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Traxens Raises 23M€ and Acquires NEXT4 To Become the World Leader of Shipping Container Tracking

Traxens

Traxens Raises 23M€ and Acquires NEXT4 To Become the World Leader of Shipping Container Tracking

TRAXENS, the leading smart-container service provider for
the global supply chain industry, announced today a new financing round of €23 million ($25+ million) from the company’s existing shareholders. The funds will be used to fuel Traxens’ international expansion starting with the acquisition of NEXT4, a fast-growing French supplier of removable and reusable shipping container trackers.

Traxens’ Internet-of-Things (IoT) solution is based on a breakthrough technology that enables access to the most comprehensive, precise and timely data for managing assets in transit anywhere in the world. In addition to tracking container geolocation, it detects shocks and monitors temperature and humidity, as well as the open-or-closed status of container doors.

The acquisition, confirmed today, will allow Traxens to streamline and merge NEXT4’s offering into its suite of solutions, providing customers with the best of both solutions — including shipments scheduling, collaborative risk management, and analysis reports. The newly consolidated company is now the market frontrunner in providing overseas cargo visibility and offers Traxens’ customers a technological edge in container tracking solutions.

“Integrating NEXT4 into our company dramatically increases our ability to serve the growing needs of our customers as they digitalize their business processes, while adding freight visibility, cargo security and goods integrity,” said Traxens CEO David Marchand.

Founded in Toulouse in 2018, NEXT4 provides trackers that can be attached to containers from point of origin to the final destination. This provides freight forwarders with a premium tracking solution and gives customers 24/7, real-time data on the status and location of their goods via sensors inside the containers.

Tens of thousands of NEXT4 trackers have been adopted by leading freight forwarders such as Bolloré Logistics and DB Schenker. Airlines have also approved the latest version of its trackers, a smaller and more versatile device, that allows them to be adapted to the needs of the air freight industry.

The €23 million round of financing follows a Series C funding round of approximately €20M ($22.7M) raised in 2019. This new acquisition will enable the consolidated French company to continue deploying its smart-containers worldwide, while building new relationships with major players in the supply chain, including companies focused on container leasing, insurance and
transport management systems.

As it moves into new markets in the U.S., South America and Asia, Traxens will also use the funding to further expand its portfolio of solutions to address the increasing needs of freight forwarders and beneficial cargo owners (BCO) for supply chain transparency.

“Joining the Traxens group enables us to market our innovative solution on an internationalNEXT4 will operate as a wholly-owned subsidiary of Traxens with offices in Toulouse. In addition
to remaining as CEO of NEXT4, Rosemont will serve as Traxens’ chief marketing officer. scale and to jointly develop new products and solutions with their team,” said NEXT4 CEO and founder Cédric Rosemont. “Our highly complementary solutions will meet the current and future challenges of shippers and their logistics providers. This means NEXT4’s customers also can benefit from Traxens’ solutions, which are now being widely deployed by container owners.”

NEXT4 will operate as a wholly-owned subsidiary of Traxens with offices in Toulouse. In addition to remaining as CEO of NEXT4, Rosemont will serve as Traxens’ chief marketing officer.

Both CEOs will be available for interviews about this strategic merger at the TPMTECH (Feb.24-25) and TPM22 (Feb. 27-March 2) trade shows in Long Beach, Calif.

carrier

A ROUNDUP OF RECENT MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS THAT ARE SHAPING AND DEFINING THE CARRIER INDUSTRY

There is no denying that the past 18 months have been a tumultuous period for the global maritime industry. 

According to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), sea-based trade plunged by 4.1% in 2020 due to the unprecedented disruption caused by COVID-19. 

The pandemic has sent shockwaves through supply chains, shipping networks and ports, leading to plummeting cargo volumes and foiling growth prospects, not helped by the enormous uncertainty that accompanies the world’s efforts to emerge out of the pandemic. 

Despite the gloom, UNCTAD expects maritime trade growth to return to positive territory and expand by 4.8% in 2021, assuming world economic output recovers. However, the organization highlights the need for the maritime transport industry to brace for change and be well prepared for a transformed post-COVID-19 world.

Looking at the commercial and strategic activities of major shipping lines is often a good sign of the health of the industry more widely. 

As we progress through 2021, mergers and acquisitions are giving mixed signals, and clearly paint a picture of fluctuating fortunes. 

Damco and Diamond S Shipping dissolve 

In September 2020, industry leaders Maersk announced that it would be integrating Damco’s air and ocean less-than-container-load shipping into its wider business, thus dissolving the brand it merged with Maersk Line at the beginning of 2019. 

The move was part of series of strategic plays by CEO Soren Skou that are geared toward a central goal of becoming an integrated logistics company that provides end-to-end solutions for its customers. 

Shipping commentators regard the Damco internalization as a blurring of the lines between forwarders and carriers. 

For forwarders, alarm bells could start ringing as Maersk now provides direct competition to these companies. DB Schenker reacted quickly to the announcement, offering a so-called stability package to Damco customers that matched the previous terms they were operating under. 

It has created a fascinating dynamic, as many forwarders rely on Maersk as a supplier of carrier services. 

And Damco has not been the only casualty of the Danish company’s reshuffling. Maersk has also spun off lines that include its once-formidable oil drilling business, instead focusing its efforts on acquiring businesses that fit into its core purpose. This includes those specializing in customs and warehousing, as well as numerous digital tools. 

Another well-known brand that has fallen away is America’s Diamond S Shipping, which in March announced it was merging with New York-based International Seaways, the latter keeping its brand as part of the all-stock transaction deal. 

Post-merger, International Seaways will own a fleet of 100 tankers that between them have a capacity of 11.3 million deadweight tons, assets which give it an implied market capitalization of around $1 billion. The fleet split will be approximately 70-30 between crude tankers and product tankers respectively.

