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Cuba Policy Under Biden: Change on the Horizon?

cuba

Cuba Policy Under Biden: Change on the Horizon?

After four years of Trump Administration efforts to increase sanctions on Cuba and reverse Obama-era efforts to normalize bilateral ties, the Biden White House last week announced its own plans to review Cuba policy and signaled that changes may soon be forthcoming.

“Our Cuba policy is governed by two principles. First, support for democracy and human rights – that will be at the core of our efforts. Second is Americans, especially Cuban Americans, are the best ambassadors for freedom in Cuba. So we’ll review the Trump administration policies,” said White House press secretary Jen Psaki during her January 28, 2021 daily news briefing.

While the full scope and timing of potential Cuba policy changes remain unknown, there are indications that the administration could move quickly to address issues affecting the Cuban American community, such as a de facto Trump-era ban on formal remittance flows to the Cuban people. Other steps may include removing some restrictions on U.S. travel to Cuba, as well as revisiting the Trump Administration’s final-hour January 11, 2021 decision to re-designate Cuba a State Sponsor of Terrorism.

The political landscape surrounding Cuba policy has shifted dramatically in recent years. Since 2017, the Trump Administration and its allies in South Florida sought to engage conservative Cuban American voters through aggressive measures to crack down on the Cuban government and strong anti-Castro messaging. Public polling in 2020, as well as Miami-Dade County vote tallies in the November presidential elections, indicate that the strategy was at least somewhat successful. Mr. Trump increased his share of Cuban American votes from 54 percent in 2016 to 56 percent four years later—amidst considerably higher turnout—and helped flip two key South Florida congressional seats in Republicans’ favor. These trends may impact Cuba policy outcomes under Mr. Biden if they heighten the perceived political costs of a return to engagement-oriented policies.

On the other hand, many of President Joe Biden’s senior White House foreign policy advisors and cabinet secretaries at the Departments of State, Homeland Security, Defense, and elsewhere, have tended to favor engagement-oriented approaches, premised on the belief that such policies better serve U.S. interests and promote positive changes in Cuba. First Lady Dr. Jill Biden’s October 2016 travel to Cuba—during which she met with diverse members of Cuban civil society—means that a member of the first family also has first-hand impressions of Cuba policy.

Historically, new presidential administrations have moved swiftly—typically within the first six months—to put their stamp on Cuba policy through executive actions. In April 2009, the Obama Administration issued its first actions by removing restrictions on family remittances and Cuban American travel to Cuba, and by expanding authorizations for U.S. telecommunications projects. In June 2017, the Trump Administration published National Security Presidential Memorandum 5 (”NSPM-5“), “Strengthening the Policy of the United States Toward Cuba,” which laid the foundation for its future Cuba policy actions.

While it seems likely that President Biden will take his own first Cuba policy steps sometime in the next few months by replacing NSPM-5 with a statement of his own administration’s priorities, how far he will go in reversing specific Trump-era restrictions is difficult to predict. However, U.S. companies with Cuba-related interests should get a better sense of the likely future contours of U.S.–Cuba relations soon and initial indications are that Cuba sanctions will become less restrictive under Biden than his predecessor.

Akerman will continue to provide updates on significant Cuba policy developments—as well as any changes to federal regulations—in the coming months.

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By Matthew D. Aho, Pedro A. Freyre, and Augusto E. Maxwell at Akerman.  This Akerman Practice Update is intended to inform firm clients and friends about legal developments, including recent decisions of various courts and administrative bodies. Nothing in this Practice Update should be construed as legal advice or a legal opinion, and readers should not act upon the information contained in this Practice Update without seeking the advice of legal counsel. Prior results do not guarantee a similar outcome.

wines

USTR Increases Tariffs on Aircraft Parts and Certain Wines and Distilled Spirits from France and Germany

Since October 18, 2019, the U.S. has imposed additional duties on various European origin goods (including aircraft, certain textiles and wearing apparel, hardware, cheeses, and other agricultural goods) due to the ongoing Large Civil Aircraft (LCA) dispute with the European Union (EU).

