MSC Shipmanagement and Chief Engineer Sentenced in Charleston Harbor Incident
MSC Shipmanagement, the operating company for the containership involved in the 2024 Charleston harbor incident, and the vessel’s chief engineer appeared in court on August 10, 2026, where they admitted guilt and were ordered to pay fines, according to The Maritime Executive. The National Transportation Safety Board and the U.S. Coast Guard had documented a series of mechanical failures aboard the ship, citing maintenance problems and alleging a failure to report a hazardous condition.
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The company pleaded guilty and was sentenced to a criminal fine of $6 million. It was also ordered to conduct a root-cause analysis of the circumstances related to the hazardous conditions on the MSC Michigan VII and to serve a four-year probation term for failing to report the hazardous condition and for obstructing the NTSB and USCG investigation.
The chief engineer, Fernando San Diego San Juan, had previously pleaded guilty to failing to report the hazardous condition and obstructing the investigation. He was fined $2,000 and will be returned to his home in the Philippines.
A Justice Department official from the Energy and Natural Resources Division commented that the hazardous condition and the failure to report it could have resulted in a fatal bridge strike, and that had the vessel been heading into port instead of out to sea, the outcome would likely have been catastrophic.
The MSC Michigan VII was built in 2000 and registered in Liberia. It began operating for MSC in 2022. The vessel is 998 feet long with a capacity of 6,648 TEU.
In his pleas, the chief engineer admitted that he found the vessel in poor condition when he boarded at the start of his contract months earlier. He had discussed the issue with the technical supervisor before the ship reached Charleston in June 2024. On the day of the incident, the ship was departing the terminal and had completed its turn in the basin to begin the transit out of the port on the Cooper River.
The pilot reported to the USCG that control of the ship had been lost, and the vessel was running at between 16 and 17 knots during its passage through the harbor. The Arthur Ravenel Jr. Bridge, a two-and-a-half-mile, eight-lane span, was ordered closed and evacuated. Two people on shore were injured by the vessel’s wash, and the ship was traveling at approximately four times the speed limit. Ships, boats, and piers along the river were damaged, and the Coast Guard ordered local beaches cleared. The crew eventually regained control outside the harbor, avoiding the bridge.
The investigation determined that the linkage rod running to the vessel’s governor had disconnected. The main engine was running at full speed, and the crew could not control the ship’s speed. It was found that the ship had been having difficulty achieving ordered speeds from the bridge, and the solution had been to manually adjust the linkage rod between the governor and the fuel rack. The nuts on both ends of the rod had been loosened by the engine department crew so the rod could be turned more easily to adjust its length and thus the engine RPMs. The locking washers designed to prevent the rod from backing out had been removed, and the USCG found one of the washers on the deck beneath the governor.
The court filing asserted that only trained technicians should manually adjust a vessel’s governor and linkage rod, and that none of the engineering crew aboard the MSC Michigan VII were qualified to make such adjustments. San Diego San Juan admitted he knew the practice was hazardous because manually adjusting the rod’s length could cause it to fail, yet he allowed the practice to continue.
During the investigation, San Diego San Juan initially told the USCG and NTSB that the crew never adjusted the linkage rod and that only a qualified technician would do so. He also denied any delay between the bridge telegraph and the main engine response. He later admitted he knew the rod had been manually adjusted at previous times to reach the desired RPM.
In pleading guilty, MSC and San Diego San Juan admitted that, on occasion, the exact RPMs ordered by the bridge telegraph could only be achieved if the length of the linkage rod was manually adjusted. Additionally, during the USCG inspection after the incident, San Diego San Juan allegedly told another crew member that he had told the USCG he did not see anyone adjust the rod, and he instructed that crew member and two others to say the same so they would be on the same page.
The court papers also detailed other issues discovered after San Diego San Juan joined the ship in April 2024. One of the main air compressors leaked and was malfunctioning, creating a risk that the main engine would not receive sufficient air during maneuvering. The ship’s generators could not sustain enough power at times to run the bow thruster, and the ship was at risk of a blackout.
The ship was detained for weeks in Charleston but made repairs and returned to service. The chief engineer had faced a maximum sentence of six years imprisonment and/or a fine of $250,000, as well as up to three years supervised release for failing to report the hazardous condition. The obstruction charge carried a maximum sentence of five years imprisonment and/or a fine of $250,000, plus up to three years supervised release.
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