Diamond S Shipping went public after it merged with Capital Product Partners in early 2019, this after failing with an IPO attempt five years earlier.

Speaking at the time of the latest merger announcement, Nadim Qureshi, chairman of the Board of Directors of Diamond S Shipping, commented: “We are pleased to enter into a transaction that will both create near-term value for our shareholders and create a superior, scale vehicle that enables investors to gain exposure in both the crude and product tanker markets with strong fundamentals. Importantly, since the focus of the management teams of both Diamond S and INSW are similar, we see further value from synergies in the combined company.”

The combined company will be home to 2,200 employees and carry a market value of around $2 billion. 

K-Alliance and Hapag-Lloyd show brighter prospects 

In South Korea, a huge code-sharing agreement in the form of the K-Alliance looks set to strengthen a series of shipping firms’ competitiveness in Southeast Asia. 

The move sees several enterprises joining forces–HMM, SM Line, Pan Ocean and the recently merged Sinokor Merchant Marine and Heung-A Line–with the intention of reducing operating costs and increasing quality of services.

It is thought that the alliance represents around 40% of South Korea’s container volumes in the region, which stands at approximately 480,000 TEUs. It is hoped that this consortium will help to stave off international competition that is threatening to take a greater market share. 

K-Alliance is the brainchild of South Korea’s Ministry of Oceans and Fisheries, which oversaw the signing of the agreement via video conferencing toward the end of 2020. As an extra incentive, it is offering alliance members preferential interest rates for new vessel orders. 

On announcing the move, the ministry hinted that more activity could be in store. 

“It’s the first attempt to form a service alliance consisting of only South Korean carriers to reap economies of scale,” read the announcement. “Other operators are welcome to join in at any time, in consultation with existing member companies.”

Korea’s shipping industry, having hit rock bottom, is starting to show signs of a rebound, the K-Alliance being another indication that the sector is on its way to a substantive recovery. 

The activity of German firm Hapag-Lloyd also sheds some light on the general direction of travel for the global shipping industry. In announcing the acquisition of NileDutch in March 2021, it has signaled its intent to expand its operations in the booming African market. 

With over 40 years of expertise, NileDutch is one the most prominent providers of container services from and to West Africa. The company is present in 85 locations across the world and has 16 offices spread across the Netherlands, Belgium, France, Singapore, China, Angola, Congo and Cameroon. 

With 10 liner services, around 35,000 TEUs of transport capacity and a container fleet of around 80,000 TEU, the company connects Europe, Asia and Latin America with West and South Africa. 

Rolf Habben Jansen, CEO of Hapag-Lloyd, outlined the firm’s faith in the African market when news broke of the NileDutch transaction.

“Africa is an important strategic growth market for Hapag-Lloyd,” Jansen said. “The acquisition of NileDutch strengthens our position in West Africa and will be an excellent addition to our existing activities on the continent. Our combined customer base will benefit from a denser network from and to Africa as well as from a much higher frequency of sailings.”

Indeed, as the world begins to emerge from its cocoon and vaccination programs extend their reach, it will be with great interest to observe where the dust settles in relation to the makeup of the global ocean carrier industry. 

Some big names have disappeared while others have strengthened–a new status quo that has revealed key trends which could shape the sector moving forward.

Whether it is the move by giants such as Maersk to combine forwarding and carrier services, or the clear vote of confidence shown by Hapag-Lloyd in the African market, the dice are starting to be rolled after the standstill period brought about by COVID-19. 

investor

Meet the New SPAC Circus Ringleader: The PIPE Investor

Since late 2019, when the special purpose acquisition corporation, or SPAC, returned to the public markets with a new twist, a circus of activity has breathed new life into the markets for privately-held emerging growth companies, forcing open a large window for public exits not seen in decades. In this “SPAC 2.0 boom,” sponsors of SPAC vehicles first raised large pools of blind capital in the public markets and then struck deals to buy emerging growth companies for ~10x the cash raised plus rollover equity and a second pile of cash in the form of a PIPE.

What is a PIPE, and why is it used for a de-SPAC merger?

“PIPE” stands for “private investment in a public entity,” often priced at a discount or containing a “sweetener” for the PIPE investor to make a more significant commitment than it would otherwise in the public market. The PIPE fundraising process happens after an LOI for a de-SPAC is signed, but before a definitive merger agreement, and is signed and announced concurrently with the latter. Then the SPAC and the target work together to prepare a joint registration statement and proxy filing on Form S-4 and seek SPAC stockholder approval, which requires the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission to review and clear the de-SPAC transaction. Once the de-SPAC merger closes, the company files a resale registration statement to register the shares of common stock and warrants underlying the PIPE.

PIPE investors include investment funds, hedge funds, mutual funds, private equity funds, growth equity funds, and other accredited large institutional and qualified institutional buyers of publicly traded stock. The PIPE is well suited to complement the SPAC in a de-SPAC merger because of the speed of execution and because it does not require advance SEC review and approval.

SPACs have tapped PIPEs to bring in additional capital in a shorter amount of time to close de-SPAC mergers. Because of the nature of the SPAC process, there is often uncertainty surrounding the amount of cash that will be on hand following the merger. When combined with the SPAC proceeds in trust, the funds from the PIPE work together to provide liquidity for sellers and post-closing capital for the business to grow.

To be clear, in SPAC 2.0, the enterprise value of the target is so many multiples of the SPAC proceeds in trust that a PIPE has become ubiquitous to bridge the value gap. The Morgan Stanley data showed that on average, PIPE capital almost tripled the purchasing power of the SPAC, and for every $100 million raised through a SPAC, adding a PIPE added another $167 million.