On December 30, 2020, the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) announced that in response to certain EU actions involving duties imposed on U.S. goods in related litigation at the World Trade Organization, the U.S. was adding LCA-dispute tariffs to certain products imported from the EU; specifically, certain aircraft manufacturing parts, non-sparkling wines, and cognacs and other grape brandies, but only if the goods are from France or Germany. All previously announced LCA-dispute tariffs remain in effect.

The additional duties for the newly listed goods will go into effect when entered for consumption, or withdrawn from warehouse for consumption, on or after 12:01 a.m. eastern standard time January 12, 2021.

The additional goods subject to LCA-dispute tariffs and their corresponding tariff provisions are as follows:

Additional goods (wine and spirits) from France and Germany subject to 25% tariff to duties effective January 12, 2021:

-Effervescent grape wine, in containers holding 2 liters or less (subject to subheading 2204.21.20).

-Tokay wine (not carbonated) not over 14% alcohol, in containers not over 2 liters (subject to subheading 2204.21.30).

-Marsala wine, over 14% vol. alcohol, in containers holding 2 liters or less (subject to subheading 2204.21.60).

-Grape wine, other than Marsala, not sparkling or effervescent, over 14% vol. alcohol, in containers holding 2 liters or less (subject to subheading 2204.21.80).

-Wine of fresh grapes, other than sparkling wine, of an alcoholic strength by volume <=14% in containers holding over 2 liters but not over 4 liters (subject to subheading 2204.22.20).

-Wine of fresh grapes, other than sparkling wine, of an alcoholic strength by volume >14% in containers holding over 2 liters but not over 4 liters (subject to subheading 2204.22.40).

-Wine of fresh grapes, other than sparkling wine, of an alcoholic strength by volume <=14% in containers holding over 4 liters but not over 10 liters (subject to subheading 2204.22.60).

-Wine of fresh grapes, other than sparkling wine, of an alcoholic strength by volume >14% in containers holding over 4 liters but not over 10 liters (subject to subheading 2204.22.80).

-Wine of fresh grapes, other than sparkling wine, of an alcoholic strength by volume <=14% in containers holding >10 liters (subject to subheading 2204.29.61).

-Wine of fresh grapes, other than sparkling wine, of an alcoholic strength by volume >14% in containers holding >10 liters (subject to subheading 2204.29.81).

-Grape must, nesoi, in fermentation or with fermentation arrested otherwise than by the addition of alcohol (subject to subheading 2204.30.00).

-Spirits obtained by distilling grape wine or grape marc (grape brandy), other than Pisco and Singani, in containers each holding not over 4 liters, valued over $38 per proof liter (subject to subheading 2208.20.40**).

Additional goods (aircraft parts) from France and Germany subject to an additional 15% duty effective January 12, 2021:

-Fuselages and fuselage sections, wings and wing assemblies (other than wings having exterior surfaces of carbon composite material), horizontal stabilizers, and vertical stabilizers as defined in U.S. note 21(t), suitable for use solely or principally with new airplanes and other aircraft of an unladen weight over 30,000 kg as described in subheading 9903.89.05 (described in statistical reporting number 8803.30.0030) (subject to subheading 8803.30.00**).

USTR stated in its announcement that the additional LCA-dispute duties were being implemented “in a restrained way” to counter what is believed to be the unfair use of certain trade data. Specifically, the WTO authorized the U.S. to impose LCA-dispute tariffs on $7.5 billion of EU goods. Thereafter, the WTO authorized the EU in related litigation to impose tariffs affecting up to $4 billion in U.S. trade. When calculating the duty impact to achieve the permitted $4 billion, the EU used trade data from a time period (August 2019 – July 2020) during which trade was substantially diminished due to the COVID-19 public health emergency. As such, when the EU tariffs are applied to trade volumes in a more normal period, the resulting duties exceed the permitted $4 billion.

In response, the U.S. is mirroring the EU’s time period, the result being that current LCA-dispute tariffs applied to goods during that time period result in additional duties substantially less than the $7.5 billion authorized by the WTO.  Consequently, the USTR’s recently announced tariffs on additional goods from France and Germany are designed to raise the LCA-dispute duties on EU goods during the August 2019 – July 2020 time period to approximately $7.5 billion.

