Trending Now

GT Podcast – Episode 129 – The Port Authority of NY…

New Articles

How Has the Trade War Affected China?

trade war
Archives, Global Trade Daily, International Trade

How Has the Trade War Affected China?

Leave a comment

In the last two weeks the stakes in the ongoing trade conflict between the United States and China have increased significantly. After negotiations stalled in July, President Trump expanded his tariff targets to cover nearly all imports from China. But the weapons in this conflict have become increasingly more sophisticated. Beijing retaliated by suspending purchases of U.S. agricultural products and by lowering the value of its currency to make Chinese goods less expensive abroad. In response, the U.S. Treasury named China a currency manipulator and vowed to take actions to eliminate the alleged unfair competitive advantage. In addition, President Trump announced that the United States is not going to do any business with China’s tech giant Huawei. 

While these escalations have recently uneased investors and rattled the markets, they have yet to make an obvious impact on the U.S. economy, albeit U.S. farmers have begun to experience the negative effects of lost sales to China. But how have these actions resonated in China? There are some indicators that the trade war has had an impact on the Chinese economy, as well as public perception in that country. 

At the moment, the U.S. can claim a short term victory, although China appears to be playing the long game. Official reports indicate that Chinese economic growth has decelerated to its slowest pace since 1992, as businesses have held back on investment in light of the ongoing trade tensions with the United States. Also, Chinese exports to the U.S. declined by $5.6 billion in June, versus a $1.8 billion decrease in U.S. exports to China. 

The Trump administration has claimed that its trade policy seeks to remedy problems which have been neglected for too long, and to defend America’s economic interests against perceived abuses by its trade partners. The administration has introduced tariffs as a means to address alleged intellectual property violations by China and a growing trade deficit. Its trade policy takes into account that some pain will need to be absorbed by the United States. However, it is not evident that the U.S. consumer has suffered yet. U.S. importers have to pay the tariffs, and so far many have sough ways to absorb them in whole or in part to minimize any price increases for the consumer. They have also begun to shift sourcing to third countries, including bringing some production to the United States. 

Concurrently, Beijing has implemented a robust domestic stimulus by encouraging banks to relax controls on borrowing and by cutting 2 trillion yuan ($291 billion) in taxes. Furthermore, investment in infrastructure has increased in the first half of the year and Chinese factory output rose 6.3% in June from a year earlier, compared with 5.3% in May. Also, by letting the value of the yuan fall and making Chinese goods cheaper, China has in effect offset some of the impact of the U.S. tariffs – essentially giving the U.S. consumer a tax cut.

The efforts by the Chinese government to lower domestic taxes and support an easier fiscal policy appear to have been, at least temporarily, beneficial to economic growth. If these actions are to be expanded, they may continue to serve as a further stimulus in the second half of this year in areas such as consumption and investment. Although Chinese shipments to the United States have declined, they comprise only about a fifth of its overall exports. By allowing the yuan to fall, China can boost its sales to other countries to offset declines to the United States. 

The trade conflict also does not appear to have had a negative impact on the mindset of the Chinese population at large. Skilled workers and professionals have expressed an open mind to the ongoing trade negotiations, some even welcoming them with a sentiment that “Trump is good for Chinese people” because he has opened up the dialogue between the two countries on trade which in turn has fostered certain welcome reforms in China, as well as tax cuts. Indeed, if Beijing had already planned to institute such measures, then U.S. policy may have provided ample cover for them.

The trade war has also led China to reevaluate existing global alliances, such as those with Japan and Russia. Mending fences with Russia, for instance, is key to the continuation of China’s ambitious “Belt and Road Initiative” of investment and infrastructure projects to connect Asia with Africa and Europe via land and maritime networks. 

With further entrenchment by both sides, and a trade deal increasingly unlikely before next year’s U.S. presidential elections, China appears to be bracing itself for a protracted conflict and may have reason to believe it can “win” if President Trump faces increased political pressures entering the election. As the President recently announced, China may be counting on a Democrat to win the White House to strike a new trade deal. On the other hand, a continuing conflict between two of the world’s greatest economies which has evolved from measures to address intellectual property protection and trade imbalances to currency manipulation, may in the long run lead to recession and hurt growth globally. 

Mark Ludwikowski is the leader of the International Trade practice of Clark Hill, PLC and is resident in the firm’s Washington D.C. office. He can be reached at 202-640-6680 and mludwikowski@ClarkHill.com

Archives, Global Trade Daily, News

U.S. Strengthens Sanctions Targeting the Government of Venezuela

Leave a comment

On August 5, 2019, the Trump Administration intensified pressure on the administration of Nicolás Maduro by imposing broad economic sanctions against the Government of Venezuela, a move that could escalate existing tensions with Venezuela’s supporters, Russia and China.  In a late-night Executive Order, President Trump announced that all property, and interests in property, of the Government of Venezuela, including its agencies, instrumentalities, and any entity owned or controlled by the foregoing, that are within the jurisdiction of the United States would be blocked.

The Order further suspended entry into the United States of sanctioned persons absent a determination from the Secretary of State. The Order also authorizes the Secretary of the Treasury to impose additional secondary sanctions on non-U.S. persons who materially support or provide goods or services to the Government of Venezuela.

Background

In January 2019, after months of economic turmoil and political unrest under Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro, the United States formally recognized Juan Guaidó, the leader of the Venezuelan National Assembly, as the country’s legitimate head of state.  More than fifty nations followed suit, asserting that President Maduro’s 2017 reelection was illegitimate and that Guaidó was the rightful interim president under the Venezuelan constitution.

The Trump Administration followed its recognition of Mr. Guaidó as interim president with sweeping sanctions on the Venezuelan government. The measures included designating Venezuela’s state-run oil company, Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A. (“PdVSA”), as a Specially Designated National (“SDN”), thereby prohibiting U.S. persons from engaging in transactions with PdVSA, as well as transactions by non-U.S. persons conducted in U.S. dollars, unless otherwise authorized by the U.S. Department of Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control (“OFAC”).  (We previously summarized the PdVSA SDN designation here.)

Despite the increasing U.S. pressure, President Maduro has refused to cede power.  He retains the support of the Venezuelan military, and Russia, China, Iran, Cuba, and Turkey have continued their economic and diplomatic relationships with the regime.

Sanctions Overview

Through this new Executive Order, the Trump Administration has ratcheted up its efforts against the Maduro regime, asserting that further measures are necessary to combat “human rights abuses,” “interference with freedom of expression,” and “ongoing attempts to undermine Interim President Juan Guaidó and the Venezuelan National Assembly’s exercise of legitimate authority in Venezuela.”

However, contrary to initial press reports, the action does not create a comprehensive embargo against Venezuela (on the model of the U.S. sanctions against Iran) that would prevent U.S. persons from engaging in almost all transactions. Instead, the new measures focus on the Venezuelan government by blocking all property and interests in property of the government that are currently in the United States, will be brought into the United States, or come into the possession or control of a U.S. person. There is, however, an exception for humanitarian goods, such as food, clothing, and medicine.  The Order applies regardless of contracts entered into, or licenses or permits granted, prior to the Order.

Further, the Order could have a broad impact outside of the United States by authorizing secondary sanctions against any party determined by OFAC to “have materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of” the Government of Venezuela.  U.S. National Security Advisor John Bolton warned the day after the Order, “We are sending a signal to third parties that want to do business with the Maduro regime: proceed with extreme caution.  There is no need to risk your business interests with the United States for the purposes of profiting from a corrupt and dying regime.”

In conjunction with the Order, OFAC also revised twelve existing general licenses (“GLs”) and issued thirteen new GLs.  Notably, GL 28 authorizes through 12:01 a.m. on September 4, 2019, transactions necessary to wind-down contracts with the Government of Venezuela.  GL 31 also authorizes transactions with the Venezuelan National Assembly and the shadow government of Interim President Juan Guaidó, underscoring that the target of the action is the administration of Nicolás Maduro.