Raising funds via a PIPE deal is comparable in some ways to an IPO roadshow in that there is a pitch to potential investors. However, PIPE deals are only open to accredited individual investors, and the share price is determined by reference to the de-SPAC merger valuation. When looking for PIPE investors in SPACs, targets look for high-profile names whose investment at a specified helps to validate the deal. This investment by well-respected investors can help to mitigate some of the risks that come with SPACs.

While PIPE deals are seen as an attractive option partly because they avoid many SEC regulations, all the attention SPACs have received, and their incredible spike in popularity has drawn the attention of regulators. This could mean additional regulations are on the horizon for both SPACs and PIPEs. But for now, these two continue to be an attractive combination for those looking to bypass the traditional IPO process.

What is SPAC 2.0 and why is the PIPE investor the ringleader?

SPAC 2.0 was essentially the cash in the SPAC vehicle combined with a new private fundraiser in the form of a PIPE merged into a privately-held emerging growth company. The resulting party for SPAC IPOs, de-SPAC transactions, and even traditional initial public offerings, or IPOs, continued through the end of the first quarter of 2021, with hardly even a little intermission for the first COVID lockdown. According to data compiled by Morgan Stanley, in 2020, PIPEs generated $12.4 billion in additional funding for 46 SPAC mergers.

The SPAC 2.0 structure had something for everyone:

-the emerging growth company got a public exit without having to go through a traditional IPO

-the emerging growth company stockholders got a snap spot-valuation based on three-year out financial projections not available in conventional IPOs

-the emerging growth company got a public acquisition currency in the form of listed stock, validation in the public markets via the stock exchange listing, and cash to the balance sheet to power growth

-stockholders in the emerging growth company could negotiate for some amount of immediate liquidity

-stockholders in the emerging growth company got long-term liquidity via the public trading market

-SPAC stockholders and PIPE investors got access to emerging growth companies that weren’t otherwise going public

-SPAC sponsors made their “carry” in the form of 20% of the equity in the SPAC (pre-dilution) plus warrants in some cases and a path to liquidity with a short lock-up period

-SPAC sponsors could rent out their names, network, and prestige and get a quick exit

While in SPAC 1.0, the SPAC sponsors would take over the target and operate it like a private equity buyout fund for long-term capital growth, in SPAC 2.0, the SPAC sponsors are like bankers, raising capital and then handing over the keys to management of the emerging growth company in exchange for a commission.

But the lights went out for the SPAC party in April 2021 when President Biden appointed a new chair to lead the Securities and Exchange Commission. Upon taking office, new SEC Chair Gary Gensler effectively closed the market for SPACs by announcing a compliance review, putting long-standing SEC policy and rule interpretations in doubt. Transaction participants reported that SEC staffers reviewing their pending transactions started asking questions, requesting changes, and appeared in no hurry to clear pending “de-SPAC” deals.

The market for new issues froze up, and the demand for de-SPAC transactions ground to a halt. The trading index for recently “de-SPAC’ed” public companies dropped double-digit percentage points.  Investors started to lick their wounds.

When the SEC began clearing SPAC mergers again in early summer 2021, it was not as simple as just turning lights back on and taking its foot off the brakes. That is because PIPE investors, who provide fresh capital to the company that is merging with a public SPAC vehicle (commonly referred to as a “de-SPAC transaction”), have taken their place as the new ringleaders at the SPAC circus. The amount of capital PIPE investors are willing to put into a de-SPAC transaction at a given valuation and what sweeteners have become the deciding factor as to whether a de-SPAC transaction can get done.

PIPE investors no longer accept transaction terms as proposed and have started to make new commitments contingent on adjusted valuations, redemptions of SPAC sponsor promote securities, and better alignment to create better after-market trading conditions. Knowing what PIPE investors want and how much they will pay has become the new ticket to success in the SPAC market. This makes the PIPE investor the new ringleader in the SPAC 3.0 cycle.

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Louis Lehot is an emerging growth company, venture capital, and M&A lawyer at Foley & Lardner in Silicon Valley. Louis spends his time providing entrepreneurs, innovative companies, and investors with practical and commercial legal strategies and solutions at all stages of growth, from the garage to global.

mergers and acquisitions

Supporting Mergers and Acquisitions in the Pharmaceutical/Biopharmaceutical Industry

In recent years, we have seen Pharmaceutical company megadeals that saw Takeda acquiring Shire for a total value of $81.7 billion, Bristol-Myers Squibb’s acquisition of Celgene for $74 billion, AbbVie’s $63 billion acquisition of Allergan and the proposed acquisition of Alexion by AstraZeneca for $39 billion. All of these acquisitions continue to have a lasting impact on the leadership and staff at these companies which collectively employ hundreds of thousands of employees worldwide. In addition, there have been a plethora of product transfers between organizations with larger multi-national companies pruning portfolios, adding gene therapy and biotechnology divisions, and consolidating core assets.

Mergers and acquisitions (M&As) in the Pharmaceutical/Biopharmaceutical industry are critical for organizations to implement strategic changes to their business. Whether it be to (a) future proof an organization’s pipeline by accessing innovation, (b) obtain additional manufacturing capacity or (c) to divest non-core assets (products, facilities, etc.), companies continue to grow, modernize and evolve to meet the targets set out in their strategic plans.

When two or more organizations reach the ‘deal’ and it is announced that ‘A’ will take over ‘B’ or that A and B will share in ‘A-B’, or indeed that ‘A’ will sell part of their organization to ‘B’, it is frequently followed by uncertainty and apprehension among internal stakeholders. This changing landscape tests an organization’s ability to communicate the distinct ‘win-win’ elements of the deal. The Kübler-Ross change curve (see fig.1 below) is always worth having in mind during this transitional period of M&A and never fails in tracking the internal stakeholder mindset, albeit with differing levels of severity.