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Robert Stang is a Washington, D.C.-based partner with the law firm Husch Blackwell LLP. He leads the firm’s Customs group.

Emily Lyons is an attorney in Husch Blackwell LLP’s Washington, D.C. office.

ITC

LATEST: Commerce Initiates Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Investigations on Utility Scale Wind Towers from India, Malaysia, and Spain

On November 10, 2020, the U.S. Department of Commerce (“Commerce”) announced the initiation of antidumping (“AD”) and countervailing duty (“CVD”) investigations on Utility-Scale Wind Towers from India, Malaysia, and Spain (Spain is AD only). The petitioners in this case are the Wind Tower Trade Coalition.

The International Trade Commission (“ITC”) is currently scheduled to make its preliminary determinations on or before December 4, 2020. If the ITC determines that there is a reasonable indication that imports of utility-scale wind towers materially injure or threaten the U.S. domestic industry, the investigation will continue and Commerce will be scheduled to announce its preliminary CVD determination on January 13, 2021, and its preliminary AD determination on March 29, 2021.

If the ITC’s determinations are negative—finding that imports of utility-scale wind towers do not pose a risk of injury to the domestic industry—the investigations will be terminated.

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Julia Banegas is an attorney in Husch Blackwell LLP’s Washington, D.C. office.

Camron Greer is an Assistant Trade Analyst in Husch Blackwell LLP’s Washington D.C. office.

lobsters

LOBSTERS ARE A PRAWN IN THE TRADE WARS

Lobster Trap

TradeVistas has named the lobster the “2020 person of the year” in international trade. It’s a well-deserved honor. The lobster is at the center of a trade war that will go down as one of the most compelling cases of the futility of tariff politics.

American lobster and lobster fishers got caught in a trade war being fought on multiple fronts. The United States is battling China on one major front and the European Union (EU) on another, but – as is typical in trade wars – it’s lobster production in another country that’s winning the war. In this case, Canada.

If that weren’t enough, tariffs are the root cause of the trade war, but not in the way you might think. China’s tariffs on U.S. lobsters are in retaliation for President Trump’s China tariffs over intellectual property. The EU didn’t raise its tariffs on U.S. lobster, but rather lowered them on Canadian ones as part of their free trade agreement. In other words, U.S. lobsters were never meant to be the target of either Chinese or EU protectionism.

Trade Person of the Year

Just a Prawn in the Trade Game

How the lobster trade war started isn’t nearly as interesting as the efforts to stop it. The Trump administration has tried to restore market access for American lobster but were outmaneuvered in part through a trade liberalizing measure by China.

Start with China, which hit American lobsters with a 25 percent tariff when President Trump rolled out his China tariffs under Section 301. This tariff hike hurt, but then China moved to lower its lobster tariff at the World Trade Organization (WTO), and this hurt even more. In particular, China slashed its most-favored-nation (MFN) tariff to 7 percent while imposing retaliatory tariffs on U.S. lobster of as much as 40 percent. American lobsters were effectively priced out of the market.

President Trump responded with an Executive order instructing the United States Trade Representative to monitor Chinese imports of lobsters. China’s Phase 1 purchase commitments in the US-China trade deal were to be tracked and “appropriate action” to be taken if China fell short. But these purchase commitments are hard for China to deliver on given the extra import duties on American lobsters. The data speak for themselves: since 2018, U.S. lobster exports to China have fallen by nearly two-thirds.

The irony is that things would be worse were it not for China’s rising trade tensions with Australia, another key supplier of lobsters. Australian lobsters have enjoyed the benefits of zero tariffs under the China-Australia free trade agreement since 2015.

Lobster X to China

Shellfish Trade Liberalization

Then there’s Europe. This front of the lobster trade war is especially interesting because it defies convention. The EU didn’t wage a protectionist campaign against the United States. Instead, since 2017, it has had free trade with Canada. The Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) zeroed out tariffs on Canadian lobsters, leaving their American seafood brethren 8 percent more costly, since U.S. exporters must pay Europe’s MFN rate. In other words, the penalty in the marketplace isn’t because Europe is cheating, but because the United States is falling behind in the race to sign preferential trade agreements.

