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Partisanship Alone Unlikely to Decide the USMCA’s Fate

Partisanship Alone Unlikely to Decide the USMCA’s Fate

With the U.S. Congressional elections rapidly approaching, there’s been a fair bit of public analysis on the impact a Democrat-controlled Congress might have on the fate of the recently negotiated United-States-Mexico-Canada Agreement or USMCA.

Some have suggested a blue wave in Congress would almost certainly result in the quashing of a trade deal whose fate must be determined by a straight up or down vote. In fact, Mexico’s incoming trade secretary, Luz Maria de la Mora, recently opined that Democrats – who have traditionally viewed free trade in less favorable terms than Republicans – are likely to use the USMCA as a bargaining chip. Others have suggested Democrats may vote down the agreement as a means of spitefully derailing what is widely regarded as one of the Trump administration’s key accomplishments.

Such predictions are certainly plausible given the polarized political dynamic in Washington. But there may be more to quashing the USMCA than political partisanship. After all, each member of Congress, whether Democrat or Republican, represents a defined constituency characterized by its own local needs and considerations. If the USMCA is a stellar agreement that will widely benefit a Congressman’s or Congresswoman’s constituents, it would be politically damaging for him or her to vote against it simply out of spite.

Just how well Americans are embracing the USMCA is an open question. There’s still substantial ambivalence about the benefits of the new trade agreement and the degree to which it will improve Americans’ lives or prospects for employment. A poll carried out by POLITICO/Morning Consult 10 days after text of the USMCA was released by the Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR) shows 38 per cent of Americans believe the USMCA will have a better or much better impact on manufacturing workers while 29 per cent feel it would have either a neutral or negative effect; the remainder had no opinion. And even fewer (32 per cent), believe the agreement would have a better or much better impact on consumers. Less than half (43 per cent) believe the USMCA is very or somewhat different than NAFTA.

Early reaction from industry groups suggests widespread relief the handshake agreement remains trilateral in nature and lifts the air of uncertainty over trade that had clouded investor confidence over the preceding 13 months. But mitigated anxiety is a far cry from resounding endorsement of an agreement few outside the U.S. Administration were itching to refurbish in the first place.

Given that ambivalence, a nullification of the USMCA’s ratification by Congress wouldn’t exactly be an act of tone deafness, though it would certainly earn it the ire of those groups for whom the agreement won modest concessions (e.g. dairy farmers, manufacturers, retailers, labour groups etc.). And it’s worthwhile noting that Congressional opposition to the USMCA wouldn’t necessarily be the exclusive domain of Democrats. There has been vocal opposition to tampering with NAFTA by Congressional Republicans whose constituents could be adversely affected by changes to select provisions within the trade deal.

Timing is also a critical consideration. A Congressional vote on the USMCA is unlikely to occur before the summer of 2019, after the International Trade Commission has filed its report on the anticipated economic impact of the trade deal. Much can change between the Congressional elections and the ratification vote with respect to how the trade deal is perceived by its most affected stakeholders, and how those stakeholders choose to air their accolades, annoyances and antipathies.

The risk in a ‘no’ vote isn’t just a return to an outdated agreement. The president has already publicly stated his intent to withdraw from NAFTA should Congress fail to ratify the deal his team has negotiated. It would leave Congress with a choice – the new USMCA or no free trade agreement at all, and therefore a return to trade uncertainty.

In addition, a ‘no’ vote would almost certainly secure the USMCA’s place as a 2020 presidential campaign wedge issue. Any candidate who votes in opposition to the USMCA will have to convince his or her constituents the concessions extracted from Mexico and Canada will not benefit the U.S. economy.

All this to say, the ratification of the USMCA does and should hinge on far more than a shift in the composition of Congress. A blue wave on November 6th shouldn’t necessarily be interpreted as a death knell for the budding trade deal. With any luck, members of Congress – regardless of their political stripes – will decide the USMCA’s fate based on the ITC’s economic impact report, combined with feedback from industry groups and their own constituents. That would not only serve to solidify the merits and/or risks embedded within the agreement, but would tangibly demonstrate to Americans that their political representatives are truly working on their behalf.

 

Candace Sider is vice president of Government and Regulatory Affairs North America at trade-services firm Livingston International. She is a frequent speaker and lecturer at industry and academic events and is an active member of numerous industry groups and associations.