Figure 1. Kübler-Ross Change Curve

The transition from pre-M&A to the post-M&A reality can be both fast and slow. The physical symbols of such transitions such as the company name, logo, and headed paper can be changed in a matter of minutes but the hearts and minds of management and employees can lag significantly further behind. It can take years before a post-M&A steady state is reached (sometimes never!) where full commitment to the change is obtained and all the anticipated ‘win-wins’ are realized.

Some acquired organizations are left to their own devices (pardon the pun medtech sector!) and they are run as true satellites whose contact with the corporate office is limited to communicating the positive financial results. In this scenario, the management team in-situ at the time of the M&A event are trusted to continue as-is and maintain the upward trajectory. Alternatively, and more commonly where there is a dominant merging partner, a strict cut-over timeline is applied for an acquired entity to morph into a fully incorporated affiliate. Typically, these sites implement corporate structures, policies and systems swiftly and assertively.

Where M&A becomes can be interesting is the cultural piece; everyone who has worked in an organization through a merger or acquisition knows that there can be a seismic shift in the objectives of the new organization… not so much what the objectives are but, how the objectives are expected to be met. Post M&A, organizations frequently change structure with new reporting lines, new titles, merged departments, increased/reduced layers of management with revised spans of control. Systems of work can also change where new policies are cascaded into procedures that are followed with varying degrees of success. Supporting systems, software tools and information flows are further material changes that tend to require extensive training and oversight in the early periods post-M&A.

When cultures collide in merging organizations, it has serious ramifications for business and its stakeholders. The industry is littered with mergers and takeovers that did not meet expectations simply because the cultural differences were too difficult to overcome. Naturally, organizations do not admit to failed mergers or acquisitions too often but some of the more interesting ones are referenced below.1 Very often the differences in personal and collective discipline, personified in the leadership differences in the two organizations, is challenging for the organizations to reconcile. Where rigid, structured and conservative management methods meet innovative and unorthodox management can be a recipe for M&A difficulties.2

At PharmaLex, we believe we have a unique understanding of the cultural challenges experienced during Mergers and  Acquisitions. Having merged ourselves in 2017 into PharmaLex, we have insight in how to overcome the challenges of maintaining agility while benefitting from working in a bigger corporate environment, having economies of scale with an increased resource pool. In addition, we have supported numerous Quality and Regulatory functions through these challenging periods through Gap Assessments, Benchmarking Studies, Cultural Assessments, Staff Augmentation, Organisational Optimisation and Leadership Coaching and Mentoring. If you would like our team to assist you or your organization with some of the challenges of changing culture, please connect with us to discuss on +353 1 846 4742 or contact@pharmalex.com

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References

https://www.fiercepharma.com/special-report/top-15-m-a-mistakes

https://hbr.org/2018/10/one-reason-mergers-fail-the-two-cultures-arent-compatible

SPAC

SPACs and Latin America

Overview

A special purpose acquisition company (“SPAC”) is a New York Stock Exchange (“NYSE”) or NASDAQ-listed shell company through which a team of sponsors raises capital in an initial public offering (“IPO”) for an unspecified future acquisition of an operating company, which in turn can quickly become NYSE or NASDAQ-listed upon merging with the SPAC. While SPACs have existed in some form for decades, their popularity has increased dramatically over the last two years. The over US$83 billion in gross proceeds raised in 248 SPAC IPOs in 2020 not only shattered the previous record of US$13.6 billion raised in 59 IPOs in 2019, but exceeds proceeds raised in the entire previous decade combined. The trend has continued to accelerate in 2021, with over 170 SPACs launched in the first two months of this year for over US$53 billion in gross proceeds, and SPACs making up over 70% of all US IPO activity.

The SPAC boom has been a major driver of the current revival in the US IPO market and helped reverse a two-decade cultural trend in Silicon Valley and the rest of the start-up world of staying private for a longer period of time. A merger with a SPAC has become an increasingly popular path to a public listing for start-ups in hot sectors such as electric vehicles and biotechnology, as well as portfolio company exit strategy for major private equity firms. Major private equity and venture capital firms, along with hedge funds, have also been prolific SPAC sponsors. SPACs have also increasingly been a vehicle for emerging market opportunities, both on the sponsor side by emerging market management teams and investors, and on the target side for emerging market companies looking for an efficient path to a US listing.

The Target

For a potential target company looking to gain access to US public markets, acquisition by a SPAC offers several advantages over a traditional IPO, including:

Speed to market. A traditional IPO will likely take months longer than being acquired by a SPAC given the broad disclosure requirements of a registration statement on Form S-1 (for a US company) or F-1 (for a non-US company) and accompanying US Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) comment process, whereas a SPAC target’s principal public disclosure obligations will come in the proxy statement on Form S-4 (for a US company) or F-4 (for a non-US company), which has considerably less onerous requirements. On the other hand, the target company will need to be prepared to be an SEC-registered and NYSE or NASDAQ-listed company quickly, including appropriate financial statements, corporate governance and capacity to meet its future disclosure obligations.  Non-US companies, or Foreign Private Issuers, will in any case enjoy a significantly lower regulatory burden than a US company, including significantly less required disclosure of executive compensation, exemption from the proxy requirements of US public companies and the ability to generally (with a couple of exceptions) follow home country governance rules instead of those imposed on US companies by the SEC, NASDAQ and NYSE.

Pricing certainty. The target company’s valuation will be negotiated in a private, M&A-like process with the SPAC sponsors and, as discussed below, PIPE investors, as opposed to the underwriter-driven and highly volatile traditional IPO pricing that will depend on real-time market conditions and demand from public investors.

Release of projections. A target company can include forward-looking projections in its Form S-4/F-4 disclosure, unlike in Form S-1/F-1, giving it more control over its story as it introduces itself to US public market investors. A company will also generally enjoy more flexibility to engage in more detailed discussions with prospective acquirers and investors ahead of any transaction, compared to the restrictions on communications that come with a traditional pre-IPO process.