The GLs and related guidance make clear that the people of Venezuela are not the target of the sanctions.  Specifically, OFAC released a document entitled “Guidance Related to the Provision of Humanitarian Assistance and Support to the Venezuelan People,” which emphasized that “humanitarian assistance and activities to promote democracy are not the target of U.S. sanctions and are generally excepted from sanctions . . . ”  OFAC simultaneously issued four new Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs).  FAQ 680 stresses that “U.S. persons are not prohibited from engaging in transactions involving the country or people of Venezuela, provided blocked persons or any conduct prohibited by any other Executive order imposing sanctions measures related to the situation in Venezuela, are not involved.”

OFAC also issued a number of GLs to authorize humanitarian transactions and transactions necessary for communications involving Venezuela, including new GLs 24 (telecommunications and common carriers), 25 (Internet communications), 26(medical services), and 29 (broadly authorizing certain non-governmental organizations).

Further, U.S. persons in Venezuela are not targeted by the sanctions.  Section 6(d) of the Order exempts from the definition of Government of Venezuela “any United States citizen, any permanent resident alien of the United States, any alien lawfully admitted to the United States, or any alien holding a valid United States visa.”  Further, GL 32authorizes U.S. persons resident in Venezuela to engage in ordinary and necessary personal “maintenance” transactions, including “payment of housing expenses, acquisition of goods or services for personal use, payment of taxes or fees, and purchase or receipt of permits, licenses, or public utility services.”

Such measures targeting an entire government have rarely been used by the United States, and there are many questions about how the restrictions and related authorizations will be interpreted and applied.  As Bolton observed, “This is the first time in 30 years that [the U.S. is] imposing an asset freeze against a government in this hemisphere.”

Effect of the Sanctions

There has been some confusion in the media over the breadth of the measures.  Some reports have mischaracterized the Order as a “total embargo;” however, the scope of the Order is limited to property, and interests in property, of the Venezuelan government, its agencies, instrumentalities, and entities owned or controlled by these.  Because many major Venezuelan government entities have already been designated as SDNs in earlier actions, including PdVSA and the Central Bank of Venezuela, the measures appear to be only an incremental expansion of the existing sanctions program.

More significantly, the Order creates a secondary sanctions regime for OFAC to designate non-U.S. parties who continue to do business with the Maduro government.  While these secondary sanctions are most likely to target Cuban, Russian, and Chinese entities that continue to provide aid to the ailing regime, all non-U.S. persons engaging in transactions in the country should carefully assess whether those transactions could benefit the government.  In particular, companies trading with Venezuela should conduct due diligence sufficient to ensure that their counterparties are not owned fifty percent or more by the Government of Venezuela, or are not otherwise controlled by the government.

In addition, from a practical standpoint, although the sanctions only apply to Government of Venezuelan and related entities, the measures may cause financial institutions, insurers, freight forwarders and other companies – who often apply a heighted level of compliance going beyond the minimum required by OFAC – to avoid dealing with Venezuelan entities altogether.

The measures against Venezuela could also escalate existing tensions with Russia and China if the sanctions further restrict the countries’ access to Venezuelan oil.  Russia and China, which have continued to back the Maduro regime, currently import Venezuelan oil as part of a debt relief program.  China is slated to continue receiving oil from Venezuela until 2021, so it stands to suffer substantial losses if it is unable to continue the shipments.  This uncertainty comes in the midst of deteriorating relations between the United States and China due to the ongoing trade war, relations which suffered another blow this week when the Trump Administration labeled China a “currency manipulator.”

Archives, Global Trade Daily, Special Reports

BREAKING BAD TRADE: FENTANYL FROM CHINA

Leave a comment

The Real Poison Pill in U.S.-China Trade

Following a historic dinner between President Trump and President Xi last December in Argentina on the margins of the G20 Summit, many of us awaited news on tariffs. We were surprised when, as part of a trade announcement, President Trump hailed a commitment from China to step up its regulatory oversight of fentanyl, the opioid that the Centers for Disease Control says has caused a “third wave” of drug-related overdose deaths in the United States.

It seems the seedy underbelly of e-commerce involves a steady stream of online purchases of deadly variants of the drug fentanyl, made in China and shipped to American doorsteps through the U.S. postal service.

Deadly Parcels from China

Fatal drug overdoses have doubled over the last decade, rising from 36,010 in 2007 to 70,237 in 2017. Synthetic opioids other than methadone – mainly fentanyl – now account for 40 percent of all drug overdose deaths and 60 percent of opioid overdose deaths.

China is the primary source of illicit fentanyl, fentanyl analogues, and fentanyl precursor chemicals in the United States. According to U.S. Customs and Border Protection, almost 80 percent of fentanyl seized in 2017 was interdicted at U.S. Postal Service and express consignment carrier facilities, having been shipped in small quantities from China.

Fentanyl precursors are also shipped from China to Mexico, and to a lesser degree Canada, before being synthesized, often mixed with heroin or cocaine, repackaged, and then trafficked over U.S. land borders in the southwest.

Fentanyl third wave of overdoses

STOP

Last March, the White House stepped up its campaign against opioid abuse, seeking to address factors driving both demand and supply. The Initiative to Stop Opioid Abuse (referred to as STOP) includes education programs, measures to curb over-prescription, expanded access to treatment and recovery, and – a focus on cutting off the flow of illicit drugs from China.

According to Homeland Security, more fentanyl in larger volumes is seized at land crossings, but the fentanyl seized from mail and express consignment carrier facilities is far more potent with purities of over 90 percent versus Mexico-sourced fentanyl that is often diluted to less than 10 percent.

The president’s initiative would require the postal service to provide advance electronic data for 90 percent of all international mail shipments within the next two years, offering data that will help law enforcement identify and seize illegal substances shipped through mail. Private shippers such as UPS and FedEx routinely require such electronic data.

The administration is also scaling up the Department of Justice’s “darknet” enforcement efforts. Fentanyl in its various forms is relatively cheap and easy to buy from China online paying with cryptocurrencies, or even credit cards or money transfers.

fentanyl shipments from China

Over One Million Pills a Day – In One Factory in China

China has grown to become the largest mass producer of generic drugs and pharmaceutical ingredients in the world with over 5,000 pharmaceutical manufacturers. Upwards of 90 percent of the active pharmaceutical ingredients used in U.S. production of finished dosage forms of medical pharmaceuticals is imported from just two countries: India and China.

In addition, China has over 160,000 chemical producers and hundreds of thousands of pharmaceutical and chemicals distributors. The explosion in volume and number of producers has far outstripped China’s FDA (CFDA) from adequately regulating and monitoring them.

Faster Than Can Be Regulated

Unlike opioids derived from the poppy plant, fentanyl is a synthetic painkiller produced in a laboratory. It is 50 times more potent than heroine and 50-100 times more potent than morphine. Inhaling just two milligrams of pure fentanyl can be lethal.

In the United States, most fentanyl products are classified either as Schedule I chemicals, those that have no accepted medical use and high potential for abuse, or as Schedule II chemicals, those with medical use but only available through a non-refillable prescription.

Fentanyl’s molecular structure can be easily modified to create new derivatives, putting regulators constantly behind in evaluating and classifying each new variant one-by-one. From furanyl fentanyl, acetyl fentanyl, acryl fentanyl, to carfentanil — to name just a few — fentanyl has hundreds of analogues that differ slightly from the original, enabling criminal producers to operate in a gray territory while regulators struggle to ban the new substances. Legislation passed in 2017 now allows U.S. FDA to schedule fentanyl analogues immediately on a temporary basis while the agency conducts its investigations.

President Trump has urged President Xi to implement a similar approach. China currently controls around 25 types of fentanyl-related products. President Trump wants China to establish fentanyl as its own class of controlled substances, restricting all fentanyl analogues, including future fentanyl-like substances. Doing so would be a start.

Busting Drug Trade

Such a commitment by China is not, however, likely to put a dent in its fentanyl exports to the United States absent real enforcement. In recent years, CFDA has imposed stricter licensing requirements for pharmaceutical and chemical producers, but diversion, adulteration, and clandestine production remain significant problems.