Back in 2019, Washington had asked Brussels for a deal to offset Canada’s advantage in lobster tariffs. The EU said no, insisting this would violate MFN. Then, this past summer, the EU agreed to zero out it’s lobster tariffs on an MFN basis, retroactive to August 1, in exchange for the United States reducing its tariffs on certain items by 50 percent. This ad hoc approach to trade liberalization, touted as the first tariff cuts in US-EU trade in 20 years, looked like it had plugged the hole. But then came decisions in a longstanding WTO dispute between Boeing and Airbus.

Out of the Blue Sky into the Sea

After more than a decade of WTO litigation, the United States and Europe were both authorized to retaliate. The United States struck first, imposing 15-25 percent tariffs on European food and drink, among other items, up to a maximum of $US7.5 billion. Europe’s authorization was postponed due to COVID-19, but came through this fall, up to a maximum of $US4 billion.

The EU’s original hit list, drawn up to $US25 billion, had included six tariff lines covering frozen and live lobsters. But this week, to the surprise of many, Europe’s revised hit list, redrawn to $US4 billion, spared lobsters entirely. Other seafood was hit, including salmon. But the August deal to walk back the tariff differential caused by CETA had ironically shielded American exporters from WTO-authorized retaliation on civil aircraft. If that doesn’t say it all.

Lobster X to EU

Clawing Back to Normal?

Things may change. A failure to negotiate a US-EU deal on Boeing-Airbus could see Europe yet impose tariffs on American lobsters. But even if that doesn’t happen, the impact of the original 8 percent tariff differential, CETA versus MFN, has been shocking enough.

In 2016, a year before the debut of CETA, U.S. exports of lobsters to Europe were valued at US$152.2 million. In 2019, they stood at US$57.8 million. Through the first nine months of 2020, U.S. exports were valued at US$14.3 million. With these figures in mind, imagine what a 15-25 percent retaliatory tariff would do.

U.S. trade policy has punished the lobster industry for years. Lobster fishermen should be included in the agricultural relief programs enacted by Congress. The takeaway for politicians is that no one set out to wage the lobster trade wars and no one can solve them with more tariffs.

The lobster, as the “person of the year” for 2020, reminds us that freer trade always puts the lie to tariff politics.

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marc busch

Marc L. Busch is the Karl F. Landegger Professor of International Business Diplomacy at the Walsh School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University, a nonresident Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council, and host of the podcast TradeCraft.

hong kong

LATEST: CBP Issues Marking Guidance for Goods Produced in Hong Kong

On August 10, 2020, U.S. Customs & Border Protection (CBP) issued a notice that goods produced in Hong Kong will need to be marked as a product of China starting on September 25, 2020. The marking changes are the result of the July 14, 2020 Executive Order on Hong Kong Normalization that ended Hong Kong’s special trade status.

CBP is allowing for a 45-day transition period after the date of publication in the Federal Register to implement the requirements due to the “commercial realities.” The notice does not specify how the changes affect tariff treatment of Hong Kong goods.

An administration official has stated that the Executive Order does not “provide for new U.S. tariffs on goods from Hong Kong”, but that the Administration is continuing to evaluate its policies. Therefore, at this time, it remains unclear whether goods originating in Hong Kong will be subject to the same tariffs as Chinese origin goods, including antidumping duties, countervailing duties and Section 301 duties.

Additional guidance from CBP, USTR and the U.S. Department of Commerce is expected.

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Stephen Brophy is an attorney in Husch Blackwell LLP’s Washington, D.C. office focusing on international trade.

Robert Stang is a Washington, D.C.-based partner with the law firm Husch Blackwell LLP. He leads the firm’s Customs group.

Turner Kim is an Assistant Trade Analyst in Husch Blackwell LLP’s Washington, D.C. office.

Camron Greer is an Assistant Trade Analyst in Husch Blackwell LLP’s Washington, D.C. office.