Control over corporate governance. A traditional IPO is a long, collaborative process with underwriters who will tend to look at all issues, including the building out and disclosure of the company’s post-IPO corporate governance, with a focus on maximizing public investor demand at the initial sale. Therefore, where founders seek to maintain a level of control to the extent permitted under SEC, NYSE or NASDAQ rules (and for non-US companies, governance rules exemptions by all three of these are broad enough that quite a lot is permitted), especially in the technology sector, they are likely to encounter more pushback from underwriters than from M&A counterparties with whom they are directly negotiating valuation. Of course, each transaction is different and the level of founder control a SPAC acquirer is prepared to accept will vary.

The SPAC IPO

While the SEC registration process for a SPAC IPO largely follows that of any IPO, with the filing of a registration statement on Form S-1/F-1 and SEC comments, in practice the lack of operating history and financial statements makes it a much more streamlined process. With no operating business to describe, disclosure will center on the experience of the sponsor team, the type of company that will be targeted for acquisition and the terms to the public shareholders of the SPAC.

Typical SPAC terms include:

Founder shares. Sponsors acquire initial equity in the SPAC for nominal value and purchase warrants to help fund costs, typically with built-in anti-dilution protections designed to ensure that such shares convert into at least 20% of the post-IPO and pre-acquisition company. This leads to the sponsors effectively acquiring their stake in the post-acquisition public operating company at a discount and potentially very attractive returns.

Units. Public shareholders are offered units typically consisting of one share of common stock and a portion of a warrant, which can only be exercised after the acquisition. Units, common stock and warrants are all publicly traded, and investors can unbundle their units to trade stock and warrants separately.

Searching period. A SPAC typically has up to two years after its IPO to submit a proposed transaction to a shareholder vote, or be required to liquidate and return the public shareholders’ investment plus accrued interest.

Shareholder redemption. When the sponsors propose an acquisition, or if they seek an extension of the searching period, public shareholders have the option to instead redeem their shares for cash at the IPO price plus accrued interest, with the right to keep their warrants and thereby maintain some upside exposure.

Trust Account. Capital raised in the SPAC IPO is placed in an interest-earning trust account to be used to fund the future acquisition, buy out any redeeming shareholders or liquidate and pay out the public shareholders if no acquisition occurs.

Acquisition by a SPAC

To meet the typical two year deadline to submit a proposed acquisition for shareholder approval, sponsors need to promptly begin the search process to allow adequate time to evaluate potential transactions, initiate and complete negotiations with targets, bring in PIPE investors, and begin and complete the S-4/F-4 drafting and filing process, including SEC review and comment.

Private-investment-in-public-equity (“PIPE”) financings by institutional investors in a SPAC prior to, or concurrently with, the announcement of a proposed acquisition have by now become standard. PIPE financings bring several benefits ahead of the acquisition, including reputable anchor investors to effectively endorse the new public company, price discovery as the valuation of the new public company is negotiated with the PIPE investors, and additional cash proceeds both for the acquisition and new public company operations, including as a backstop against uncertain levels of public shareholder redemptions.

Following the announcement of an acquisition, the sponsors will solicit the SPAC’s public shareholders’ approval of the transaction in a proxy statement filed on Form S-4 or F-4. As discussed above, this will be the principal disclosure document describing the business of the target company, including historical and pro forma post-merger financial data, as well as management’s discussion and analysis of its financial condition and results of operations. The S-4/F-4 will describe the terms of the proposed merger and transaction documents, the latter of which will be provided as exhibits. The document will also describe the process leading up to the transaction, including a history of the search process, insight into the SPAC’s management and board of directors’ analysis of potential transactions and decision-making process, and the role of outside advisors.  Once the acquisition is approved, under most structures the target is merged with the SPAC and its shareholders receive shares of the listed entity (in some structures the surviving public company is a new entity, but the end result is effectively the same for public shareholders).

Emerging Markets, Latin America and SPACs

Emerging market companies are increasingly participating in the SPAC wave. Most prominently, Grab Holdings Inc., a leading Southeast Asia technology company, recently agreed to be acquired by NASDAQ-listed Altimeter Growth Corp. in the largest SPAC acquisition in history. Other recent prominent transactions include, on the target side, India’s ReNew Power Private Limited’s proposed acquisition by, and NASDAQ listing through, RMG Acquisition Corporation II, and on the sponsor side, Chinese private equity firm Primavera Capital Group’s launch of Primavera Capital Group Acquisition Corporation, a SPAC to be listed on the NYSE.

Now, Latin American companies, especially in the technology sector, are also becoming the targets of SPACs. Several investment firms, including Softbank, LIV Capital, Rocket Internet and DILA Capital have recently formed SPACs with the intention of acquiring Latin American companies.

Brazilian businesses, in particular, have had a strong presence in the recent SPAC boom as both sponsor and target. SPACs sponsored by prominent Brazilian business figures that have gone public in the last two years include: NASDAQ-listed Patria Acquisition Corp., sponsored by Patria Investments Limited; NYSE-listed HPX Corp., led by 3G Capital and Vinci Partners veterans Bernardo Hees, Carlos Piani and Rodrigo Xavier; NASDAQ-listed Itiquira Acquisition Corp., led by Paulo Carvalho de Gouvea, previously associated with XP Inc., MMX, Eneva and Rede D’Or; NASDAQ-listed Alpha Capital Acquisition Company, led by OLX founder Alec Oxenford and former head of Qualcomm Latin American and Cisco Brazil Rafael Steinhauser; and NYSE-listed Replay Acquisition Corp., led by Edmond Safra and Gregorio Werthein of Argentina’s Werthein Group. All five of the foregoing launched with the stated purpose of acquiring a business in Brazil or elsewhere in Latin America. Replay ultimately announced the acquisition of Blackstone portfolio company and US-focused Finance of America Equity Capital LLC instead, illustrating the flexibility enjoyed by both SPAC sponsors and, via the effective put option on their shares, shareholders.