“Chinese chemical manufacturers export a range of fentanyl products to the United States, including raw fentanyl, fentanyl precursors, fentanyl analogues, fentanyl-laced counterfeit prescription drugs like oxycodone, and pill presses and other machinery necessary for fentanyl production.” — U.S China Economic and Security Review Commission Staff Research Report

CFDA has undergone several reorganizations in the last few years. In the most recent, some of its regulatory responsibilities have devolved to provinces and counties with little accountability. Pre-marketing approvals will be managed separately from post-market inspections and surveillance. With just a little over 2,000 inspectors, authorities have little hope of effectively overseeing legal compliance, let alone spotting even a fraction of criminal activity.

The central government has assisted U.S. drug and law enforcement agencies, sharing information and intelligence that helps U.S. agencies target Chinese nationals trafficking illicit drugs in the United States. To alleviate the free flow of fentanyl from China, the Chinese government should also prosecute transnational criminals operating in China in high-profile cases with severe penalties.

Soybeans, Tech Transfer, and Fentanyl

Trade talks over soybeans and intellectual property protections for American technologies seem an unlikely setting for addressing illicit trade in deadly fentanyl.

There are some in the United States who are frustrated with this administration’s willingness to toss out the traditional trade policy playbook, but this is one case where it can welcomed by everyone.

 

 

Interested to read about fentanyl trade in more detail?

See two key reports produced by U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission analyst Sean O’Connor: Fentanyl: China’s Deadly Export to the United States, February 2017 and Fentanyl Flows from China: An Update, November 2018

Andrea Durkin is the Editor-in-Chief of TradeVistas and Founder of Sparkplug, LLC. Ms. Durkin previously served as a U.S. Government trade negotiator and has proudly taught international trade policy and negotiations for the last fourteen years as an Adjunct Professor at Georgetown University’s Master of Science in Foreign Service program.

This article originally appeared on TradeVistas.org. Republished with permission.

couscous
Archives, Global Trade Daily, Imports/Exports

EU Couscous Market 2019 – France is the Undisputed Leader in Consumption, Production, and Imports

Leave a comment

IndexBox has just published a new report: ‘EU – Couscous – Market Analysis, Forecast, Size, Trends And Insights’. Here is a summary of the report’s key findings.

The revenue of the couscous market in the European Union amounted to $538M in 2018, approximately equating the previous year. This figure reflects the total revenues of producers and importers (excluding logistics costs, retail marketing costs, and retailers’ margins, which will be included in the final consumer price). The market value increased at an average annual rate of +2.2% from 2007 to 2018; however, the trend pattern indicated some noticeable fluctuations being recorded over the period under review. The pace of growth was the most pronounced in 2011 with an increase of 13% y-o-y. The level of couscous consumption peaked in 2018 and is likely to see steady growth in the near future.

Consumption By Country in the EU

France (143K tonnes) remains the largest couscous consuming country in the European Union, comprising approx. 43% of total consumption. Moreover, couscous consumption in France exceeded the figures recorded by the region’s second-largest consumer, Germany (53K tonnes), threefold. The third position in this ranking was occupied by Italy (25K tonnes), with a 7.5% share.

In France, couscous consumption remained relatively stable over the period from 2007-2018. In the other countries, the average annual rates were as follows: Germany (+7.7% per year) and Italy (+4.1% per year).

In value terms, France ($238M) led the market, alone. The second position in the ranking was occupied by the UK ($79M). It was followed by Germany.

In 2018, the highest levels of couscous per capita consumption was registered in France (2,198 kg per 1000 persons), followed by the Netherlands (690 kg per 1000 persons), Belgium (669 kg per 1000 persons) and Germany (640 kg per 1000 persons), while the world average per capita consumption of couscous was estimated at 654 kg per 1000 persons.

In France, couscous per capita consumption remained relatively stable over the period from 2007-2018. The remaining consuming countries recorded the following average annual rates of per capita consumption growth: the Netherlands (+5.7% per year) and Belgium (+5.3% per year).

Market Forecast 2019-2025 in the EU

Driven by increasing demand for couscous in the European Union, the market is expected to continue an upward consumption trend over the next seven years. Market performance is forecast to decelerate, expanding with an anticipated CAGR of +1.1% for the seven-year period from 2018 to 2025, which is projected to bring the market volume to 361K tonnes by the end of 2025.

Production in the EU

In 2018, the amount of couscous produced in the European Union stood at 333K tonnes, growing by 3.6% against the previous year. The total output volume increased at an average annual rate of +2.8% from 2007 to 2018; however, the trend pattern indicated some noticeable fluctuations being recorded over the period under review. The pace of growth was the most pronounced in 2016 with an increase of 8.3% against the previous year. Over the period under review, couscous production attained its peak figure volume in 2018 and is expected to retain its growth in the near future.

In value terms, couscous production stood at $509M in 2018 estimated in export prices. The total output value increased at an average annual rate of +1.5% from 2007 to 2018; however, the trend pattern remained consistent, with only minor fluctuations in certain years. The pace of growth appeared the most rapid in 2011 with an increase of 9% against the previous year. The level of couscous production peaked in 2018 and is likely to continue its growth in the near future.

Production By Country in the EU

France (140K tonnes) remains the largest couscous producing country in the European Union, accounting for 42% of total production. Moreover, couscous production in France exceeded the figures recorded by the region’s second-largest producer, Italy (67K tonnes), twofold. The third position in this ranking was occupied by Germany (46K tonnes), with a 14% share.

In France, couscous production remained relatively stable over the period from 2007-2018. The remaining producing countries recorded the following average annual rates of production growth: Italy (+6.4% per year) and Germany (+6.8% per year).

Exports in the EU

The exports stood at 77K tonnes in 2018, lowering by -8.1% against the previous year. The total exports indicated a remarkable expansion from 2007 to 2018: its volume increased at an average annual rate of +4.0% over the last eleven years. The trend pattern, however, indicated some noticeable fluctuations being recorded throughout the analyzed period. The most prominent rate of growth was recorded in 2010 with an increase of 18% against the previous year. The volume of exports peaked at 84K tonnes in 2017, and then declined slightly in the following year.

In value terms, couscous exports totaled $107M in 2018. The total export value increased at an average annual rate of +3.7% over the period from 2007 to 2018; however, the trend pattern indicated some noticeable fluctuations being recorded in certain years. The growth pace was the most rapid in 2008 with an increase of 29% y-o-y. The level of exports peaked in 2018 and are expected to retain its growth in the near future.

Exports by Country

Italy represented the largest exporter of couscous in the European Union, with the volume of exports resulting at 44K tonnes, which was approx. 57% of total exports in 2018. It was distantly followed by France (23K tonnes), making up a 30% share of total exports. The following exporters – Belgium (2.8K tonnes), the UK (1.8K tonnes), the Netherlands (1.5K tonnes) and Germany (1.2K tonnes) – together made up 9.5% of total exports.

From 2007 to 2018, the most notable rate of growth in terms of exports, amongst the main exporting countries, was attained by the Netherlands, while the other leaders experienced more modest paces of growth.

In value terms, the largest couscous markets in the European Union were Italy ($47M), France ($39M) and Belgium ($6.1M), together accounting for 86% of total exports. These countries were followed by the UK, the Netherlands and Germany, which together accounted for a further 9.2%.

In terms of the main exporting countries, the Netherlands experienced the highest growth rate of exports, over the last eleven-year period, while the other leaders experienced more modest paces of growth.

Export Prices by Country

The couscous export price in the European Union stood at $1,381 per tonne in 2018, surging by 12% against the previous year. Over the period under review, the couscous export price, however, continues to indicate a relatively flat trend pattern. The pace of growth appeared the most rapid in 2008 an increase of 28% against the previous year. In that year, the export prices for couscous reached their peak level of $1,825 per tonne. From 2009 to 2018, the growth in terms of the export prices for couscous failed to regain its momentum.