3PLs

10 3PLS KILLING IT WITH DISTRIBUTION LOGISTICS

The third-party logistics (3PL) industry did more than $200 billion in revenue in the U.S. in 2018, according to Armstrong & Associates. That figure is double what it was just a decade ago. Rising labor costs, tight shipping capacity and a general need for companies to cut distribution costs are all fueling the growth.

Here are 10 3PLs that are making noteworthy advancements in the world of distribution logistics.

C.H. Robinson

Already one of the largest 3PLs in the world, C. H. Robinson is in the process of acquiring Prime Distribution Services, one of the nation’s leaders in retail consolidation services. “Prime Distribution Services is a high-quality growth company that brings scale and value-added warehouse capabilities to our retail consolidation platform, adding to our global suite of services,” said Bob Biesterfeld, C.H. Robinson CEO, in January. Prime currently operates five distribution centers throughout the U.S., totaling about 2.6 million square feet. With nearly $20 billion in freight under management and 18 million annual shipments, C. H. Robinson earned the top slot in Armstrong & Associates’ Top 50 U.S. 3PLs for 2018.

Holman Logistics

Headquartered in Kent, Washington, Holman opened in Portland back in 1864. Today, it’s one of the leading logistics firms in the Pacific Northwest, though it also manages facilities throughout the nation. The company offers public and contract warehousing (with 7 million square feet of warehousing space), manufacturing logistics, plant support, transportation, collaborative logistics and order-fulfillment services. In terms of distribution, Holman handles both truckload and LTL deliveries, as well as spotting and shuttle services. Some of Holman’s biggest customers are Hill’s Pet Nutrition, Kimberly-Clark, General Electric appliances, Dr. Pepper/Snapple Group, Dole Pineapple, Kerry Foods, Cargill and Morton Salt.

Anchor 3PL

For customers that deal with hazardous materials, logistics can be a tricky, even dangerous proposition. If it’s going the 3PL route for distribution, it’s imperative that it find a company that thoroughly understands the demands of hazmat logistics. While not a large firm, Anchor 3PL operates a 140,000-square-foot warehouse that has 40,000 square feet dedicated to hazmat. Based in Salt Lake City, Anchor regularly deals with chemical and hazmat storage and distribution, works with fire and safety departments, stays on top of the thousands of legal requirements for storing and transporting hazardous materials and maintains relationships with all the regulating authorities.

Kanban

Even with the Trump Administration’s 2018 tariffs on imported photovoltaic panels, the solar industry is booming. Located in eastern North Carolina, in the heart of domestic solar energy production, Kanban is using its thorough knowledge of the industry and logistics to help customers with warehousing and distribution of solar panels. With a million feet of warehouse space, Kanban was able to both assist customers with high-volume warehousing before the tariffs took effect, and then offer solutions for companies that had to change course once the tariffs started. The company also offers logistics assistance for aerospace, food processing and automotive industries.

Cardinal Health Specialty Solutions

Moving pharmaceuticals around the country requires more than simply a cold chain distributor. In 2011, Cardinal began using a special non-toxic, environmentally friendly insulated tote to keep products between 2°C – 8°C (36°F – 46°F) during shipment. The result keeps the supply chain safe as well as prevents possible spoiled or adulterated products from re-entering the supply chain. For vaccine storage and shipment, Cardinal’s commercial refrigeration units are only calibrated using devices from the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). It’s no surprise that Cardinal Health moves one out of every six pharmaceutical products in the country.

Cerasis

Since 1997, Cerasis has specialized in less than truckload (LTL) freight management. In fact, close to 95 percent of the company’s business has been in the LTL realm. Not only does this make sense for those wishing to move smaller volumes of freight, but it’s also perfect for e-commerce shipping. Cerasis is based in Minnesota but maintains offices in Oklahoma and Texas. GlobalTranz acquired Cerasis in January 2020. “Combining with GlobalTranz allows us to continue this history while providing our customers with increased service offerings and access to capacity,” said Cerasis President Steve Ludvigson shortly after the acquisition.

Expeditors

Based in Seattle, Expeditors operates 322 locations in more than 100 nations. Though it handles logistics for a variety of industries, Expeditors has considerable experience and expertise in the automotive world. Its customers include both original equipment manufacturers and tier suppliers, and it uses its sprawling global network—which includes more than 25 million square feet of warehouse space—to track items at the part or vehicle identification number level. Expeditors’ distribution services even include light manufacturing, labeling, product localization, inspection and product rework and compliance.