Patria, HPX, Itiquira and Alpha have yet to announce a proposed acquisition. Brazilian sponsors have also launched SPACs with the express purpose of outbound investment into the developed world, as was the case with the NASDAQ-listed vehicle launched by GP Investments in 2015, GP Investments Acquisition Corp., which ultimately acquired US software services company Rimini Street, Inc. On the target side, sanitation company Estre Ambiental S.A. became NASDAQ-listed through a December 2017 merger with Boulevard Acquisition Corp. II, a SPAC sponsored by executives of Avenue Capital Group which, interestingly, at its launch expressed no particular plans to seek Brazilian or non-US businesses.

Despite the recent increase in activity in the Latin American capital markets, the reality is that it remains a very volatile environment for companies to raise capital. In this context, Latin American companies, especially in the technology and financial sectors, have more recently in growing numbers considered a listing in the US as an alternative for their capital needs. For Latin American sponsors, it is an interesting opportunity to take advantage of the current excess of liquidity in the US market and make the bridge between US investors and great companies in Latin America looking for capital. As SPACs become an increasingly dominant portion of public US capital markets, Brazilian and other emerging market investors and companies who seek access to that market should naturally find themselves more active in one side or another of these transactions.

culture quiet

M&A Includes Smart Navigating of Culture Issues When Merging

Mergers and acquisitions are a common part of the corporate life cycle. For example, in the tech industry, many established companies will expand into new markets by buying startups that are innovating in emerging fields. But integrating a tiny startup into a much larger company can be challenging because they may operate in very different ways. Any merger could face similar issues, even with companies that seem similar. However, companies undergoing a merger can mitigate these clashes by recognizing each organization’s cultural distinctives and seeking thoughtful changes that benefit the combined whole.

A number of years ago, Deloitte conducted a survey to investigate issues of culture in mergers and acquisitions. The report defined culture as “the long-standing, largely implicit shared values, beliefs, and assumptions that influence behavior, attitudes, and meaning in a company.” In other words, corporate culture is how employees as a group think and act, and sometimes, cultural differences can become serious enough to derail integration.

As a simple example, a small startup might have Ping-Pong tables in the break room and provide sushi lunches for everyone on Fridays. These niceties may be less likely to persist at a large company with a stricter culture, so a merger between the two corporations could lead to disagreements between “fun” and “serious.” While disagreements over perks might frustrate employees, cultural differences can be much more serious, such as how leaders make decisions or how managers relate to their subordinates.

The first step to reconciling cultural differences is identifying them. As Deloitte notes, “The most insightful cultural observers often are outsiders, because cultural givens are not implicit to them.” Consider engaging key people from both companies to work on the cultural differences and decide how to reconcile them. This cultural integration team should hash out the details of what the key differences are, what needs to be kept, and what needs to be changed.

Early in the integration process, have the team start identifying how each company operates. Management style is an important aspect, but you should also consider how employees interact with each other and with managers within the company. Try to identify the implicit assumptions that both companies have. Once you have identified these assumptions, determine which ones align with the goals and vision of the combined company. Keep what will help.  Change what will not.

Throughout the process, make sure that the integration team communicates clearly what is happening and why. But do not simply dictate what changes will be made. Genuinely ask for input from employees at both companies. Keep them in the loop. Many people are wary of change, but transparency and being willing to listen will help prevent alienating anyone, which will encourage employees to stay.

When cultural integration is handled well, the combined company benefits from the strengths of the original organizations. McKinsey points out that “A merger provides a unique opportunity to transform a newly combined organization, to shape its culture in line with strategic priorities, and to ensure its health and performance for years to come.” Seize the opportunity and build a new corporate culture that benefits everyone involved.

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Louis Lehot is an emerging growth company, venture capital, and M&A lawyer at Foley & Lardner in Silicon Valley.  Louis spends his time providing entrepreneurs, innovative companies, and investors with practical and commercial legal strategies and solutions at all stages of growth, from the garage to global.

succession

Who’s The New Boss? How To Avoid Succession Planning Mistakes.

Many corporations have endured a rough 2020 that included the resignations of top executives at some major brands. Will their replacements be ready? It’s a fair question, especially if the new company leader is promoted from within. Studies show many senior leaders don’t think their companies properly educate and prepare future leaders for succession.

If an organization has no pipeline of leaders ready to take over senior leadership positions, then a lack of succession planning can be catastrophic for even the most enduring company, says Jennifer Mackin (www.jennifermackin.com), a leader of two consulting firms and the ForbesBook author of Leaders Deserve Better: A Leadership Development Revolution.

“Many companies don’t find the development of leaders significant until they are readying for succession planning, embarking on a new venture, or weathering storms that threaten their viability,” Mackin says. “This reactive approach is risky because development takes time.”

Mackin says it’s time for CEOs, senior leaders, and heads of HR to modernize their leadership development because of the ever-evolving business world, which is especially volatile now.

“Leaders often weren’t ready to assume higher roles before the pandemic, and now it’s a bigger problem in terms of succession,” Mackin says. “A rapidly-changing time, such as now, is a good reason to focus on succession to ensure the chances of a company’s long-term survival.”

Mackin says the common mistakes companies make in their succession plans are:

They start too late. Even when companies realize they will have a void in their leadership roles, they wait too long to get the succession process started, Mackin says. “They may know people are retiring in two years,” she says, “but they need to start their planning well before then. It takes three to five years to do it right.”

They only consider the CEO role in their succession conversation. Mackin says that when a company does a thorough evaluation of its people, looking not only at their present performance but gauging their future, they might discover they don’t have the right kinds of people in the right roles. “Companies that win think strategically and have a people plan to address those gaps,” she says. “I recommend an overall development plan for the organization’s leaders as a whole and for individuals, and a succession plan for all key roles, not just for the CEO or C-Suite.”