 

China International Import Expo Kicks-Off with Tariff Talks

The first China International Import Expo gathered 2800 companies from over 130 countries and regions to meet with over 150,000 buyers in Shanghai from Nov 5 to 10, 2018. This event is now anticipated as an annual event that provides success initiatives and strong performance, according to Chinese President Xi.

The conference  kicked-off with China’s president stating that he will cut tariffs and expand China’s economy in a speech today addressing changes to come, including an overall drop in anticipated imports, according to reports.

In his address, he stated he aims to “help friends from around the world to seize opportunities presented by China’s development in the new era and offer a platform for us to deepen international business cooperation for shared prosperity and progress.”

In addition to expanding China’s trade efforts, Xi explained how openness and cooperation are at the center of dynamic international economic trade activities and how the current economic state calls for such actions and cooperation on a global level.

Xi also stated that his goals moving forward include efforts to ” lower tariffs, facilitate customs clearance, reduce institutional costs in import, and step up cross-border e-commerce and other new forms and models of business.”

Creating a world-class business environment from enforcing and respecting international laws and implementing fair practices were mentioned during his address.

“Countries need to improve their business environment by addressing their problems. They should not just point fingers at others to gloss over their own problems. They should not hold a “flashlight” in hand doing nothing but to check out on the weakness of others and not on their own.”

As the expo continues on, nations around the world watch closely for global leaders responses and comments on the speech and how things moving forward will be impacted by Xi’s statements and plans of action.

Source: http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2018-11/05/c_137583815.htm

 

Trump Administration Trade Battles Continue

There have been several important developments in regard to (1) U.S. use of Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 to restrict imports of various products from China and (2) U.S. imposition of global trade restrictions on steel and aluminum imports pursuant to Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962.  The Trump Administration asserts that the former are justified as a result of unfair intellectual property policies and practices maintained by China and that the latter are necessary to prevent emerging threats to U.S. national security.  As summarized below, the conflict between the United States and China continues to intensify, but there are signs that the Administration is looking to de-escalate the global conflict over steel and aluminum.

Developments in the U.S.-China Trade Relationship

On June 15, the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (“USTR”) issued two lists of Chinese goods that would be subject to a 25 percent tariff surcharge as a result of its Section 301 investigation.  The first list covered approximately $34 billion in goods and was comprised of machinery and mechanical appliances; electrical equipment; vehicles, aircraft, vessels, associated transport equipment, and parts thereof; and measuring, checking, precision, medical or surgical instruments.  The second list covered approximately $16 billion in goods and was comprised of lubricants; plastics; machinery and mechanical appliances; electrical equipment; locomotives, vehicles, and parts thereof; and measuring instruments.  The duties for the goods on the first list were imposed starting July 6, while those for the goods on the second list were imposed starting August 23.

Shortly after USTR’s June 15 announcement, China announced its intention to retaliate against the United States by imposing a 25 percent tariff surcharge on certain U.S. goods being imported into China.  China issued two lists of targeted goods, with the first list covering agricultural products, cars, and aquatic products, and the second list covering mineral fuels, chemical products, and medical machinery.  The duties for the goods on those lists were imposed starting July 6 and August 23, respectively.

President Trump responded to China’s retaliatory measures by ordering USTR to develop an additional list of $200 billion worth of imports from China to be subject to a 10 percent tariff surcharge.  Shortly after that announcement, China promised to fight back with “qualitative” and “quantitative” measures.  On August 3, China announced new duties in the range of 5-10 percent on imports from the United States valued at $60 billion, and those duties were imposed starting September 24.

On September 18, USTR issued its third list of Section 301 tariffs, covering approximately $200 billion worth of imports from China, dwarfing the value of imports covered by the first and second lists.  The products targeted are subject to an additional tariff of 10 percent, effective September 24, which increases to 25 percent starting January 1.  The list contains 5745 tariff lines, covering a wide range of products, including live animals and animal products; vegetable products; prepared foodstuffs; mineral products; chemical products; plastics and rubbers; rawhides, skins, and articles thereof; wood and articles of wood; paper; textile articles; headgear; articles of stone, ceramic, and glass; pearls; base metals and articles thereof; mechanical and electrical equipment; vehicle parts; photographic and cinematographic equipment; and miscellaneous manufactured articles.  On October 12, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (“CBP”) confirmed that imports from China that qualify for reduced or suspended duties under the recently signed Miscellaneous Tariff Bill will still face the specified Section 301 tariffs.