Prices varied noticeably by the country of origin; the country with the highest price was Germany ($2,524 per tonne), while Italy ($1,058 per tonne) was amongst the lowest.

From 2007 to 2018, the most notable rate of growth in terms of prices was attained by the Netherlands, while the other leaders experienced more modest paces of growth.

Imports in the EU

In 2018, couscous imports in the European Union amounted to 77K tonnes, reducing by -12.7% against the previous year. Overall, couscous imports, however, continue to indicate resilient growth. The most prominent rate of growth was recorded in 2013 with an increase of 19% against the previous year. Over the period under review, couscous imports attained their maximum at 89K tonnes in 2017, and then declined slightly in the following year.

In value terms, couscous imports stood at $106M in 2018. The total imports indicated a buoyant increase from 2007 to 2018: its value increased at an average annual rate of +5.9% over the last eleven years. The trend pattern, however, indicated some noticeable fluctuations being recorded throughout the analyzed period. Based on 2018 figures, couscous imports increased by +84.0% against 2010 indices. The pace of growth was the most pronounced in 2011 with an increase of 27% year-to-year. Over the period under review, couscous imports attained their peak figure at $108M in 2017, and then declined slightly in the following year.

Imports by Country

France was the key importer of couscous in the European Union, with the volume of imports reaching 26K tonnes, which was near 34% of total imports in 2018. It was distantly followed by the UK (11K tonnes), Belgium (8.7K tonnes), Germany (7.8K tonnes), Spain (5.1K tonnes) and the Netherlands (3.5K tonnes), together comprising a 47% share of total imports. The Czech Republic (2.8K tonnes) followed a long way behind the leaders.

From 2007 to 2018, average annual rates of growth with regard to couscous imports into France stood at +2.8%. At the same time, the Czech Republic (+17.9%), Germany (+14.8%), the UK (+8.9%), Spain (+6.6%), Belgium (+5.5%) and the Netherlands (+4.7%) displayed positive paces of growth. Moreover, the Czech Republic emerged as the fastest-growing importer in the European Union, with a CAGR of +17.9% from 2007-2018. While the share of the UK (+8.7 p.p.), France (+8.7 p.p.), Germany (+7.9 p.p.), Belgium (+5 p.p.), Spain (+3.3 p.p.), the Czech Republic (+3 p.p.) and the Netherlands (+1.8 p.p.) increased significantly, the shares of the other countries remained relatively stable throughout the analyzed period.

In value terms, France ($35M) constitutes the largest market for imported couscous in the European Union, comprising 33% of total couscous imports. The second position in the ranking was occupied by Belgium ($15M), with a 14% share of total imports. It was followed by the UK, with a 12% share.

In France, couscous imports increased at an average annual rate of +5.3% over the period from 2007-2018. The remaining importing countries recorded the following average annual rates of imports growth: Belgium (+6.0% per year) and the UK (+8.7% per year).

Import Prices by Country

In 2018, the couscous import price in the European Union amounted to $1,369 per tonne, rising by 13% against the previous year. Over the last eleven years, it increased at an average annual rate of +1.2%. The pace of growth was the most pronounced in 2008 when the import price increased by 30% y-o-y. In that year, the import prices for couscous reached their peak level of $1,572 per tonne. From 2009 to 2018, the growth in terms of the import prices for couscous remained at a somewhat lower figure.

There were significant differences in the average prices amongst the major importing countries. In 2018, the country with the highest price was the Netherlands ($1,837 per tonne), while the Czech Republic ($1,109 per tonne) was amongst the lowest.

From 2007 to 2018, the most notable rate of growth in terms of prices was attained by the Netherlands, while the other leaders experienced more modest paces of growth.

Source: IndexBox AI Platform

Espionage
Archives, Global Trade Daily, International Trade

Economic Espionage and the U.S.-China Trade War

Leave a comment

Combatting Chinese theft of U.S. intellectual property (IP) has been a principal policy focus of the Trump Administration, including through the utilization of the Section 301 investigation process, the subsequent imposition of tariffs on Chinese-origin goods, via challenges in international regulatory bodies such as the World Trade Organization, updated foreign investment restrictions and through targeted legal designations of entities such as the leading Chinese telecommunications and consumer electronics company Huawei. IP and trade secret theft are to this day some of the largest economic and national security threats facing the U.S. and American businesses. Apart from the international trade remedies implemented by the Administration, the U.S. legal system has been another critical theatre for countering theft of IP and trade secrets from American businesses, and prosecutions have ramped up over the last half decade using civil and criminal enforcement mechanisms. 

The Economic Espionage Act of 1996 (“EEA”), 18 U.S.C. § 1831 et seq., is an act that makes theft or the misappropriation of trade secrets, especially through acts of industrial espionage, a federal crime. Such trade secret theft can lead to both civil and criminal enforcement actions. The EEA currently defines “trade secrets” broadly to include “all forms and types of financial, business, scientific, technical, economic, or engineering information, including patterns, plans, compilations, program devices, formulas, designs, prototypes, methods, techniques, processes, procedures, programs, or codes.”1

Penalties under the EEA can be severe. In 2012, Congress revised the EEA to increase the penalties for organizations and individuals, and sentencing guidelines were increased for trade secret theft that seeks to benefit a foreign government or agent. A violation of the EEA can result in an individual being fined up to $500,000 and facing up to 10 years in prison, and a corporation found guilty can be fined up to $5,000,000. These penalties increase greatly if the trade secret theft or misappropriation benefits a foreign country or foreign agent. 

In 2016, the EEA was again amended when Congress passed the Defend Trade Secrets Act (“DTSA”). The DTSA established for the first time a private cause of action for the theft or misappropriation of trade secrets, which prior to its enactment had largely been addressed under individual state laws. 

The EEA and DTSA have been critical enforcement mechanisms for the U.S. government and private businesses in recent years to combat theft of corporate IP and trade secrets, in particular that of Chinese origin. A 2017 report from the independent Commission on the Theft of American Intellectual Property found that the annual cost to the U.S. economy from Chinese IP theft could be as high as $600 billion. More recently, a March 2019 survey found that one in five North American-based corporations on the CNBC Global CFO Council says Chinese companies have stolen their IP within the last year.2 And in April, the Department of Justice proclaimed that since 2011, more than 90 percent of the Department’s economic espionage prosecutions involve China, and more than two-thirds of all federal trade secret theft cases during that period have had at least a geographical nexus to China.3

The largest companies in the U.S. are not immune to such theft, and the EEA has been utilized in several recent high-profile prosecutions, including against a former Chinese national software engineer of IBM for the theft of proprietary source code4, a former Chinese national employee of Apple for the theft of a confidential circuit board schematic drawing designed for autonomous vehicles5 and a Chinese Ministry of State Security intelligence officer for his attempt to steal trade secrets from multiple U.S. aviation and aerospace companies, including GE Aviation.6

Beyond the government’s use of the EEA, the broad reach of the DTSA makes it important for every U.S. business to understand its nuances. The DTSA protects trade secrets if a company has taken reasonable measures to keep such information secret and “the information derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not being generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable through proper means by, another person who can obtain economic value from the disclosure or use of the information.”7 Trade secret misappropriation and the implications of the DTSA are therefore also prevalent in everyday business matters, including employment contracts and areas such as non-disclosures, non-compete, or confidentiality contractual provisions. The DTSA further provides important civil remedies for victims of trade secret theft, including the possibility of injunctive relief and even seizure of the allegedly stolen trade secrets. 

The EEA and DTSA are significant enforcement mechanisms for both the U.S. government and private businesses, which has been further underscored in recent years in light of ongoing malevolent Chinese industrial espionage activity. Conducting robust due diligence on new employees, foreign investors, and supply chain entities is more important than ever for U.S. businesses and their research and development entities. The effects of the U.S.-China trade war are a global concern, and problems such as securing future U.S. telecommunications networks from supply chain threats, eliminating foreign direct investment calculated to obtain proprietary U.S. trade secrets and technology,  and continuing to fight industrial cyberespionage must remain a top priority for the U.S. moving forward. 