BDP International

Moving oil and gas around the world is complex, even in the realm of international logistics. No shipment is the same, and regulations are often changing. But BDP has long specialized in moving fuel, so it understands pricing, procurement, heavy lift and turn-key rig mobilization. In terms of distribution, the company operates facilities all around the world (including Dallas, Houston, Los Angeles and Philadelphia), and uses extensive barcode scanning technology to keep track of everything. The company even offers its own BDP Smart Tower application, which allows customers to monitor asset locations, maximize asset utilization and coordinate maintenance and repairs to keep equipment downtime at a minimum.

Qualex

In 1990, Qualex opened as a dock-to-dock delivery company for Southern California furniture makers. Since then, it’s evolved into a full 3PL firm with tightly integrated warehouse and transportation services, though it still specializes in the furniture industry. For each customer, Qualex sets up an Electronic Data Exchange (EDI), which channels replenishment orders directly into its own Warehouse Management System (WMS), making logistics practically invisible.  Full distribution services include confirmation receipts, the automatic emailing of proof of delivery, inventory status reports, installation job status and even emailed photos of product condition upon delivery.

United Natural Foods, Inc.

Since grocery profit industry margins hover around just 2 percent, outsourcing logistics is practically mandatory. With its 2018 acquisition of Supervalu Advantage Logistics, United Natural Foods Inc. (UNFI) became a leader in grocery industry logistics. In fact, it’s the largest publicly traded grocery distributor in the nation. And its warehouse facilities are cutting edge—some have radiofrequency devices that guide selectors to stock, while others are completely automated, ready to deliver aisle-ready pallets to retail stores. SuperValu also ran all the logistics for four regional warehouses belonging to Krogers, the second-largest grocery chain in the country.

administrative review

Opportunity to Request Administrative Review

On August 4, 2020, Commerce announced in the Federal Register the opportunity to request an annual administrative review for products that are currently subject to antidumping and countervailing duties.

The products and countries that have August anniversary months are the following:

-Seamless Line and Pressure Pipe from Germany

-Sodium Nitrite from Germany and China

-Finished Carbon Steel Flanges from India and Italy

-Brass Sheet & Strip; Tin Mill Products from Japan

-Polyethylene Retail Carrier Bags from Malaysia, Thailand, and China

-Light –Walled Rectangular Pipe and Tube from Mexico, Korea, and China

-Dioctyl Terephthalate; Large Power Transformers; Low Melt Polyester Staple Fiber from Korea

-Small Diameter Carbon and Alloy Seamless Standard Line and Pressure Pipe from Romania

-Ripe Olives from Spain

-Certain Frozen Fish Fillets from Vietnam

-Steel Propane Cylinders from Thailand

-Silicomanganese from Ukraine

-Various Products from China

As part of this annual review process, Commerce intends to select respondents based on an analysis of U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) data for U.S. imports during the period of review, which is released only to legal counsel for interested parties.

Any party wishing to participate in the antidumping and countervailing duty review process or who may be affected by duties on the products identified in the Federal Register notice should file a request for review no later than August 31, 2020.  In order to be eligible to participate in the review, a party must either be an exporter or importer of the specific products and during the specific time periods identified in the Federal Register notice.

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Camron Greer is an Assistant Trade Analyst in Husch Blackwell LLP’s Washington D.C. office.

hs code

HS Code Classification Freeway: Take Your Exit

Since the introduction of the Harmonized Tariff System (HTS or HS) in January of 1988 and its global implementation in following years (for example, in the U.S. on January 1, 1989), classifying products (i.e., associating the tangible product to its related HS code) has been a global party. Used on import (and export) declarations, HS codes identify the duty rates applicable to the specific goods, relate to statistics, give regulators an opportunity to link Anti-Dumping Duties (ADD) and Countervailing Duties (CVD) to products, dictate how to qualify for preferential treatment, and can govern document and license requirements. Quite a laundry list—and that makes the correct HS code classification an important piece of information, especially when using an incorrect classification can lead to penalties and delays upon import.