USTR has established a process by which U.S. stakeholders (such as purchasers or importers) may request the exclusion of particular products from Section 301 tariffs covered by the first two tranches.  Notably, the notice for the third list did not indicate that there would be an exclusion process.

The deadline for requests regarding the first list lapsed on October 9, but the deadline for the second list is December 18.  USTR prefers electronic submissions made through the Federal eRulemarking Portal: www.regulations.gov.  Exclusion requests should include certain information, including the following: the applicable 10-digit subheading of the HTSUS; physical characteristics that distinguish the proposed excluded product from other products within the covered 8-digit subheading; the ability of CBP to administer the exclusion; the annual quantity and value of the Chinese-origin product that the requester has purchased in each of the last three years; and the percentage of total gross sales in 2017 accounted for by sales of the Chinese origin product.

Section 232 Tariffs on Steel and Aluminum

In March of this year, the Administration announced global tariffs on imports that it found to threaten U.S. national security – a 25 percent tariff on steel and a 10 percent tariff on aluminum.  Several countries negotiated their own deals to avoid the tariffs.  Australia is exempt entirely but is likely to be monitored for import surges.  Argentina, Brazil, and South Korea are subject to quotas (not tariffs) on steel.  Argentina has a quota for aluminum, but Brazil and South Korea did not reach a similar agreement and therefore are subject to the tariff on aluminum without any quantitative restriction.

The original, global Section 232 actions can be adjusted on a country-by-country basis.  For example, in August, the tariff for imports of steel from Turkey was increased to 50 percent in response to the depreciation of the Turkish lira – the concern there was that the depreciation of the lira had made imports of Turkish products less costly and thereby undermined the effectiveness of the original Section 232 tariffs.  Canada and Mexico are reportedly negotiating for quotas to replace the Section 232 tariffs as early as this November.  And the Administration recently notified Congress of its intent to negotiate trade agreements with Japan and the European Union, which could involve quotas to replace Section 232 tariffs.

The product exclusion process has been a key focus since imposition of the Section 232 measures.  Product exclusions may be requested by U.S. stakeholders on a rolling basis.  According to the Commerce Department, a product exclusion will be granted if the article is not produced in the United States in a sufficient and reasonably available amount or at a satisfactory level of quality, or if there is a specific national security consideration warranting exclusion.  The product exclusion process was recently extended to imports from the quota countries.

The Administration has made some important changes to the product exclusion process since it was established.  First, domestic companies can seek “expedited relief from quantitative limits” for existing supply contracts.  Second, since early September, rebuttals (responses to objections) and surrebuttals (responses to rebuttals) are allowed and the Commerce Department has facilitated tracking of requests through its website (www.commerce.gov/page/section-…).  Third, parties are now permitted to submit confidential business information in support of requests or comments.  These last two changes were implemented in response to significant criticism of the process from companies and Congress.

At present, over 3,500 exclusions for steel and aluminum products have been granted (about 10 percent of posted requests).  In all but a few cases, the exclusions that were granted had been unopposed.

How Does a Company Take Advantage of a Product Exclusion?

As of today, the Administration has not granted any requests for exclusion from the Section 301 tariffs on imports from China.  The Administration has, however, indicated that such exclusions would be effective for one year upon publication of the exclusion determination in the Federal Register, apply retroactively to July 6 for products on the first list and to August 23 for products on the second list, and cover all imports of the product in question.  (As mentioned above, no product exclusions are planned for the third list, but Congress is raising concerns with the Administration on this point.)

For product exclusions from the Section 232 measures, requestors must closely track the regulations.gov dockets (Steel 232 docket BIS-2018-0006 and Aluminum 232 docket BIS-2018-0002) for the status of requests.  Once granted, an exclusion is valid for one year and is limited to the product description, quantity, supplier(s), and country(ies) of origin as defined in the request.

After a decision is posted, the Commerce Department notifies CBP, but the importer of record is nevertheless required to inform CBP in advance of importation.  More specific guidance on claiming an exclusion can be found at CSMS #18-000378.  If an exclusion is granted, companies are eligible for a retroactive refund of Section 232 tariffs back to the date the request for exclusion was posted for public comment at regulations.gov.

It is especially important to remember that, other than with respect to the first list of products covered by the Section 301 tariffs, U.S. stakeholders who believe a product should be excluded from the application of Section 232 or Section 301 tariffs may still be able to file an exclusion request.

