to be growing.

A Russian invasion of Ukraine has the potential to cause extensive and debilitating disruption across global supply chains, resulting in rising input costs to a heightened threat of cyber attacks (see below).

Today thousands of U.S. and European companies do business with suppliers in Russia and Ukraine, which could be at risk during a prolonged military conflict. Analysis of global relationship data on the Interos platform reveals key findings:

-More than 1,100 U.S.-based firms and 1,300 European firms have at least one direct (tier-1) supplier in Russia.

-More than 400 firms in both the U.S. and Europe have tier-1 suppliers in Ukraine.

-Software and IT services account for around 12% of supplier relationships between U.S. and Russian/Ukrainian companies, compared with 9% for trading and distribution services, and 6% for oil and gas. Steel and metal products are other common items purchased from the two countries.

While the proportion of U.S. and European supply chains that include tier-1 Russian or Ukrainian suppliers is relatively low, at around 0.75%, this figure increases significantly when indirect relationships with suppliers at tier 2 and tier 3 are included.

-More than 5,000 firms in both the U.S. and Europe have Russian or Ukrainian suppliers at tier 3 (representing 2.76% and 2.37% of their respective supply chains).

-More than 1,000 firms in both the U.S. and Europe have tier-2 suppliers based in Ukraine, with around 1,200 dependent on suppliers at tier 3.

Supply chain and information security leaders in U.S. and European organizations should review their dependence on Russian and Ukrainian suppliers at multiple tiers as a key first step in their efforts to assess risk exposure in the region and ensure operational resilience.

Four Major Risks for Global Supply Chains

In the event of a Russian invasion of Ukraine, there are four major areas where global supply chains could be negatively impacted:

1. Commodity prices and supply availability

2. Firm-level export controls and sanctions

3. Cyber security collateral damage

4. Wider geopolitical instability

1. Commodity price increases. Energy, raw material and agricultural markets all face uncertainty as tensions escalate. Russia provides over a third of the European Union’s (E.U.) natural gas, and threats to this supply could force up prices at a time when companies and consumers are already facing higher energy bills. Natural gas supply pressures likely would spike volatility in other energy markets too. By one estimate, an invasion could send oil prices spiraling to $150 a barrel, lowering global GDP growth by close to 1% and doubling inflation. Even lower estimates of $100 a barrel would cause input costs and consumer prices to soar.

Food inflation is another risk, with Ukraine on track to being the world’s third largest exporter of corn, and Russia the world’s top wheat exporter. Ukraine is also a top exporter of barley and rye. Rising food prices would only be exacerbated with additional price shocks, especially if core agricultural areas in Ukraine are seized by Russian loyalists.

Metal markets may also continue to be squeezed. Russia controls roughly 10% of global copper reserves, and is also a major producer of nickel and platinum. Nickel has been trading at an 11-year high, and further price increases for aluminum are likely with any disruption in supply caused by the conflict.

2. Firm-level Export controls and sanctions. Commodity cost pressures could be exacerbated by targeted U.S. and European export controls. The use of such controls to restrict certain companies or products from supply chains has soared over the last few years. While many have been aimed at Chinese companies, a growing number of Russian firms have been earmarked for export controls for “acting contrary to the national security or foreign policy interests of the United States”.

Prominent Russian companies already on a U.S. restrictions list include Rosneft and subsidiaries and Gazprom. Extending export controls and sanctions to Gazprom’s subsidiaries, other energy producers, and key mining and steel market firms could further impact supply availability and input costs. Not surprisingly, U.S. companies and business groups are urging the government to be cautious in how it applies any new rules.

U.S. and E.U. export controls would also likely target the Russian financial sector – including state-owned banks – if an invasion takes place, and may be a tactic for deterrence as well. U.S. officials have noted that any sanctions would be aimed at the Russian financial sector for “high impact, quick action response”.

3. Cyber security collateral damage. Entities linked to malicious cyber activity may also face further repercussions from the U.S. and its partners. Ukraine is certainly no stranger to Russian cyber aggression. Russia has twice disrupted the Ukrainian electric grid, first in December 2015 leaving hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians in the cold, and then again the following year. But destructive attacks on the country’s infrastructure could also spark significant collateral damage in global supply chains.

In 2017, the NotPetya attack on Ukrainian tax reporting software spread across the world in a matter of hours, disrupting ports, shutting down manufacturing plants and hindering the work of government agencies. The Federal Reserve Bank of New York estimated that victims of the attack, which included companies such as Maersk, Merck and FedEx, lost a combined $7.3 billion.

This figure could pale in comparison to the global supply chain impact of a Russia-Ukraine military conflict, which would inevitably include a cyber element. Whether Russia would target its cyberwar playbook at U.S. or E.U. targets in retaliation for any support to Ukraine remains hotly debated. But the Cybersecurity Infrastructure and Security Agency (CISA) has been urging U.S. organizations to prepare for potential Russian cyber attacks, including data-wiping malware, illustrating how the private sector risks becoming collateral damage from geopolitical hostilities.

4. Geopolitical instability. Just as cyber warfare would be unlikely to remain within Ukraine’s borders, so the destabilizing effect of a Russian invasion could have wider geopolitical ramifications. In Europe, a refugee crisis could emerge, with three to five million refugees seeking safety from the conflict. In Africa and Asia, rising food prices could fuel popular uprisings. Of the 14 countries that rely on Ukraine for more than 10% of their wheat imports, the majority already face food insecurity and political instability.

China is watching closely to see how the world responds if Russia invades Ukraine. The superpower has its own aspirations of seizing territory and extending its sphere of influence. Taiwan’s defense minister has remarked that tensions over Taiwan are the worst in 40 years. A Russian invasion could further embolden China to enlist military tactics against Taiwan – something that, as well as its far-reaching geopolitical implications, would have a significant impact on electronics and other global supply chains.

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Although many of these risks may not materialize, and represent a worst-case scenario, executives should be thinking now about the potential impact of a Russia-Ukraine military conflict on their operations over the coming months. These same leaders need to ensure that appropriate contingency plans are in place for their most critical supply chains and riskiest suppliers in the region.

Risk mitigation strategies include:

-evaluating required levels of inventory and labor in the short to medium term;

-discussing business continuity plans with key suppliers; and

-preparing to switch to, or qualify, alternative sources for essential products and services.

With proper analysis, planning and execution, it is possible to mitigate significant risk and ensure operational resilience.