Julius Bodie is an associate with Baker Donelson who assists U.S. and foreign companies across multiple industries with international trade regulatory issues, including identifying import/export licensing strategies, advising on global anti-corruption compliance, and counseling on Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) economic sanctions programs.

Joe Whitley is a shareholder with Baker Donelson who represents national and international clients in various white-collar criminal matters including regulatory enforcement, corporate internal investigations and the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA). During the Ronald Reagan and George H.W. Bush administrations, he served as Acting Associate Attorney General, the third-ranking position at Main Justice.

Alan Enslen is a shareholder with Baker Donelson who works with clients in international trade and national security matters, as well as government enforcement and investigations and trade remedy disputes. Enslen represents clients in numerous areas of international trade including economic/trade sanctions programs and global anti-corruption laws.

This article includes the following references:

118 U.S.C. § 1839(3).

2Eric Rosenbaum, 1 in 5 corporations say China has stolen their IP within the last year: CNBC CFO survey, CNBC (March 1, 2019) https://www.cnbc.com/2019/02/28/1-in-5-companies-say-china-stole-their-ip-within-the-last-year-cnbc.html.

3Deputy Assistant Attorney General Adam S. Hickey of the National Security Division Delivers Remarks at the Fifth National Conference on CFIUS and Team Telecom, Department of Justice (April 24, 2019) https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/deputy-assistant-attorney-general-adam-s-hickey-national-security-division-delivers-0.

4Chinese National Sentenced for Economic Espionage and Theft of a Trade Secret From U.S. Company, Department of Justice Press Release (January 18, 2018)  https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/chinese-national-sentenced-economic-espionage-and-theft-trade-secret-us-company

5Former Apple Employee Indicted On Theft Of Trade Secrets, Department of Justice Press Release (July 16, 2018) https://www.justice.gov/usao-ndca/pr/former-apple-employee-indicted-theft-trade-secrets.

6Chinese Intelligence Officer Charged with Economic Espionage Involving Theft of Trade Secrets from Leading U.S. Aviation Companies, Department of Justice Press Release (October 10, 2018) https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/chinese-intelligence-officer-charged-economic-espionage-involving-theft-trade-secrets-leading.

718 U.S.C. § 1839.  

Archives, Global Trade Daily, Imports/Exports

Sausage Market in the USA – Key Insights

Leave a comment

IndexBox has just published a new report, the U.S. Sausage, Canned Meat, And Meat By-Product Market. Analysis And Forecast to 2025. Here is a summary of the report’s key findings.

The revenue of the sausage market in the U.S. amounted to $4B in 2018, dropping by -7.9% against the previous year. This figure reflects the total revenues of producers and importers (excluding logistics costs, retail marketing costs, and retailers’ margins, which will be included in the final consumer price).

Overall, sausage consumption continues to indicate an abrupt reduction. The pace of growth was the most pronounced in 2014, when the market value increased by -0.8% y-o-y. Over the period under review, the sausage market reached its peak figure level at $6B in 2013; however, from 2014 to 2018, consumption stood at a somewhat lower figure.

Sausage Exports

Exports from the USA

In 2018, the amount of sausage, canned meat, and meat by-product exported from the U.S. stood at 852K tonnes, growing by 15% against the previous year. Overall, the total exports indicated a prominent expansion from 2013 to 2018: its volume increased at an average annual rate of +4.4% over the last five year period. The trend pattern, however, indicated some noticeable fluctuations being recorded throughout the analyzed period. Based on 2018 figures, the sausage exports increased by +64.3% against 2015 indices.

In value terms, sausage exports totaled $527M (IndexBox estimates) in 2018.

Exports by Country

Indonesia (216K tonnes), Singapore (160K tonnes) and China (84K tonnes) were the main destinations of sausage exports from the U.S., with a combined 54% share of total exports.

From 2013 to 2018, the most notable rate of growth in terms of exports, amongst the main countries of destination, was attained by Singapore (+763.0% per year), while the other leaders experienced more modest paces of growth.

In value terms, Singapore ($111M), Indonesia ($105M) and China ($58M) appeared to be the largest markets for sausage exported from the U.S. worldwide, together comprising 52% of total exports.

Export Prices by Country

The average sausage export price stood at $618 per tonne in 2018, reducing by -8.2% against the previous year. In general, the sausage export price continues to indicate a moderate slump. The growth pace was the most rapid in 2017, an increase of 6.6% year-to-year. Over the period under review, the average export prices for sausage, canned meat, and meat by-product reached their peak figure at $697 per tonne in 2013; however, from 2014 to 2018, export prices remained at a lower figure.

There were significant differences in the average export prices for the major foreign markets. In 2018, the country with the highest export price was Honduras ($901 per tonne), while the average price for exports to the Philippines ($419 per tonne) was amongst the lowest.

From 2013 to 2018, the most notable rate of growth in terms of export prices was recorded for supplies to the UK (+13.3% per year), while the export prices for the other major destinations experienced more modest paces of growth.

Sausage Imports

Imports into the USA

Sausage imports into the U.S. stood at 258K tonnes in 2018, jumping by 26% against the previous year.

In value terms, sausage imports stood at $533M (IndexBox estimates) in 2018.

Imports by Country

In 2018, Australia (99K tonnes) constituted the largest supplier of sausage to the U.S., accounting for a 38% share of total imports. Moreover, sausage imports from Australia exceeded the figures recorded by the second largest supplier, New Zealand (46K tonnes), twofold. China (22K tonnes) ranked third in terms of total imports with a 8.6% share.

From 2013 to 2018, the average annual growth rate of volume from Australia amounted to +19.6%. The remaining supplying countries recorded the following average annual rates of imports growth: New Zealand (-5.7% per year) and China (+22.3% per year).

In value terms, China ($135M), Australia ($121M) and New Zealand ($99M) appeared to be the largest sausage suppliers to the U.S., with a combined 67% share of total imports. Brazil, France, Belgium, India, Canada, Denmark, Italy and Chile lagged somewhat behind, together accounting for a further 22%.

Import Prices by Country

In 2018, the average sausage import price amounted to $2.1 per kg, going up by 10% against the previous year. Over the last five year period, it increased at an average annual rate of +2.8%. The growth pace was the most rapid in 2018, an increase of 10% year-to-year. In that year, the average import prices for sausage, canned meat, and meat by-product reached their peak level, and is likely to continue its growth in the immediate term.

There were significant differences in the average import prices amongst the major supplying countries. In 2018, the country with the highest import price was China ($6.1 per kg), while the price for Canada ($506 per tonne) was amongst the lowest.

From 2013 to 2018, the most notable rate of growth in terms of import prices was attained by Belgium (+21.0% per year), while the import prices for the other major suppliers experienced more modest paces of growth.

Companies Mentioned in the Report

Darling Ingredients, Griffin Industries, Baker Commodities, R U K Ltd, Neatsfoot Oil Refineries Corp, Geo. Pfau’s Sons Company, Inland Products, Hrr Enterprises, Ace Grease Service, Texas By-Products Partnership, Park West Enterprises, Tallowmasters, Kruger Commodities, Mendota Agri-Products, Riegel By-Products Co, Valley By Products, Marine Polymer Technologies, Kane-Miller Corp, Sanimax Ato, Hahn & Phillips Grease Company, Nupro Industries Corporation, W B Riggins Tallow Co, H.T.C. Industries, North State Rendering, Co., Nevada Byproducts, Istamer, Simmons Feed Ingredients

Source: IndexBox AI Platform

leek
Archives, Global Trade Daily, Imports/Exports

Leek Market in Asia – Supply and Demand

Leave a comment

IndexBox has just published a new report, the Asia – Leeks And Other Alliaceous Vegetables – Market Analysis, Forecast, Size, Trends and Insights. Here is a summary of the report’s key findings.