In the U.S., with roughly 16,000 HS codes to choose from, a customs ruling database for U.S. classifications only (CROSS) that is 206K classifications strong, ongoing changes to import tariffs, and a massive World Customs Organisation-initiated overhaul every five years (2022 here we come), it is no wonder classification is evergreen on trade compliance professionals’ list of concerns that demand a significant amount of attention.

To make it more complicated—although harmonized globally at the six-digit level, local authorities are allowed to differentiate down to a local nth digit (usually eight or 10) and have not been hesitant to do so. For example, the U.S. and European Union both support HS codes that have 10 digits, but few are the same or represent the same products. As import declarations are filed locally, this implies that, for each importing country, a different HS code must be identified and then maintained for any product shipped into that country. Do the math: a product catalog of 50,000 parts that ship to 50 different countries adds up to a solid 2.5 million classifications. Not something to maintain on the back of an envelope—unless it’s a really, really big one, erasers are cheap, and pencils are free.

With widely diverse needs for classification (e.g., from a B2C ecommerce shipment of two cotton T-shirts that need an HS code for a quick landed costs calculation, to raw materials and semi-finished products for manufacturers, to a single unique import of a $10 million factory engine), it is no surprise that any self-respecting Global Trade Management (GTM) solution or consultant is happy to assist companies in desperate need for those classifications. And no wonder that, since around 2000, numerous software companies have been trying to solve the mystery of auto-classification.

The diversity in the initial reason for classification comes with different parameters for success. For an ecommerce retailer, an autoclassification tool can solve many challenges (e.g., quick returns, high volume of items are immediately classified), but accuracy can be a challenge. A lack of accuracy is not something importers can afford when, for example, the classification determines whether the import is subject to ADD, is heavily restricted from a license perspective, or is subject to quotas. Basically, (auto-) classification is like a freeway and, depending on the exact needs, companies take a different exit.

There are three key components to a successful (auto-) classification project—other than, of course, the hopefully not superfluous statement that a decent amount of classification expertise comes in handy when either classifying or building a tool.

First, the quality of the product description. ‘Garbage in, garbage out’ also applies to classifying. Poor descriptions, lack of product detail, or even incorrect specifications will likely lead to an incorrect HS code with all related consequences. For quality descriptions, product managers or developers may get involved to provide the necessary technical detail as some classification decisions are made based on those elements.

Second, the classification logic. Whether the classification is assigned by a person or a tool, classification logic cannot lack, well, logic. This means many things: rules that decide to classify a piece of clothing that is not gender-specific as textiles for female or male (and the U.S. handles it differently from the EU); rules-based classification that guides the correct classification in a decision matrix fashion; the ability to ignore information not relevant to the classification (e.g., color); or the ability to observe characteristics that may be needed in one case but not for another (e.g., weight), including material compositions that are usually very important. The logic must also account for a way to ‘smart search’, or search across different references to generate results from, such as synonyms, natural language, industry jargon, and even from images. In addition, classification logic means integrating Artificial Intelligence (AI) and Machine Learning (ML) into the application so results can automatically improve, which enhances both the number of items classified and the quality of the classifications without human intervention.

Third, the classification reference database. The classification logic must look to match a description with an HS code not only by matching it with a ‘word in the tariff’ but also with the explanatory notes and, preferably, for broader context a natural language reference. This might include a shipping manifest reference or information gained via access to previous imports and classification repositories of identical products. Regardless, all types of references need to be reviewed before the final classification is determined. The logic is only as sound as the foundation on which it is built.

It’s important to keep in mind that references are also where, as an industry, companies should actually assist one another. Data privacy concerns notwithstanding, there must be a way to ‘crowd source’ references, which could reduce the efforts made and resources spent on classification in sensational fashion—engineering a classification freeway that is even more well-marked and efficient to traverse.

hong kong

President Trump’s Executive Order Ends Hong Kong Country of Origin

On July 14, 2020, President Trump signed into law an Executive Order that ends Hong Kong’s differential treatment compared to the People’s Republic of China (“PRC” or “China”). The President’s action follows the Chinese government’s decision in late May to impose new national security legislation on Hong Kong that outlaws any act of “secession,” “terrorism,” or “collusion” with a foreign power.