The succession plan and development plan aren’t shared with leaders. Many companies worry that if their plans are known by the individuals slotted for upcoming senior roles, other people, not chosen, will leave. “Having outlined all roles with expectations will help others aspire to gain the knowledge and skills they need, because then they know what is required at the next level,” Mackin says.

Decisions are made subjectively by the top leadership team. “It is tough to create a succession plan without objective data about the future open roles and the employees that could potentially fit those roles with the right development,” Mackin says.

“Prepared leaders who are stepping into higher roles have never been more important than they are now,” Mackin says. “They are more adept during unforeseen disruptions and are able to pull their teams together. They can recraft a new, realistic, strategic direction quickly.”

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Jennifer Mackin (www.jennifermackin.com) is a ForbesBook author of Leaders Deserve Better: A Leadership Development Revolution, and a leader of two consulting firms – CEO of Oliver Group, Inc. and President and Partner of Leadership Pipeline Institute US. As an author and speaker with over 25 years of consulting experience, she is a recognized leadership development influencer, having worked with CEOs, human resources managers, leadership development leaders, entrepreneurs, and other senior leaders in all industries. She earned her BS in marketing from Indiana University and her MBA from Owen School of Management at Vanderbilt University. 

equity

Tales from the Trenches: Founder Equity and Founder Agreements in the Pandemic

From day one, it’s crucial to put your company on the right path. With proper planning, you can avoid a number of common problems that would make investors run for the doors, such as co-founder disputes, tax issues, and cap tables. Startup equity is one of those things that most founders struggle with unless they have an MBA.  But as with all of life, founders’ paths may grow apart for different reasons. It’s one thing when the “divorce” is peaceful, but sometimes situations become very complicated. In a blink of an eye, you’re fighting over the “custody” rights with someone who was previously on your side.

With the added stresses of the pandemic—working from home or working from anywhere—and the pivots required for businesses to adapt their models and work styles to the new normal, we are seeing significant pressure placed on the relationships between founders and other founders, between boards and founders, and between investors and founders.

Founder equity splits. When considering how to initially split founder equity among the various co-founders, some of whom may be present, and some of whom are merely a twinkle in your eye, startups should think long term.

First, consider the relative contributions each person will make.  While everyone says they are “all in” at the start, are they quitting their jobs? Have they invented something? Is their role critical to fundraising or engineering? Who is adding the most value now, and who will add value later? What cash is available? Get clear on these issues from the start and understand that they will evolve over time.

Types of startup equity. As to the types of startup equity, they are generally structured as common stock at formation. The price per share is usually insignificant, or what is referred to as “par value,” a “peppercorn,” or close to zero. This is referred to as “sweat equity,” which is vested over time.

Founder stock terms can also include some of the elements typically found in preferred stock, such as governance rights, liquidation preferences, and super-voting rights. Special founder terms can be a red flag for venture capital investors, and for that reason, particular consideration should be given as to whether such terms are reasonably obtainable.

At formation, cash investors typically receive a convertible note, a simple agreement for future equity, or series seed preferred stock. Some founders put in cash at the formation and structure the cash investment in one of these instruments.

Who gets what? There are four groups of people who typically get equity in the early stages:  founders and co-founders, advisors, investors, and employees, and consultants. Who gets what is more art than science, and there is no simple answer. Numerous websites offer purported “co-founder equity split” calculators and practical advice.

Equity incentive plans. Stock options are the typical currency for employees, consultants, and advisors of startup companies. Restricted stock units, restricted stock awards, phantom stock, and a large assortment of hybrid instruments may also exist.  In early-stage and venture-backed startups, the currency is usually a stock option. Stock options can be structured in a number of ways for tax purposes. Typically, they can be “incentive stock options” or “ISOs.” If options do not qualify for ISO status, they are referred to as “non-qualified” stock options, or “NSOs.” An ISO gives an employee the right to buy shares with the profit taxed at the capital gains rate, not the higher rate for ordinary income.

Vesting. Founder equity, like stock options, typically vests over time. Founder equity is usually subject to repurchase by the company, with one-fourth of the equity ceasing to be subject to repurchase, or vested, after a one-year cliff. After that, founder equity vests monthly or quarterly until the culmination of four years from the formation. Sometimes, repeat entrepreneurs can obtain equity without offering the right of repurchase or reverse vesting, or with reduced vesting, but four years is the standard.

Stock options are not actual ownership, and there is no cash outlay upon grant. These options become exercisable after one year from the initial vesting date, which is usually the date of grant, and they vest in monthly or quarterly installments until four years have transpired from the initial vesting date. In order to exercise stock options, the holder pays the exercise price, which for tax purposes must correspond to fair market value upon the date of the grant. Unless the option has ISO status, upon subsequent exercise and sale, it would be taxed at ordinary income tax rates.

Cap tables. Founders are well served to ensure that their companies use a technology-enabled vendor to store the company’s capitalization records in an automated, secure, and cloud-available format.

409A valuations. In a nutshell, Section 409A of the Internal Revenue Code provides a safe harbor. It suggests that the IRS will not challenge an exercise price as being below fair market value if a third-party independent valuation firm established the fair market value, and that value was approved by the board of directors, all within the prior year of the grant. While there is much fine print and some exceptions, a 409A valuation is generally important to obtain once a year and after each financing round. This risk of doing nothing is that the IRS could argue that the option was granted below fair market value and impose a higher tax rate on the income or gain.

When things change. After your company’s formation is complete, the founder equity has been divided, the equity incentive plan approved, and stock options doled out, life goes on. The world turns, and things change. Co-founders join, co-founders leave, co-founders fight, key employees join and depart, venture capital is raised, and M&A transactions come and go.