The revenue of the leek market in Asia amounted to $1.1B in 2017, going down by -16% against the previous year. This figure reflects the total revenues of producers and importers (excluding logistics costs, retail marketing costs, and retailers’ margins, which will be included in the final consumer price). The market value increased at an average annual rate of +1.9% from 2007 to 2017; the trend pattern remained consistent, with only minor fluctuations throughout the analyzed period.

The most prominent rate of growth was recorded in 2016, when the market value increased by 20% y-o-y. The level of leek consumption peaked at $1.3B in 2012; however, from 2013 to 2017, consumption failed to regain its momentum.

Production in Asia

In 2017, the amount of leeks and other alliaceous vegetables produced in Asia totaled 1.2M tonnes, falling by -3.1% against the previous year. The leek production continues to indicate a relatively flat trend pattern.

Leek Exports

Exports in Asia

In 2017, exports of leeks and other alliaceous vegetables in Asia amounted to 75K tonnes, surging by 17% against the previous year. The leek exports continue to indicate a modest increase.

In value terms, leek exports amounted to $70M (IndexBox estimates) in 2017.

Exports by Country

China dominates leek exports structure, recording 62K tonnes, which was approx. 82% of total exports in 2017. It was distantly followed by Turkey (5.1K tonnes), achieving 6.8% share of total exports. Malaysia (2.8K tonnes) and Pakistan (2.4K tonnes) followed a long way behind the leaders.

From 2007 to 2017, average annual rates of growth with regard to leek exports from China stood at +2.3%. At the same time, Pakistan (+65.4%) displayed positive paces of growth. Moreover, Pakistan emerged as the fastest growing exporter in Asia, with a CAGR of +65.4% from 2007-2017. By contrast, Turkey (-1.5%) and Malaysia (-5.6%) illustrated a downward trend over the same period. From 2007 to 2017, the share of Malaysia increased by 2.9% percentage points, while Pakistan (-3.1%) and China (-16.5%) saw their share reduced. The shares of the other countries remained relatively stable throughout the analyzed period.

In value terms, China ($54M) remains the largest leek supplier in Asia, comprising 78% of global exports. The second position in the ranking was occupied by Turkey ($3.2M), with a 4.6% share of global exports. It was followed by Malaysia, with a 3.3% share.

Export Prices by Country

In 2017, the leek export price in Asia amounted to $925 per tonne, reducing by -17.3% against the previous year. The the leek export price continues to indicate a relatively flat trend pattern.

There were significant differences in the average export prices amongst the major exporting countries. In 2017, the country with the highest export price was China ($882 per tonne), while Pakistan ($395 per tonne) was amongst the lowest.

From 2007 to 2017, the most notable rate of growth in terms of export prices was attained by Malaysia (+3.8% per year), while the other leaders experienced more modest paces of growth.

Leek Imports
Imports in Asia

In 2017, imports of leeks and other alliaceous vegetables in Asia amounted to 92K tonnes, picking up by 13% against the previous year. The total import volume increased at an average annual rate of +1.9% from 2007 to 2017; however, the trend pattern indicated some noticeable fluctuations being recorded over the period under review. In value terms, leek imports stood at $104M (IndexBox estimates) in 2017.

Imports by Country

Japan dominates leek imports structure, recording 63K tonnes, which was approx. 69% of total imports in 2017. South Korea (8.4K tonnes) ranks second in terms of the global imports with a 9.2% share, followed by Malaysia (6.2%). The following importers – Singapore (3.8K tonnes), China, Macao SAR (2.6K tonnes), Afghanistan (1.9K tonnes) and Vietnam (1.5K tonnes) together made up 11% of total imports.

From 2007 to 2017, average annual rates of growth with regard to leek imports into Japan stood at +1.3%. At the same time, Vietnam (+86.2%), Afghanistan (+79.8%), China, Macao SAR (+13.8%), South Korea (+13.0%) and Malaysia (+4.1%) displayed positive paces of growth. Moreover, Vietnam emerged as the fastest growing importer in Asia, with a CAGR of +86.2% from 2007-2017. By contrast, Singapore (-2.2%) illustrated a downward trend over the same period. Vietnam (-1.6%), Malaysia (-2%), China, Macao SAR (-2%), Afghanistan (-2.1%), South Korea (-6.5%) and Japan (-8.6%) significantly weakened its position in terms of the global imports, while the shares of the other countries remained relatively stable throughout the analyzed period.

In value terms, Japan ($79M) constitutes the largest market for imported leeks and other alliaceous vegetables in Asia, comprising 76% of global imports. The second position in the ranking was occupied by Singapore ($6.4M), with a 6.1% share of global imports. It was followed by Malaysia, with a 5.2% share.

Import Prices by Country

The leek import price in Asia stood at $1.1 per kg in 2017, reducing by -14.6% against the previous year. Over the period from 2007 to 2017, it increased at an average annual rate of +2.3%.

There were significant differences in the average import prices amongst the major importing countries. In 2017, the country with the highest import price was Singapore ($1.7 per kg), while Afghanistan ($399 per tonne) was amongst the lowest.

From 2007 to 2017, the most notable rate of growth in terms of import prices was attained by Singapore (+7.2% per year), while the other leaders experienced more modest paces of growth.

Source: IndexBox AI Platform

animal food
Archives, Global Trade Daily, Imports/Exports

USA Animal Food Market: Key Insights

Leave a comment

IndexBox has just published a new report, the U.S. Animal Food (Except Dog And Cat) Market. Analysis And Forecast to 2025. Here is a summary of the report’s key findings.

The revenue of the animal food market in the U.S. amounted to $30.5B in 2018, falling by -2.1% against the previous year. This figure reflects the total revenues of producers and importers (excluding logistics costs, retail marketing costs, and retailers’ margins, which will be included in the final consumer price). Over the period under review, animal food consumption, however, continues to indicate a measured reduction.

The most prominent rate of growth was recorded in 2015, with an increase of 2.7% year-to-year. Over the period under review, the animal food market reached its peak figure level at $34.8B in 2013; however, from 2014 to 2018, consumption stood at a somewhat lower figure.

Animal Food Production in the USA

In value terms, animal food production totaled $30.8B in 2018. Over the last decade, animal food production, however, continues to indicate a measured curtailment. The most prominent rate of growth was recorded in 2015, with an increase of 2.4% year-to-year.

Exports from the USA

In 2018, animal food exports from the U.S. stood at 864K tonnes, standing approx. at the previous year. The total export volume increased at an average annual rate of +3.0% over the period from 2013 to 2018; the trend pattern remained consistent, with somewhat noticeable fluctuations over the period under review.

In value terms, animal food exports totaled $506M (IndexBox estimates) in 2018.

Exports by Country

China (163K tonnes), Japan (137K tonnes) and South Korea (110K tonnes) were the main destinations of animal food exports from the U.S., together accounting for 47% of total exports. These countries were followed by Indonesia, Trinidad and Tobago, Vietnam, the Philippines, Colombia and Taiwan, Chinese, which together accounted for a further 37%.

From 2013 to 2018, the most notable rate of growth in terms of exports, amongst the main countries of destination, was attained by Colombia, while the other leaders experienced more modest paces of growth.

In value terms, China ($115M) remains the key foreign market for animal food exports from the U.S., comprising 23% of total animal food exports. The second position in the ranking was occupied by Japan ($48M), with a 9.5% share of total exports. It was followed by Indonesia, with a 9.4% share.

Export Prices by Country

In 2018, the average animal food export price amounted to $586 per tonne, dropping by -2.3% against the previous year. Over the period under review, the animal food export price continues to indicate a slight decrease.

Export prices varied noticeably by the country of destination; the country with the highest export price was Taiwan, Chinese ($850 per tonne), while the average price for exports to South Korea ($306 per tonne) was amongst the lowest.

From 2013 to 2018, the most notable rate of growth in terms of export prices was recorded for supplies to Taiwan, Chinese, while the export prices for the other major destinations experienced mixed trend patterns.