 

Written by:  Matthew R. Nicely, Dean A. Pinkert, Julia K. Eppard and James Ton-that at Hughes Hubbard & Reed LLP

 

Tariff Turbulence

Whether you endorse or decry the strategy, it’s clear that the escalating exchange of tariffs between the U.S. and other countries is not going away anytime soon. The unpredictable roller coaster of tariffs in the last year has led to growing trade tension and shifting trade dynamics with countries like China, Canada, Mexico and Turkey.

For third-party logistics providers, the current state of affairs presents both new complexities and new responsibilities—but also new opportunities. While this trade instability persists, logistics providers’ ability to serve as true counselors and problem-solvers for their clients will be essential.

With new tariffs constantly emerging, third-party logistics professionals must think on their feet. They need to understand and appreciate what products (and in what forms) are subject to tariff taxes, and be willing and able to help their clients identify opportunities to recapture some of those taxes to lessen the impact on the organization’s bottom line. Clients expect their logistics partner to mitigate the extra cost of tariffs through other means, as well, such as localizing products in lesser amounts. Providers need to continue to get smarter and more strategic with respect to production and distribution locations as well.

The following tips will help third-party logistics providers achieve some of those goals, navigating today’s rapidly shifting tariff landscape and mitigating the financial impact of the current trade war. In the process, both clients and providers will be better able to position themselves for continued flexibility and resiliency going forward.

 

Open negotiations

Now is the time for clients to head to the negotiation table with their supply base. We strongly advise our clients to use the current circumstances as a negotiation tactic to try and get as many pricing concessions as possible. Approaching a steel supplier in Canada, for example, and informing them that you can get a better deal here in the U.S. might secure those concessions without requiring costly and complex adjustments to your existing supply chain.

 

Make exceptions

Look closely at any available duty exceptions, and identify opportunities to leverage those exceptions to your clients’ advantage. The high-profile 25 percent tariff on raw steel imports from Canada and the EU might be avoidable if a manufacturer purchases the steel and ships it to an outside processor before bringing it into the U.S. Modest changes to a product or tweaks in the supply chain may make it possible to bypass tariffs that would otherwise be costly or prohibitive.

 

Conduct an audit

In today’s environment, it makes sense to conduct a full-blown audit of the Harmonized Tariff Schedule (HTS) codes that apply duty rates globally to different commodities. Third-party logistics providers need to ensure that, whether the product is steel or potatoes, the HTS codes applied by U.S. Customs are accurate and valid. Within the category of steel alone, for example, there are literally thousands of different HTS codes. Errors are surprisingly (or perhaps, depending on your perspective, unsurprisingly) common.

 

Utilize duty drawback programs

Another strategy is to make efficient use of duty drawback programs, especially with respect to temporary bonds. When material is imported, processed or altered and shipped back to its country of origin within a certain time frame, clients can file through a temporary import bond instead of a their standard continuous import bond. Logistics providers should be diligent about ensuring that all clients with a supply chain that ships freight back are doing so through a temporary bond. If not, they can apply for a duty drawback—essentially a refund from U.S. customs. Duty drawbacks can also recoup funds in the event of mislabeled/mischaracterized material or misfiled documentation. Mistakes are all too easy to make, especially when dealing with massive volumes of  customs import entries.

 

Go direct

Finally, advise clients to create a direct ACH (automated clearing house) account with U.S. customs. Duties can be paid one of two ways: either through a contracted customs broker who makes payments on your behalf and subsequently invoices you/the importer of record, or through a direct ACH account with U.S. customs. With the first option, importers are typically paying a disbursement fee (typically 1-3 percent). While this wasn’t usually a significant sum with the modest to minimal tariffs in the past, it can now add up to a painful chunk of change.

 

While these practical and specific steps can all be impactful, third-party logistics providers should remain cognizant of the big-picture, recognize the value of staying nimble in the current environment. With circumstances changing constantly, maintaining strict record-keeping and regular audits is essential. None of these measures should be a one-time check list item. Navigating turbulent times requires a full-blown maintenance program that should continue indefinitely. Taking the time and investing the resources to set these systems up correctly before mistakes happen or circumstances change can help you avoid missteps and missed opportunities in the future. Don’t scramble and patch holes when your vessel springs a leak in the rough seas of a trade war—instead, do the proactive work and ongoing maintenance that it takes to make your operation seaworthy for years to come.

 

 

Drew Janney is Vice President of Operations at Michigan-based Argus Logistics, a non-asset based, third party logistics management provider with operations across the globe. To connect with Drew, email djanney@argussolutions.net.