Founder roles adjust over time. It’s only natural. So, as well, should their salaries, bonuses, commissions, downside protections, and equity stakes. These are all easy to adjust when things are going well, but what about when things go sideways? Management carve-out plans can provide incentives for people to struggle through a tough spot.

Founder break-ups and departures. When founders leave, the first questions asked are whether the equity is vested and what happens to it. If unvested, the company should repurchase it at the issue price. For vested equity, founders will want it bought back at fair market value, and investors won’t want precious dollars going out the door to provide liquidity to someone who is leaving. Deals are struck where founders have something that investors want, like super-voting rights, board control, and exit rights. When the parties can’t agree, founders who push the envelope too far risk getting recapitalized and diluted, being terminated for cause, undergoing investigation, and having their information rights clipped. Does the founder have the right to severance? Is it enough to buy peace?  Non-competition agreements post-termination of employment are generally not enforceable in California, so this can be another carrot that departing founders can dangle in exchange for a buyout of their shares. Will the remaining team know where the bodies are buried, or is a consulting agreement with the departing founder required to make sure her or his services are available when needed? Was there a bonus due? A commission? Inevitably, companies and departing founders will need to get along to ensure a good exit.

Mergers and acquisitions. It is not uncommon for companies to be put up for sale when a founder departs, and market participants expect it.  So for boards and founders in a deadlock, is it the right time to bring things to a boil? Who constitutes the universe of potential strategic and financial buyers? Is it feasible to raise a growth equity round or “minority recap” with primary and secondary capital to reshuffle the C-suite and the cap table? Is a management carve-out plan needed? A new retention plan? Or restructuring? Potential scenarios abound…

What happens next. Invariably, after a founder divorce, the parties need to find a way to get along…in the board room…to raise capital…to help sell the business…to market the message…to evangelize the mission.

Things sometimes fall apart. Founders have to know how to keep things together until the next off-ramp is in sight.

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Louis Lehot is the founder of L2 Counsel. Louis is a corporate, securities, and M & A lawyer, and he helps his clients, whether they be public or private companies, financial sponsors, venture capitalists, investors or investment banks, in forming, financing, governing, buying and selling companies. He is formerly the co-managing partner of DLA Piper’s Silicon Valley office and co-chair of its leading venture capital and emerging growth company team. 

L2 Counsel, P.C. is an elite boutique law firm based in Silicon Valley designed to serve entrepreneurs, innovative companies and investors with sound legal strategies and solutions. 

carve-outs

Carve-outs are Attractive for M&A, but Complications can Decrease Value

Before the COVID-19 pandemic brought mergers and acquisitions to a standstill, dealmakers increasingly turned to carve-out deals –the sale or divestiture of a business unit or division from a company. Our research shows carve-outs have increased by 200% since 2016, demonstrating the attractiveness of these deals.Our research shows carve-outs have increased by 200% since 2016, demonstrating the attractiveness of these deals.

But carve-outs are far from straightforward, especially across borders. The more jurisdictions involved, the higher the degree of complexity firms must navigate. (Complexity, in this case, refers to the headaches and distractions that arise when complying with new regulations, language barriers, borders, currencies, and laws.)

The increased complexity of a carve-out creates both opportunity and risk for buyers. On the one hand, not many firms have the expertise or resources to re-incorporate a business from a parent structure, meaning the few companies able to do this have a natural advantage. On the other hand, the execution risk is increased significantly, and value can be quickly lost from carve-outs if not executed correctly.

A recent survey by TMF Group found that 34% of senior executives from private equity firms with buy-side experience and 27% from corporations said their most recent cross-border carve-out failed to deliver on expectations, with 24% and 19%, respectively, saying costly overruns significantly impacted the deals. If a deal is delayed by more than four months as a result of business entanglements across jurisdictions, the average resulting cost overrun comes to about 16%.

Consider how one financial executive in India described an overrun deal: “We hadn’t expected it to be seamless, but we weren’t prepared for the effect on costs, and we had to make some hasty financial decisions to get the deal over the line.”

If a transaction takes place across jurisdictions, the complexity of those deals increases once local regulations come into play. Examples of regulations that, though innocuous, can significantly delay the deal-making process include:

-In some markets, it can take up to 60 days to open a bank account

-In others, business licenses are required before the new entity can register for VAT, while the company may need a local fiscal representative or director

-Some markets, such as the U.S., carry significant differences between states for regulations pertaining to licenses, tax registrations, and employment regulations

If these complexities aren’t accounted for at the start of the deal-making process, the monetary value of the deal can decrease, as evidenced by the 1 in 5 deals that create millions of dollars in extra costs. Take it from a head of finance at a Finnish corporation: “Complying with the domestic requirements, such as legal, accounting, and taxation, were the most difficult aspects for us to manage…rather than solving complex operational issues, we were more concerned with getting the company ready for various compliance items.”

Conversely, having a presence in the country in which a deal is conducted increases the likelihood of a deal going well. Those with a limited or no presence in the target’s country were more likely to have disappointing outcomes, with 38% of respondents who had limited or no presence at all in the carve-outs jurisdiction noting their most recent carveout had been mostly unsuccessful in terms of reaching its strategic goals.

There is, of course, the question of when deal activity will return to a pre-COVID-19 pace. It’s a question of when, not if, because private equity firms are sitting on large cash piles, interest rates are historically low and companies are distressed. Companies facing a cash flow crunch may be more likely to sell off non-core assets than consider an outright sale of the entire business. The environment is ripe for carve-outs in the near future, although valuations may look a lot different than six months ago.

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Randy Worzala is Head of Business Development – North America at TMF Group, a multinational professional services firm based in Amsterdam, providing accounting, tax, HR and payroll services to international businesses. The company has around 7,000 employees in 80 countries.