Imports into the USA

In 2018, the amount of animal food (except dog and cat) imported into the U.S. amounted to 291K tonnes, growing by 7.4% against the previous year. Over the last decade, the total imports indicated a prominent increase from 2013 to 2018: its volume increased at an average annual rate of +10.2% over the last five year period. The trend pattern, however, indicated some noticeable fluctuations being recorded throughout the analyzed period. Based on 2018 figures, the animal food imports decreased by -1.8% against 2016 indices. The growth pace was the most rapid in 2014, when the imports increased by 27% against the previous year. Over the period under review, animal food imports attained their maximum at 296K tonnes in 2016; however, from 2017 to 2018, imports stood at a somewhat lower figure.

In value terms, animal food imports amounted to $428M (IndexBox estimates) in 2018. The total import value increased at an average annual rate of +4.3% from 2013 to 2018; however, the trend pattern remained relatively stable, with somewhat noticeable fluctuations being observed over the period under review. Over the period under review, animal food imports attained their peak figure in 2018, and are likely to continue its growth in the near future.

Imports by Country

In 2018, Malaysia (87K tonnes) constituted the largest supplier of animal food to the U.S., with a 30% share of total imports. Moreover, animal food imports from Malaysia exceeded the figures recorded by the second largest supplier, China (38K tonnes), twofold. The third position in this ranking was occupied by India (34K tonnes), with a 12% share.

From 2013 to 2018, the average annual growth rate of volume from Malaysia totaled +20.6%. The remaining supplying countries recorded the following average annual rates of imports growth: China (-1.2% per year) and India (+137.4% per year).

In value terms, France ($69M), China ($64M) and Malaysia ($58M) appeared to be the largest animal food suppliers to the U.S., with a combined 45% share of total imports. These countries were followed by Germany, India, the Netherlands, Norway, Belgium, Italy, Indonesia, Ireland and South Korea, which together accounted for a further 30%.

Import Prices by Country

The average animal food import price stood at $1.5 per kg in 2018, coming down by -5.7% against the previous year. Over the last decade, the animal food import price continues to indicate a deep shrinkage.

There were significant differences in the average import prices amongst the major supplying countries. In 2018, the country with the highest import price was France ($7,787 per tonne), while the price for South Korea ($132 per tonne) was amongst the lowest.

From 2013 to 2018, the most notable rate of growth in terms of import prices was attained by Germany, while the import prices for the other major suppliers experienced mixed trend patterns.

Companies Mentioned in the Report

Southern States Cooperative, Jbs United, Inc., Valley Proteins, Furst-Mcness Company, Hi-Pro Feeds, H.J. Baker & Bro., Milk Specialties Company, Stillwater Milling Company, Cooperative Producers, Kent Nutrition Group, Provimi North America, Purina Mills, Reconserve, ADM Alliance Nutrition, American Proteins, Goldsboro Milling Company, Farmers Union Industries, O.K. Industries, Vp Holdings Corporation, Equity Group – Kentucky Division LLC, Heartland Pet Foods Manufacturing, Blue Buffalo Pet Products, Inc.

Source: IndexBox AI Platform

Archives, Global Trade Daily, International Trade

Amid the US-China Trade War, Vietnam Emerging as a Rising Star

Leave a comment

As the US-China trade war continues to escalate with no relief in sight, American businesses are scrambling to find solutions to avoid the hard swallowing 25% tariffs on imported Chinese goods. One silver lining from the protracted conflict is China’s neighbor to the south and, at one time, one of America’s staunchest enemies, Vietnam. War-torn and poverty stricken merely 4 decades ago, this Southeast Asian star is rising quickly and experiencing record performing 7% GDP growth. However, despite its potential can Vietnam live up to the hype as China’s best alternative?

It is without a doubt that Vietnam has been rising eyebrows the last decade as a low-cost manufacturing destination. Since early 2000s, supply chains have been shifting quickly to this small, Southeast nation. In recent years, foreign direct investment (FDI) from China, Taiwan, Japan, and South Korea have been pouring in, boosting its manufacturing base. For the last several decades Vietnam has been an export leader in textiles, electronics parts, machinery, and cell phones, with no signs of slowing down.

Vietnam’s manufacturing potential has been creating a buzz—and for good reason. One of the most dynamic countries in Southeast Asia, Vietnam’s population is just under 100 million to which a 70% of the population is under the age of 35. A young, vibrant, hungry and able population make for an attractively strong workforce. As labour prices and raw materials continue to climb in China, manufacturers are enticed by Vietnam’s low-cost labor often at one-third less to that of China.

Government stability, fostered by Vietnam’s communist government, is also an attractive condition many businesses require before investing whole-heartedly. Finally, geographically, Vietnam is blessed as sits strategically to the south of China and is at the cross-roads of some of the busiest maritime trading routes in the world and within easy access to its economically growing ASEAN neighbors. For these reasons, Vietnam is a standout among its peers.

Despite the country’s potential, however, when it comes to manufacturing investors are quickly discovering that Vietnam is no China. For one, the overall country’s infrastructure is underdeveloped and in bad need of repairs and upgrades: roads, bridges, ports and railways all lag many of its neighbors. To the government’s credit, there are major infrastructure and developmental projects in the works, such as commuter metro trains in both Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City and updated shipping ports, however, Vietnam needs to press on in major ways if it wishes to compete in the 21 century global economy.

Though Vietnam boasts a young and energetic workforce, the reality is that the majority of its workers are low-skilled, lacking any modern manufacturing training and skill sets essential to meeting the current manufacturing surge. This phenomenon dates back to the historically poorly plagued educational system, including its outdated vocational training, facilities, and know-how. Third, production infrastructure, proper facilities, and quality raw materials are in short supply, compounding this problem. For these very reasons, Vietnam may not be the silver bullet many are hoping for.

Vietnam’s stunning export growth is backed by impressive numbers. In 2019, exports to the USA increased 28.8% compared to last year. The investment bank Nomura in one estimate credits the US-China trade war to boosting Vietnam’s economy 8%. Everything from telephone electronics parts, furniture, and automatic data processing machines have all seen an uptick. Light industry manufacturers such as textiles and electronic components have all benefited in recent months.

Though the lack of modern infrastructure has plagued Vietnam’s growth, in recent years the government has been investing heavily in industrial parks, answering the calls by large corporation demands and their needs for up-to-date facilities.

While Vietnam is rising as a quick alternative to China, obstacles could quickly derail this apparent boon. For one, in late June of this year American President Donald Trump, in a news briefing with reporters who asked what his thoughts are about the quick shift in manufacturing from China to Vietnam, remarked, “Vietnam is one of the worst offenders. Sometimes even worse than China.” He followed up by threatening that as president he would consider tariffs against Vietnam. If President Trump were, indeed, to follow through on his threat doing so would quickly sap Vietnam’s headlining potential. Moreover, as Vietnam nudges forward as an export leader, its neighboring countries are also quickly upping their manufacturing, technology and export industries in earnest, adding to the competition in the process.

Thailand, Cambodia, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Indonesia—all members of ASEAN— are ramping up their industrial competitive advantage. Finally, rampant corruption at both the provincial and national level as well as the increasing environmental destruction and pollution are cause for concern. The result is the lack in the ease of doing business; foreign direct investment and attracting skilled foreign expats to work in Vietnam are increasingly being jeopardized. Vietnam’s recent gains, though substantial, are fragile are at risk of unraveling at a moment’s notice.

Vietnam finds itself at an opportune crossroads at a time to reap the benefits made by the US-China trade war. This emerging market holds great potential which has already proven itself as an industry leading manufacturer in electronics, small parts, and textiles. However, despite Vietnam’s enormous strides in recent years, the country falls short in several key areas, mainly, skilled workers with modern training and know-how, outdated facilities, lack of quality raw material, and overall poor infrastructure.

Despite these deficiencies, with government leadership, input from business leaders, continued foreign investment, and the implementation of the rule of law and decreased corruption, Vietnam may not only be a convenient alternative to China but emerge as an economic Asian tiger in its own right.