The United States government objects to this legislation and believes that it has compromised Hong Kong’s autonomous status, which justified  Hong Kong’s differential treatment from China for a number of purposes. As President Trump stated following the signing of the Executive Order, “Hong Kong will now be treated the same as mainland China…no special privileges, no special economic treatments and no export of sensitive technologies.”

As a result of the Executive Order, any imported Hong Kong origin goods will now be considered Chinese origin and will be subject to the Section 301 tariffs on certain Chinese imports, or any antidumping or countervailing duty orders applicable to China.

The Executive Order also eliminates any passport preferences for persons from Hong Kong as opposed to those from the PRC and revokes any Export Administration Regulation (“EAR”) license exceptions for exports, re-exports, and in-country transfers pertaining to Hong Kong. The order also authorizes steps to end other forms of U.S.-Hong Kong cooperation unrelated to international trade, such as the Fulbright exchange program.

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Robert Stang is a Washington, D.C.-based partner with the law firm Husch Blackwell LLP. He leads the firm’s Customs group.

Jeffrey Neeley is a Washington-based partner with the law firm Husch Blackwell LLP. He leads the firm’s International Trade Remedies team.

Turner Kim is an Assistant Trade Analyst in Husch Blackwell LLP’s Washington D.C. office.

Camron Greer is an Assistant Trade Analyst in Husch Blackwell LLP’s Washington D.C. office.

france

USTR Announces Additional Duties on Cosmetics and Handbags from France, Delays Effective Date Until January 2021

On July 10, 2020, the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) announced that it would impose a 25 percent additional duty on certain cosmetics, soaps and cleansing products, and handbags that are products of France, valued at $1.3 billion, due to the French Digital Services Tax (DST). Nevertheless, USTR delayed the application of the duties for as long as 180 days, which means that at the earliest, the additional duties would go into effect January 6, 2020.  USTR stated that the tariffs could go into effect sooner than the 180-day suspension period, but if this change were to occur, USTR would issue a subsequent Federal Register Notice amending the effective date of implementation for the tariffs.

In July 2019, USTR opened an investigation directed at the Government of France under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, because of France’s new DST, which imposed a 3 percent revenue tax on companies providing certain online services directed at French customers. In December 2019, USTR found that the French DST was “unreasonable, discriminatory, and burdens U.S. commerce” and was expected to collect over $500 million in taxes for activities in 2021. USTR accepted comments from interested parties in early 2020 on a proposed list of goods targeted for additional tariffs, which included French cheeses, wines, cosmetics, and handbags. However, prior to the imposition of additional duties, the U.S. and French governments were able to negotiate a truce that temporarily delayed the implementation of the DST until December 2020 and obviated the need for USTR to take immediate action.

USTR has stated that this action concerning tariffs on certain French goods is not intended to escalate trade tensions with France but instead was necessitated by Section 304(a)(2)(B) of the Trade Act of 1974 requiring that USTR announce the action to be taken within 12 months of the initiation of the Section 301 investigation. The 180-day delay of the imposition of the tariffs is intended to provide USTR and France additional time to continue discussions, which could lead to a satisfactory resolution of the DST matter.

USTR has stated that it will continue to monitor the effect of the trade action and may modify the list of affected goods necessary to ensure resolution of the matter with the Government of France.

This action comes on the heels of USTR announcing a similar action into digital service taxes involving India, the European Union and several other countries. Over the last few years, various governments have enacted or considered taxes on revenues generated by digital services companies within the different jurisdictions. Proponents of DSTs argue that the tax corrects corporate taxation to cover previously untaxed or undertaxed revenues. Alternatively, the position of the Trump administration is that DSTs unfairly discriminate against “large, U.S.-based tech companies” such as Amazon and Google.

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Robert Stang is a Washington, D.C.-based partner with the law firm Husch Blackwell LLP. He leads the firm’s Customs group.

Emily Lyons is an attorney in Husch Blackwell LLP’s Washington, D.C. office.