Vinh Ho is a Manager at APAC Consulting 

Archives, Global Trade Daily, International Trade

RENEWING RARE EARTH THREATS, CHINA DIGS DEEP FOR LEVERAGE IN TRADE WAR

Leave a comment

Optics and Symbolism

On May 28, the South China Morning Post reported that upon visiting one of China’s major rare earth mining and processing operations in Jiangxi Province, President Xi Jingping commented he would give priority to domestic demand over exports. Beside him was his lead negotiator in trade talks with the United States. At the same time, his top economic planning agency leaked it would not rule out using rare earths as a bargaining chip in the trade war.

The visit and Xi’s signal came just days after the Trump administration ratcheted up U.S. tariffs on $200 billion worth of Chinese goods followed by China’s response that it would increase in tariffs on $60 billion worth of U.S. goods.

When it comes to trade in rare earths, we’ve been here before. It’s a story worth unpacking as yet another cautionary tale about the perils of China’s meteoric rise to dominance in supplying the world with critical inputs, in this case the metals that lie behind today’s — and tomorrow’s — modern electronics, high-tech and advanced military applications

Magic Pixie Dust in the Earth’s Crust

There’s a group of 17 chemical elements on the periodic table that are classified as rare earth elements or rare earths. They can discharge and accept electrons and mix well with other elements to convey magnetism, luminescence, added strength and other key properties.

For example, neodymium helps power the magnets in hard drives and hybrid cars; praseodymium is deployed to create strong metals for aircraft engines; gadolinium is used in MRI scanning equipment; yttrium, terbium and europium are used to produce our computer, TV and device screens.

As our consumer tech and industrial products become more sophisticated and new uses are discovered, demand for rare earths will only grow. Rare earths also play a key role in some of our military’s most advanced defense tools from stealth technologies to guidance systems and armored vehicles.

REE table

Not Rare, But Hard to Harvest

The issue is not that rare earth deposits are scarce, but that they are challenging and costly to mine. Rare earths tend to be scattered rather than clustered, and bond easily with other minerals, so the elements must be separated in painstaking and costly processes that produce toxic and hazardous waste. Significant investments over years are required to get a mine and processing facility up and running and to control for environmental risks.

China’s Rise to Top Producer, User and Exporter

Although China began mining rare earths in the 1950s, the Chinese government put the capacity to mine and produce rare earths on its critical path toward economic modernization in the 1980s. Rare earths are now part of China’s Made in China 2025 plan to achieve global advantage in advanced manufacturing, high tech and green technologies.

As was the case in other industries such as steel, glass, paper and auto parts, the Chinese government deepened its intervention in the rare earths sector in 1990s to ensure access to low-cost supplies for domestic producers. Government support enabled Chinese companies to ramp up mining and processing of rare earths even while operating at a loss.

As production grew, exports were encouraged through export rebates, attracting more Chinese entrants to the industry. Excess production flooded global markets, setting in motion a downward spiral in prices and profitability for producers in other countries. Between 2002 and 2005, rare earth prices dropped to historic lows, forcing most of the world’s mines outside China to close.

Chinas Share of REE

An Overplayed Hand?

Having achieved global dominance, producing over 90 percent of the world’s rare earths, China created a two-tier pricing system through a variety of export controls. According to data from the U.S. International Trade Commission, by the beginning of 2010, U.S. importers were paying an average $5,589 per metric ton for rare earths from China.

When China announced in July 2010 it would restrict exports of rare earths by 70 percent and impose minimum export price levels, rare earth prices surged by the fall of 2011 to $158,389 per metric ton. By applying export duties, quotas and price floors to exports, China created a two-price system, keeping low-priced supplies for itself. U.S. manufacturers had no alternative but to curb spending on Chinese rare earths, causing a drop in U.S. imports.

In March 2012, the United States, European Union and Japan initiated a dispute settlement case in the WTO against China’s rare earth restrictions. Two years later, a WTO dispute panel agreed that China had violated commitments it made when it joined the WTO to eliminate dual pricing practices, certain export duties, and price controls. The panel also found China violated other aspects of other WTO agreements such as those governing the administration of export quotas. After losing its appeal, China agreed to remove quotas by December of 2014 and abandon its export tariffs by May 2015.

Damage Done

Life goes on in the global economy and for industry players over the two years that WTO cases are being decided. In a 2017 National Review article, Mike Fredenburg explains what happened to the U.S. company Molycorp that owned the Mountain Pass mine in California, which at one time was the largest producer in the world.

“In 2012, U.S.-based Molycorp, attracted to the higher prices that resulted from the Chinese government’s efforts to boost profits by restricting REE [rare earth elements] exports, made plans to ramp up domestic REE production, investing nearly $800 million in state-of-the-art mining operations in California. At the moment when the project was poised to succeed, China flooded the market with REEs just long enough to knock Molycorp out of the market. After its Chapter 11 bankruptcy reorganization, Beijing is allowing Molycorp to continue operations in China. But once again, the U.S. has no domestic REE production.”

China lost in the WTO. But in effect, China no longer needs the trade tools that violated its WTO obligations. The Molycorp mine was bankrupt, its rare earth assets sold to a consortium of buyers that included a Chinese firm with ties to the government.

The Next Chapter for Rare Earths Production and Use

China’s experiments restricting exports served as a wake up call for global manufacturers and foreign governments, who are working on Plan B to China’s dominance in rare earths. Leading manufacturers including General Electric and Toyota among others have openly announced they would cultivate and support alternative suppliers while finding ways to reduce their use of rare earth elements by reengineering their product designs.

China controls 36 percent of the world’s reserves, so government agencies have stepped up efforts to find more deposits. Mining companies around the world are reevaluating old rare earth prospects for possible development and are working to develop innovative extraction techniques to achieve what fracking did for the natural gas industry in the United States.

World REE Production and Reserves

Back to the China Playbook

China will not go quietly into that good night when it comes to the advantage it created in rare earths production. Following its playbook, China is working to consolidate the number of domestic rare earths producers (all have ties to the state) and tighten oversight of resource use and production rights. No need for WTO-illegal export restrictions when state-owned or state-directed companies can directly limit their business sales with foreign buyers.

Recognizing that domestic demand could outstrip production, China is hedging its bets by purchasing rare earth resources in other countries, though not always successfully. Notably, the China Non-Ferrous Metal Mining Co. made a $250 million bid for Australia-based Lynas back in 2009-10, but was rejected by Australia’s Foreign Investment Review Board.* The Chinese state has also acquired multinational firms with science and technology assets critical to helping Chinese manufacturers move up the value chain to produce the intermediate goods and advanced technologies that use rare earths.

Meanwhile, China is stockpiling rare earths. Why?

Is the government trying to induce foreign manufacturers to produce in China? Would China withhold rare earths in the race to global use of 5G on Chinese technology platforms? Or does China simply need to ensure access to this valuable resource for the development of its own advanced manufacturing sectors?

When commenting about the role of rare earths in the trade war, a representative from the National Reform Development Commission said, “If anyone wants to use the products made from our rare earth exports to try to counter China’s development, then the people from the southern Jiangxi Communist revolutionary base would not be happy, and the people of China will not be happy.”

Perhaps the stockpiling is emblematic that China thinks the United States is trying to contain China’s economic expansion. Threatening to withhold rare earths could be China’s way of digging into this trade war with the United States.

More reading:

For context see Congressional Research Service Report, China’s Rare Earth Industry and Export Regime

For contemporary commentary see Stewart Patterson’s Rare Earths: The Threat of Embargo and the Clash of Systems

*Editor’s note: this sentence contains a correction from the originally posted version.

Andrea Durkin is the Editor-in-Chief of TradeVistas and Founder of Sparkplug, LLC. Ms. Durkin previously served as a U.S. Government trade negotiator and has proudly taught international trade policy and negotiations for the last fourteen years as an Adjunct Professor at Georgetown University’s Master of Science in Foreign Service program.

This article originally appeared on TradeVistas.org. Republished with permission.